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ABSTRACT
The Seven Years' War on the Virginia and Pennsylvania 
frontier was a devastating struggle. About two thousand 
colonists died, almost as many were captured, and tens of 
thousands fled for safety in the east. The British and their 
colonists proved unable to mount an effective military 
defence: colonial forces proved unfit for warfare in the
frontier environment and military efforts resulted only in 
intense discord between civil and military authorities. As a 
result of the destruction of the raids both Virginia and 
Pennsylvania were unable to contribute to the war effort in 
the northern theater, on the St. Lawrence, Lake Champlain, and 
Acadia.
The French and their Indian allies achieved this success 
with few resources. The French were unable to commit over a 
few hundred men to the Ohio Valley, while the Indians 
experienced an acute shortage of arms and supplies caused by 
the disruption of their traditional trading network. To 
achieve their success the French and their Indian allies did 
not raid randomly, but with an intentional strategy and with 
specific targets.
The Indians who fought on both sides, fought, not as 
European pawns, but with their own specific war-aims: the 
Susquehanna Delawares sought independence from Iroquois 
overlordship; the Cherokees joined the Virginians in an 
attempt to break the South Carolinian control of their trade; 
the Ohio Indians struggled to keep European settlements out of 
the Ohio Valley.
Eventual success for the British in the theater was 
achieved not by the superiority of their forces in the 
theater— in each regular battle British troops were routed, at 
Fort Necessity, Braddock's Field, and Major Grant's defeat 
outside Fort Duquesne in 1758— but through attrition caused by 
British superiority in other theaters. In particular British 
naval superiority deprived the French, and in turn their 
Indian allies, of needed supplies.
viii
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Introduction
From 1754 until 1760 a bitter war between Great Britain 
and France devastated much of North America. This is a study 
of that conflict on the frontiers of Virginia and 
Pennsylvania. Unlike other works this study focuses not on 
the military maneuvers of the regular armies in New York and 
on the St. Lawrence River, where British arms eventually 
emerged victorious, but rather on the war of raids by the 
French and their Indian allies on the backcountry of the 
middle colonies. In this region the war was a disaster for 
the British and their colonists; colonial troops proved 
singularly inept at waging frontier warfare, while backcountry 
inhabitants, their civil officials, and colonial assemblies, 
actively hindered the war effort.
All studies of the war have relegated the struggle in 
what may be termed "the Ohio theater" to a distinctly 
secondary role. However, to the French, and more especially 
to the Indians who participated in. the war, the struggle here 
was a central element of the war. In North America the French 
were hard-pressed to withstand the superior power of the
2
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3British.1 British North America dwarfed French Canada, both
in terms of population and economic output. British forces
outnumbered the French on the seas, and in North America on
the land. The French had to allocate their precious resources
as wisely as possible to hold the British at bay while they
brought their superiority in Europe to bear.
Using the bulk of their manpower in the north, in New
York and on the St.Lawrence, the French won the support of
Indian allies who participated in paralysing important British
colonies. The French viewed the war in the Ohio theater as a
distinctive struggle; compared with the war of regular armies
in the North, la guerre militaire, it was a war of Indian
raids and Indian diplomacy, la guerre sauvage. In 1756
Governor Vaudreuil wrote from Canada to Jean Baptiste
Machault, Minister of the Marine and Colonies, discussing the
success of his policies in waging the war. He commented that
There must no longer be any question of managing 
the English. Their enterprises are carried to 
excess, and you see, my Lord. . . that they are
making new and greater efforts against this Colony; 
that I am making use of the reinforcements the King 
has granted me to oppose them, and that I neglect
1 It is difficult to separate the terms "British" and 
"English" although they are significantly different. Great 
Britain refers to the largest island in the British Isles, 
England refers to only one of the kingdoms. In general I have 
used the term British to refer to inhabitants of the United 
Kingdom and also to settlers of the British North American 
colonies, although it is galling to so call such men as Conrad 
Weiser, whose ancestry and cultural heritage could scarcely be 
less British. However as eighteenth century writers 
frequently used the terms British and English, 
indiscriminately, as do most modern writers, on occasion for 
clarity I have also used the term English to mean British.
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4nothing to enable me to carry the war into their 
country. . . I apply myself particularly, my Lord, 
to sending parties of Indians into the English 
Colonies. I also do my best to multiply them as 
much as circumstances permit. Nothing is more 
calculated to disgust the people of those Colonies 
and to make them desire the return of peace.2
The Indians who participated in these raids did so not as
pawns of their European neighbors, but with their own specific
goals: the willingness of the French to supply the Ohio and
Susquehanna Indians with food and weapons which they could use
against the British provided a rare opportunity to drive back
the British onslaught and prevent future encroachment on their
homelands; the willingness of the Virginians to provide the
Cherokees and Catawbas with supplies offered them the
possibility of freedom from the South Carolinian trade-
monopoly .3
2 John Romeyn Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the 
Colonial History of the State of New York, 15 Vols., (Albany, 
NY: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1853-1887) 10:413.
3 For clarity and brevity I have referred to those 
Indians who support favored the French as "francophile," and 
those who favored the English as "anglophile." The men who 
influenced and controlled the policies of Indian groups I have 
referred to simply as "leaders" rather than the more 
culturally biased "chiefs." This terminology avoids 
particular confusion as contemporary accounts referred to 
Indian leaders by numerous different terms, shaman, chief, 
half-king, and king, to name but a few. The search for a term 
is further complicated because the Indian leaders' claims to 
their position varied greatly. Some of the leaders occupied 
"recognized" leadership positions from leading tribal 
families, for example Shingas and the Beaver, two leaders of 
the Ohio Delawares. Some were appointed to their position, 
and held power by the nature of their backers, such as 
Scarouady, whose sole claim to leadership over the Ohio 
Indians was his appointment by the Iroquois. Others, such as 
Teedyuscung, rose to prominence merely because of their own 
personal leadership abilities.
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5The French and their Indian allies conducted the war not 
as a series of random, uncoordinated, and brutal raids, but 
with a central strategy. While many raiding parties did not 
coordinate their individual activities, the general pattern of 
the raids reveals an element of planning by both the Indians 
and the French. On occasion the raids concentrated on cutting 
communications with the Cherokees, or on isolating British 
supply routes, at other times they focused on destroying 
isolated frontier posts, or even threatening peace 
negotiations by sowing doubts about the reliability of 
specific Indian groups.
For the French and their Indian allies the war in this 
theater was a stunning success. Pennsylvania and Virginia, 
two of the wealthiest and most populous colonies in North 
America, along with the less important colonies of North 
Carolina and Maryland, did not contribute to the war effort in 
the northern colonies. The raids were considerably more 
destructive than historians have recognized. The Indians and 
the French killed over two thousand British subjects. In 
addition raiders drove settlers from their homes in an area 
covering about twenty-thousand square miles, and returned to 
their homes loaded with booty. British captives filled Indian 
towns from the Delaware to the Wabash Rivers, and British 
cattle grazed in Indian meadows throughout the region.
While the Seven Years' War has traditionally been viewed 
as a great victory for British and American arms, in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
middle colonies it was a fiasco. The only successes came when 
the British had large numbers of southern Indian allies, 
particularly the Cherokees, or when events elsewhere 
precipitated French action. The reaction of the colonists 
only aided the success of the French and their allies. While 
the French and francophile Indians devastated the backcountry, 
frontier settlers refused to aid the war effort. Indeed, they 
seized every opportunity to profit from the distress of 
others.
In recent years historians have commenced a new struggle 
over the nomenclature of the conflict. This struggle 
indicates many of the issues ignored by historians. Called by 
contemporaries simply "the last great war," generations of 
Americans have known the conflict as "The French and Indian 
War." However, recent historians have, with good reason, 
objected to this term because it implies that blame for the 
conflict lay with the French and Indians, and ignores the fact 
that Indians fought on both sides. These historians have 
chosen instead to term the war "the Seven Years' War." 
Calling the conflict the Seven Years' War avoids much of the 
jingoism and ethnocentricity invoked by the French and Indian 
War. But this term is also misleading. It insinuates that 
the struggle in North America was a by-product of the greater 
conflict in Europe as were most of the colonial wars. But the 
origins of this struggle lay solely in North America and the 
war in Europe was in many ways instigated by the struggle in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7North America.4 The term also disregards the involvement of 
a crucial participant in North America, the Indians. The 
Seven Years' War was a European struggle fought from 1756 to 
1763 between the French and their allies the Austrians and 
Russians against the Prussians and their allies the British. 
The war in North America was a struggle fought from 1754 to 
1760 between the French and their allies the Great Lakes 
Indians, the Delawares, the Shawnees, and supported by several 
lesser tribes, against the British and their allies the 
Cherokees, Catawbas, and, at least in name, the Iroquois.
Lawrence Henry Gipson avoided this dilemma by creating 
his own term "the Great War for the Empire." In many ways 
this is the most suitable term for the war suggestive of the 
conflicting imperial claims of the French and British as a 
cause of the war and of its world-wide nature. Stephen Auth 
has also coined his own term, naming the conflict in 
Pennsylvania "The Ten Years' War." However, as neither "The 
Great War for the Empire" nor "The Ten Years' War" are in 
common usage. For this reason this study will refer to the 
conflict as the Seven Years' War.5
4 It is probably more accurate to argue that the war in 
North America provided a catalyst for the unrelated conflict 
in Europe.
5 Stephen F. Auth, The Ten Years' War: Indian-White 
Relations in Pennsylvania, 1755-1765, (New York, NY: Garland 
Publishing, 1989) ; Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire 
Before The American Revolution, 15 Vols., (New York, NY: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1936-1970).
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The "Eurocentric” approach to the war is reflected in 
other aspects of the historiography of the conflict. From 
late-nineteenth-century historians, such as Francis Parkman, 
to late-twentieth-century "ethnohistorians," such as Francis 
Jennings, scholars have focused most of their attention on the 
military maneuvers in New York and Nova Scotia and on the St. 
Lawrence, all but ignoring the war in the Ohio Valley and in 
the backcountry of Virginia and Pennsylvania.
Francis Parkman1 s work laid the groundwork for many later 
historians. Parkman was the first historian to closely 
examine the war and Indian involvement in the conflict. 
However, Parkman's work has long been acknowledged as deeply 
flawed and outdated. The pages overflow with patriotic 
sentiment: Parkman generally depicts the French as scheming, 
corrupt fops; the Indians are savage, mindless, brutes; while 
the English and their colonists represent the forces of 
progress, civilization, and democracy. More seriously, some 
historians have even questioned Parkman's use of sources and 
accused him of inventing evidence.6
Francis Jennings' Empire of Fortune is more than a 
corrective to Parkman. Jennings' study is the first to pay 
adequate attention to the intricacies and significance of 
Indian diplomacy and to view the Indian actions as rational
6 Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1890). For a discussion of Parkman's work and accuracy 
see Francis Jennings, "Francis Parkman, A Brahmin Among 
Untouchables," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser. 42 (1985) , 
305-328.
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and reasoned. But Jennings' work is in a different way as 
flawed as Parkman's. Portraying almost every incident as part 
of a grand conspiracy of either the colonial administrators 
for personal profit, or of imperial bureaucrats to remove the 
colonists' power, large parts of Jennings' work are deeply 
flawed and distorted. Jennings directly challenges critics of 
his conspiratorial view of the war arguing that "critics of 
conspiracy theories of history deserve respect only after they 
attend to the evidence of conspiracy facts."7 Most 
importantly Jennings develops a complex series of conspiracies 
around the Walking Purchase of 1737, upon which he blames the 
alienation of the Susquehanna Delawares. As a result, he 
portrays Pennsylvania's Indian diplomacy during the war as a 
struggle simply between those conspiring to hide the fraud, 
the Penns and the Proprietary faction, and those seeking to 
unearth the details, the Quakers and many assemblymen.
The most balanced account of the war is Canadian Guy 
Fregault's Canada: The War of the Conquest. Fregault portrays 
the war as the result of the conflicting imperial ambitions of 
the two European powers. The colonists, British and French, 
were simply the unfortunate victims of the clash. Fregault's 
narrative has a distinctly anti-Parisian tone, reflecting the 
animosity still felt by many French-Canadians for the manner 
in which they feel the French government deserted them.
7 Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies
& Tribes in the Seven Years' War in America, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1988). The quotation appears on p.259.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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However, Fregault pays almost no attention to Indian 
diplomacy, and all but totally ignores the war on the Virginia 
and Pennsylvania frontier.8
The most encompassing account of the war is Lawrence 
Henry Gipson's multi-volume study The British Expire Before 
the American Revolution. Gipson shows how the struggle was a 
world war, and how events in North America influenced those in 
Europe, Africa and Asia. However, perhaps surprisingly, 
Gipson's coverage of the war in the Ohio Valley is shallow, 
and he too pays little attention to the raids on the 
frontier.9 Studies of the war in this region have been few 
and restricted. Hayes Baker Crothers' Virginia and the French 
and Indian War concentrates primarily on the political impact 
of the war and goes into little detail. As disappointing is 
the more recent work of James Titus' The Old Dominion at War, 
which concentrates primarily on the history of the Virginia 
Regiment during the war.10 Studies of Pennsylvania's 
involvement in the war are even fewer; the colony lacks any 
in-depth monographic study of the war. Work has been
8 Guy Fregault, Canada: The War of the Conquest, trans. 
Margaret Cameron, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969).
9 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before The 
American Revolution, 15 vols, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1958- 
)
10 Hayes Baker-Crothers, Virginia and the French and 
Indian War, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928). 
James Titus, The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and 
Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia, (Columbia S.C.: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1991).
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11
restricted to articles detailing specific incidents, except 
for Stephen Auth's published undergraduate honors thesis The 
Ten Years' War, which is the fullest study of the war in the 
colony.11
Several doctoral dissertations illuminate aspects of the 
conflict. Chester Raymond Young's "The Effects of the French 
and Indian War on Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of 
Virginia, 1754-1763," provides a useful quantitative account 
of the impact of the war.12 Michael McConnell's "The Search 
for Security: Indian-English Relations in the Trans-
Appalachian Region, 1758-1763," while focusing primarily on 
the years after the fall of Fort Duquesne until Pontiac's 
uprising, provides an excellent survey of anglo-Indian 
relations in the Ohio Valley during the period of the Seven 
Years' War.13
11 Stephen F. Auth, The Ten Years' War: Indian-White 
Relations in Pennsylvania, 1755-1765, (New York, NY: Garland 
Publishing, 1989). The most prolific author of articles has 
been Donald Kent, editor of The Henry Bouquet Papers. See 
especially "The French Advance into the Ohio Country," Western 
Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 37 (1954), 135-141; "The 
French Occupy the Ohio Country," Pennsylvania History, 21 
(1954), 301-314.
12 Chester Raymond Young, "The Effects of the French and 
Indian War on Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of 
Virginia, 1754-1763," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Vanderbilt University, 1969.
13 Michael N. McConnell, "The Search for Security: Indian 
English Relations in the Trans-Appalachian Region, 1758-1763," 
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The College of William and 
Mary, 1983.
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Several other studies have investigated important aspects 
of the war. Several touch upon the impact of the war in 
creating popular dissatisfaction with government policies. 
Marc Egnal' s A Mighty Empire examines the role of expansionist 
ideology in fueling opposition to British policy and 
fermenting the Revolution. In Empireand Liberty Alan Rogers 
studies many of the political disputes spawned by the war.14 
Two works study the war from the "Indian perspective." 
Anthony Wallace's King of the Delawares focuses on the life of 
Delaware leader Teedyuscung to provide a vehicle for the study 
of the Susquehanna Delawares during the period.15 David 
Corkran's The Cherokee Frontier, provides a detailed history 
of Anglo-Cherokee relations from the early eighteenth century 
through to the Revolution and illustrates the fluctuating 
relations between the tribe and the colonial authorities which 
resulted in their providing substantial assistance for the 
British from 1756 to 1758, and then assaulting the frontier 
from 1759 to 1761.16
14 Alan Rogers, Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to 
British Authority, 1753-1763, (Berkeley, Ca.: University of 
California Press, 1974); Marc Egnal. A Mighty Empire: The 
Origins of the American Revolution, (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1988).
15 Anthony F.C. Wallace, King of the Delawares: 
Teedyuscung, 1700-1763, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1949).
16 David Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and 
Survival, 1740-1762, (Norman Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1962).
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None of these studies has explored the conflict on the 
frontier in detail. Yet only through a full examination of 
the war on the frontier is it possible to provide an adequate 
appraisal of the struggle. Such a study as this also provides 
insight into the mindset of the backcountry settlers during a 
period of intense strife, in a region which saw considerable 
unrest in the following years and which has been the focus of 
much recent study.17
17 Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1986); Ronald Hoffman, Thad Tate, Peter 
Albert, eds., An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During 
the American Revolution, (Charlottesville, Va: University of 
Virginia Press, 1985).
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Chapter I
The Bleed of the English 
War Comes to the Ohio Valley
It is in the blood of Englishmen to hate Frenchmen
— Memoire sur les Colonies frangoises et angloises. . .1
In the summer of 1748 diplomats from all over Europe 
gathered in the ancient city of Aix-La-Chapelle to negotiate 
an end to four years of blood-letting between Great Britain 
and France. After several months of negotiations a settlement 
was finally reached: Great Britain would restore to France all 
colonial conquests, most importantly the fortress of 
Louisbourg at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, and 
guarantee colonial boundaries; France, in turn, would restore 
conquests in Europe, particularly the barrier fortresses in 
the Netherlands.2 The Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle seemed to 
provide, at least for some time, an opportunity for peace in
1 •Memoire sur les Colonies frangoises et angloises de 
l'Amerique Septentrionale,' 1739, quoted in Guy Fregault, 
Canada: The War of the Conquest, trans. Margaret Cameron 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.3.
2 W.A. Speck, Stability and Strife, England 1714-1760, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp.252- 
253; J.R. Jones, Britain and the World 1649-1815, (Brighton, 
England: Harvester Press Ltd., 1980), pp.206-207.
14
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Europe. Over three thousand miles away, however, events were 
in motion which would undermine the efforts of the diplomats 
in Aix-La-Chapelle.
In 1748 conditions in the Ohio Valley seemed to be 
turning in favor of Oreat Dntain. Many of the Indians were 
abandoning their traditional support of the French and 
adopting a more anglophile stance, seeking closer ties 
diplomatically and economically with the English. Yet only 
seven years later the Ohio Indians devastated the frontiers of 
Virginia and Pennsylvania with astonishing success. The Ohio 
tribes were not alienated by a secret conspiracy amongst 
members of the English and colonial elite, but rather by 
repeated political miscalculations and diplomatic blunders 
influenced by greedy Virginia land speculators and 
Pennsylvania traders.3
While the diplomats convened in Europe, in the dusty, 
backcountry hamlet of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, a group of 
rather less distinguished delegates gathered for a conference. 
Delegates from the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania 
joined representatives from the Iroquois Confederacy and
3 Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies 
and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1988) Jennings portrays the origins of the war as 
enmeshed in a series of conspiracies. Everywhere groups were 
conspiring to rob others of their rights. To deflect 
criticism he comments that "critics of conspiracy theories of 
history deserve respect only after they attend to the evidence 
of conspiracy facts." Unfortunately the evidence for most of 
Jennings' conspiracies is non-existent, and instead rather 
points to incompetence and blunders by the parties, 
particularly the British and colonial authorities, p.259.
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several Ohio Valley tribes, most notably the Shawnees, 
Delawares and Twightwees4. The conference served several 
purposes. The English had called the Indians to Lancaster to 
strengthen the ties they had made with the Indians of the 
western Ohio Valley during the latter years of King George's 
War. Several of the western tribes had recently thrown out 
the French traders amongst them and sought to exclude French 
influence. The English were now faced with a great 
opportunity to exploit their discontent.5
The Ohio Indians came to the meeting with different 
purposes. For some the meeting was an opportunity to atone 
for their support of the French during King George's War, as 
the War of the Austrian Succession was called in North 
America. Claiming they had been "seduc'd" to join the French 
who had "promis'd us great Things," the Shawnees admitted that 
they had "been a foolish People & acted wrong" and promised 
"better behaviour for the future." In response the English
4 The Twightwees were a confederacy of several tribes, 
called the Miamis by the French. The Miamis were also the 
largest of the three tribes who made up the confederacy, the 
others being the Piankashaws and Weas. Bruce G. Trigger, ed., 
Handbook of North American Indians: The North East (Washington 
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), p.597.
5 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the 
American Revolution: Zones of International Friction, North 
America/ South of the Great Lakes Region, 1748-1754, (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf 1939), p.175.
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commissioners formally forgave them "on Condition of better 
behaviour for the future."6
For the western Indians, particularly the Twightwees, the 
meeting in Lancaster was an opportunity to develop a closer 
relationship with the English, with whom they had had little 
previous contact. Eager for the benefits of English trade the 
western Indians sought acceptance from the English and the 
promise that more traders would be sent to them in the 
future.7 But most important, the Ohio Indians came to 
Lancaster to inform the English that they would no longer 
abide by the decisions of the Iroquois and instead wanted the 
English to treat them as equals rather than subordinates of 
the Iroquois. Indeed, the Ohio Indians were opposing the 
wishes of the Iroquois by attending the conference.8
The desires of the Ohio Indians posed a major dilemma for 
the English which they proved incapable of resolving. By 
circumstance the Ohio Indians had tended to side with the 
French. Both the Ohio Indians and the French were hostile to 
the Iroquois who claimed the lands upon which the Ohio Indians
6 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania: Minutes of the 
Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, 16 Vols. (Harrisburg, Pa.: 
Theo. Fenn and Co., 1852-1853), 5:311, 316.
7 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:317; Stephen 
Cutcliffe, "Indians, Furs and Empires: The Changing Policies 
of New York and Pennsylvania, 1674-1768, " (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Lehigh University, 1976), pp.18-19.
8 Lois Mulkearn ed., George Mercer Papers Relating to the 
Ohio Company of Virginia (Pittsburgh Pa.: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1954), p.476; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 5:145-147.
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lived and were historic enemies of the French and in turn 
close allies of the English.9 The English had two options: 
they could recognize the Ohio Indians as equals of the 
Iroquois and lose Iroquois support, or they could continue to
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lose the potential support of the Ohio Indians.
This was a difficult decision. Since the late 
seventeenth century the English had recognized the Iroquois as 
the speakers for other tribes in the Northeast. The "Covenant 
Chain" which linked the English to the Iroquois and the 
Iroquois to the other tribes was the cornerstone of English 
Indian policy. The system had enabled the English more easily 
to control their relations with the Indians, and it enhanced 
Iroquois power and prestige. At Albany in 1722 the Shawnees 
had been formally placed under Iroquois direction. However, 
by the mid-eighteenth century the Iroquois had become 
dependent upon the English to enforce their power over the 
other Indian tribes.10
There were compelling reasons why the English should 
support the Iroquois. The English claim to the Ohio Valley 
came from the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 in which the French 
had recognized that the Iroquois were "under the Dominion of
9 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The 
Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English 
Colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), pp.350-351.
10 Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, pp.148-149, 297- 
301, 363.
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the Crown of Great Britain.” In turn, the Iroquois claimed 
the Ohio Valley as a conquest, and thus as Iroquois territory 
it was English territory. To decide that the Iroquois were 
not masters of the Ohio put into doubt any English claim to
M M  H
Still more important to many, only four years earlier in 
Lancaster the Iroquois had sold for £400 to Virginia "the 
Right and Title of our Sovereign the King of Great Britain to 
all the lands within the said Colony, as it is now or 
hereafter may be peopled and bounded by his said Majesty.”12 
The Iroquois later claimed that they had thought they were 
only ceding a strip of land along the Appalachians, most 
notably the Shenandoah Valley, to the English. But the 
English saw the cession as including all lands that could be 
claimed by Virginia. As Virginia's charter gave the colony a 
claim to most of North America from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific the Iroquois had unwittingly given up any claim of 
theirs to North America outside Iroquoia. If the Iroquois
11 In the seventeenth century the Iroquois, in a series of 
campaigns, had driven other Indian tribes from the Ohio 
Valley. "Representation of the State of the Colonies in North 
America, 1754", British Library, Additional Mss., London, 
33,029:156-163.
12 Deed of Release of Lands in Virginia, by Six Nations, 
at the Treaty of Lancaster, 1744, Ralph Boehm ed., British 
Public Record Office, Class 5 Files, [from originals in the 
Library of Congress] (Frederick, Md., University Publications 
of America, Inc. 1983), Part l, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(Vol. 1330) 12:168-170
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were not really masters of the Ohio, the treaty of Lancaster 
was worthless.13
In return for the Lancaster grant the English had 
reconfirmed that they would recognize Iroquois suzerainty over 
the Ohio territory. This claim had once had some validity, 
but by 1748 it was far from true. In the early 1730s,, on the 
prompting of the French, the Shawnees moved from the Tennessee 
Valley to the Ohio Valley.14 They were soon followed by other 
groups of Indians. The Twightwees moved east into the region 
between the Miami and Wabash rivers. The Wyandots moved south 
to the southwestern shores of Lake Erie. The Delawares, 
forced out of their homelands on the Delaware and Susquehanna 
rivers, moved west to the upper reaches of the Ohio River. 
Some dissident Iroquois joined them on the southeastern shores 
of Lake Erie, establishing their own hybrid tribal identity, 
the Mingoes.15
The Ohio tribes developed several substantial settlements 
in the region. A few miles downstream from the Forks of the
13 "Deed of Release of Lands in Virginia," Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 13 30) 
12:169; Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, pp.359-362.
14 Gipson, The British Empire Before the American 
Revolution, Zones of International Friction, 4:154-155; 
Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., Wilderness 
Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Pa: 
Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), pp.3-4, 5-6.
15 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:464; Michael N.. 
McConnell, "The Search for Security: Indian English Relations 
in the Trans-Appalachian Region, 1758-1763" (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1983), pp.8-9.; 
Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, p. 308.
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Ohio was the town of Logstown. Founded in 1743 by 
Kakawatcheky, who had migrated to the Ohio Valley from eastern 
Pennsylvania, Logstown served as a place of general rendezvous 
for most of the Ohio Indians and a trading center for the 
eastern Ohio Valley.15 Also on the Ohio River, a few miles 
downstream from the mouth of the Scioto River, was Old Shawnee 
Town. During the late 1740s and early 1750s the town, which 
straddled the Ohio River, was a major political center for the 
Ohio tribes, home to Shingas and the Beaver, two of the 
dominant Shawnee leaders of the region. By 1748 Lower Shawnee 
Town contained over 150 houses and was capable of furnishing 
over three hundred warriors. But in 1753 it was destroyed by 
a flood and many of its inhabitants moved a few miles north up 
the Scioto River to Lower Shawnee Town, which remained an 
important political center for the Shawnees throughout the 
1750s.17 North of Logstown, near the confluence of Neshanock 
and Mahoning Creeks, was a complex of Delaware villages known 
as Kuskuskies Town which contained almost one hundred houses 
and was an important political center for the Delawares in the 
Ohio Valley.18 West of the region, on the branches of the
16 Mulkearn ed., George Mercer Papers, p.476.
17 Mulkearn ed., George Mercer Papers, Journal of 
Christopher Gist, p. 16.; Gipson, The British Empire Before the 
American Revolution, Zones of International Friction, 4:159.
18 McConnell, "The Search for Security," p.11; Michael 
McConnel, "Kuskusky Towns and Early Western Pennsylvania 
Indian History, 1748-1778," Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
and Biography, (January 1992) 116:33-58.
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Miami River was the Twightwee trading town of Pickawillany,
one of the fastest growing centers in the Ohio Valley in the
late 1740s, containing over four hundred families. Attracting
traders from Pennsylvania, who were protected by a blockhouse
built by George Crognan, Pickawillany served as a symbol of
English penetration into the Ohio Valley.19
By 1748 the Ohio tribes were more populous and powerful
than the Iroquois Confederacy which supposedly retained
suzerainty over them. Both Conrad Weiser and Governor
Hamilton sensed these important shifts in the traditional
balance of power. In 1752 Hamilton informed Richard and
Thomas Penn, the proprietors of Pennsylvania, that
The Six Nations consider the Western Indians not as 
Councillors but Hunters, and wou'd take it amiss to 
have them treated with in any other manner than as 
a People depending upon them; on the other hand the 
Western Indians Look upon it, as the truth is, that 
they either are, or soon will be, as numerous and 
powerful as the Six Nations at Onondago; & 
therefore will not be content to take the Law from 
them.20
The English, nonetheless, refused to make a clear choice 
and continued to treat with the Iroquois on matters dealing 
with the Ohio Valley. Simultaneously, they consulted with the 
Ohio Indians to win their acceptance of their schemes. At 
Logstown, for instance, in 1752, even though they had invited
19 McConnell, "The Search for Security," pp. 5-18; 
Mulkearn ed., George Mercer Papers, p.18-19, 491.
20 Governor Hamilton to Richard Penn and Thomas Penn, 
[1752], Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Phildelphia, Pa., 
Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:20.
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the Ohio Indians, it was the Iroquois to whom the English 
addressed their speeches and from whom they sought answers.
As a result neither side was satisfied. The reason for this
disastrous policy lay in the opposing influences upon English
f «« n ^  A«k «« 4 •« ^  M J • mV. i* a J «* a • «•
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Indians closer to the English, while Virginia land speculators 
sought to acquire their lands as quickly and cheaply as 
possible. The Pennsylvanians sought negotiations with the 
Ohio tribes, the Virginians with the Iroquois.
During King George's War the English sent several 
diplomatic missions to the Ohio Indians. These missions were 
quickly followed by traders from Pennsylvania who established 
a substantial trading network. The preference of the Ohio 
Valley Indians for English goods over French hastened the 
growth of the Pennsylvania trade. During most of the 1740s 
and early 1750s French goods were scarce and expensive, owing 
to profiteering by the suppliers in France and the 
leaseholders of the western posts.21 In 1749 the Intendant of 
New France, Frangois Bigot, complained to the government in 
France about the poor quality of trade goods sent to Canada. 
The cloth was "frightful; the red cloth is brown and 
unpressed; the blue of a very inferior quality to that of the 
English." Bigot predicted that "as long as such ventures are
21 W.J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier: 1534-1760 2d ed., 
(Alburuerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 
1983), pp.151-153.
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sent, they will not become favourites with the Indians."22 As 
a result, the Pennsylvania trade boomed. By 1748 there were 
over twenty English traders in Logstown alone and a similar 
number at Pickawilany. George Croghan in particular had 
established an extensive trading network and had "accounts" 
with several hundred Ohio Valley Indians. By 1750 the skin 
and fur trade provided Pennsylvania with over one-third of its 
exports, while around a third of the total London trade in 
deerskin came from Pennsylvania.23
The impact of European trade goods on the Ohio Valley 
Indians was significant. The Indians of the Ohio Valley were 
not primitive subsistence hunters who sold their surplus to 
purchase luxury items, but had become tied into a complex 
nexus of trade stretching back to western Europe. When 
Christopher Gist visited the home of Delaware Chief 
Windaughakah on the Scioto River, he was entertained lavishly 
and was waited upon by his black slave, hardly the reception 
to be expected several hundred miles from the nearest European 
settlement.24 The Indians came to depend upon trade to supply 
them with various items which became all but essential to
22 Abstract of Despatches from Canada, 1749, Brodhead, 
ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State 
of New York, 10:200.
23 Cutcliffe, "Indians, Furs and Empires," p. 221; 
Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, p.476; "Accounts of Ohio 
Traders," H.S.P., Cadwallader Collection: Trent-Croghan 
Papers.
24 "Journal of Christopher Gist," Mulkearn, ed., George 
Mercer Papers, p.14
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their existence. As a result, whoever controlled the Indian 
trade could exercise great influence over the Indians. In 
particular, the Indians sought access to European cloth, arms, 
and ammunition. Thomas Lee, acting governor of Virginia 
before Robert Dinwiddie's arrival, candidly informed the Board 
of Trade in 1749 that if the Indians "are not Supplied with 
Guns[,] Ammunition, & Cloths, by presents and trade; they must 
starve; soe they are Obliged to cultivate a friendship with 
those that will help them."25
The development of the Pennsylvania fur and skin trade in 
the Ohio Valley had significant international repercussions. 
As the Ohio Indians came into contact with English traders 
their allegiances slowly shifted. Before King George's War 
the Ohio tribes had had little contact with the English. The 
French cultivated their ties by supplying the Ohio Valley 
Indians with trade goods. The arrival of a large number of 
Pennsylvania traders threatened to overturn French influence 
in the area. Indeed at Sandusky on Lake Erie in 1747, a group 
of Wyandots led by their "Chief Nicholas," whom some 
Pennsylvania traders had supplied with arms, killed and drove 
out the French traders there.26
25 Thomas Lee to Board of Trade, October 18, 1749, Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 
1327) 11:605-607; McConnell, "The Search for Security," pp.27- 
38.
26 Gipson, The British Empire Before the American 
Revolution, Zones of International Friction, 4:175.
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If trade alone had been the only desire of the English 
they might have succeeded in winning the allegiance of the 
Ohio Indians. But in Virginia in particular, wealthy 
gentlemen cast their eyes upon the fertile lands of the Ohio 
Valley. From the early 1740s, when fur traders and trappers 
first crossed the Appalachians, reports, often exaggerated, of 
the fertility and possibilities for settlement in the region 
filtered eastward. Travellers such as Peter Salley, a German 
immigrant from Augusta County, Virginia, described the Ohio 
Valley in glowing terms: "well Water'd, there are plenty of 
Rivulets[,] clear fountains[,] and running Streams and very 
fertile Soil." There were even salt and lead mines in the 
region which could be profitably exploited.27 Such reports 
could not fail to whet the appetites of land-hungry 
Virginians.
From 1745, requests for land grants on the frontier 
flooded the Virginia Council. In April 1745 the Council 
granted over 300,000 acres on the frontier of Augusta County 
to four land companies. In November the Blair-Russell Company 
was granted 100,000 acres in Frederick County adjacent to Lord 
Fairfax's land. In April 1747 the Council issued another 
grant of 50,000 acres on the Youghiogheny River adjacent to 
the Blair-Russell grant to William McMachon and Company. In
27 "A Brief Account of the Travels of Peter Salley a 
German who Lives in the County of Augusta in Virginia," Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 
1327) 11:657, 659
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1749 they made even larger grants: 500,000 acres on the New 
River, 50,000 acres on the Ohio, and 800,000 acres on the 
border of Virginia and North Carolina.28
These grants represented an unprecedented interest in 
land speculation by the Virginia elite. Settlers were not 
driven west by a shortage of land, but rather wealthy eastern 
planters saw a potential to make profits by claiming the best 
western lands and later selling them to immigrant small­
holders.29 The government was willing to make these grants 
because many Virginia burgesses and Councilors were themselves 
involved in land speculation, while the process had appeared 
to work well in speeding the settlement of the Shenandoah 
Valley on the Fairfax, Beverley, and Borden Lands. The land 
companies did serve a useful purpose. Once they had obtained 
their lands, they "sell & parcel them to poor People that come 
from other Colonies to the North. . . who cannot bear the
Expence of coming down. . . [to Williamsburg] to make their 
Entries, & other Necessaries in taking up Lands." This 
enabled many smaller planters, particularly new immigrants, to
28 H.R. Mcllwaine, ed, Executive Journals of the Council 
of Colonial Virginia, 6 Vols., (Richmond Va.: Virginia State 
Library, 1925-1966), 5:172-173, 191-195, 231-232, 295-298;
Alfred P. James, The Ohio Company: Its Inner History,
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), p.9.
29 Allan Kulikoff illustrates how small-scale speculation 
drove the settlement of Virginia into the piedmont, Tobacco 
and Slaves: The Development of Southern Cultures in the 
Chesapeake, 1680-1800 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, for the Institute of Early American History 
and Culture, 1986), pp.141-157.
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gain a toehold on the way to becoming established landowners. 
In other circumstances these people would not have been able 
to bear the expense of surveying and patenting their lands.30
The flood of so many and such large requests for lands 
caused Governor William Gooch to become apprehensive about the 
advisability of the grants if they "might possibly give 
Umbrage to the French." In November 1747 and again in the 
summer of 1748, he wrote to London requesting advice on making 
any further grants.31 But while Gooch's reservations 
increased, so did the power and influence of by far the most 
important and influential of all the land companies, the Ohio 
Company of Virginia. With members and supporters, including 
the Earl of Halifax the president of the Board of Trade, 
expounding their case at the highest levels of government, 
the Board of Trade proclaimed that indeed the settlement of 
the Virginia frontier in that manner "will be for His 
Majesty's Interest, and the Advantage and Security of that and 
the Neighbouring Provinces."32 At the same time the departure
30 Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, June 16, 1753, Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 
1327) 11:788-789; Robert D. Mitchell, Commercialism and
Frontier: Perspectives on the Early Shenandoah Valley,
(Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1977), 
pp.59-65, 78-84.
31 Gov. Gooch to Board of Trade, June 16 1748, Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 
11:548-554; Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, p.l
32 Orders in Council, November 24, 1748, Boehm, ed., BPRO 
C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 11:550; 
Jennings, Empire of Fortune, pp.12-13.
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of Gooch from Virginia and his replacement, at first by Thomas 
Lee as acting governor and then by Robert Dinwiddie, aided the 
cause of the company. Both Lee and Dinwiddie were active 
members of the company and could be relied upon to further its 
cause. Dinwiddie himself divulged that he had "the Success 
and Prosperity of the Ohio Company much at Heart."33
In January 1749 John Hanbury, a wealthy London merchant 
and leading member of the Ohio Company, presented the Crown 
with the company's petition for a land grant. Unlike the 
other Virginia land companies, the Ohio Company was to receive 
its charter directly from the crown, not from the governor and 
council. In February the petition received royal assent and 
the company acquired the right to 500,000 acres on the Ohio. 
The Crown granted 200,000 acres immediately, exempt of 
quitrents for ten years. The other 300,000 acres were to be 
received later, on condition of the company "seating at their 
proper Expence a hundred Familys upon the Lands in Seven 
Years" and of their "Erecting a Fort and maintaining a 
Garrison for the protection of the Settlement.1,34 The Ohio 
Company thus acted as more than just a holder of land for sale
33 Gov. Dinwiddie to Thomas Cressap, January 23, 1752, 
R.A. Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758, 2 
vols. (Richmond Va.: Virginia Historical Society Collections, 
1883-1884) , 1:17-18; Louis Knott Koontz, Robert Dinwiddie: His 
Career in American Colonial Government and Westward Expansion, 
(Glendale, Ca.: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1941), p.159.
34 Orders in Council, February 9, 1749, Boehm, ed., BPRO 
C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 11:551- 
553; Mulkearn ed., George Mercer Papers, p.1-2.
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to potential settlers. The company was to be actively
involved in the development of their lands and envisioned 
settling German Protestants from the Rhineland and engaging in 
the lucrative Ohio fur trade.35
As soon as the company heard of the grant, they ordered 
Hanbury to purchase the necessary goods for the Indian trade. 
They settled upon a location upon the Potomac at the mouth of 
Wills' Creek as the best location for their first company 
warehouse, and hired Christopher Gist to explore the Ohio 
Valley to ascertain the best area for settlement.36 There 
were now only two obstacles in the way of the company: the 
opposition of the French and the attitude of the Ohio Indians. 
In the company's eyes, neither seemed insurmountable, for 
there seemed no reason that the Indians should strongly object 
to the settlement of lands they had already ceded at 
Lancaster, nor why the French should oppose the settlement of 
lands they had showed no interest in developing and which were 
rightly English. To the French and Ohio Indians, however, the 
plans of the Ohio Company did pose a major threat.
As long as the English did not physically occupy the Ohio 
Valley, the French had paid little attention to it. However 
once news of the proposed settlements reached Canada, the 
French perceived a challenge to the integrity of New France.
35 Petition of John Hanbury, presented February 9, 1749, 
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(vol. 1327) 11:555-560; James, The Ohio Company, p.14.
36 Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, pp.5, 7-10, 142.
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Economically, the worth of the Ohio Valley to the French was 
questionable. In September 1748 the acting governor general 
in Quebec, Roland-Michel, marquis de La Galissoniere, wrote 
to Paris that the French settlements and lands in the interior 
of North America had "been praised greatly beyond their just 
value, scarcely a person can be found to-day who regards them 
as good for anything." They were "so remote," and even "the 
fur trade carried on there [is] one of the least advantageous 
in Canada."37
However, while economically of little worth, the Ohio 
Valley was strategically vital. The Ohio was "almost the only 
route for the conveyance from Canada to the River 
Mississipi. "38 In addition, the French felt that if they did 
not secure the region the English would quickly overrun it and 
succeed in "intruding themselves between our two Colonies, the 
loss of the Mississipi and the ruin of the internal trade of 
Canada would be assured." Penning the English in by the 
Appalachians appeared the only means "to prevent their 
penetrating into our trading colonies and even into Mexico."39 
Before the plans of the Ohio Company the Ohio Valley had
37 La Galissoniere to Count de Maurepas, September 1, 
1748, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial 
History of New York, 10:134.
38 La Galissoniere, Memoir on the French Colonies in North 
America, December 1750, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to 
the Colonial History of New York, 10:229.
39 La Galissoniere to Count de Maurepas, September 1, 
1748, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial 
History of New York, 10:134-136.
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seemed hardly worth attention: by 1749 French officials in 
Canada were arguing the necessity of establishing "one or more 
trading posts on the Belle Riviere [Ohio] or in its vicinity, 
and especially toward its headwaters" to secure the loyalty of 
the Indians and to counteract English influence.40 This 
brought the interests of the Ohio Company, the Pennsylvania 
traders, and the French into direct conflict.
To Englishmen not involved in the fur and skin trade or 
in land speculation, the importance of the Ohio Valley was 
less tangible. The English claimed the Ohio Valley. To allow 
the French to settle the region was an affront to English 
pride and prestige. It impinged upon the abstract and 
overwhelming fear and hatred of France which permeated all 
English dealings with the French and offended the chauvinism 
of those in Great Britain and the colonies who saw most of 
North America as a future part of the British Empire.41 
Moreover, the English feared that if the French gained 
possession of the Ohio Valley, they would restrict the English 
colonies to the Atlantic seaboard while they would expand 
unhindered into the interior. Paranoia enabled the English to 
believe that the French were even capable of destroying their 
colonies and would "soon be in a Condition, by the nature of
40 Marquis de La Jonquiere to Comte de Maurepas September 
20, 1749, Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles, 
pp.26-27.
41 Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the 
American Revolution, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) , 
pp.11-15.
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their Situation, to seize upon either Pensilvania, Maryland, 
Virginia, or the Carolina's, or drive us from the whole.”42 
This strategic rhetoric was used in Whitehall, Philadelphia, 
and Williamsburg to justify English actions. However, behind 
it lurked baser motives of the Pennsylvania traders and 
Virginia land speculators who sought to exclude the French 
from the region. But it failed to convince everyone.
In 1748 neither Great Britain or France was prepared to 
go to war over the Ohio Valley. Both governments attempted to 
restrain the colonial authorities from starting any such 
conflict. But over the next seven years the dispute in the 
Ohio Valley steadily grew. As each new dispute broke, both 
sides escalated the conflict, gambling that the threat of a 
larger war would prevent the other from taking further action. 
At first the contestants seized trade goods. Then they 
attacked Indian allies. Finally, colonial troops clashed and 
the ensuing global war engulfed four continents.
Initially, the French were reluctant to use force so soon 
after the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle and restricted themselves 
to issuing threats and strengthening their claims. The French 
first attempted to weaken the English alliance with the 
Iroquois by exciting jealousies between them. They sent 
parties of Caughnawaga Indians amongst the Iroquois to inform 
them of English plans to occupy the Ohio Valley. They
42 P. Co Hinson, "Some Thoughts upon the French Scheme and 
the Ohio Country," February 25, 1757, British Library, Add. 
Mss., 33,029:380-381.
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stressed that when the French "occupied" a territory they 
merely sought the friendship of the Indians and established a 
few trading posts, but when the English occupied an area they 
established settlements and destroyed the Indians' hunting 
grounds. They tried to convince the Iroquois that since the 
end of King George's War the English had ignored them, 
pointing to the reluctance of the English to help the Iroquois 
gain the release of prisoners held in Canada and to the 
attention and gifts which the English had lavished on the 
Catawbas since the war as compared to their relative disregard 
of the Iroquois.43
The English quickly moved to forestall French influence 
amongst the Iroquois. In 1750 the Council of Virginia sent 
Conrad Weiser with an invitation to the Iroquois to come to 
Fredericksburg, Virginia, for a conference with the Catawbas 
and to discuss grievances. But much to the Virginians' 
surprise, the Iroquois refused, claiming they feared disease 
so far from their homeland. Their refusal showed their 
disdain for their recent neglect by the English.44
The French also consolidated their claim to the Ohio 
Valley. In the summer of 1749 acting governor de La 
Galissoniere sent an expedition, headed by Pierre-Joseph
43 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:470-480; Journal of 
the Council of Virginia, 5:332.
44 Journal of the Council of Virginia, 5:332, 333, 340; 
Thomas Lee to Board of Trade, June 12, 1750, Boehm, ed., BPRO 
C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 
11:601-604; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:477.
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Celoron de Blainville, down the Ohio River to bury lead plates 
claiming the region for the French and to investigate the 
extent of Indian defections. De Blainville commanded a large 
detachment of 230 men including regular troops and Abenaki and 
Caughnawaga Indians. From the Ohio he wrote a warning letter 
to Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania, complaining about the 
presence of Pennsylvania traders in the Ohio, "a Country to 
which the English never had any pretension." He demanded that 
Hamilton "prohibit trade in the future, as it is contrary to 
the treaties; and notify your traders that they will expose 
themselves considerably, should they return to these 
countries."45 What de Blainville discovered on the Ohio 
disturbed the French immensely. At Logstown English traders 
were furnishing the Indians with goods at one-quarter of the 
French price. Not only had the English won over most of the 
Shawnees and Delawares in the Ohio, but they had "succeeded in 
causing a revolt among the Miamis. . . These Indians had even 
invited the Illinois to join them."46
De Blainville's expedition had not been large enough to 
do anything more than issue threats and investigate,
45 Celeron de Blainville to Governor Hamilton, August 6, 
1749, Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles pp.25-26;
46 Donald H. Kent, The French Invasion of Western 
Pennsylvania, 1753, (Harrisburg Pa.: Pennsylvania Historical 
and Museum Commission, 1954), p.9; "Ministerial Minute on 
Despatches from Canada," September 18, 1750, Brodhead,
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:219-220; Lord Halifax to the Duke of Newcastle, August 15, 
1753, British Library, Add. Mss., 33,029:96-100; Eccles, The 
Canadian Frontier, p.159.
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especially as he received an unfavorable reception from many 
of the Ohio Valley Indians, particularly at Pickawillany.47 
La Galissoniere reacted de Blainville's reports by sending 
messages to the Ohio Indians, informing them that he was "much 
displeased with the usedge his solgers received from all the 
Indians that was settled on the Ohio." He warned that "if 
they Did not unaidedly send the English Traders home from 
among them and charge them never to return, that he was 
Determined to Disown them for his Children and send a party of 
men" to bring them into line.48
Neither the Ohio Indians nor the English traders took the 
French threats seriously. The following year, 1750, the new 
governor of Canada, Pierre-Jacques de Taffanel, marquis de La 
Jonquiere, decided to send a much larger expedition of "divers 
detachments of Frenchmen and Indians" to back up La 
Galissoniere's threat, punish the Ohio Indians, and throw out 
the English. However, La Jonquiere came across unexpected 
opposition from Canadian fur traders and merchants who feared 
that the scheme would spark a general Indian war. Instead, he 
abandoned the project, much to the chagrin of the government 
in Paris, and limited himself to seizing more English traders 
and establishing a trading post to compete with the English,
47 Lord Halifax to the Duke of Newcastle, August 15, 1753, 
British Library, Add. Mss., 33,029:96-100.
48 George Croghan to Richard Peters, November 25, 1749, 
H.S.P. Cadwallader Collection: Trent-Croghan Papers, 5:18.
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hoping with the combination of threats and rewards to recover 
Indian allegiance without the use of force.49
La Jonquiere sent a party under Philippe Thomas de 
Joncaire to the Ohio to establish a trading post at Logstown, 
or Chiningue as the French called it. There Joncaire was to 
arrest all the English traders he could find and seize their 
goods, while offering gifts and presents to the Indians. At 
Logstown Joncaire came across Andrew Montour and George 
Croghan on a mission from the Pennsylvania Assembly. Croghan 
and Montour were two of the most influential and popular 
traders amongst the Ohio Indians. Any attempt to seize them 
in Logstown, surrounded by anglophile Indians, would have been 
difficult if not impossible. Instead Joncaire merely issued 
the same warning, that the Ohio Valley "has always belonged to 
the King of France, and the English have no right to go there 
to trade." He warned that English traders would no longer be 
able "to plead ignorance" if they were found, but would be 
arrested. Joncaire's failure to arrest Croghan and Montour 
seemed to prove that the French threats were empty. Neither 
were the Indians impressed by his gifts, for Montour and 
Croghan had bought £700 in gifts from Pennsylvania and
49 "Ministerial Minute of the Attempts of the English to 
settle on the Ohio," September 23, 1751, "Instructions" given 
to Duquesne, April 1752, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relating to 
the Colonial History of New York, 10:239-240, 242; Kent, The 
French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, pp. 9-10; Eccles, The 
Canadian Frontier, p.147.
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Virginia to Logstown which overshadowed those brought by the 
French.50
Farther west La Jonquiere's plans had no more success. 
In the spring of 17 50 he sent out parties of western Indians, 
mainly Potawatomis, Ottawas and Hurons, from Detroit to visit 
Indian towns and villages near Lake Erie. They had orders "to 
take or destroy what English Men they could meet" and were 
given rewards for English prisoners or scalps. In particular, 
the French offered a large reward for killing George Croghan. 
But Croghan was in Logstown where Joncaire and the francophile 
Indians still dared not harm him. The parties were to let the 
anglophile Indians know that the French were "making all the 
Preparations possible. . . to destroy some Nations of Indians" 
in the English interest.51 This direct threat concerned many 
of the western Ohio Valley tribes, particularly the 
Twightwees. But until the French actually acted it would not 
make them change their allegiance. By the end of 1750 it had 
become clear that if the French were to gain control of the 
Ohio Valley they would have to do more than threaten English 
traders and woo the Indians with gifts: military action
against the Indians to force out the anglophile factions would 
be necessary.
50 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:540; Eccles, The 
Canadian Frontier, pp. 159-160; Kent, French Invasion of 
Western Pennsylvania, pp.10-11.
51 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:481, 482-483.
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To succeed in stemming the English tide La Jonquiere 
should have carried out his threat of military action. But 
because of his mercantile connections, he was reluctant to 
risk promoting a general war. He did send a small expedition, 
led by de Blainville, in the summer of 1751 against the 
Twightwees. The aim of the expedition was to destroy the 
forces of the anglophile Twightwee leader la Demoiselle. But 
de Blainville's Indian allies were reluctant to press their 
attack, and without them the expedition was not large enough 
to assault the Twightwees directly.52 The French satisfied 
themselves by killing two anglophile Miami chiefs and seizing 
a few English traders. Rather than intimidating the 
Twightwees, this action only enraged them more. Reports sent 
to Paris simply stated that the "rebels of the Beautiful river 
[have] not experienced any ill treatment from the Nations 
that. . . La Jonquiere had excited against them." More action 
was needed. The death of La Jonquiere in May 1752 and his 
replacement by the more bellicose Ange de Menneville, marquis 
de Duquesne, made this possible.53
As Duquesne mustered his forces in Quebec, the actions of 
the English helped his plans. The English had first begun to
52 M. de Longueil to M. de Rouille, April 21, 1752, 
Brodhead ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
New York, 10:245-251
53 "Ministerial Minute of the English Encroachments on the 
Ohio," 1752, "Instructions" given to Duquesne, April 1752, M. 
de Longueil to M. de Rouille, April 21, 1742, Brodhead, ed., 
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:240-241, 242, 247; Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, p.160.
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win the Ohio Indians' allegiance through the Indian trade; it
was also through the Indian trade that the English first began
to alienate them. In the wake of the rapid expansion of the
Ohio fur and skin trade, many unscrupulous traders had found
that they could quickly make large profits, despite the danger
from the French. Almost any frontiersman who had a few pounds
to invest could enter the trade. These traders soon found a
way to maximize their profits. They discovered the ease of
transporting large quantities of liquor to the Ohio and the
eagerness of the Indians to buy and consume it. With the
Indians in a drunken stupor, the traders could purchase their
skins at bargain rates: George Croghan complained in 1749
that most of the Ohio Indians "are for the English at present
but if there be nott a stop put to the bringing of Liquor out
amongst them. . . [they] will go to the French."54 At almost
every meeting between the colonial authorities and the Indians
after 1752 the Ohio Indians complained about the Indian
traders. Scarouady, an anglophile leader of the Ohio Indians,
stated in 1753:
your Traders now bring scarce any thing but Rum and 
Flour; They bring little Powder and Lead or other 
valuable Goods. The Rum ruins Us. . . When these 
Whiskey Traders come they bring thirty or forty 
Caggs and put them down before Us and make Us 
drink, and get all the Skins that should go to pay 
the Debts We have contracted for Goods bought of 
the Fair Traders, and by this means We not only 
ruin Ourselves but them too. These wicked Whiskey 
Sellers when they have once got the Indians in
54 George Croghan to Richard Peters, November 25, 1749, 
H.S.P. Cadwallader Collection: Trent-Croghan Papers 5:18.
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Liquor make them sell the very Clothes from their
Backs.55
The Pennsylvania authorities made sincere attempts to 
halt the illegal liquor trade and to license traders. In 
Cumberland County Andrew Montour led efforts to halt the 
illegal trade. Several unlicensed Indian traders were brought 
before the county court and prosecuted. Yet in nearly every 
case the Grand Juries found them not guilty, "tho' the Facts 
be ever so clearly proved." This outcome was hardly surprising 
considering that one of the largest illegal traders, John 
Smith, was also one of the county's justices.56 Conrad Weiser 
complained to Hamilton that he was "credibly informed that 
some of the Magistrates of that County sells the most." He 
reported that Smith had gone to Aughwick "I suppose to gather 
some Money for Liquor he sent— he is an old Hypocrite— told me 
that the Governor ought not to suffer any strong Liquor to 
come to Aucquick."57
The traders also increased Indian unease in other ways. 
While the Pennsylvania traders and Ohio Company speculators 
both wished to see the French excluded from the Ohio Valley, 
neither Pennsylvanians nor Virginians wanted to see the other 
in the Ohio Valley, for their ends were mutually exclusive:
55 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:675-676
56 Proceedings of Criminal Court, 1750-1759, Cumberland 
County Historical Society, Carlisle PA., Box 6; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 5:628, 749;
57 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:149.
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control of the Indian trade and settlement of the Indians' 
lands. The Pennsylvania traders bitterly opposed the schemes 
of the Ohio Company and they made no secret of their 
opposition, especially to the Ohio Indians whom they 
repeatedly warned about the dangers of the Ohio Company. They 
cautioned the Indians that the Virginians would take and 
settle their lands, destroy their hunting grounds, and drive 
them from the river. They warned that the fort the company 
intended to build was not to provide protection and a center 
for trade but rather "to be a bridle for them, and that the 
roads which the Company are to make is to let in the Catawbas 
upon them to destroy them."58 Considering the influence of 
the Pennsylvania traders among the Indians these warnings must 
have carried considerable weight.
While the warnings of the Pennsylvanians and the French 
raised the fears of the Ohio Indians, the Ohio Company pressed 
:Jor a conference with the Ohio Indians to ratify the cession 
of their lands made in the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, and to 
gain their acquiescence in the construction of a company fort 
on the Ohio, the very events the Indians most feared. No 
desire could have been more calculated to rouse their 
suspicions. As soon as Robert Dinwiddie arrived in Virginia 
in November 1751, he prepared for negotiations with the 
Indians the following summer in Logstown. He ordered James
58 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:423, 424; Journal 
of Council of Virginia, 5:302-303.
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Patton to purchase some "Rich Goods" to present to the Indians 
"in Consequence of the Treaty at Lancaster. . . as a further 
Consideration for the Lands they then Sold to this Government 
and an Inducement for them to protect and secure a peaceable 
Possession to the Ohio Company."59
The conference convened at the end of May 1752. Present 
were representatives from the Shawnees, Delawares, wightwees, 
and Iroquois, and colonial delegates from Virginia and 
Pennsylvania. Andrew Montour, speaking for the Virginians, 
came straight to the point. He informed the Indians that 
under the terms of the Lancaster cession, the lands on the 
Ohio were part of Virginia. The Virginians attempted to 
assuage Indian fears by maintaining that the purchase at 
Lancaster was not with "any intention of taking them from You, 
but that we might live together as one People, and keep them 
from the French." Montour added that the Virginians now 
wished "to make a Settlement of British Subjects on the South 
East side of the Ohio." To sweeten the announcement, he 
stressed that "from such a Settlement, greater Advantages will 
arise to You, than you can at present conceive. Our People 
will be able to supply you with Goods much cheaper, than can 
at this time be afford'd." In addition, "they will be a ready 
Help, in case you shou'd be attack'd, & some good Men among
59 Dinwiddie to Conrad Weiser, December 12, 1751,
Dinwiddie to James Patton, December 13, 1751, Brock, ed.,
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:6-7, 9-10; Journal of 
the Council of Virginia, 5:370-378.
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them will be appointed, with Authority to punish and restrain, 
the many Injuries, & Abuses, too frequently committed here, by 
disorderly white People.” Cheaper trade goods and protection 
from the French and unscrupulous Indian traders were the 
advantages that the Virginians offered to the doubting 
Indians. The Ohio Company even guaranteed that if the Indians 
wanted land, they would be able to buy it from the Ohio 
Company at the same rate as English settlers. This must have 
seemed less than a bargain to the Ohio Indians who had 
presumed that they had never ceded the land.60
One of the most anglophile of the Ohio Indians, 
Tanaghrisson, a Seneca who had been appointed by the Iroquois 
to oversee their "subsidiary" tribes on the Ohio and whose 
authority was directly threatened by these developments, was 
reluctant even to confirm the Lancaster grant, let alone give 
consent to the actual settlement of the Ohio and to the 
construction of a fort there.61 The Virginians tried to by-
60 "Account of the Treaty of Logstown," 1752, Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 
11:752-753; "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn ed., 
George Mercer Papers, p.53.
61 The Iroquois appointed several leaders for the Ohio 
Indians, most notably Scarouady and Tanaghrisson. They 
claimed the right to do this by virtue of their "conquest" of 
the Ohio Valley in the seventeenth century, and their 
suzerainty over the Delawares in Pennsylvania, (the Ohio 
Delawares had moved there from Pennsylvania.) The Ohio 
Indians, for their part, seem to have accepted the Iroquois 
appointees although they did not always pay great attention to 
their wishes. Indeed, as soon as hostilities commenced on the 
Ohio, both Tanaghrisson and Scarouady removed to the 
Pennsylvania frontier. William A. Hunter, "Tanaghrisson,"
(continued...)
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pass him. On June 9, the commissioners showed the Ohio 
Indians the Lancaster deed. The Ohio Indians had never been 
informed of it and were horrified. They "blamed them [the 
Iroquois] much for keeping it private. . . they never told
them they had sold further than the warriors road." Suddenly, 
they found that Iroquois had already granted their lands to 
the English. Tensions rose. The Iroquois delegates at 
Logstown attempted to save face, claiming that they had "never 
understood. . . that the Lands then sold were to extend
further to the Sun Setting, than the Hill, on the other Side 
of the Alligany Hill," a substantially different 
interpretation of the treaty from the Virginian's. All the 
Indians agreed they would have to consult with the Iroquois 
Council at Onondaga "so that we can't give you any further 
Answer now." Instead of considering a land cession, the Ohio 
Indians brought up new issues of the abuses in the Indian 
trade and the Shawnees taken prisoner in South Carolina when 
returning from an expedition against the Cherokees.62
The negotiations were stalled. But Virginia pressed on. 
The Virginians knew that the Ohio Indians wanted both 
protection from the French and increased trade. After
61 (. .. continued)
Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 3:613-614; Francis Jennings, 
Empire of Fortune, pp.27-29.
62 "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed., George 
Mercer Papers, p.56; "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 
1752," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700- 
1783, (Vol. 1327) 11:761-764.
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considerable persuasion, on June 11 Tanaghrisson finally 
seemed to acquiesce in the construction of a fort at the Forks 
of the Ohio, but he still objected to any settlement there as 
the Virginians demanded.63 The Virginians stressed that 
"Trade could never be carried on with them, to their 
Advantage, unless we had a Settlement of People near, to raise 
Provisions, & render them Plenty & Cheap." But the Indians 
only promised "we will take care that there shall be no 
Scarcity," while the Iroquois delegates repeated that they 
would have to confer with the council at Onondaga for any 
final decision.64
After over two weeks of negotiation no progress had been 
made. The colonial commissioners finally urged Andrew Montour 
"to converse with his brethren the other Sachems in private on 
the subject to urge the necessity of such a settlement and the 
great advantage it would be to them as to their trade." That 
afternoon the Iroquois delegates "retir'd for half an Hour" 
with Montour.65 In the end they were persuaded to agree to 
the Ohio Company's plans. Whether through open bribery, as 
Francis Jennings claims, or merely through persuasion and
63 "Case of the Ohio Company 1762," Mulkearn, ed., George 
Mercer Papers, pp.62-63.
64 "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 1752," Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 
11:766, 770.
65 "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 1752," Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05 Part l, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 
11:770; "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed., 
George Mercer Papers, p.64.
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pressure, the Iroquois finally gave their "Consent and 
Confirmation" of the Lancaster deed "in as full and ample a 
Manner as if the same was here recited."66 More important, 
they agreed to Ohio Company settlement on the Ohio and 
guaranteed that the settlement "shall be unmollested by us, 
and that we will as far as in our Power assist & protect the 
British subjects there Inhabiting.1,67
The Ohio Company now had the deed they wanted, even 
though its validity was in doubt. Members of the Ohio Company 
admitted ten years later that "it was with great difficulty 
that the Indians were. . . brought to agree that any 
settlements should be made by the English upon the Ohio tho' 
at that very time they were under the strongest apprehensions 
of being attacked by the French."68 What was of more concern 
in the long-term, although it did not concern the Ohio Company 
at the time, was that only the Iroquois delegates consented at 
Logstown, not any of the Ohio Indians. While the company's 
indifference reflected the English position that the Iroquois 
possessed the Ohio, the purpose of the meeting had been to get
66 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, pp.43-44. Jennings 
suggests that the Virginians and Iroquois entered into a 
secret conspiracy in "the back room" where the Indians were 
bribed. There is absolutely no evidence for this in the 
accounts of the Logstown Treaty.
57 "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 1752," 
"Confirmation of the Lancaster Deed," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 
Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 11:774,
(Vol. 1330) 12:171-172.
68 "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed., George 
Mercer Papers, p.54.
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the acquiescence of the Shawnees and Delawares. In this it 
had failed.69
There were even those among the English who questioned 
the validity of the grant. Governor James Glen of South 
Carolina informed the Board of Trade that "I can hardly think 
that a verbal promise from some of the Head Men. . . or even 
giving leave to build two Forts can be deemed a Cession of 
their Rights to these Lands." Glen assailed the claims of 
Virginia, pointing out that "such a permission neither conveys 
Dominion nor Possession of the Country, on the Contrary our 
desiring their permission, may be said to be a tacit 
acquiessence [sic] and acknowledgement that they retain that." 
At much cost, the treaty at Logstown had achieved little. 
Almost immediately Dinwiddie decided that it would be 
necessary to invite the Ohio Indians to another conference to 
reaffirm the treaty of Logstown, which in turn he had intended 
as a reaffirmation of the treaty of Lancaster I This time the 
conference would be at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley of 
Virginia, in the spring of 1753.™
The Ohio Company pressed on, but events in the Ohio 
Valley quickly made the plans of Dinwiddie and the company 
obsolete. Over the winter of 1751-1752 the French finally
69 "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 1752," Boehm, ed. , 
BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 
11:778.
70 James Glen to Holderness, June 25, 1753, Boehm ed., 
BPRO C05, Part l, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 13) 
13:434.
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began their assault on the Ohio Indians. Moving south from 
Detroit into Twightwee territory, they killed at least thirty 
warriors. The Twightwees appealed to Pennsylvania for arms 
and ammunition with which to fight the French. This request 
placed Governor Hamilton in a quandary. He could hardly 
refuse such a request when it was the Twightwees1 support of 
the English which had exposed them to the wrath of the French. 
On the other hand, he realized that the Quaker-dominated 
Pennsylvania Assembly would never approve sending arms 
directly to the Indians. Hamilton therefore instructed 
Croghan to tell the Twightwees that he could not supply them 
but he was sure the Virginians would.71
Before the Twightwees could appeal to Virginia, the 
situation deteriorated further. On June 21, 1752, while the 
English and the Ohio Indians were leaving Logstown, a party of 
twenty French and over two hundred Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
descended on the Twightwee trading town of Pickawillany. The 
party had specific orders "to kill all such Indians as are in 
amity with the English, and to take the Persons and Effects of 
all such english Traders as they could meet with." They 
killed one English trader, captured six more, and killed many 
more Indians, including the Twightwee anglophile chief "la 
Demoiselle" or "Old Briton." Any Twightwees who survived the 
attack soon fled. When Thomas Burney and William Trent 
arrived in the town two weeks after the attack, they found it
71 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:568-569, 570, 571.
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completely deserted.72 The attack on Pickawillany escalated 
the conflict. The French had openly attacked the main town of 
an Indian nation allied to the English. It remained to be 
seen how the English would react.
The Twightwees appealed frantically to Virginia for aid. 
Instead, Dinwiddie sent William Trent with an invitation to 
the planned conference in Winchester the following spring. To 
the Twightwees the call to discuss the Ohio Company's grant 
must have seemed ludicrous. Trent reported that the 
Twightwees were in a "miserable Condition." All the traders 
had either been killed, captured, or had fled the region. 
Those Indians who would not join the French were left to 
starve.73 The Virginians decided to send Thomas Burney to the 
Twightwees with a supply of arms. But Burney took his time 
preparing, and by the time he had gathered the arms and 
ammunition it was almost winter; Dinwiddie decided simply to 
present the arms when the Twightwees arrived in Winchester in 
the spring. As a result, with the French refusing to trade 
with anglophile Indians and the English refusing to supply
72 The French troops had been ordered not to kill any of 
the English traders if they could avoid it."Detail of Indian 
Affairs," Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles, p. 
31; "Journal of William Trent," Boehm, ed., BPRO COS, (1327) 
Part 1, 11:712-728; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:599- 
600, 674.
73 Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, December 10, 1752, 
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(Vol. 1327) 11:702-704.
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arms for the Indians' protection, many of the Twightwees began 
to change their allegiance to support the French.74
In the spring of 1753 Duquesne expanded French 
activities. He sent another large expedition to Lake Erie 
which established forts at Presqu'Isle on Lake Erie, and 
Riviere au Boeuf and Fort Machault on tributaries of the 
Allegheny.75 Duquesne reported that the Indians were shocked 
to see the French using such force in the Ohio country. Many 
of the Ohio Indians, some of whom had moved south only a few 
years earlrier to have greater access to English goods and to 
obtain greater English protection, began to conclude that the 
English were now incapable of protecting them and returned 
north. Some of the Indians even turned against the English 
and rejected wampum belts sent to encourage them to oppose the 
entry of the French into the Ohio country.76
From their new strongholds on Lake Erie and the upper 
branches of the Ohio, the French sent a clear message to any 
traders still in the Ohio Valley: French Indians, particularly 
Ottawas, killed traders and confiscated the goods of others. 
By May William Trent reported that "There is not one 
[anglophile] Indian or whiteman anywhere below the Shawnese or
74 Gov. Dinwiddie to Captains Cressap and Trent, February 
10, 1753, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert 
Dinwiddie, 1:22-24.
75 Fort Machault was called Venango by the English.
76 Duquesne to M. de Rouille, August 20, 1753, Brodhead 
ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:255-257
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Logstown" who was not packing up and leaving.77 The French 
sent a final warning to the English traders which now carried 
weight.
If the English Traders would imediately Quit the 
River (on their own commanding them to go off) they 
would let them go unmollested, but if they or 
their Indians should make any resistance, they 
sho'd take them all Prisoners and perhaps Kill some 
of them; and that the Govr of Canada would not 
suffer any further Trade to be carried on by the 
English on the Waters of the Ohio's [sic]78
The French threat worked. Dinwiddie reported that "All
the English Traders have left the Ohio in a great Panick,
being affraid of being cut off." With English traders gone,
the Indians had no choice but to trade with the French or
starve, and by trading with the French they bound themselves
increasingly to French influence.79
The Ohio Indians did not arrive in Winchester in May 1753
as the Virginians had hoped. It was not until mid-September
that several parties left their homes to meet Dinwiddie and to
discuss what aid he would give them, as it was Dinwiddie, they
maintained, "on whom they cheifly [sic] depend for immediate
Assistance." Dinwiddie, however, decided that business in
77 "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed. , 
George Mercer Papers, p.71.
78 William West to Gov Hamilton, May 7 1753, British
Library, Add. Mss. 14,034:178-180
79 Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, 16 June 1753, Boehm, ed. , 
BPRO C05 Part l, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1327) 
11:793
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Williamsburg was too pressing for him to meet them that fall. 
Instead, he sent a group of commissioners from the Council to 
arrange another meeting in Winchester the following summer.80
Offended by the failure of Dinwiddie to attend the 
conference, Scarouady, speaking for the Ohio Indians, told the 
Virginians outright that "We now request you may not build 
that Strong-House, for we intend to keep Our County clear of 
Settlements during these Troublesome times." He did, however, 
promise in private that when the French were driven from the 
Ohio, "We will consider what to say to you about the Lands."81
If the Twightwees expected arms, they were again sorely 
disappointed. In July the Virginia Council had approved 
sending two barrels of powder, four-hundred weight of lead, 
and five small arms to the Twightwees. Almost immediately 
William Fairfax informed them that Montour had counselled 
against arms being sent because of the danger of capture by 
the French. As a result, the Twightwees received nothing. 
They went on to Carlisle to meet with Governor Hamilton hoping 
for more success there.82
The Pennsylvania Council, however, decided that since 
Dinwiddie had not bothered to meet the Indians in person
80 Journal of the Council of Virginia, 5:439-440.
81 "Narrative of Negotiations with Indians at Winchester," 
September 1753, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward 
Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1328) 11:903, 915-916.
82 Journal of the Council of Virginia, 5:438-439; "Case of 
the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, 
p.79.
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"there was no Necessity for the Governor's indulging the 
Indians with his Presence.1,83 Instead, they sent
commissioners Benjamin Franklin, Richard Peters, and Isaac 
Norris, who brought the good news that the Pennsylvania 
Council had finally approved aid. Again the Indians were 
disappointed. A group of traders present at the conference 
persuaded the commissioners not to give the Indians any arms - 
for fear of capture by the French. The commissioners only 
promised that George Croghan would bring them to the Ohio when 
it was safer.84
The Ohio Indians, concerned at the advance of Pennsyvania 
settlers and annoyed by the refusal of the colony to provide 
arms, bluntly informed the Pennsylvanians that "we desire that 
Pennsylvania. . . would at present forbear settling on our 
lands over the Allegheny Hills. . . Let none of your People 
settle beyond where they are now."85 If Virginians could not 
settle on the Ohio, Pennsylvanians could not settle on the 
upper reaches of the Susquehanna.
The only "success" for the Pennsylvanians came in 
persuadung Scarouady not to go to South Carolina himself to 
seek the release of the Shawnee prisoners. But these efforts 
also served to enrage the Ohio Indians further. The Shawnee
83 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:657
84 Ibid. , 5:682
85 Ibid., 5:675
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chiefs in particular expressed "Dissatisfaction at this 
Endeavour of the Commissioners to stop Scarrooyady."86
The Winchester and Carlisle conferences had been 
disasters. The Ohio Indians had gone with the hope of talking 
to governors Dinwiddie and Hamilton, but neither had attended. 
The Indians had hoped that they would be supplied with arms 
with which they could resist the French, but they returned 
home with nothing. They did, however, leave with the 
impression that the English had agreed not to build a fort at 
the Forks of the Ohio. This impression would not last long. 
For any of the Twightwees who had remained loyal to the 
English, the refusal to supply them with arms was a bitter 
blow and convinced them that the English were unworthy allies. 
Within a few weeks they defected to the French. Meanwhile, the 
French were attacking the anglophile Shawnees and Delawares 
further up the Ohio.87
Dinwiddie was disturbed at the failure of the Winchester 
conference. He received more bad news when Governor Hamilton 
reported that the Iroquois had also decided that no fort 
should be built on the Ohio, for it was "an hunting 
country. . . and we would have it reserved for this use only, 
and desire that no Settlements may be made there, tho’ you may
85 Ibid. , 5:683
87 Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, pp.69-71; James 
Glen to the Earl of Holderness, June 25, 1753, Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 13) 
1:431-432.
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trade there as much as you please.”88 Still worse, the 
Iroquois objected to the English treating directly with the 
Ohio Indians. They complained to Montour that the Ohio 
Indians were just "Hunters, and young and giddy Men and 
Children; that they were their Fathers, and if the English 
wanted any thing from these childish People they must first 
speak to their Fathers." Driven by the desire to ensure the 
security of the Ohio Company's grant, the English had 
attempted to negotiate both with the Iroquois and the Ohio 
Indians, now they were losing the support of both.89
The anglophile Indians remaining on the Ohio now looked 
to the English for protection and action. Tanaghrisson called 
upon the English to send arms and ammunition, claiming "if 
you don't send immediately, we shall surely be cut off by our 
Enemy the French."90 Dinwiddie's first reaction was to send 
a young Virginia militia commander, George Washington, to the 
new French forts on the Allegheny to demand removal of French 
forces from English soil. Washington's mission was a complete 
failure. The French laughed at the governor's audacity. To 
the Ohio Indians Washington's journey proved yet another 
insult, for "Col. Washington whom we conveyed to the French 
Fort, left us there, came through the Woods, and never thought
88 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:637.
89 Ibid., 5:635
90 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:691; "Journal of 
George Croghan," January 1754, H.S.P., Penn Mss.:Indian 
Affairs, 2:1.
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it worth his while to come to Logs Town” to discuss the 
results of his mission.91
Washington returned to Williamsburg with another message 
from the French that the English must evacuate the region. 
Dinwiddie had to take action. He determined to build a fort 
on the Ohio, despite the requests of the Ohio Indians and 
Iroquois to the contrary. He resolved to send William Trent 
to the Forks of the Ohio to construct a small fort, for even 
if the fort was unable to halt the French advance, he wrote to 
Hamilton, "if we can only erect a Fort or Two as a mark of 
our Possession, it will be doing something."92 But 
Dinwiddie's plan went further than constructing a fort. To 
encourage volunteers to serve against the French, the Virginia 
Council agreed to grant 200,000 acres on the Ohio to those who 
would volunteer.93 To many of the Ohio Indians this action 
only proved the perfidy of their so-called allies.94
Trent, accompanied by a small party of volunteers, mainly 
former fur traders, began construction of the fort in January 
1754. The Ohio Company had already chosen an easily
91 "Treaty with Indians at Fort Cumberland, October 18- 
November 5, 1754," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward
Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 15) 2:158, 165
92 "Narrative of What Happened on the River Ohio," British 
Library, Add. Mss., 15,874:208-211; Journal of the Council of 
Virginia, 5:458-459; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:5-7
93 100,000 acres was to be contiguous to the fort, and was 
to be free of quitrents for fifteen years.
94 Journal of the Council of Virginia, 5:461-462
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defensible site on the Ohio a few miles downstream from the 
Forks. Dinwiddie had originally planned to send more militia 
in the early spring to reinforce Trent. However, he soon 
discovered that he "c'd not compell them to march to the Ohio; 
and if forc'd, [they] w'd have been of little Service." He 
decided instead to draft three hundred men from the militia 
and to form them into the Virginia Regiment. He ordered 
Washington, appointed second in command of the regiment, to 
march a detachment to Wills' Creek, while Colonel Joshua Fry, 
the commander, assembled the remainder in Northern Virginia 
and awaited the arrival of three Independent Companies which 
Whitehall had agreed to send to assist Virginia in holding the 
Ohio.95
Fry and Washington were beset with many problems. There 
was a shortage of skilled officers and a surplus of disputes 
over respective authorities, particularly between officers of 
the Independent Companies with royal commissions and of the 
Virginia Regiment, with commissions from Dinwiddie. The 
troops were slow to assemble for there were few volunteers and 
several of the county justices refused to draft men from the 
militia into the regiment. In addition the Independent
95 One Independent company was from South Carolina and two 
were from New York. Journal of the Council of Virginia, 5:464; 
Gov. Dinwiddie to Lord Fairfax, [January 1754,] Dinwiddie to 
the Earl of Holderness, April 27, 1754, Gov. Dinwiddie to Earl 
of Halifax, Brock, ed., Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
1:48-50, 133-134, 134-135. The Independent companies were
companies of colonial troops, who were part of the British 
Army but were not attached to any regiment, hence they were 
"independent."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
Companies took much longer than expected to arrive in 
Virginia. Finally, a shortage of horses and wagons slowed the 
expedition's progress.96
Trent wrote to Washington at the beginning of March 
pleading for reinforcements before the French arrived. Since 
there was no way Fry could be ready in time, Washington took 
the initiative to march his detachment to the Forks to 
reinforce Trent.97 But before Washington could arrive, the 
shortage of supplies forced Trent to return to Will's Creek, 
leaving behind only a small detachment of forty-one men under 
the command of Ensign Edward Ward to hold the fort against the 
French.98 On April 17, French forces under the command of 
Frangois Le Mercier appeared outside the uncompleted fort. 
Ward was greatly outnumbered. He later claimed that there 
were almost 1,000 French. He had little choice but to
96 Gov. Dinwiddie to Lord Fairfax, February 23, 1754, 
Dinwiddie to Col. Innes, July 20, [1754], Brock, ed., Official 
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:82, 232; George Washington to 
Thomas Cressap, April 18, 1754, George Washington to Governor 
Dinwiddie, May 9, 1754, W.W. Abbot, ed., and Dorothy Twohig, 
assoc, ed., The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series 
(Charlottesville Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1983-), 
1:82, 93-95; Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, March 12, 1754, 
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(Vol. 14) 1:540-542.
97 Gov. Dinwiddie to Joshua Fry, March 18, 1754, Brock, 
ed., Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:109-110; Douglas 
Southall Freeman, George Washington, New York, Charles 
Scribener's Sons, 1948, p.3 55.
98 Edward Ward was a half-brother of George Croghan. Of 
the men with him only thirty-three were troopers.
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surrender the fort and inarch his men back to Wills's Creek.99 
The French proceeded to utilize the supplies of lumber the 
English had already amassed to construct their own fort at the 
Forks, which they named Fort Duquesne in honor of their 
governor.100
The surrender of the fort horrified the anglophile 
Indians. The English seemed to have done nothing to hold the 
Ohio. The day after the fall of the fort, Tanaghrisson, still 
at Logstown, sent a plea to the English. "We have been 
waiting this long Time for the French to strike Us, now we see 
what they design to do with Us, we are ready to strike them 
now and wait for your Assistance; be strong and come as soon 
as possible you can." He warned "if you do not come to our 
Relief, we are gone entirely."101
In light of the Indians3 appeals, Washington, who was now 
in command of the expedition following the death of Fry, 
determined to proceed towards the fort to see if there was any
99 "Deposition of Ensign Ward," [May 1754], Gov. Dinwiddie 
to Board of Trade, May 10, 1754, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, 
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 14) 1:693-697, (Col.
1328) 11:985-990; Washington to Dinwiddie, April 25, 1754,
George Washington to Hamilton, April [24], 1754, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., Papers of George Washington, 1:83-85, 89-90.
100 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the 
American Revolution, 6:31-32
101 Speech of Scruniyatha [Tanaghrisson], April 18, 1754, 
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:2.
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chance of taking it by surprise.102 But the French had 
scouting parties out. For several days Tanaghrisson and 
Scarouady, scouting for Washington, reported French parties in 
the vicinity. Finally, on the evening of May 27, they 
informed him there was a party shadowing him. Washington sent 
out a detachment in ambush. In the ensuing skirmish his 
troops killed the French commander, Joseph Coulon de Villiers, 
sieur de Jumonville, and ten other French troops, taking 
another twenty-one prisoner.103
The skirmish marked the first direct conflict between 
troops of the two powers and the French were bound to react 
quickly. News of the skirmish and deaths angered the French 
forces at Fort Duquesne. It was an escalation of the conflict 
from encouraging Indian tribes to destroy one another to 
Europeans themselves killing one another. Almost immediately 
the French sent out a much larger party, under the command of 
de Jumonville's brother, Louis Coulon de Villiers, to 
intercept Washington.104
Surely aware that the French would react but unaware 
that the French had sent out a much larger party, Washington
102 Fry died at the beginning of June after falling from 
his horse. Gov. Dinwiddie to Washington, June 4, 1754, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 1:126-127.
103 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 18, May 29, 
1754, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington June 4, 1754, George 
Washington to John Augustine Washington, May 31, 1754, Abbot 
& Twohig eds., Papers of George Washington, 1:96, 110-111, 
118, 126-127;
104 Fregault, Canada: The War of the Conquest, p.69.
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continued his advance towards Fort Duquesne. Dinwiddie sent 
Washington a message warning him not to be too rash or to 
"make any hazardous Attempts agst a too numerous Enemy."105 
On June 28 Washington halted at Gist's "plantation" on the 
Monongahela a few miles south of Fort Duquesne. At a Council 
of War with Washington and his officers, Scarouady revealed 
that the French had been reinforced and resupplied and had 
sent a much larger force out.106 Washington had around 400 
men with him, many of them ill and unfit for duty. Instead of 
continuing, he chose to retreat hastilly towards Wills' Creek. 
However, his troops were weary from their tough march over the 
rough terrain and made slow progress. Informed that the 
French were quickly closing on him, Washington determined to 
halt his retreat at a spot already prepared for defense, Fort 
Necessity. The Indians who were with Washington were 
disgusted at his temerity and his refusal to accept any advice 
from them, despite their knowledge of the terrain. Even worse 
was Washington's general contempt for the Indians; they later 
complained that "he took upon him to command the Indians as 
his Slaves." As a result, shortly after Washington arrived at 
Fort Necessity, the Indians abandoned him.107
105 Twohig and Abbot, eds., Papers of George Washington, 
1:119.
106 "Minutes of Council of War, June 28, 1754," Abbot & 
Twohig eds., Papers of George Washington, 1:155-156.
107 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:151
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On the morning of July 3 the French arrived at his camp 
with about 700 men, 600 French and 100 Indians. The battle 
continued from eleven in the morning until the evening. But 
the fight was unequal. The earthworks were of little utility; 
while they prevented the French from storming the camp, they 
offered little protection from the fire of the French snipers. 
The French took cover behind the trees surrounding the camp 
and sniped at the exposed English troops. One by one, they 
picked off Washington's forces. By dusk Washington had lost 
one hundred men killed and wounded.108 With his force 
surrounded and demoralized, abandoned by his Indian allies, 
and with a fierce storm raging, Washington asked for terms. 
The document he signed admitted responsibility for the 
"murder" of Jumonville, acknowledged that the Ohio was "les 
Terres du Domain du Roy," and agreed that the English would 
evacuate the region. Washington, of course, repudiated the 
agreement as soon as he was back in Virginia, claiming that he 
had been unable to read the surrender document clearly in the 
flickering candle night of the sodden evening. The French 
hoped that the defeat of Washington's force would mark the end 
of the dispute in North America and that the English would now
108 Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, July 24, 1754, 
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1 Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(Vol. 14) 1:712-714; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:50- 
52; Varin to Bigot, July 24, 1754, Brodhead, ed., Documents 
Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 10:260-261.
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lose interest in the Ohio Valley, but it merely encouraged the 
English to do more to recover the region. 109
By the summer of 1754 the English had alienated most of 
the Ohio Indians. By constructing a fort and planning 
settlements, they had proven that they were untrustworthy; by 
surrendering at Fort Necessity they had shown that they were 
powerless to protect their allies and to punish their enemies. 
In the wake of Fort Necessity, the English did little to 
recover their position, while the French took great pains to 
point out to the Indians that the English had all but 
abandoned the Ohio Valley. The French promised the Ohio 
Indians that if they would support them, they would allow them 
to live in peace and would supply them with the goods they 
needed; if they continued to support the English, they would 
drive them away and kill them.110 In May Andrew Montour 
warned Governor Hamilton that the French would soon harass any 
anglophile Indians in the Ohio Valley to "prevent their 
planting, and thereby render them incapable of Supporting 
their Families." He added that before they began, force must 
be used "to preserve our Indian allies."111
109 Varin to Bigot, July 24, 1754, Stevens and Kent, eds., 
Wilderness Chronicles, p.81; "Narrative of What Happened upon 
the River Ohio," British Library, Add. Mss., 15,874:208-211.
110 "Treaty with Indians at Ft. Cumberland, October 18- 
November 5, 1754," Boehm, ed. , BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward
Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 15) 2:157-158; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 5:691;
111 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:46.
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French pressure prompted many Shawnees and Delawares on 
the Ohio, now isolated from the English by Fort Duquesne, to 
reconsider their allegiance. The majority joined the French. 
But a few, like Tanaghrisson and Scarouady, whose outspoken 
support for the English meant that they could not possibly 
change sides, had little choice but to evacuate their 
families. When Tanaghrisson arrived at Washington's camp in 
June, he brought with him over eighty Indians. The numbers 
increased dramatically after Fort Necessity. By the end of 
1754 over three hundred Indians from the Ohio Valley were 
living on the branches of the Susquehanna River in 
Pennsylvania and another two hundred on the upper branches of 
the Conococheague in Cumberland County. Many of the Indians 
went to Aughwick, George Croghan's plantation on the Juniata 
River on the frontiers of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 
There they were maintained at colonial expense until the end 
of the war. For the remainder of 1754 any remaining 
anglophile Shawnees and Delawares desperately strove to 
discover what English policy entailed.112
Indians who remained loyal to the English assembled in 
October at Fort Cumberland to discover what the English 
planned. The Indians were uneasy at the inactivity of the 
English and were concerned that "what the French tell them of 
their Brethren is too true, that is that the English are
112 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:130, 140, 149,
159, 257; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, [June 1754,] 
Brock, ed., Official Records of Governor Dinwiddie, 1:229-230;
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afraid of the French."113 From the start of the conference 
there was bad news. En route to the conference, Tanaghrisson 
had died at Harris's Ferry. One of the purposes of the 
conference had been to get the Indians to declare war against 
the French, but the Indians made use of the occasion instead 
to voice their complaints about English actions. Scarouady 
complained that "we expected you would have told us more of 
your minds. . . what was spoke in public, was only to prevent 
some of our People from knowing what we were about." He also 
protested the actions of Washington that summer, particularly 
during the Fort Necessity campaign. Scarouady added that the 
French had warned the Ohio Indians that the English would 
drive them away or kill them. Scarouady concluded that "you 
have given us some reason to suspect you." That even the 
staunchest of English allies accused the English of duplicity 
was a sorry commentary on English policy.114
With the collapse of Indian support for the English in 
the Ohio Valley, Governor Dinwiddie in Virginia, and Governor 
Hamilton and his successor Robert Morris in Pennsylvania 
sought support from the colonial assemblies. Shortly after his 
arrival in Pennsylvania, Morris informed the Assembly that the 
Indians who remained loyal to England "dare not be active for
113 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:140.
114 "Treaty with the Indians at Fort Cumberland, October 
18 to November 5, 1754," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward 
Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 15) 2:156-169; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 6:184.
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us till they see a Force in the Field superior to that of the 
French, and if that be not soon they will certainly give up 
our Cause and embrace the tempting Offers made them by the 
French."115 But the governors' appeals fell on deaf ears.
Dinwiddie had summoned the House of Burgesses as early as 
November 1753 to grant aid for the construction and protection 
of a fort on the Ohio and to strengthen his authority over the 
militia. He informed the burgesses that the crown had 
instructed him to call them "immediately" and "to lay before 
them the Necessity of a mutual Assistance." But instead of 
granting a supply, the House demanded to see Dinwiddie's 
instructions from the crown and accounts of the treaties of 
Lancaster and Logstown. The House refused to give Dinwiddie 
additional authority over the militia, maintaining that only 
"if any Invasion should Happen, and the Power given to the 
Governor, by those Laws, should then be found insufficient" 
would they reconsider their decision.116
The burgesses' recalcitrance stemmed from two unrelated 
disputes which soured relations between Dinwiddie and the 
House. Some members saw the conflict as one caused by the Ohio 
Company. Many burgesses were members of competing land
115 Address of Gov. Morris to Pennsylvania Assembly, 
December 3, 1754, Edward Reed, ed., Pennsylvania Archives, 
Papers of the Governors, 1747-1759 (Harrisburg Pa.: State of 
Pennsylvania, 1900), 2:302-303.
116 H.R. Mcllwaine, Journals of the House of Burgesses: 
1752-1755, 1756-1758, (Richmond, VA, Virginia State Library, 
1909), pp. 103-104, 110, 115-116.
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companies and opposed the activities of the Ohio Company. 
They even directly attacked the company, suggesting that 
Dinwiddie should make many land grants over the Appalachians 
"in small parcels," which would have destroyed the value of 
the Ohio Company's grant.117 Others were alienated by 
Dinwiddie's continuing attempts to collect a fee of a pistole 
for the registering of land patents. Until 1755 the "Pistole 
Fee Controversy" generated "factious Disputes and violent 
Heats" which undermined meetings of the House.118 On December 
19, in disgust, Dinwiddie dissolved the Assembly. He warned 
them that
His Majesty's Royal Command for a mutual supply 
recommended to you at the beginning of this 
Session, to preserve the Friendship of the 
Indians. . . should have been the fix'd Object of
your Attention; but to disregard the Designs of the 
French, to despise the Friendship of the Indians, 
and to dispute the rights of the Crown in the 
Disposal of their own Lands, may be of bad 
Consequence.119
With Washington's initial return from the French forts, 
Dinwiddie recalled the House on February 4, 1754. He
presented the details of Washington's expedition and painted 
a bloody picture of what would happen if they did not act.
117 H.R. Mcllwaine, Journals of the House of Burgesses: 
1752-1755, 1756-1758, p.116. Egnal, A Mighty Empire, pp.96-97.
118 Gov. Dinwiddie to Capel Hanbury, May 10, 1754, Brock, 
ed., Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:153; For a full 
discussion of the pistole fee controversy see John Alden, 
Robert Dinwiddie, Servant of the Crown, (Charlottesville, VA: 
University of Virginia Press, 1973), pp.26-37.
119 Mcllwaine, Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752- 
1755, 1756-1758, p.171.
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The House agreed to authorize £10,000 for defense but the 
governor felt that they "clogg'd" the bill "with unreasonable 
Regulations, & Incroachments." Distrustful of allowing 
Dinwiddie control of any funds, they appointed a committee to 
oversee their disbursement. At first Dinwiddie would not 
consent to the bill, complaining that "the People here are too 
much on a republican Spirit. The Ho. of B. making resolves in 
dispos'g of the King's Money without the Concurrence of the 
other Branches of the Legislature, is without Precedent." 
However, he was forced to agree to the Assembly's terms in 
order to obtain funds for the fort at the Forks of the 
Ohio.120
After Washington's defeat at Fort Necessity, Dinwiddie 
recalled the House. They met "with good Dispositions," and on 
August 29 agreed to raise £20,000. Opposition was slow to 
form, but eventually a group of burgesses, led by the speaker, 
John Robinson, organized themselves into "something like a 
Party that were not for Laying anything." They tacked a rider 
onto the bill to pay £2,500 to Peyton Randolph who was in 
London arguing the Assembly's case in the Pistole Fee
120 Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, March 12, 1754, May 10, 
1754, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700- 
1783, (Vol. 1328) 11:981, (Vol. 1328) 11:985-987; Dinwiddie to 
William Fairfax, March 15, 1754, Dinwiddie to James
Abercromby, July 24, [1754], Brock, ed., Official Records of 
Robert Dinwiddie, 1:108, 236; William Waller Henning, Statutes 
at Large, Richmond, Franklin Press, 1819, 6:420-422.
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Controversy.121 Dinwiddie was mortified. He rejected the 
bill and promptly prorogued the Assembly. William Fairfax 
commented to Washington "The news of your engagement & rout at 
the Meadows did not give the public more affecting concern 
than the unhappy conclusion of our present meeting.1,122 It 
was clear that Virginia would not be able to drive the French 
from the Ohio unaided.
Governor Hamilton had even less success in persuading the 
Pennsylvania Assembly to grant supplies. Hamilton wrote 
despairingly to Dinwiddie in March 1754, "I never expected 
they would appropriate Money for the Purpose of War or Warlike 
Preparations, but thought they might have been brought to make 
a handsome Gift to the King's Use, and have left the 
Disposition of it to me." But the Assembly had stuck rigidly 
to its Quaker principles, intensified by a religious revival 
which swept the sect in the 1750s.123
It was not, however, the Quaker beliefs of the majority 
of the Assembly that finally kept them from granting money for
121 Gov. Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, September 1, 1754, 
Brock, ed., Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:298-300; 
Jack Greene ed., The Diary of Colonel Landon Carter of Sabine 
Hall 1752-1778, (Charlottesville, Va, : University Press of 
Virginia, 1965), 1:111-114.
122 William Fairfax to George Washington, September 5, 
1754, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, September 11, 1754, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., Papers of George Washington, 1:201, 
206-207.
123 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:1-3; Joseph E. 
Illick, Colonial Pennsylvania: A History, (New York, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1976), pp.218-225.
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defense but rather a series of disputes with the governor. 
After Washington's defeat, the Assembly received petitions 
from the inhabitants of Cumberland and Lancaster Counties 
expressing fears that they would soon be attacked by the 
French. This warning was enough to stir some Assemblymen to 
consider providing for the colony's defense. The Assembly ran 
into the first of several conflicts with the governor which 
would last for several years and paralyse Pennsylvania's war 
effort.124
The Assembly agreed to raise funds by issuing £30,000 in 
paper money, £10,000 of which was "for the King's use," but 
the governor and the Assembly could not agree on the period in 
which the bills were to be retired. The Assembly refused to 
listen to any of Hamilton's complaints maintaining that "the 
Representatives of the People have an Undoubted Right to 
judge, and determine, hot only of the Sum to be raised for the 
Use of the Crown but of the Manner of raising it." Neither 
side would give ground, and Pennsylvania had raised no money 
at all.125
124 Petition of the Inhabitants of Cumberland County, July 
15, 1754, H.S.P., Conarroe Collection 10:60; Colonial Records 
of Pennsylvania, 6:130-132.
125 Hamilton had previously refused to give his assent to 
paper money bills claiming that they were contrary to his 
instructions from the proprietors and the crown. This time, 
fearing the results if nothing was provided for defense, 
Hamilton gave way. Then came the question of the life of the 
bills and the method for retiring them. Hamilton wanted the 
bills retired in four years, the Assembly in ten. Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 5:729-730, 6:39-45, 244-246; Gov.
(continued...)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
Governor Morris arrived in the fall of 1754. Many hoped 
the succession of a new governor would prompt the Assembly to 
be more receptive. Morris exhorted the members to "exert 
yourselves at this critical Juncture in Defence of your 
Country." But once more the Assembly attempted to issue paper 
money, and again the governor and Assembly ran into deadlock 
over the period of retirement. Morris's only solution was to 
"suspend" the bill until it could be approved by the Crown an 
action which would take several months. The Assembly had again 
failed to raise any money for actions on the Ohio.126
The French were in possession of the Ohio Valley, 
Washington's force had been routed, yet the colonial
125(.. .continued)
Morris to Sir Thomas Robinson, January 30, 1755, Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 15) 
2:39-41; Gertrude MacKinney, ed., Votes of the Assembly, 
Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser. (Harrisburg Pa.: State of
Pennsylvania, 1931), 5:3705-3706; Theodore Thayer,
Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776, 
Harrisburg, PA., Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission, 1953, pp. 28-29.
126 The Assembly agreed to raise £40,000, £20,000 for "the 
King's Use," but again in paper money. Regardless of the 
explicit orders from the Privy Council which Morris laid 
before them forbidding issues of paper, the Assembly pressed 
on. However, Morris was prepared to compromise. He claimed 
that Whitehall had previously allowed the colonies to issue 
paper money in emergencies and the situation on the frontier 
was definitely an emergency. He offered to approve an 
emission of paper retired in four years. But the Assembly 
would not abandon their schemes and demanded that the paper be 
retired in twelve years. Gov. Morris to Sir Thomas Robinson, 
December 24, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward
Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 15) 2:6-12; Pennsylvania Archives, 
5:3742, 3764, 3771, 3786; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 
6:206; Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of 
Democracy, pp.37-38.
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assemblies and governors were squabbling over privilege. 
There was only one way the French could be driven out and that 
was through intervention by Great Britain. In Whitehall the 
Newcastle administration sought to avoid the expense of 
conflict with the French in the Ohio and pursued "the most 
effectual Measure for preserving The Peace."127 The French 
ambassador in London, Charles-Pierre-Gaston-Frangois de Levis, 
due de Mirepoix, proposed the evacuation of the Ohio with the 
Alleghenies as the English boundary and the French boundary 
running Southwest from the southern shore of Lake Erie. But 
the two sides could not agree on exact boundaries, and both 
demanded the demolition of the other's forts in the region. 
Each could have compromised, but neither was willing.128
Even after negotiations stalled, the Newcastle 
administration hoped that they could recover the Ohio Valley 
without a war. In 1753 they hoped that the colonial 
authorities would be able to deal with the situation without 
help from Great Britain. After Fort Necessity, with the 
colonial assemblies squabbling, it became clear that this was 
impossible. Newcastle still hesitated. He was concerned 
about lack of support in Great Britain for a war in North 
America, for "Ignorant People say what is the Ohio to us, what
127 Duke of Newcastle to Dayrolle, November 16 1753, 
British Library, Add. Mss., 15,874:217
128 "Demandes de La Grande Bretagne et de La France, 
1755," Holdernesse to Keith, March 11 1755, British Library, 
Add. Mss., 6,865:97-104, 15,874:286 .
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expense is there like to be about it, shall we bring on a War 
for the sake of a River."129
Newcastle, however, was not a "dove." He had opposed the 
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle because it was not sufficiently 
advantageous for Great Britain. By the fall of 1754 he was 
convinced that in order to recover the situation, regular 
troops would have to be sent to North America.130 On 
September 24, Edward Braddock received his instructions. He 
was to take two companies of infantry from Cork, Ireland, to 
Virginia. The colonial governors were instructed to assist 
him and to insure that his regiments were recruited up to full 
strength. With these troops, numbering over three thousand, 
he would drive the French from the Ohio.131
129 P. Collinson "Some Thoughts on the French Scheme and 
the Ohio Country", February 25 1757, British Library, Add. 
Mss., 33,029:380-381;
130 Speck, Stability and Strife, p.252.
131 "Instructions to General Braddock," November 28, 1754, 
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 3, The French and Indian War, (Vol.. 
6) 1:16-26; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:200-201;
"Report of the Board of Trade on the Plan for a General 
Concert," August 9, 1754, British Library, Add. Mss.,
35,909:194-201.
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Chapter II
The Defeat
It is taken for granted that this Summer's Campaign will make 
Major General Braddock Master of the Ohio. . . It is not to be 
doubtedhe .will soon make himself Master of all Canada1
Braddock's plan was beautifully simple. The English 
forces would advance to the Forks of the Ohio and seize Fort 
Duquesne. Then in a single, swift move they would advance 
upon Fort Niagara and seize that French stronghold. There was 
no possibility of failure. The English had massed over three 
thousand troops. The French, on the other hand, had fewer 
than three hundred soldiers and militia and six hundred 
Indians protecting Fort Duquesne. Governor Vaudreuil wrote 
despairingly to Paris informing the government of the straits 
he was in. He informed the government that Fort Duquesne 
could not possibly withstand a siege because the post had not 
been properly reinforced and supplied. He added, "I dread, 
with reason. . . the first intelligence from that fort."2
1 "Project for Next Year's Campaign in N. America" August 
11, 1755, British Library, Additional Mss., 35,909:208-210.
2 "Account of the Battle of the Monongahela," July 9, 
1755, Vaudreuil to Machault, July 24, 1755, Brodhead, ed., 
Documents Relative to the History of New York, 10:303-304, 
307.
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Braddock had arrived in Virginia on February 24, 1755. 
The transports carrying his troops arrived three weeks later. 
Preparations had been underway for several weeks before he 
arrived. Sir John St. Clair, who had arrived in Virginia 
ahead of Braddock, had already begun reviewing the colonial 
forces, amassing provisions, and searching for a good route to 
the Ohio. All along the frontiers of Virginia and 
Pennsylvania officials scoured plantations for provisions, 
wagons, and horses. Braddock's expedition was a major 
undertaking that would strain the resources of the colonies.3
In many ways Braddock and St. Clair were unfortunate 
choices to lead the expedition. Both were irritable and 
haughty and regarded the colonists with a disregard equalled 
only by their disdain for their Indian allies, which they made 
no effort to hide.4 Almost immediately upon his arrival 
Braddock began to complain about his reception, commenting to 
Newcastle "I cannot say as yet they have shown the
3 Gen. Braddock to Thomas Robinson, March 18, 1755,
British Library, Additional Mss., 32,853:346-354, London; Gov. 
Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, March 17, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO 
C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1763, (1328) 11:1021;
Gov. Dinwiddie to Adam Stephen, February 18, 1755, Gov.
Dinwiddie to Earl of Halifax, February 24, 1755, The Official 
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:504, 512; James Burd to Edward 
Shippen, February 21, 1755, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania, Shippen Papers, Vol 1. [the volume I inspected 
was unpaginated] Philadelphia, PA.; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 6:297, 300-301.
4 St. Clair would become an even greater burden in 1758 
during Forbes' Campaign. Forbes himself commented of St. Clair 
"He is a very odd Man, and I am sorry it had been my fate to 
have any Concerns with him." Forbes to Bouquet, September 4, 
1758, Kent, ed., The Papers of Henry Bouquet, 2:477
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Regard. . . that might have been expected."5 He berated
Morris and Dinwiddie on their failure to provide him with all 
the necessaries he demanded for the expedition.6
In the middle of April Braddock summoned Governors 
DeLancey of New York, Sharpe of Maryland, and Dinwiddie and 
Morris to his camp at Alexandria. There he informed them of 
his demands. He expected that they would create a general 
fund of money from all the colonies on which he could draw for 
his expenses without having first to gain the approval of the 
colonial assemblies. The governors replied that they were 
sure that the assemblies would never approve the creation of 
such a fund. They angered Braddock more when they informed 
him that they would be unable to provide him with any funds at 
all. To avoid failure, they advised Braddock that he should 
instead "make use of his Credit upon the Government at home to 
defray the Expence of all the Operations under his 
Direction."7 Braddock was aghast. Not only had the governors 
refused to create the general fund he felt he needed, but they 
had the audacity to suggest that he should pay all the costs.
5 Gen. Braddock to the Duke of Newcastle, March 20, 1755, 
British Library, Additional Mss., 32,853:388-391.
6 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:332-333, 335-338.
7 Gov. Dinwiddie to John Hanbury, April, 1755, "Minutes 
of a Council of War held at Alexandria," April 14, 1755,
British Library, Additional Mss., 32,854:378, 33,029:174-177; 
"Minutes of a Council at Alexandria," April 14, 1755, BPRO
C05, Boehm, ed., Westward Expansion, 1700-1763, (15) Part 1, 
2:263-268.
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He had been expecting a hero's welcome and the colonists to 
heed his every whim. He made no secret of his displeasure.
While Braddock was fuming at the colonial governors in 
Alexandria, Sir John St. Clair was alienating the colonial 
authorities and frontier inhabitants of Pennsylvania and 
Virginia. Braddock had sent St. Clair to Wills' Creek on the 
Potomac to reconnoitre a route to the Ohio and to gather 
wagons and supplies. St. Clair found, however, that it was 
much more difficult than he had expected to engage road 
cutters, obtain wagons, and purchase provisions. Repeatedly 
rebuffed by the frontier inhabitants, he "stormed like a Lyon 
Rampant" at the provincial commissioners Pennsylvania had 
appointed to help him. He threatened the frontier inhabitants 
that "instead of marching to the Ohio he would. . . march his 
Army into Cumberland County" and would "by Fire and Sword 
oblige the Inhabitants" to follow his instructions, and if 
they would still not cooperate he would order his troops to 
"kill all kind of Cattle and carry away the Horses, burn the 
Houses, &ca." He further suggested to the commissioners that 
to speed the cooperation of the frontier inhabitants, they 
should "hang an arse (as he phrased it.)" St. Clair's 
activities left a bitter legacy of distrust on the frontier 
which remained throughout the war.8
8 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:368; Gen. Braddock 
to Sir Thomas Robinson, April 19, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, 
Part 3, The French and Indian War, (6) 1:47-56; Robert Orme, 
"Journal of General Braddock's Expedition," British Library, 
Kings' Mss., 212:13, 23.
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Braddock's demands meant that both Dinwiddie and Morris 
again had to call their assemblies in an attempt to gain more 
supplies. Six weeks before Braddock's arrival, the 
Pennsylvania Assembly, disgusted with the failure to make 
progress in 1754, had proposed adjourning until May. This 
threat appalled Morris. He managed to persuade the Assembly to 
continue in session, but they still refused to provide 
supply.9 Eventually, thanks largely to the efforts of 
Benjamin Franklin, the Assembly agreed to provide fourteen 
thousand bushels of wheat for the expedition, but no more. 
The Quaker members of the Assembly, who refused to provide 
direct war material such as arms and ammunition, did not balk 
at providing supplies. They combined with the frontier 
representatives, who demanded aid, to override the resistance 
of those who sought to use the opportunity to press for 
greater Assembly power. An attempt to provide aid beyond the 
wheat became enmeshed in disputes with the governor, although 
the Assembly, despite Morris's opposition, did agree to raise 
£5,000 in paper money on their own credit to pay for Indian 
gifts and other expenses of the commissioners.10
By the middle of March the intransigence of Pennsylvania 
had exasperated Braddock. He complained to Morris that the 
province, although "by far the most Opulent of any upon the
9 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th ser. 2:235; Colonial Records 
of Pennsylvania, 6:295-296.
10 Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Morris, March 10, 1755, Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie,1:522, 523.
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Continent, as well as most nearly interested in the Event of 
the Expedition," was taking "advantage of the Common Danger 
in order to encroach upon His Majesty's Prerogative in the 
Administration of his Government." Braddock sent a veiled 
warning to the Assembly. "In what light such Behaviour must 
Appear to His Majesty, may be easily conceiv'd. . . It may be 
worth their while. . . to consider, whether it may not be
presum'd that the Government at Home will take some Method to 
oblige 'em to act for the future."11
But rather than being intimidated, the Assembly embarked 
on a new dispute with Morris over the publication of the 
Assembly's minutes. The Assembly refused to show Morris their 
minutes before publication. Worse for Morris, the published 
version included some letters from the Secretary of State, 
which Morris had lain before the Assembly to support his 
request for supply. Morris maintained that the letters were 
private: the Assembly defended their need to explain their 
actions. The dispute made any prospect of the Assembly 
granting supply still fainter.12
Eventually, with the threat of royal action hanging over 
them and in view of Braddock's expedition, the Assembly 
reconsidered their reluctance to grant funds. In March they
11 Braddock to Gov. Morris, March 9, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO 
C05, Part 3, The French and Indian War, (6) 1:41-42.
12 Gov. Morris to Sir Thomas Robinson, April 9, 1755,
Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783,
(15) 1:43; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:387;
Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser., 5:3865.
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agreed to raise £25,000 for "the King's Use."13 However, 
again the Assembly insisted on a paper issue to be retired in 
ten years. Still smarting from the dispute with Morris, the 
Assembly was reluctant to give him control over the 
expenditure of the money. The bill assigned only £5,000 
directly to Braddock and left the other £20,000 under the 
control of a committee of the House. Morris again refused his 
assent, informing the Assembly that he felt that such a 
restriction was "trifling with the King's Commands, and 
amounts to a Refusal to give at all, and I am satisfied will 
be seen in this Light by my Superiors."14 The Assembly 
replied that they were confident the people would see that "we 
did everything in our Power" and that "the Danger to which 
this Country stood exposed, and his Majesty's repeated and 
affectionate Calls, had great Weight with us, whatever they 
had with the Governor." The House then adjourned until the 
beginning of September, having failed once more to grant major 
support for Braddock's expedition.15
13 £5,000 was set aside for Braddock to use as he saw 
fit, £5,000 was given to the commissioners to pay off other 
debts Pennsylvania had encumbered in building roads and 
getting supplies to the expedition and providing gifts to the 
Indians, £10,000 was given for providing supplies, and the 
final £5,000 was set aside to pay debts Pennsylvania had 
previously incurred. Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser., 5:3870
14 Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser., 5:3874-3875, 3894; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:386-388.
15 Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser., 5:3896-3897, 3903.
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In Virginia the disputes over the "Pistole Fee 
Controversy" had subsided. Peyton Randolph had returned from 
London, apologized to Dinwiddie about his behavior, and made 
a "Promise to conduct himself more regularly." Dinwiddie in 
turn had restored him to his post of Attorney-General, and 
both sides were prepared to overlook their past disputes.16 
But the subsiding of the Pistole Fee Controversy did not mean 
that the House of Burgesses would automatically provide 
additional funds for Braddock's expedition. The House, and 
Dinwiddie himself, felt aggrieved at the failure of the other 
colonies to provide any funding for Braddock, and the House 
pointedly refused to pay for the subsistence of troops from 
other colonies stationed in Virginia. The House believed that 
they had already provided sufficient aid and would grant no 
more until needs on the Ohio were clearer. Thus, as Braddock 
assembled his forces at Fort Cumberland, the assemblies of the 
two provinces most intimately involved with the success or 
failure of the expedition were refusing to supply aid.17
Braddock's expedition was beset with many handicaps 
before it even got underway. Indeed, there were some who
16 Gov. Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, February 18, 1755, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:506- 
507.
17 Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, March 17, 1755, Boehm 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (1328) 
11:1021-1022; Gov. Dinwiddie to Lord Halifax, February 24, 
1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gen. Braddock, May 9, 1755, Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:512-517, 
2:34;
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doubted that the expedition could ever succeed. Braddock's 
secretary, son of Governor Shirley of Maryland, after touring 
the camp at Fort Cumberland wrote to Morris that he was 
"greatly disgusted at seeing an Expedition (as it is called) 
so ill concerted originally in England and so ill appointed, 
so improperly conducted since in America, and so much Fatigue 
and Expence incurred for a Purpose which if attended with 
success might better have been let alone." The delays were so 
long that the expedition was "in Danger of ending in little or 
nothing.1,18
The delays were excessive. The troops were to rendezvous 
at Wills' Creek, or Fort Cumberland as the newly constructed 
defenses were called. Newcastle had ordered Braddock to 
complete his regiment to full strength when he reached North 
America but recruiting was painfully slow. In addition, 
Braddock was determined to conduct the expedition in European 
style and to march to the Ohio with a large baggage train and 
heavy artillery for conducting a siege. The difficulties in 
obtaining horses and wagons greatly delayed the advance. 
Braddock also had to hire hundreds of workers to build the 
very road along which he intended to march.19 Progress was
18 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:404-406.
19 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:378-379; George 
Washington to John Augustine Washington, May 14, 1755, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., Papers of George Washington 1:277-278; 
Richard Peters to Gov. Morris, May 18, 1755, HSP Gratz Papers, 
Case 8, Box 24; Robert Orme, "Journal of General Braddock's 
Expedition," British Library, Kings' Mss., 212:37, 56;
(continued...)
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further delayed by the scores of camp-followers who swarmed 
around the expedition: sutlers and victuallers, whores and 
washerwomen, wives and mistresses. The presence of such non- 
combatants was a constant problem, despite several attempts 
Braddock was unable to reduce their numbers significantly.20
Braddock also delayed to await the arrival of the Indian 
auxiliaries he expected. Dinwiddie had invited the Ohio 
Indians to meet in May in Winchester, but after his snub the 
previous year and with the French firmly controlling the Ohio 
Valley, none came. In addition, Dinwiddie had opened 
negotiations with the southern Indians, the Catawbas and 
Cherokees, in the Carolinas, hoping that they would send 
support. But Governor Glenn of South Carolina objected to 
Dinwiddie's interference in what he viewed as South Carolina's 
exclusive preserve. Because of French pressure and the 
failure of the English to provide a sufficient number of 
gifts, (due to the inability of Morris and the Pennsylvania 
Assembly to agree upon a supply,) the Iroquois were also 
reluctant to send men.21 At the end of March Scarouady
19(.. .continued)
"Instructions to General Braddock," November 28, 1754, Gen. 
Braddock to Sir Thomas Robinson, April 19, 1755, Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05, Part 3, The French and Indian War, (6) 1:16-26, 47- 
56.
20 Robert Orme, "Journal," pp.66, 69; Gov. Morris to Gen. 
Braddock, June 16, 1755, Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 
2:413; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:426.
21 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:358-360, 370-372; 
Robert Orme, "Journal," pp. 11, 39-40; Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir
(continued...)
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bluntly informed the Pennsylvania Council, "You think You 
perfectly well understand the Management of Indian Affairs, 
but I must tell You that it is not so, and that the French are 
more politick than You. They never employ an Indian on any 
Business but they give him fine Cloathes, besides other 
Presents, and this makes the Indians their hearty Friends." 
He warned the Council that unless they had gifts ready for the 
Iroquois, any Indians who would come to help them "will be 
laughed at and made ashamed."22
About one hundred Indians assembled at Fort Cumberland on 
May 10, mainly from George Croghan's plantation at Aughwick. 
The Indians brought with them their wives and families, 
fearing that if they were left behind the French and their 
Indian allies would attack them.23 Instead of welcoming the 
Indians who had struggled to reach his army, Braddock 
complained at their small number and asked them to send their 
families home.24 Braddock's lack of consideration disturbed 
the Indians. Several months after the expedition Kanuksusy, 
one of the Indians who had removed to Aughwick, informed the
21 (. . .continued)
Thomas Robinson, June 23, 1755, Brock, ed., Official Records 
of Governor Dinwiddie, 2:70.
22 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:343-344.
23 Virginia Gazette, May 23, 1755; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
May 29, 1755; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:398-399.
24 "Speech of General Braddock to the Indians at Fort 
Cumberland," May 10, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, 
Westward Expansion, 1700-1763, (15) 2:247-249.
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Pennsylvania Council bluntly that the French had defeated the
English because of
the pride and ignorance of that great General that 
came from England. He is now dead; but he was a 
bad man when he was alive; he looked upon us as 
dogs, and would never hear anything what was said 
to him. We often endeavoured to advise him and to 
tell him of the danger he was in with his Soldiers; 
but he never appeared pleased with us, & that was 
the reason that a great many of our Warriors left 
him & would not be under his Command.25
Braddock's lack of consideration was not all that 
disturbed the Indians; his intentions also concerned them. 
According to a later account, the Delaware leader Shingas had 
asked Braddock what he intended to do when he had driven the 
French from the Ohio. Braddock replied that "the English Shoud 
Inhabit & Inherit the Land." Shingas then asked if the Indians 
who supported the English "might not be Permitted to Live and 
Trade Among the English and have Hunting Ground sufficient To 
Support themselves and Familys as they had no where to Flee 
Too But into the Hands of the French." Braddock replied 
abruptly that "No Savage Shoud Inherit the Land." This amazed 
the Ohio Indians who repeated the question. But Braddock 
merely reaffirmed his reply. Shingas and the other Indians 
then informed Braddock that "if they might not have Liberty To 
Live on the Land they woud not Fight for it[.] To wch Genl 
Braddock answered that he did not need their Help and had No
25 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:588-589.
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doubt of driveing the French and their Indians away."26 It is 
possible that even Scarouady himself thought about defecting 
to the French. On June 19 he was "captured" by the French, 
although he later managed a miraculous escape.27
Braddock's haughty treatment and blunt assertions that 
the English alone would occupy the Ohio Valley, combined with 
Washington's earlier misuse of the Indians in the Fort 
Necessity campaign, convinced many of the Indians who were 
still wavering in their support of the English to abandon them 
and join the French or at least to assume a neutral stance. 
Indeed, Shingas, one of the principal leaders of the raids on 
the frontier, maintained that this was his primary reason for 
deserting the English. Even the Indians who had come from 
Aughwick left in disgust, claiming they wanted to protect 
their wives and children whom Braddock had ordered to return 
to their homes. As a result, at one point, Braddock was left 
with only eight Indians for the expedition, a woefully 
insufficient number.28
Braddock finally left Fort Cumberland on June 10. His 
party made a strange sight, "the Knight [St. Clair] swearing
25 Beverly W. Bond, Jr., ed., "The Captivity of Charles 
Stuart, 1755-1757," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, June
1926, 13:63.
27 Gov. Sharpe to Sir Thomas Robinson, June 28, 1755, 
Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1763,
(16) 2:361; Robert Orme, "Journal," p.77; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 6:456.
28 Robert Orme, "Journal," p.40.
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in the Van, the Genl curseing & bullying in the Center, and 
their Whores bringing up the Rear."29 The advance was 
painfully slow becuase Braddock took with him some of the 
heavy guns from the warship Norwich moored in Alexandria. But 
with the shortage of horses the guns were more of a liability 
than an asset. It took seven of "the most able Korses" to 
pull one howitzer and five for each twelve-pounder. When the 
expedition came to steep hills it was necessary to send horses 
from the rear of the column to help those in the front pull 
the guns up the slope. With such obstacles the expedition 
advanced at a snail's pace, averaging only five or six miles 
a day, and on some days no more than two miles. With a column 
extending for five miles, they offered an inviting target for 
French and Indian attacks.30
Lacking Indian auxiliaries, Braddock's expedition 
advanced blindly towards the French. The French took full 
advantage of this to send out scouting parties to keep track 
of his slow advance. The French-allied Indians quickly 
captured any of Braddock's men who wandered too far from the 
camp and left their mutilated bodies along the line of march 
for their fellow soldiers to find. Several times Braddock
29 John Rutherford to Richard Peters, August, 1755, HSP, 
Peters Papers, 4:441.
30 Guy Fregault, Canada, The War of the Conquest, p.95; 
Robert Orme, "Journal," pp. 23, 52, 57, 67, 69, 90; Gov.
Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, June 13, 1755, Brock,ed., Official 
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:60; Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir 
Thomas Robinson, June 23, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, 
Westward Expansion, 1700-1763, (16) 2:314.
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came across abandoned Indian camps, the fires still burning, 
with "many Threats and Bravados with all Kinds of Scurillous 
Language" carved into the bark of the trees warning the men of 
what would happen to his men if they continued their 
advance.31 Not surprisingly, Braddock's men became nervous. 
Rumors careered through the expedition; morale plummeted. At 
times the flanking troops fired timorously into the woods, 
believing they had spied the French. Generally, the sightings 
were imaginary, but occasionally they did see Indians, often 
their own scouts rather than francophile Indians. On July 6 
such wild shooting killed Scarouady's son who was scouting on 
the flanks.32
The possibility of an ambush preoccupied Braddock. He 
had flankers posted during his march to prevent a surprise 
attack on the column. The most dangerous point was the 
crossing of Turtle Creek, only a few miles from Fort Duquesne, 
where the column would be split and the French could attack 
with a great advantage. On July 7 Braddock's expedition 
arrived at the creek. The banks were precipitous and a 
crossing was extremely perilous. Braddock spent two days 
preparing for the crossing. On the morning of July 9 his 
troops began to cross the creek. By noon the whole party had
31 Robert Orme, "Journal," pp.84-85, 87-88, 97; George 
Washington to John Augustine Washington, June 28-July 2, 1755, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., Papers of George Washington, 1:322.
32 Robert Orme, "Journal," pp. 79, 98
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crossed. Fort Duquesne was only ten miles away. It seemed 
that nothing could prevent Braddock's success now.33
The plight of Fort Duquesne was critical. Contrecoeur 
decided that it was pointless to attempt to resist a siege and 
sent Beaujeu with 123 soldiers, one hundred militia and six 
hundred Indians, mainly Onondagas, Ohio Delawares and Ottawas, 
to try to halt Braddock's advance. Beaujeu had intended to 
surprise and surround Braddock's troops, but "his ambush. . . 
failed," his troops were sighted and the fighting began, just 
after two o'clock in the afternoon of July 9.34
Braddock imagined a heavy attack and sent the colonial 
troops forward to reinforce the regulars in the vanguard. He 
ordered his artillery to open fire. The volley wreaked havoc 
on the French who reeled back from heavy losses. English 
firing killed the French commander, Beaujeu. The Indians were 
on the verge of fleeing, leaving the English to destroy the 
remaining two hundred French troops. But Dumas, the second in 
command of the French forces, managed to rally his men and 
sent Indians to flank Braddock's column. "The whoop of the 
Indians, which echoed through the forest, struck terror into 
the hearts" of Braddock's troops. They remembered .what had 
happened to their comrades whom the Indians had captured. The
33 Ibid., pp. 100, 102-103.
34 "Account of the Battle on the Monongahela," July 9, 
1755, Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:303-304; Charles Swaine to Richard Peters, August 5, 1755, 
HSP, Peters Papers, 4:38.
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regulars gave ground, only to find to their horror that they 
were trapped between the French and the advancing colonials.35
There was complete confusion. Braddock attempted to 
order his men but he was unable to form them into their 
regular ranks in the woods and ravines. The casualties were 
horrific. Three-quarters of the officers were killed, 
Braddock himself was mortally wounded. Two-thirds of the 
English casualties were shot by their own men. Not 
surprisingly, the regulars exposed to this endless fire soon 
gave way.36
The rout was complete. The surviving troops fled in 
total panic, abandoning their artillery which they had dragged 
with such great effort across the Appalachians. The French 
even discovered Braddock's secret instructions from the Privy 
Council, and his war chest containing £25,000 (some of which 
the colonial assemblies had appropriated for the expedition,) 
thrown aside to hasten the flight. Braddock himself was 
hastily buried in the field. It had taken the British twelve 
days to reach Fort Duquesne from Gist's Plantation, it took
35 "Account of the Battle on the Monongahela," July 9, 
1755, Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:303-304; Robert Orme, "Journal," pp. 104-105.
36 Robert Orme, "Journal" pp.104-105; George Washington to 
Gov. Dinwiddie, July 18, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 3, 
The French and Indian War, (46) 1:99-101; Charles Swaine to 
Richard Peters, August 5, 1755, HSP Peters Papers, 4:38; "A 
list of Officers who were present and of those killed and 
wounded in the action on the Banks of the Monongahila the 9th 
July 1755," British Library, Additional Mss., 33,046:330-335
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them only thirty hours to retreat. Colonel Dunbar was several 
miles in the rear, near Gist's, with the supply train 
advancing slowly. He had as many troops as Braddock and still 
outnumbered the French. Dunbar's forces by themselves were 
capable of attacking Fort Duquesne. But the panic spread 
quickly, and soon Dunbar's troops were also in flight. Dunbar 
abandoned his supplies, and in a month retreated the three 
hundred miles to Philadelphia.37
Braddock's defeat was a terrible disaster for the
English. Not only had a major field army been completely 
destroyed, their equipment lost, and hundreds killed, but the 
defeat had major political ramifications and influenced Indian 
relations. In Virginia and even more in Pennsylvania, the
expedition had strained relations between the governor and
Assembly. The pressure to gather supplies on the frontier had 
created great discontent among the frontier inhabitants. The 
expedition had also proven to the Ohio Indians that the
English were incapable of providing any protection against the 
French and their Indian allies. The defeat shattered Indian 
fears about European invincibility because a force composed 
mainly of Indians, outnumbered three-to-one, had destroyed 
Braddock. Several of the Ohio Indians, such as Shingas and 
the Beaver, actively joined the French in the wake of
37 Robert Orme, "Journal" p. 107; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 6:593, 595; Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas 
Robinson, August 20, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO 005, Part 1,
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (16) 2:449; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 6:514.
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Braddock's defeat. Shingas maintained that the Indians had 
nothing to fear in going to war against the English for the 
English were nothing but "a Parcel of Old Women." "They could 
not travel without loaded Horses and Waggons full of 
Provisions and a great deal of Baggage." Since the British 
could not find their way to the Indian towns without Indian 
guides, if the Indians refused to help them their towns would 
be safe.38
Braddock's defeat need not have spelled the end for 
British offensive measures. Dunbar still had sufficient 
troops with him to threaten Fort Duquesne. Dinwiddie in 
particular was in favor of another attempt on the fort. 
However, the troops were badly demoralized, and their 
uncontrolled flight meant that they had lost most of their 
equipment. Dunbar decided to withdraw into winter quarters so 
that his men could recoup. To protect the frontier he left 
only a few forces. At Fort Cumberland he posted five hundred 
sick and wounded troops at the field hospital Braddock had 
built and a company of Virginia troops to guard them. Not 
surprisingly the troops felt they had been left as "a Prey for
38 Both Shingas and the Beaver, if not loyal to the 
English, had a least kept a neutral stance. Shingas, 
according to his own account, came to talk to Braddock during 
the expedition, while the Beaver was used by Scarouady as a 
messenger. During the war Shingas and the Beaver were 
probably the two most feared Ohio Indians in Pennsylvania and 
a special bounty of £350 was offered for their killing or 
capture. Pennsylvania Gazette, January 1, 1756; Deposition of 
John Craig, March 30, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 
2:78.
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the Enemy" and deserted in hundreds. By the middle of August 
the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier was almost completely 
unguarded, an easy target for the French and their Indian 
allies. Only one protection remained for the English: the 
Susquehanna Indians.39
The presence of the Susquehanna Indians formed a barrier 
which it would have been difficult for the French and their 
allies to cross as long as the natives were at peace with the 
English. Braddock's defeat, however, released the Susquehanna 
Indians. Previously the Susquehanna Indians had maintained 
peaceful relations with the English. Enclosed by the English 
to the south and east and the Iroquois to the north, they were 
exceptionally vulnerable to reprisals from the English or 
their Iroquois allies and thus had felt powerless to act. But 
now English power had collapsed, the French had established 
themselves in the Ohio Valley and on Lake Erie, and the 
Iroquois seemed determined to maintain a neutrality in the 
conflict. The time was ripe for the Susquehanna Indians to 
express their grievances.
39 Col. Innes to Col. Dunbar, August 6, 1755, Col. Dunbar 
to Col. Innes, August 7, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas 
Robinson, August 20, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, 
September 6, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward 
Expansion 1700-1783, (16) 2:468, (16) 2:469, (16) 449-451 
(1328) 11:1027; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:550, 602- 
603; Gov. Dinwiddie to Col. Dunbar, July 26, 1755, Gov.
Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, August 7, 1755, August 20, 
1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, August 20, 1755, Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:118-120, 139- 
140, 162-163, 164; Virginia Gazette, August 8, 1755.
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In the mid-eighteenth century the Susquehanna Valley was 
home to a mixture of many different Indian groups. On the 
Susquehanna River, in the township of Paxton in Lancaster 
County, lived the Conestoga Indians. The Pennsylvania remnant 
of the much larger Susquehannock tribe, the Conestogas were 
the most assimilated to English ways of the Susquehanna 
tribes. Farther north, in the Juniata Valley, lived a band of 
Nanticokes and Conoys who had moved north from Virginia and 
Maryland in the early eighteenth century. East of them, at 
the Forks of the Delaware, lived the Tutelos, also originally 
from Virginia. The Tutelos were the Susquehanna group most 
under the influence of the Iroquois, and many of the tribe 
moved north after 1753 to join the Cayugas. On the eastern or 
northern branch of the Susquehanna, and on the upper reaches 
of the Delaware River lived the Minisinks, a sub-group of the 
Delawares, driven from their homeland in New Jersey. All the 
Indians of the Susquehanna region were dominated by the 
largest tribe in Pennsylvania, the Delawares.40
The Susquehanna Delawares lived principally along the 
east branch of the Susquehanna River, with major settlements 
in the Wyoming Valley at Diahoga and Nescoping, with smaller 
settlements along the West Branch, most notably at Great 
Island. Other smaller groups lived on the upper reaches of
40 Bruce G. Trigger, ed., Handbook of North American 
Indians, Vol. 15, Northeast, pp.221, 246, 366-367, 501.
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the Delaware River, and in the northern parts of Northampton 
and Berks counties in Pennsylvania.41
The Susquehanna Delawares were perhaps the Indian group 
with the most reason to fight the English. From the arrival 
of the first Pennsylvania settlers, the Delawares had been 
steadily pushed from their homes on the Delaware and 
Susquehanna Rivers. The Iroquois, supported by the English, 
had relegated the Delawares to the status of "women," a 
tributary people with no power to make war or to negotiate 
directly with the English. The English and the Iroquois used 
this designation as an excuse to deprive the Delawares of 
their lands.42
From the earliest settlement of Pennsylvania, many of the 
Pennsylvanians had attempted to maintain good and trusting 
relations with the Indians. Under William Penn, the Indians 
had, with good reason, trusted the English not to defraud 
them. Unfortunately in the early eighteenth-century relations 
with the Indians came increasingly under the influence of less
41 Bruce G. Trigger, ed., Handbook of North American 
Indians, Vol. 15, Northeast, pp.213-224.
42 Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois
Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier, 1701-1754, (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1983), pp.184-186; Francis Jennings, 
The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain
Confederation of Indian Tribes with the English Colonies from 
its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1984), pp. 301-302; C.A. Weslager, The Delaware 
Indians: A History, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University 
Press, 1972,) pp.196-218; C.A. Weslager, The Delaware Indian 
Westward Migration, (Wallingford, PA.: Middle Atlantic Press, 
1978), pp.12-19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
scrupulous men such as James Logan. Logan schemed to acquire 
lands from the Delawares for the colony beyond the original 
purchase line. By the early 1730s the Delawares had been 
driven out of their original homelands on the lower reaches of 
the Delaware River and had moved farther north and west into 
the Susquehanna Valley into territory which the Iroquois 
claimed though did not occupy.43
The Delawares' settlement on Iroquois-claimed land gave 
Logan and the Penns an opportunity they could not resist. The 
Penns were desperately short of funds; their "fortune" lay in 
their grant of Pennsylvania, but only a small part had been 
made available for settlement. The remainder of the land the 
Indians claimed and occupied, and it was necessary to get a 
quitclaim before the Penns could sell it. The Penns and their 
representatives in Pennsylvania connived with the Iroquois to 
define the Delawares as guests of the Iroquois on their land. 
The Iroquois were only too prepared to participate in this 
scheme since declaring the Delawares their guests could not 
fail to bolster their power and prestige.44
In 1735 the Penns produced notes of an old Delaware land 
cession, made in the seventeenth century.45 A day and a
43 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 
pp.238-316 passim.
44 Ibid., pp. 316-324.
45 Francis Jennings details how the piece of paper the 
Penns produced was not a "deed." In particular it bore no 
signatures or marks, and did not even contain all the details,
(continued...)
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half's walk would determine the boundary of the grant. At the 
time the Indians had understood that the walk would be done at 
a normal pace, the walkers stopping "to eat their dinner, 
[and] after that smoak a pipe." But the walk had never been 
completed and the Delawares had long ceded the lands it 
covered to the Pennsylvanians. In 1735 the Penns claimed the 
right to conduct the walk.46
In 1737, under intense Iroquois pressure, the Delawares 
agreed to allow the "Walking Purchase." With horror they 
discovered that the Penns intended to use trained runners to 
cover as much ground as possible. The land thus acquired 
included a large area along the Delaware River, the heart of 
Delaware territory. The Delawares protested, but the Iroquois 
quickly moved to silence them. In 1742 the Iroquois pointedly 
declared that the Delawares were "women" who had settled on 
Iroquois land and thus now had no power to treat directly with 
the Pennsylvanians but should only negotiate through the 
Iroquois. The Iroquois had designated the Delawares as women 
before. But previously the designation had born no opprobrium 
but rather represented their status as one of the most 
important of their "tributary tribes." Now the Iroquois
45(.. .continued)
but had blank spaces which were to be filled in. Ibid., p. 
332.
46 Ibid. pp.330-332. Jennings points out that the "notes" 
which were produced to support the claims for the "Walking 
Purchase" were only scribblings, and despite the claims of the 
Penns could in no way be called a grant or a deed.
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sought to rob them of their independence. Faced with the 
combined power of the Iroquois and the English, the Delawares 
had little choice but to bide their time.47
The Iroquois ordered the Delawares to move to the East 
Branch of the Susquehanna between Wyoming and Diahoga. At 
least there the Delawares could feel secure from English 
encroachment under the protection of the Iroquois. Indeed, 
the Pennsylvania authorities in the late 1740s and early 1750s 
made several efforts to restrict the spread of settlements 
into areas not yet purchased from the Iroquois. In 1748 and 
again in 1750 Richard Peters and Conrad Weiser led expeditions 
of magistrates to evict settlers from their lands. This move 
caused great discontent amongst the frontier settlers, 
although there was little actual resistance. However, the 
authorities were probably motivated more by a desire to 
preserve the profits of future land sales than a desire to 
protect the lands of the Delawares.48
Concern for the Delawares did not prevent the 
Pennsylvanians from pressuring the Iroquois for still further 
cessions of their lands. In April 1754 Governor Hamilton sent 
Conrad Weiser to visit the Iroquois-appointed leader on the 
Susquehanna, Shickalamy, at Shamokin to make inquiries into 
the possibility of further purchases. Shickalamy was
47 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, p.344; 
Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration, pp. 185-187.
48 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 5:431, 440-449.
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reluctant to act but was finally persuaded to go to Onondaga 
to open negotiations with the Iroquois.49
Negotiations got underway during the Albany Conference in 
June 1754. The Pennsylvania commissioners at the conference, 
John Penn, Richard Peters, Isaac Norris, and Benjamin 
Franklin, approached the Iroquois for a cession of land. The 
Iroquois initially agreed to cede all lands "to the south of 
the Western Branch [of the Susquehanna] as far as the 
Alleghenny Hills." The commissioners made clear their 
displeasure at such a small grant and insinuated that the 
Iroquois must be "under a Contract with the French for the 
Ohio Lands, and desired they would explain themselves on this 
Head." Instead, they demanded "a Deed for all the Lands that 
have been settled by White People, or are now wanted for 
Settlements, on the west Side of the River Susquehanna, as far 
Westward as the Province extends. "50
The Iroquois were very reluctant to make such a large 
grant, and were deeply divided. Eventually, however, they 
agreed to cede lands west of the Susquehanna, south of 
Shamokin to the boundary of the Province. The grant very 
specifically exempted the East Branch of the Susquehanna and 
Shamokin in as much as the Iroquois bluntly informed the
49 Conrad Weiser to Richard Peters, May 2, 1754, HSP, Penn 
Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:9; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 
6:24.
50 "Report of Richard Peters on Proceedings at Albany," 
August 5, 1754, HSP, Penn Mss., 2:4-7.
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Pennsylvanians "we will never part with the Land at Shamokin 
and Wyoming."51
It seemed that the Susquehanna Delawares were safe for a 
while. But almost immediately the lands on which they had 
settled became the focus of another group. In 1753 a group of 
Connecticut speculators had formed themselves into the 
Susquehannah Company. They intended to acquire lands on the 
East Branch of the Susquehanna River, which they regarded as 
part of the colony of Connecticut by virtue of its original 
charter. Soon the company had over eight hundred members, all 
eager for a share of the new lands.52
The Susquehannah Company was even less scrupulous than 
the Penns in obtaining grants and was prepared to recognize 
any deed as long as it came from an Indian, no matter what his 
origin or status. At the Albany Conference in the summer of
51 The actual boundary as determined by the deed was "all 
the Lands lying within the said Province of Pennsylvania 
bounded and limited as follows, namely Beginning at the 
Kittochtinny or Blue Hills on the West Bank of Sasquehannah 
River, and thence by the said River to a mile above the mouth 
of a certain Creek called Kayarondinhagh, thence North West 
and by West as far as the said Province of Pennsylvania 
extends to its Western Line or Boundary, thence along the said 
Western Line to the South Line or Boundary of the said 
Province, thence by the said South Line or Boundary to the 
South side of the said Kittochtinny Hills, thence by the South 
side of the said Hills along the said Hills to the place of 
Beginning." "Report of Richard Peters on Proceedings at 
Albany," August 5, 1754, HSP, Penn MSS: Indian Affairs, 2:4-7.
52 "Minutes of a Meeting of the Susquehannah Company," 
September 6, 1753, Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Susquehannah
Company Papers, 10 Vols., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), 1:40-41; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania,
6:259.
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1754, Martin Lydius, acting for the company, managed to 
acquire a deed to the East Branch of the Susquehanna from 
several Iroquois of dubious repute for £2,000.53 The company 
soon set about surveying and selling their lands. They 
quickly won the support of many Pennsylvania inhabitants by 
offering land for sale at prices considerably lower than those 
set by the proprietors. Most important, they won over the 
local magistrates, who refused to act against them. In 
November 1754 Richard Peters received a report from 
Northampton County that there was "not one Magistrate. . . but 
what joins them." John Shickalamy complained bitterly to 
Morris about the settlers moving onto lands reserved for the 
Indians and "coming like Birds to disturb me." Conrad Weiser 
added his voice to the clamor, warning that if the government 
continued to allow settlement, "there will certainly be 
Bloodshed, for the Indians always said they would never suffer 
any white People to settle Wyomink or higher up.',S4
The Susquehanna Delawares knew they were in a dangerous 
predicament. They had been forced from their heartland by the 
Pennsylvanians in the Walking Purchase. Then the Iroquois had 
schemed to keep them silent while granting away still more of
53 "Deed from Indians of the Six Nations to the
Susquehannah Company, " Susquehannah Company Papers, 1:101-102; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:248, 259.
54 "Report of Richard Peters on the Proceedings at
Albany," August 5, 1754, HSP, Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:4-
7; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:341-342; Colonial
Records of Pennsylvania, 6:248-249, 250, 253-254, 267.
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their lands. Now the final vestiges of their homeland were 
the focus of a group whom both the Iroquois and Pennsylvanians 
seemed reluctant to halt. The Delawares faced the possibility 
of losing all their lands in Pennsylvania. Yet they felt 
powerless to act. They could not dare risk the wrath of the 
English and the Iroquois. The defeat of General Braddock gave 
them their opportunity. With the English unable to mount an 
offensive and the Iroquois carefully walking a path of 
neutrality, the Delawares felt they could finally risk 
breaking with the English and seeking their independence from 
Iroquois domination. They also knew that they could gain 
succor from the French.
Braddock's defeat had also provided the French with an 
unparalleled opportunity. By committing regular troops, the 
British had in effect declared war on France. But Newcastle 
believed that the war could remain limited to North America, 
for "in North America, the Disputes are; And there They shall 
remain for us; And there the War may be kept."55 
Newcastle's hopes were not unreasonable. The French had no 
wish to start a general war over North America. They had been 
deeply disturbed that de Villier's expedition had caused so 
much "ferment" in England and were aware that in any struggle 
limited to North America the Royal Navy would be able to
55 Duke of Newcastle to Sir Benjamin Keene, April 28 1755, 
Disposition of Dunbar's Regiment [undated] BL Additional Mss., 
32,854:299-302, 35, 909:196-199; Machault to Duquesne, February 
17, 1755, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial 
History of New York, 10:275-278.
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strangle French trade and supplies, while the English colonies 
so decisively outnumbered the French colonies that their 
weight of numbers must quickly tell. In April 1755 Governor 
Vaudreuil had received instructions from Paris that he must be 
careful that "he might not appear the aggressor." The French 
intention was to continue on "a strict defensive, so long as 
the English will not make any attack, which is to be regarded 
as a rupture on their part."55
However, Braddock's defeat meant both that the British 
had started the war and that the French had dominance, if only 
temporarily, in North America, and the risk of a full-scale 
war seemed more attractive. In Europe, French forces had an 
overwhelming superiority over the English. In addition, the 
French had managed to break apart Britain's alliance with 
Austria and Russia and left Britain with Prussia as her only 
ally. If the war could be fought quickly in Europe before too 
many losses were sustained in North America, they would be 
able to force some major concessions from Great Britain.57
The French took the war to Europe by attacking the 
English-held island of Minorca in the Mediterranean. 
Suddenly, hostilities which had begun in the Ohio Valley had 
become a world war. In Canada French regular troops were to
56 "Private Instructions to Vaudreuil," April 1, 1755, 
Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History o.f 
New York, 10:292.
57 Jones, Britain and the World, pp. 209-210; Speck, 
Stability and Strife, pp. 262-263.
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hold colonial forces at bay while parties of Indians commanded 
by French officers were to harass the colonial frontier. On 
land the French army was to invade and plunder George II's 
electorate of Hanover. If the colonies could be dissuaded 
from their support of the war, the crown terrified of the 
destruction of his hereditary homeland, and the administration 
convinced that the costs of the war were becoming too great, 
it might be possible to obtain an advantageous peace from 
Great Britain. By 1756 a full-scale war had broken out.58
Braddock's defeat was the final essential element in the 
collapse of British policy. It was his defeat which
precipitated the descent of the French and Indians on the 
frontier. If the British had been able to maintain a 
substantial force on the frontier, it is doubtful that either 
the French or Indians would have felt sufficiently secure to 
attack. His defeat also provided the French with the 
motivation to recommence the war they had ended at Aix-La- 
Chapelle in 1748, and was to spark a world-wide conflict.
58 Gipson, The British Empire Before the American 
Revolution, The Great IVar for the Empire: The Years of Defeat, 
6:398-417.
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Chapter III 
In Search of A Policy
The Delawares and Shawanese [are] falling upon your Bretheren 
of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia in the most cruel and 
treacherous Manner. . . Unless you, the Six Nations, who have 
always maintained a Superiority over them Indians will now 
exert yourselves in this Case, you will not only loose that 
Authority which they hitherto acknowledged, but will have them 
your Enemies.
— Sir William Johnson to the Iroquois, February, 17561
Braddock's defeat opened the frontiers to the assaults of 
the French and their Indian allies. For the next four years, 
until 1759, the French and the francophile Indians subjected 
the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontiers to almost continual 
raids. There were two types of raids. The first the French 
initiated and planned. They were generally larger raids, 
originating primarily from Fort Duquesne, and to a lesser 
extent, Fort Niagara. Usually a French officer commanded 
these raids, sometimes accompanied by Canadian ensigns, often 
former coureurs de bois. The Indians who participated were 
generally western Indians, Ottawas, Potawatomis, and sometimes 
Ohio Indians, Twightwees, Shawnees, and Delawares. Normally
1 Council between Sir William Johnson & Iroquois, 
February 20, 1756, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Penn 
MSS: Indian Affairs, 2:68.
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the Indians determined the actual targets, while the French 
determined the regions to be raided. However, on occasions 
the French decided the targets, such as frontier forts like 
Fort Granville in Pennsylvania and Fort Vause in Virginia.
The second category of raids the Indians themselves 
initiated, with no French prompting. The Ohio Shawnees and 
Delawares raided Augusta, Frederick, and Hampshire counties in 
Virginia and Cumberland County in Pennsylvania, while the 
Susquehanna Delawares raided the Susquehanna Valley and 
Lancaster, Berks, and Northampton counties in Pennsylvania. 
These raids rarely attacked military targets and had no French 
involvement.
In many of the raids the Indians crossed the Appalachians 
in large parties and then split into smaller groups, after 
determining a rendezvous to regroup for the return. The 
smaller groups were able to pass through frontier defenses, 
penetrate deep into the settled parts of the provinces, and 
quickly retreat before colonial parties could be raised 
against them. This tactic made the groups extremely difficult 
to intercept and defeat. They travelled light and lived "off 
the land," particularly after the early raids had pushed the 
frontier back many miles, and the raiders were able to supply 
themselves with provisions from the fields of the abandoned plantations.2
2 In April 1756, for instance, the Indian raiders 
rendezvoused on the back of Warm Spring Mountain near 
Winchester. George Mercer to John Fenton Mercer, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:354-355.
(continued...)
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In the opening months of the war both Virginia and 
Pennsylvania attempted to develop a policy to deal with the 
emergency. The raids forced both colonies to change their 
traditional military and Indian policies. Virginia had long 
relied upon the militia to defend the colony. The raids soon 
proved that the militia was all but useless, and Virginia was 
forced to develop a professional military establishment in the 
form of the Virginia Regiment. Pennsylvania, on the other 
hand, had relied on Indian alliances to protect the colony. 
The collapse of Indian support forced the colony to develop a 
military policy for the first time. Simultaneously, the 
strength of the pacifist Quakers compelled the government to 
pursue a negotiated settlement.
The first raids had begun even before Braddock had 
marched. In July 1754 and again in the early spring of 1755, 
there were sporadic attacks on the Holston River in Augusta 
County. Although few Indians were involved in the raids and 
they killed few settlers, they created disproportionate alarm 
on the frontier because these were the first direct Indian 
attacks on the Virginia frontier for many years. The French 
organized these early raids out of Fort Duquesne, and the main 
Indian participants were Shawnees. The raids aimed to hinder 
and break communications between Virginia and the Cherokees in
2(...continued)
"Abstract of Dispatches received from Canada," June 4, 1756, 
Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
New York, 10:408.
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the Carolinas.3 In the latter months of 1754 Ohio Shawnees 
and Delawares also launched a few isolated raids on Cumberland 
County, Pennsylvania. Again, few Indians were involved. The 
raids concentrated mainly on taking plunder and driving off, 
rather than killing, the frontier settlers.4 These early 
raids were small in scale compared with the raids which 
followed Braddock's defeat. But they were a foretaste of what 
was to come. Without an organized system of defense the 
frontiers lay exposed and hundreds of frontier settlers 
abandoned their homes.
As Braddock advanced towards Fort Duquesne, the first 
large-scale raids descended upon the frontiers. At the end of 
June 1755 a heavy raid, composed of about 130 Indians, mainly 
Ohio Delawares and Shawnees, struck in the rear of Braddock's 
march at the settlement at Patterson's Creek, Virginia, twelve 
miles east of Fort Cumberland. The Indians killed eleven 
settlers and captured eleven more. From Patterson's Creek 
they spread out into the rest of Frederick and Hampshire
3 Dinwiddie to Richard Pearis, August 2, [1754], Brock, ed., 
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:266-268; Duquesne to 
Antoine Louis Rouille, Count de Jouy May 31, 1755, Sylvester K. 
Stevens & Donald H. Kent eds., Wilderness Chronicles of 
Northwestern Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Historical 
Commission, 1941) pp.89-90.
4 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:133-136, 402-409;
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counties and into Cumberland County in Pennsylvania, killing 
almost fifty settlers and capturing about thirty.5
Dinwiddie again discovered the limitations of the 
militia. Despite the raids, William Fairfax, the commander of 
the Frederick County militia, refused to march outside the 
county's boundaries. Other men refused to serve and remained 
to defend their own families or fled from the frontier. Even 
when the men could be persuaded to muster, they lacked 
adequate weapons to pose a serious deterrent to the raiders. 
Although by law all men were supposed to have their own arms, 
many did not or had unreliable weapons. In addition, the arms 
were of different calibers, making the provision of ammunition 
difficult.6
From the French perspective, the raids had the desired 
effect. The inhabitants deserted large areas of the 
backcountry behind Braddock, rendering the acquisition of 
supplies for the expedition increasingly difficult. The 
backcountry settlers who had not fled, or who lived in areas 
still free from raids, refused to bring provisions to the army
5 Maryland Gazette, July 3, 1755; Pennsylvania Gazette, July 
3, 1755; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:455-456, 457-458 463; 
Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, July 4, 1755, Boehm ed., 
BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (16) 2:344-346;
Edward Shippen to William Allen, July 4, 1755, H.S.P., Shippen
Family Papers, Vol. 1; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, July 5, 1755, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:85.
6 Gov. Dinwiddie to Gen. Braddock, July 4, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie 
to Thomas Bryan Martin, July 4, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. 
Sharpe, July 5, 1755, Brock ed., Maryland Gazette, July 24, 1755; 
Henning, Statutes At Large, 5:112-118.
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without an escort. This demand forced Braddock to divert some 
of his forces to provide a guard. Fleeing settlers clogged the 
roads with wagons heading east, hindering communications 
between Braddock and his rear.7
At the end of June, another party of Indians raided 
Holston's River in southwestern Augusta County. They soon 
advanced east into the New River Valley. The raid was small, 
but the Augusta County militia was in such disarray that it 
could not repulse the attack.8 Dinwiddie complained to the 
county commanders that "if the Militia w'd only in small 
Numb's appear with proper Spirit, the Banditti of Ind's w'd 
not face them; but it appears to me that the inhabit'ts of 
Augusta have been siez'd with a Pannick in allowing a few 
Ind's to bully all that Co'ty."9
Eventually enough militia assembled to oppose the 
raiders. But the defenders proved a sorry lot. In two
engagements, the Indians killed several Virginians, including 
the commander of one party and one of the most respected 
Augusta gentlemen, James Patton, while suffering no
7 Gov. Morris to Thomas Penn, July 8, 1755, Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (16) 2:442-
443; Edward Shippen to James Burd, July 8, 1755, H.S.P.
Shippen Family Papers, Vol 1; Colonial Records of
Pennsylvania, 6:641-642.
8 Gov. Dinwiddie to David Stewart, July 16, 1755, Gov. 
Dinwiddie to Col. Patton, July 16, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to 
John Buchanan, August 11, Brock ed., The Official Records of 
Robert Dinwiddie, 2:100-101, 101, 154-155.
9 Gov. Dinwiddie to William Byrd, July 22, 1755, Brock
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:110.
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casualties. By the end of July, the raiders had penetrated as 
far as Smith's Mountain in Halifax County, deep into the 
settled parts of Virginia, and had killed at least twenty- 
seven settlers in Augusta County alone.10 The raids of June 
and July were still small in scale compared with later forays, 
though they did more damage than in the winter of 1754-1755 
and the French reported that the Miami and Potawatomi Indians 
alone had killed or captured 120 English settlers.11
The complete failure of the militia disgusted Dinwiddie 
as he received repeated complaints from frontier settlers who 
found themselves unprotected and were forced to flee. He 
wrote despairingly to an officer of the Augusta militia, "if 
Y'r People will dastardly give up their Families and Interest 
to a barbarous Enemy, with't endeavour'g to resist them, they 
cannot expect to be protected." He added ominously "If they 
will run away from themselves and desert their Int[eres] ts[, ]
10 "A Register of Persons who have been either Killed, 
Wounded or taken Prisoners by the Enemy in Augusta County, as 
also of such as have made their Escape," Gov. Dinwiddie to 
James Buchanan, August 11, 1755, Draper Mss.: William Preston 
Papers, 1QQ:83, 86.
11 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 4, 11, October 9, 1755; 
Maryland Gazette, September 11, 25, October 2, 1755; Gov.
Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, September 15, 1755, Brock ed., The 
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:198-199; "Journal of 
Occurrences in Canada from October, 1755, to June, 1756," 
Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
New York, 10:401.
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those that y[e]t rema. to defend the Co[un]ty may hereafter be 
tho[ugh]t worthy of enjoying their Platat[ion]s.1,12
Dinwiddie summoned the House of Burgesses to meet on 
August 5. He urged them to grant money to raise troops and to 
pass a new militia law to increase its efficiency in defending 
the frontier. He implored them to "oblige every Subject, that 
is able to bear Arms, to be ready and obedient on all 
Occasions, to acquire such military Knowledge, and submit to 
such military Discipline as can alone make them act with 
Safety and Hon'r to themselves, and Utility to their Co'try." 
Fearful of the impact of the raids, the House quickly obliged. 
They agreed to grant £40,000 for 1,200 men to be formed into 
the Virginia Regiment.13 They also passed new regulations to
12 Virginia Gazette, August 8, 1755; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
August 21, 1755. Gov. Dinwiddie to John Buchanan, August 11, 
1755, Brock ed. , The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:155.
13 The Assembly sought to make Washington Commander-in- 
Chief. He had resigned his previous commission, disgusted at 
the independent companies' officers' refusal to regard the 
Governor's commission as equivalent to a royal commission. He 
served Braddock as a volunteer, as aid-de-camp. When the 
Assembly suggested his appointment he made known that his 
disgust at the conditions under which he had previously served 
and demanded the power "of having the Officers in some measure 
appointed with my advice, and with my concurrance." 
Unfortunately, Dinwiddie had already promised many of the 
commissions. The two entered into negotiations and eventually 
compromised. Washington was able to select most of the field 
officers, while other officers who had already received their 
commissions from Dinwiddie, retained them. Philip Ludwell to 
George Washington, August 8, 1755, Warner Lewis to George
Washington, [August 9, 1755,] George Washington to Warner
Lewis, August 14, 1755, George Washington to Andrew Lewis,
September 6, 1755, George Washington to Charles Dick,
September 6, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of
(continued...)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
improve attendance at musters, and hence training, and to 
provide stiffer penalties for insubordination, including the 
death penalty. Yet again, however, hopes that such stiff 
penalties would be enough for the militia to function as an 
effective local defense force proved false.14
Dinwiddie immediately set about raising six ranger 
companies of fifty men each. The rangers were to be based in 
small forts constructed along the frontier and to operate 
independently of the Virginia Regiment. Their role was to 
detect incoming parties before they could reach inhabited 
parts of the colony and to intercept them or alert other 
detachments to their presence. Meanwhile, Dinwiddie ordered 
the recruitment of sixteen companies of sixty men each to form 
the Virginia Regiment. In return for their commissions, the 
officers had to recruit a specific number of men for their own 
companies. If the system of voluntary recruiting failed, the
13(.. .continued)
George Washington, 1:356-357, 358-359, 360-361, 2:1, 19-20, 
21-22; Address of Gov. Dinwiddie to House of Burgesses, August 
[5], 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, August 7, 
1755, Instructions to Washington," [August 14, 1755], Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:134-135, 141- 
143; Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, August 7, 1755, 
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(16) 2:375-380; "Extracts of Letters from Gov. Dinwiddie,"
August 7, 20, September 6, 1755, British Library, Additional 
Mss., 33,029:210; Henning, Statutes At Large 6:521-530; 
Mcllwaine, Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756- 
1758, 297-298.
14 Henning, Statutes at Large, 6:53 0-544.
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House empowered Dinwiddie to draft unmarried men from the 
militia to complete the numbers required.15
As the Virginian military effort had proved less than 
expected, Dinwiddie hoped that the Cherokees and Catawbas 
would send warriors to protect the Virginia frontier. In 
August he sent Daniel Carroll with a message to them. In 
September several Cherokee warriors came to Williamsburg and 
held a conference with Dinwiddie. Dinwiddie requested that 
they should station some of their men on the New and Holston's 
Rivers to protect their communications with Virginia. Another 
deputation who arrived in Williamsburg at the beginning of 
October agreed to protect southwestern Virginia. However, it 
would be some time before they could send men. Virginia was 
still without Indian allies and an effective military force as 
the winter drew near.16
15 The dependence of a commission on the recruitment of a 
specific number of men was standard procedure in the mid­
eighteenth century. Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, August 29, 
1755, Gov. Dinwiddie's Instructions to George Washington, 
[August 14, 1755] The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:182, 184-186; General Instructions for Recruiting, September 
1-3, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., Papers of George 
Washington, 2:13-14; Henning, Statutes at Large, 6:521-53 0. A 
condition of accepting a commission in the Virginia Regiment 
was that the officer had to recruit a certain number of men. 
Failure to do so was considered equivalent to resigning one's 
commission. Each captain was to raise thirty men, each 
lieutenant eighteen, and each ensign twelve.
16 "Message from Gov. Dinwiddie to the Catawbas and 
Cherokee Indians," August 22, 1755,"Minutes of a Council with 
the Cherokee Indians," September 5, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to 
John Smith, September 6, 1755, Brock, ed., The Official
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:168-169, 187-188, 190;
"Negotiations of Governor Dinwiddie with the Cherokees,"
(continued...)
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At the end of September, scattered reports arrived of 
parties of Ohio Indians skulking around Fort Cumberland. Adam 
Stephen, the commander at the fort, reported that about 150 
Indians had crossed the Appalachians and then "divided into 
Small parties." One party descended on the Greenbriar River 
in Augusta County killing twelve and capturing eight. Another 
party descended on Patterson's Creek east of Fort Cumberland. 
They attacked on October 1, killing forty-two settlers. The 
party then pressed on down the Potomac to Town Creek, 
Maryland, wreaking havoc en route. A third party of 
Delawares, commanded by Shingas, descended on the South Branch 
of the Potomac. This raid so terrified the detachment of the 
Virginia Regiment stationed there that they abandoned their 
positions and retreated towards Edwards Fort on the Cacapon.17
The Virginia frontier was in chaos. Hundreds of families 
fled, abandoning their belongings. Washington, who had been 
supervising recruitment in Fredericksburg, hurried back to 
Winchester. There he "found everything in the greatest hurry 
and confusion by the back Inhabitants flocking in, and those
16(.. .continued)
October 1, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward
Expansion, 1700-1783, (16) 2:493-498.
17 Adam Stephen to George Washington, October 4, 1755,
George Washington to William Vance, October 10, 1755, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:72-73, 
93; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11/12, Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:236-242; 
"Register," Draper Mss.: William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:641-643; Maryland 
Gazette, October 16, 1755.
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Figure 2: Towns and Counties of the Virginia and
Pennsylvania Frontier in the 1750s.
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of the Town removing out." He encouraged the frontiersmen to 
remove to the many blockhouses which the Virginia Regiment and 
the frontiersmen themselves had built along the frontier 
rather than completely abandon the region. A few did, but 
most were intent on fleeing as far as possible and warned 
Washington that if he attempted to stop them, they would "blow 
out [his] brains."18
Many of the troops Washington had recruited were still in 
Fredericksburg for rudimentary training. Washington attempted 
to speed their march to Winchester, but the newly appointed 
officers were slow to act. Their own safety concerned them as 
much as the safety of the province. When Washington called 
out the militia from the counties of Augusta, Frederick, 
Hampshire, Prince William and Fairfax, they refused to muster. 
One captain claimed that "his Wife, Family and Corn was at 
Stake, so were those of his Soldiers, therefore it was not 
possible for him to come." Those soldiers and militia who 
were in Winchester, or who arrived from Fredericksburg, 
deserted in droves upon the first warning of an attack.19
18 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 8, 1755, 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:83-84, 
101-102.
19 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11/12, 
1755, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:239; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, 
Abbot and Twohig eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:103, 
106; Pennsylvania Gazette, October 30, 1755.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
120
With the militia failing to provide protection, the 
frontier settlers feared an Indian onslaught. Fear soon 
turned to panic, which in turn hampered the defense efforts, 
breeding yet greater fear and panic. Settlers fleeing their 
plantations blocked the roads, making it all but impossible to 
send detachments to intercept the raiding parties. When 
Washington attempted to speed reinforcements from Winchester 
to the South Branch and Fort Cumberland, they were unable to 
move owing to "the Crowds of People who were flying" down the 
roads.20
Panic also bred wild rumors. There were even reports 
that Winchester had fallen. The rumors made it exceedingly 
difficult for Washington and his commanders to judge the most 
effective disposition for the few troops they had at their 
disposal, and resulted in much time and effort being wasted. 
On October 11 an alarm was raised that a large party of 
Indians had attacked a plantation twelve miles from 
Winchester. The next report purported that the raiders had 
penetrated to within four miles of Winchester. The 
townspeople were "flying in the most promiscuous manner." In 
desperation, Washington sent out a company to intercept the 
raiders. What the company found, however, was not a large 
Indian raiding party but "a Mulattoo and negro seen hunting,"
20 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, 
Abbot and Twohig eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:105.
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and three drunken soldiers "carousing, firing their Pistols, 
and uttering the most unheard of Imprecations."21
The October attacks revealed many critical weaknesses in 
Virginia's military system. The military regulations the 
House had approved were completely inadequate. The provisions 
for conducting courts martial were insufficient, and there 
were no provisions at all for prosecuting civilians who aided 
deserters and hampered the defense efforts. Washington found 
it all but impossible to organize an adequate defense, for 
civilians refused to cooperate with military authorities. He 
complained that "no orders are obey'd but what my a Party of 
Soldiers, or own drawn Sword Enforces; without this a Single 
horse, for the most urgent occasion, cannot be had, to such a 
pitch has the insolence of these People arriv'd."22
Washington pressed Dinwiddie to persuade the Assembly to 
pass a new mutiny law which would enable him to keep order. 
Under the "Act for making Provision against Invasions and 
Insurrections" of 1748, the only punishments which could be 
inflicted on mutinous troops were fines. In the face of a 
determined enemy, fines were unlikely to be much deterrent to
21 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11-12, 
1755, Brock, ed. , The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:238-239; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 
1755, "Memorandum and Advertisement," [October 13, 1755,] 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
2:102-104, 109-110.
22 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11/12, 
1755, Brock, ed. , The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:'237.
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mutiny and desertion. Washington pressed for the provision of 
the death penalty for such offenses and urged the House to 
make civilians "liable to certain heavy Fines, or Corporal 
Punishments for Entertaining of Deserters." He was aware, 
however, of the deep opposition of some in the House to such 
harsh measures, even in time of war. He commented to 
Dinwiddie that he had "some surprise, that we alone shou’d be 
so tenacious of Liberty as not to invest a Power where 
Interest and Politics so unanswerably demand it; and from 
whence so much good must consequently ensue." He threatened, 
publicly, that if the House would not pass new military 
regulations, he would resign his commission and leave the 
colony to its fate.23
Dinwiddie summoned the House to meet on October 27. At 
its opening, Dinwiddie urged the Burgesses to pass measures 
promoting discipline and improving recruitment. He warned 
them that the defensive measures of the Virginia Regiment 
would "prove abortive, unless the commanding Officer be 
enabled to keep them under strict Discipline, and in a proper 
Submission to their Officers." He then informed them of 
Washington's difficulties in recruiting. Most distressing 
were the "repeated complaints. . . of the great Obstructions 
given to the Service, by many of the Magistrates and other
23 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11/12, 
1755, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:237-238; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 
1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
2:103; Henning, Statutes at Large, 5:112-118.
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civil Officers, some of whom have even given Protection to 
those who have shamefully deserted.” Some officers "with an 
unparalled [sic] and most criminal Undutifulness to their 
Country, have discouraged, and prevented the enlisting of 
Men.1,24
Impressed by Washington's pleas and threats, the House 
quickly passed a new mutiny act. The act approved the death 
penalty for desertion and disobedience. But the act still did 
not stem the flow of deserters because Washington had to apply 
to Dinwiddie for writs to hold courts martial, and before 
Washington could carry out a sentence he had to supply 
Dinwiddie with full transcripts of the trial for the 
governor's approval. As a result the whole process was 
tediously slow and proved little deterrent to deserters and 
mutineers.25
Moreover, the House was not in session long enough to 
begin to consider other penalties for civilians. Dinwiddie 
prorogued it after several of the members "began to be 
factious and enter'g into Cabals very incosist't with their 
Duty at this Period." Several burgesses attempted to use the 
emergency to press for the establishment of a loan office to 
emit £200,000 in paper money. The exchange rate on Virginia
24 H.R. Mcllwaine, Journal of the House of Burgesses, 
1752-1755, 1756-1758, pp.319-320.
25 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, January 13, 1756, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:316; 
Henning, Statutes, 6:559-564.
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currency had already fallen from a 25% discount in 1754, to a 
32%% discount in the fall of 1755. Dinwiddie thus felt that 
he could not in good conscience allow the issuing of paper 
money. When several burgesses pressed their cause, Dinwiddie 
dissolved the House and issued writs for a new election.26
Fortunately for Virginia, following the October 1755 
Potomac raids, the French and the Ohio Indians did not subject 
the frontier to another major raid until the following April. 
Washington used the lull to attempt to rationalize the 
frontier defenses. He began the construction of a series of 
forts from which scouts could range the frontier to detect 
raiding parties and raise the alarm. He determined that 
Winchester should be the base of operations for the Virginia 
Regiment and began construction of a large fort there, named 
Fort Dinwiddie in honor of the governor. He also abandoned 
any dependence upon the militia and used it solely as an 
auxiliary force, to garrison forts when the regular troops 
were needed elsewhere, and when he believed there was little 
chance of attack.27
26 Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washingi. October 18, 1755, 
Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Morris, Novemoer 12, 1755, Gov. 
Dinwiddie-to Gov. Dobbs, November 13, Gov. Dinwiddie to the 
Earl of Granville, November 15, 1755,Brock, ed., The Official 
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:247-248, 264-265, 265-266, 275; 
William Fairfax to George Washington, October 20, 1755, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:132.
27 Adam Stephen to Washington, November 7, 1755, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:158-159.
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Washington's attempts to organize the colony's defense 
were hindered by the slow pace of recruiting for the Virginia 
Regiment. By the end of December 1755, instead of the one 
thousand men the Assembly had authorized for the regiment, 
Washington's officers had recruited only five hundred. It was 
not until the middle of January that Washington was finally 
able to divide the regiment into the sixteen companies which 
Dinwiddie had authorized. Even then, many units were still 
incomplete, leaving the command structure inefficient and 
cumbersome and lessening the impact of training.28
Recognizing the weaknesses of the regiment and eager for 
their own share of glory, several groups of Virginia gentlemen 
organized their own volunteer forces. The gentry in Hanover 
county formed a company of volunteers which ranged the 
frontier in October. In the spring of 1756 a larger volunteer 
group of "Associators," commanded by Peyton Randolph, 
assembled in Fredericksburg. The volunteer companies, 
however, were all but useless. They were top-heavy in 
officers, thin in ranks, and rarely courageous enough to 
engage in combat.29
28 Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, Brock, ed., The 
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:307. "Order," January 
9, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 2:259-263.
29 Virginia Gazette, November 7, 1755; John Robinson to 
George Washington, May 3, 1756, Landon Carter to George
Washington, May, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of 
George Washington, 3:87, 186; Pennsylvania Gazette, May 20, 
June 3, 1756; Maryland Gazette, May 20, 1756.
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Washington also sought to strengthen Virginia's defenses 
by withdrawing the forces garrisoned at Fort Cumberland to 
blockhouses and forts near still-inhabited areas to the east. 
While Fort Cumberland was located on the outer limits of 
settlement in 1754, and although important as a supply depot 
for assaults on the Ohio, it was a great liability in 
defensive terms. Garrisoning it drew men from other areas 
without protecting the settlers, for raiders could easily by­
pass the fort. Supplying the fort was also difficult. 
Moreover, because the fort was in Maryland, there were 
constant disputes over command between Washington, his 
officers, and Colonel Dagworthy of the Maryland forces. 
However, pressure from Dinwiddie and from General Shirley
forced Washington to maintain the fort for a future attack on
the Ohio.30
In Pennsylvania, news of Braddock's defeat threw the 
frontier into chaos. The news caused settlers to quit their 
plantations, leaving crops rotting in the fields. A report 
from Carlisle confirmed that the settlers were "in general in 
great Trouble and Confusion" and the "Back Settlers are in
general fled, and are likely to be ruined for the Loss of
their Crops and Summer's Labour."31 In Philadelphia initial
30 Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 270-271n; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, 
January 14, 1756, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert 
Dinwiddie, 2:317.
31 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 31, 1755.
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reaction to the news suggested that governor and Assembly 
could reconcile their differences. The Assembly agreed to 
provide £50,000 to raise troops for the frontier. Even Quaker 
assemblymen acquiesced to funding volunteer units, while other 
members abandoned their quest for paper money, proposing 
instead to raise funds by a tax "upon all Estates, Real and 
Personall, and Taxables, within this Province."32
However, old disputes soon resurfaced. On August 5, 
Morris rejected the bill because it violated his instructions 
in other ways: it taxed proprietary lands and the Assembly 
appointed assessors to determine the rates. Most
Pennsylvanians imagined the Penns as fabulously wealthy 
aristocrats, and the Assembly would not exempt the colony's 
largest landowner from taxation. But while the Penns were 
great landowners, most of their lands were undeveloped and 
they were relatively impoverished. Instead of defending his 
actions in terms of the chimera of the Penns' wealth, Morris 
instead informed the Assembly that "all Governors. . . are
from the Nature of their Office exempt from the Payment of 
Taxes," and, in the same manner that the House of Commons 
could not tax the Crown, the Assembly could not tax the 
Proprietors. But the Assembly would not concede and merely
32 Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser., 5:3933.
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replied that "the Proprietary. . . does not govern us. The
Province supports a Lieutenant to do that Duty for him."33
Morris attempted to break the stalemate by offering Ohio 
lands to all who would serve on the frontier. But the 
Assembly rejected his proposal. It pointed to the 
contradiction in his position: while claiming he was "bound 
not to encumber proprietary lands," he was "proposing to give 
away 6 or 700,000 acres of it as bounties." Assemblymen 
maintained that they must merely "endeavour patiently to wait 
for that Relief which Providence may in due Time think fit to 
favour us with." Others, however, were increasingly concerned 
at the deadlock. Several leading Pennsylvanians were so 
distressed by the disputes that they offered to pay the 
Proprietors' tax if defense measures were passed.34 But the 
Assembly refused to consider any measures as long as deep 
divisions still existed with the governor over taxation.
So far, only the Ohio Indians and western Indians had 
raided Virginia and Cumberland County. Most Pennsylvanians 
believed that the French and their allies could not attack 
deep into Pennsylvania, certainly not east of the Susquehanna,
33 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:454-456, 8th Ser., 
5:3937, 3939; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:525-527;
Pennsylvania Gazette, August 14, 1755.
34 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:517-519, 525-528, 
530, 563-564, 585, 586; Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser.,
5:3932; Pennsylvania Gazette, August 14, 1755; Address of
Gov. Morris to the Assembly, August 9, 1755, Address of Gov. 
Morris to the Assembly, August 21, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, 
Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (16) 2:432, (17) 2:740- 
741.
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unless the Susquehanna Indians were "drawn off." In October 
rumors began to circulate of their defection. Scarouady, 
supported by George Croghan, warned that the Susquehanna 
Delawares were close to abandoning their allegiance to the 
English and might even take up arms because the French were 
making great efforts to lure them away.35
By the fall of 1755 virtually all the former anglophile 
Indians on the Susquehanna had deserted Pennsylvania. The few 
who remained were in no position to offer support for the 
colony. The Council thus decided that the only hope to 
protect the frontier, without raising troops and beginning a 
war, was to engage the Iroquois to stop their tributary 
Indians from assaulting the frontier. The belief was still 
widespread in Pennsylvania that the Delawares remained at the 
bidding of the Iroquois. In mid-October they sent Scarouady 
and Andrew Montour to inform the Iroquois of the "treachery" 
of the Ohio Indians and to encourage them to intervene to 
prevent the defection of the Susquehanna Indians.36
While the Pennsylvanians threatened the Delawares with 
the wrath of the Iroquois, the French also sent a clear 
message. The governor of New France informed the Indians who 
were reluctant to fight the Pennsylvanians to "go where I
35 Pennsylvania Archives, 6th ser., 2:475-576; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 6:551-554, 588-590, 615-616, 642-643.
36 Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, October 18, 1755, HSP 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:58; Scarouady and Montour did not 
leave for Iroquois until late January 1756. See Chapter IV for 
more details of their mission.
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cannot hurt you. You are in my way. You must not stay any 
longer." They should move to the Ohio Valley or at least 
farther up the East Branch. Alarmed by the French threats, 
the Susquehanna Delawares offered no resistance and either 
moved away or allowed the French and their Indian allies to 
move through their territory unmolested to reach the 
unprotected Pennsylvania frontier. Many even joined their 
Ohio compatriots and prepared for war.37
In the middle of October the Susquehanna Delawares called 
Andrew Montour to the "Great Island" near the forks of the 
Susquehanna to inform him that the French had given them a 
hatchet "to be used against the English if they proved saucy." 
John Harris, who visited the "Great Island" at the end of 
October, reported that he found the Indians all painted in 
black and ready for war. It was apparent that the Susquehanna 
Delawares were joining the French. Weiser warned William 
Allen, "I think all our Indians are gone off with the French, 
or rather joined them because they could not stand their 
Ground." Within a few days this realignment became apparent 
as news of raids by the Susquehanna Delawares arrived in 
Philadelphia.38
On October 16 a party of Susquehanna Indians from the 
West Branch descended upon the settlement of Penn's Creek on 
the west side of the Susquehanna, a few miles south of
37 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:683.
38 Ibid., 6:659-660, 672-673.
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Shamokin. The raiders killed or captured twenty-five 
settlers. A party that set out from Harris' Ferry to bury the 
dead was itself attacked on October 24, losing eight more. At 
the end of October the raiders crossed the Susquehanna and 
attacked into Lancaster County, coming within five miles of 
Harris' Ferry and leaving a trail of destruction along the 
Susquehanna.39
This was the first attack east of the Susquehanna. The 
final realization that the Susquehanna Delawares had deserted 
their former allies and that the province no longer had 
protection from raids caused great terror amongst the 
inhabitants. Pennsylvania had no militia, no regular forces, 
and a substantial proportion of the population who opposed any 
form of violence, even self-defense. Some of the frontiersmen 
attempted to organize themselves to make a stand, but they 
lacked arms, experience, and authority. Weiser informed 
Morris from Reading that "We are all in uproar, all in 
Disorder. . . We have no authority, no commissions, no
officers practised in War, and without the commisseration of 
our Friends in Philadelphia, who think themselves vastly safer 
than they are." He warned Morris, "if we are not immediately
39 "Petition of the Inhabitants of Penn's Creek," October 
20, 1755, HSP, Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:32; William
Buchanan and John Armstrong to James Burd, October 27, 1755, 
HSP, Shippen Family Papers, Vol.2; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 6:645, 647, 650-652, 654, 654-655; Gov. Morris 
to Governors of Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey and New York, 
October 29, 1755, Boehm, ed. , BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward
Expansion, 1700-1783, (17) 2:813-814.
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supported we must not be sacrificed, and therefore are 
determined to go down with all that will follow us to 
Philadelphia, & Quarter ourselves on its Inhabitants and wait 
our Fate with them."40
Morris informed the frontier inhabitants that if they 
would organize themselves into groups, he would do all he 
could to provide them with supplies and weapons. In 
Cumberland County the local gentry formed a general committee 
to defend the county. They appointed James Burd, a leading 
member of the county's elite, to command the men who had 
volunteered to defend the county and resolved to build five 
forts at the county's expense, to which they could evacuate 
all the women and children.41 Other settlers, rather than 
form themselves into military units, built their own 
blockhouses. However, the ad hoc defense units and frontier 
blockhouses were insufficient to protect the frontier. The 
blockhouses were small and often offered an inviting target to 
the raiders. The men were volunteers and received no pay.
40 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:667.
41 "Meeting of the General Council of Cumberland County," 
October 30, 1755, HSP: Lamberton Scotch-Irish Collection,
1:23; John Armstrong, William Smith, and William Buchanan, to 
James Burd, November 2, 1755, Pennsylvania State Archives, 
Edward Shippen Thompson Papers, 1:3; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 6:680.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
133
They quickly disbanded if they perceived it was more in their 
interest to flee or protect their families.42
Meanwhile, the raiders pressed west into Paxton Township, 
Lancaster County, and on into Berks County. Conrad Weiser 
attempted to organize defense efforts in the area and to halt 
the flow of refugees. But the inhabitants lacked arms and 
"did not care to fight if they could avoid it." The 
inhabitants' anger soon turned against the Quakers living in 
Reading. A report from the town declared that "The people 
exclaim against the Quakers, & some are scarce restrained from 
burning the Houses of those few who are in This Town." The 
raiders soon divided into smaller parties and harassed much of 
northern Lancaster and Berks counties, leaving a trail of 
devastation and terror.43
On November 1 Shingas' party, consisting of about one 
hundred Ohio Indians who had been raiding the South Branch in 
Frederick and Hampshire counties in Virginia, crossed into 
Pennsylvania and descended upon the Great Cove in Cumberland
42 In the spring of 1756 the blockhouses and forts 
themselves became the targets of the raids. For details see 
below. Gov. Morris to George Washington, October 31-November 
1, Abbot and Twohig, eds., Papers of George Washington, 2:151; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:680; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
November 6, 1755.
43 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:705; Conrad Weiser 
to Gov. Morris, November 18, 1755, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser
Papers, 1:60; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 19, 
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:49.
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County. They killed over forty settlers.44 Following the 
descent on the Great Cove, Shingas's party divided into 
smaller parties to ravage the Little Cove and Conolways.45 
John Potter, sheriff of Cumberland County, attempted to form 
the local inhabitants into a band to pursue the Indians to 
prevent them from raiding farther. But the inhabitants 
decided to vote on the suggestion and decisively rejected his 
proposal. On the night of November 2, over one hundred 
terrified settlers sought protection from Potter's only 
slightly less terrified volunteers.46
On November 16 the East Branch Susquehanna Delawares 
launched their first raid into the heart of Pennsylvania. A 
party attacked the settlements at Tulpehocken and Bethlehem in 
Berks County, killing thirteen. The party then divided into 
two groups. One group advanced southwest into Berks County, 
attacking several defense parties who were guarding key passes 
through the mountains. The other party attacked southeast 
towards the Delaware River. On November 21 the second group
44 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:668-669, 675, 676, 
704, 707; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November, 1755, HSP, 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:63; "Meeting of Residents of 
Cumberland County," November 3, 1755, HSP, Lamberton Scotch- 
Irish Collection, 1:23.
45 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:676.
46 Ibid. , 6:673-674.
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descended upon the Moravian settlement at Gnadenhiitten, 
killing all but two of the settlers.47
The raids on Berks and Northampton counties continued 
through December. Numerous small parties raided isolated 
targets and picked off settlers as they ventured back to their 
homes to recover their possessions. Weiser reported to Morris 
that "the Country is in a dismal Condition: Believe me kind 
Sir, that it cannot hold out long. Consternation, Poverty, 
Confusion, Parties is everywhere." William Parsons warned 
that even the inhabitants of the town of Easton on the 
Delaware River were preparing to evacuate. The raiders killed 
seventy-eight in Northampton County alone.48
A report from Northampton County painted a gruesome
picture: There may be seen horror and desolation,
populous Settlements deserted, Villages 
laid in Ashes, Men, Women and Children 
cruelly mangled and Massacred, some found 
in the Woods very nauseous for want of 
interment, some just seeking after the 
hands of the Savage Slaughterers, and 
some haggled and covered all over with 
Wounds, which look like so many Mouths 
crying for Vengence against their 
Murderers, and yelling at the negligence 
& insensibility of the Administration, to
47 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:703-704, 704-705, 
736-737, 737; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 18, 1755,
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:60; Timothy Horsfield to 
William Parsons, November 25, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part
I, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (17) 2:736-737; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, November 27, December 4, 1755.
48 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:756-761; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, December 11, 18, 25, 1755, January 8, 
1756; "List of Inhabitants Killed in Northampton County," 
December 19, 1755, HSP., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:52.
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whose inactivity there are so many 
Sacrifices.49
Meanwhile, a new Assembly met in Philadelphia. Although 
many Quakers had decided not to seek office and others made 
few efforts to campaign, many were returned, "so strongly were 
the Publick disposed to have Friends for their 
Representatives." Many Pennsylvanians distrusted Morris 
fearing that he intended to create compulsory militia service. 
Conrad Weiser reported to Richard Peters that one of his 
neighbors, Jonas Seely, had been running for sheriff of Berks 
County. It had seemed at first that he had much popular 
support. But then his opponents went around "to all most 
every man and reported that Jonas Seely was a Governors 
Man. . . and that he would Certainly bring things about that 
they must all take up a Musket and Exercise, which our foolish 
Germans did belief." As a result Seely was decisively 
defeated. A similar pattern was repeated over much of the 
colony. The strength of the Quakers meant that the Assembly 
was reluctant to enact any measure which might suggest the 
creation of compulsory military service.50
When Morris received news of the raids, he informed the 
Assembly and attempted to cajole them into providing funds for
49 List of Inhabitants Killed in Northampton Co., December 
19, 1755, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 2:52.
50 Christopher Wilson and John Hunt letter, November 4, 
1755, British Library, Additional Mss., 33029:355; Conrad 
Weiser to Richard Peters, October 2, 1755, HSP, Conrad Weiser 
Papers, 1:56.
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a defense force. The Assembly acquiesced in the creation of 
a strictly volunteer defense force, but again attempted to tax 
proprietary lands. Although Morris was prepared to compromise 
and assent to the bill, including the taxation of proprietary 
estates, he demanded in return that the rates for the 
proprietary estates should be set by commissioners jointly 
appointed by the governor and Assembly, not elected as the 
bill required. He also demanded that the bill include a 
suspending clause permitting the Privy Council to suspend the 
taxation of proprietary estates if they deemed it 
unconstitutional.51
The Assembly refused the amendments, claiming that "one 
of the most valuable Rights of British Subjects, [is] to have 
their Bills granting money to the Crown accepted without 
Amendments.” To put pressure on Morris, they declined to pay 
his salary or any other expenses of government. Thomas Penn 
applied more pressure by informing him of the considerable 
concern in London over the refusal "on our part to assist the 
publick at such a time as this." Many influential 
Pennsylvanians, including Richard Peters and several other 
members of the Council, expressed deep concern that "the lives 
of the people are not to [be] plaid with nor thrown away
51 Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser., 5:4101, 4102-4103.
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because the two parts of the Legislature differ," and pressed 
Morris to come to a compromise.52
Morris would not compromise over the supply bill. Nor 
would the Assembly compromise over efforts to create and 
regulate a volunteer military service. Mindful of the 
opposition to any military service amongst the Quakers, the 
Assembly was reluctant to act. Despite a flood of petitions 
from every quarter of the frontier "praying that the House 
would either enact a Militia Law, or grant a sufficient Sum of 
regular Troops as may be thought necessary to defend our 
Frontiers," the Assembly sought a different course of 
action.53
At the beginning of the session, Morris informed the 
Assembly that "the French had gained the Delawares and 
Shawnese to their Interest, under the ensnaring Pretence of 
Restoring them to their Country." Morris intended only to 
report that the Indians sought to drive the Pennsylvanians 
from the frontier. But to many in the Assembly, Morris' words 
suggested that the Indians still considered the frontier to be 
their land, whereas the Pennsylvanians believed that the 
Indians had sold these lands. The implication was that for 
some reason the Indians regarded the sale of their lands as
52 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:695, 731; Richard 
Peters to Conrad Weiser, October 14, 1755, HSP Conrad Weiser, 
1:57.
53 Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser., 5:4096, 4100-4101, 
4103, 4104, 4109; Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire, pp. 73, 79-85.
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invalid. The Assembly, led by the Quakers, demanded 
negotiations with the Delawares to discover the causes of 
their alienation, rather than preparations to fight.54
While the Assembly was correct to believe that there were 
genuine reasons for the alienation of their former allies, 
they could not guess how deep the animosity of the Susquehanna 
Indians ran. The Assembly established a commission to inquire 
into the alienation of the Indians, but it could find no 
definitive reason for the Delawares' alienation, even though 
the Assembly suspected that some of the proprietors' dealings 
may have lurked behind it.55
Many Pennsylvanians expressed dissatisfaction at the 
Assembly's determination to end the conflict by negotiation. 
The flood of petitions from the frontier meant that the 
Assembly was well aware of the dissatisfaction on the 
frontier. Soon it became apparent that dissatisfaction was 
not limited to the frontier. The mayor and aldermen of 
Philadelphia came before the Assembly to demand action to 
provide "legal protection to your bleeding Country, which 
ought to be the chief object of all Government." They warned 
that it would "not be possible to preserve the peace and quiet 
of this City, nor of the Province itself much longer, if some
54 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:684-685; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, November 13, 1755.
55 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:710, 724-728;
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effectual Methods are not speedily taken for their general 
Defence and Security."56
Almost as if on cue, a mob of seven hundred frontiersmen 
descended on Philadelphia demanding protection and denouncing 
the Assembly's refusal to compromise with Morris. The 
Assembly defended its actions by claiming that "We have the 
most Sensible concern for the poor distressed Inhabitants on 
the Frontiers. . . [but] Those who would give up essential 
Liberty to purchase a Little temporary safety deserves neither 
Liberty nor Safety." The frontiersmen, fuming at the 
Assembly's recalcitrance, replied that "they did not know that 
their Liberties were invaded, but they were sure their Lives 
& Estates were."57
With a mob hammering on their doors and faced with the 
threat of widespread unrest, the Assembly finally agreed to 
provide for the creation of a military force of "such people 
as are desirous to be united for military purposes." Morris 
disliked the bill because it did not mandate compulsory 
military service. But in a province such a Pennsylvania, 
where a substantial proportion of the inhabitants were 
pacifists, any compulsory military service would have been 
unthinkable. Morris also disliked the "democratic" elements
55 "Remonstrance by the Mayor, Aldermen, etc. to the 
Assembly of Pennsylvania," November 25, 1755, Boehm, ed. , BPRO
C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, (17) 2:714-717.
57 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser. , 2:552; Gov. Morris to 
Thomas Penn, November 28, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, 
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (17) 2:794-800.
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of the bill, for the companies were to elect their own 
officers, who in turn were to chose the regiment's colonel, 
lieutenant-colonel, and major. However, Morris did have the 
power to reject an officer, in which case the companies were 
to present him with a choice of two candidates and he was to 
pick one.58
Considering the nature of the province, the restrictions 
were reasonable. However, the greatest weakness of the law 
was that the commander could not maintain troops on garrison 
duty for over three weeks without the men agreeing beforehand. 
This restriction would cause great problems because one of the 
main duties of the Pennsylvania forces was the garrisoning of 
frontier forts. Compared to the militia laws in other 
colonies, let alone the army regulations in Great Britain, the 
Pennsylvania law was extremely lenient. Indeed, Governor 
Dinwiddie regarded the law as "a Joke on all military 
Affairs." But for a colony which had a strong pacifist 
tradition, it was a major development. Despite his
58 Morris has been bitterly attacked for his reluctance to 
approve such a just measure. However Morris also had to 
consider the reaction of the government in Whitehall. Indeed 
his reservations about the Assembly's acts were justified for 
in June 1756 the Privy Council disallowed the militia act as 
it was so much in discordance with British tradition, and 
because of the election of officers. Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 1:275-277; Pennsylvania Gazette, November 27, 
December 18, 1755; Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Ser., 5:4130.
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misgivings, Morris approved the bill, which laid the basis for 
the future defense of the colony.59
The Assembly went even further and provided £50,000 for 
the defense of the province and, in exchange for a voluntary 
contribution of £5,000 from the Penns, agreed to exempt 
proprietary estates from taxation. Although Morris still had 
reservations, because the bill suggested the Assembly could 
have taxed proprietary estates if it had wished, he 
nevertheless gave his assent. Pennsylvania finally had a law 
regulating military units and money to pay for them.60
By the end of 1755 both Virginia and Pennsylvania had 
created rudimentary military establishments. Whether these 
forces were capable of defending the colonies remained to be 
seen. Neither colony had developed a suitable strategy for 
winning the war and colonies had to struggle with the results 
over the following months. During the early months of 1756 
both Virginia and Pennsylvania strove to discover a policy 
which could halt the raids. Virginia attempted to woo the 
southern Indians, the Cherokees and Catawbas in particular, to 
aid in offensive measures, while Pennsylvania continued to 
pursue a combined military and diplomatic solution.
59 Gov. Dinwiddie to William Allen, January 2, 1756, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:313.
60 Gov. Morris to Thomas Penn, November 28, 1755, Boehm, 
ed. , BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (17) 
2:794-800.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
In Pennsylvania the commissioners appointed by the 
Assembly to oversee the colony's conduct of the war were 
convinced that the best means to fight the war was "to carry 
the warr into the Enemy's Country and hunt them in all their 
Fishing, Hunting, Planting, & dwelling places." George 
Croghan and others, however, argued that Pennsylvania should 
build a chain of forts to defend the backcountry before 
embarking on offensive operations. As a result of the 
influence of Croghan and his supporters with Morris, during 
the winter of 1755-1756 the colony followed a defensive 
policy. The newly raised provincial troops garrisoned an 
extensive network of fortifications to protect the province, 
while simultaneously the government continued to seek a 
negotiated settlement with the Indians.61
The forts extended in a continuous line along the 
frontier from the Maryland border to the Delaware River. 
Chief among them was Fort Augusta at Shamokin at the forks of 
the Susquehanna River. Dominating the forks, the fort 
controlled an important route into Pennsylvania for raiding 
parties coming from the Ohio and West Branch of the 
Susquehanna. It also served as an important base from which 
the Pennsylvanians exerted influence over the Susquehanna 
Delawares. However, like Fort Cumberland, it was many miles 
beyond the farthest settlements, and was difficult to 
reinforce and keep supplied. Some of the Council proposed the
61 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:153.
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construction of a fort at Adjouay, twelve miles above Wyoming, 
but it would have been completely impracticable and could not 
have been supplied.62 Although most of the forts were small, 
only having garrisons of twenty to fifty men each, many 
Pennsylvanians believed that they would "prove a sufficient 
Protection to the Inhabitants against such Parties as have 
hitherto appeared." The construction of the forts took 
considerably longer than had been expected, preventing 
Pennsylvania. from taking the offensive against the Indians 
through the summer of 1756.63
Meanwhile, the Pennsylvanians sought to negotiate a 
settlement with the Indians and to conclude a peace without 
fighting. Morris had received information from the missionary 
David Zeisburger that many East Branch Indians had still not 
deserted the English, but were afraid to come to negotiate
62 The fort at Adjouay was supposed to protect any 
"friendly" Delawares, and deter the French from interfering 
with the East Branch Susquehanna Delawares. Minutes of 
Council, February 26, 1756, H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 
2:75; William, Clapham to James Burd, June 7, 1756, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol 2; Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, 
June 15, 1756, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:75;
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:622-624; Colonial Records 
of Pennsylvania, 7:158-160.
63 The construction of the forts was not completed until 
the summer of 1756. Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:10- 
11, 153-154; Gov. Morris to George Washington, February 2, 
1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
2:316-317; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:577-578, 580- 
582; William Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753- 
1758, (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission, I960,) pp.168-193.
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because the Pennsylvanians "would suspect them for Enemies."64 
Morris countered by inviting the Delawares to a conference at 
Harris's Ferry in January. The governor sent Scarouady to 
Wyoming to ask the Delawares to attend and to promise 
protection for the Indians and their families. Although 
"Hitherto we have not been a Warlike People," the governor 
observed, "we have seen our Error, and are determined to act 
with Vigour. . . and afford. . . our Friends & Allies the
Protection they have a right to demand of us."65
Scarouady returned with bad news. He reported that the 
Susquehanna Delawares were completely in the French interest 
and that "they are determined to fight the English as long as 
there is a Man left; and that when they have conquered the 
English, they will turn their Arms against those Indians who 
will not join with them now."66 Not surprisingly, few Indians 
came in January. Those few were led by the most anglophile of 
the Susquehanna and Ohio Indians, "the Belt," Aroas (or as the 
English called him "Silver Heels,") Jagrea, and Newcastle, 
hardly an indication of a strong peace party amongst the 
Susquehanna Indians. They informed Morris too, that they
64 Deposition of David Zeisburger, November 22, 1755, 
Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(17) 2:718-719.
65 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:562-563, 564-565; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:753-754; "Minutes of 
Conference held at Carlisle," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, 
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (17) 2:826-829.
66 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:12; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 4th Ser., 2:578-580.
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believed most Susquehanna Delawares were firmly in the French 
interest. More to mollify the Quakers than with any real hope 
of peace, Morris persuaded Aroas and Scarouady to go to 
Nescoping to an old ally of the English, the Susquehanna 
Delaware John Shickalamy, to ascertain the disposition of the 
Delawares more precisely.67
While Morris awaited their return, ’’fifteen or twenty” 
East Branch Susquehanna Delawares attacked settlements near 
GnadenhUtten in Northampton County. The local inhabitants 
were so terrified that, although they could easily have driven 
off the attackers, they fled in terror. Throughout early 
January the party of raiders continued to harass Northampton 
County. On January 18 they ambushed a party on the Delaware 
River twelve miles above Easton. On January 27 a much larger 
raid of West Branch Susquehanna Delawares on the Juniata River 
in northern Cumberland County killed fifteen. The next day 
a smaller party of Ohio Indians fell on the Conolaway in 
southern Cumberland County. These raiders pressed on towards 
McDowell's Mill near the Susquehanna River, capturing several 
settlers there. In early February another small raiding party 
attacked Northampton County, near the Blue Mountain, killing 
two settlers and capturing four.68
67 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:574-576. Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 6:773-774, 7:1-3, 3-4, 33-35, 46-50.
68 Pennsylvania Gazette, January 8, 15, 29, February 5, 
12, 19, 1756; Robert Morris to James Burd, February 7, 1756, 
Hugh Mercer to James Burd, February 17, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen 
Family Papers, Vol. 2.
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In Virginia over the winter of 1755-1756, Governor 
Dinwiddie similarly sought to win the Cherokees. Dinwiddie 
believed that "with[ou]t some of the Ind[ian]s to join our 
Forces we may have the like Misfortune as at [the] 
Monongahela.1,69 Dinwiddie and the Cherokees had long been 
courting each other. The Cherokees sought to end their 
dependence upon South Carolina for trade goods. The mounting 
tension between Britain and France had aggravated the internal 
divisions among the Cherokees between those settled around 
Chota and those around Tellico. The divisions, which had long 
existed, developed into anglophile and francophile factions. 
Sensing the shifts amongst the Cherokees but misunderstanding 
the full implications, the Carolinians had threatened a trade 
boycott of the tribe if any of them supported the French. It 
was at this point that the Virginians offered to negotiate, 
much to South Carolina's Governor Glen's horror, but to the 
delight of the Cherokees.70
In October 1755, Dinwiddie sent Richard Pearis to the 
Cherokees to encourage them to send some of their men to 
defend the Virginia frontier. In November he appointed 
William Byrd and Edmund Randolph to treat with them and 
authorized them to offer payment for any warriors the
69 Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, November 15, 
1755, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:267.
70 David H. Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and 
Survival 1740-1762, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1962), pp.38-74, passim.
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Cherokees might send to Virginia. The negotiations were 
successful and 130 Cherokees spent the winter of 1755-1756 
guarding the New River Valley.71
With this victory Dinwiddie began to consider offensive 
operations against the Ohio Indians. In the fall of 1755 
Obadiah Woodson, one of the more experienced Virginia 
"woodsmen," had suggested an expedition against the Shawnees. 
But at the time Washington was still attempting to bring the 
Virginia Regiment to full strength. Because they disliked 
roaming the frontier defensively, many of the Cherokees 
supported Woodson and advocated a more honorable assault upon 
the Shawnees.72
Planning for an expedition in December 1755, Dinwiddie 
ordered William Preston and John Smith to draft about 350 men 
from the Augusta militia to form an expedition with Indian 
auxiliaries. In January 1756 he appointed Andrew Lewis to 
the command. In the same month he conferred with several 
Cherokee leaders who visited Williamsburg to confirm and
71 Negotiations with the Cherokees, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, 
Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (16) 2:493-498;
Corkran, The Cherokees Frontier, pp. 63-64; Gov. Dinwiddie to 
Gov. Dobbs, December 13, 1755, Brock, ed., The Official
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:290.
72 Gov. Dinwiddie to Obadiah Woodson, November 20, 1755, 
Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 14, 1755, Gov. 
Dinwiddie to Capt. Hogg, December 15, 1755, Brock, ed., The 
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:278-279, 292, 294-295.
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coordinate their participation.73 Preparations were complete 
by the beginning of February and the expedition set off on 
February 19 from Fort Frederick to travel up Stony Creek to 
the Ohio River to attack the Ohio Indians' towns.74
The Stony Creek expedition was beset with problems from 
the outset. The officers of the expedition were deeply 
divided. John Smith was under the impression that he was to 
be in command, as was Obadiah Wilson. When Dinwiddie 
appointed Andrew Lewis, the others became intensely jealous of 
his authority. In addition, all the Virginia officers took an 
immediate dislike to the Indian trader Richard Pear is, to whom 
Dinwiddie gave a commission in recognition of his services in 
persuading the Cherokees to aid the Virginians.75
The expedition had been badly planned. The strategy, 
urged by the Cherokees, had been to attack the Shawnee bases 
on the Scioto. The Cherokees expected the Virginia forces to 
travel light and live off the land as they did. However, the
73 Gov. Dinwiddie to Capts. Preston & Smith, December 15, 
1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, January 2, 1756, Gov. 
Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, January 15, 1756, Brock, ed., The 
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:230-232, 295-296, 308- 
310; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, January 13, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
2:278-280; Gov. Dinwiddie to William Preston, December 15, 
1755, Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:90.
74 William Preston's Diary of the Sandy Creek Expedition, 
Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, lQQ:96-97.
75 Gov. Dinwiddie to John Smith, January 15, 1756, Gov. 
Dinwiddie to Obadiah Wilson, January 15, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie 
to Richard Pearis, January 15, 1756, Brock, ed., The Official 
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:322-323, 323, 324-325.
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Virginia troops were incapable of inarching such a distance 
over the rough terrain. Heavy rains made fording streams 
difficult. The expedition "had no tents, nor Indeed hardly 
any other Necessaries for such a Journey." The February and 
March weather was cold and wet and, exposed to the bitter 
weather, many of the men fell ill. The expedition had an 
insufficient number of packhorses, and with no fodder en route 
many of the horses died. The expedition carried insufficient 
supplies for the men as well. The commissaries had provided 
only fifteen days' provisions for the three hundred mile 
march, expecting the men to hunt and provide much of their own 
food. Despite the myth of the frontier hunter, the men proved 
singularly inept at locating and killing game and on March 2 
Lewis put the men on reduced rations.76
The expedition moved slowly. Not surprisingly there was 
soon unrest among the forces. William Preston reported "the 
Men Murmured very much for want of Provisions & numbers 
Threatened to Return home." Lewis was able to persuade the 
troops to stay, but they were "faint & weak with hunger and 
could not Travel the Mountains nor wade the Rivers."77 By the 
middle of March there was open mutiny among the men. Large 
numbers deserted and sought their own way home. "Hunger & 
Want was so much Increased that any man in the Camp would have
76 William Preston Diary of the Sandy Creek Expedition, 
Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:105, 108-110, 117.
77 Ibid., 1QQ: 105, 110-111, 112.
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Ventured his Life for a Supper." On March 13 Lewis called the 
men together. He told them that he believed they would soon 
find good hunting grounds. He reminded them of the importance 
of the expedition and asked "all that was willing to share his 
Fate to go with him[.] All the Officers & some private men 
not above 20 or 30 Join'd him." The rest returned home. With 
only thirty men remaining Lewis was forced also to return to 
Virginia.78
The Stony Creek expedition had been a complete fiasco. 
Peter Hog blamed the failure on "the Disobedience of Men[,] 
Undisciplined, & Subject to no Military law, a too Smal [sic] 
Store of provisions; & the most Impassable Route that Ever was 
Attempted." The House of Burgesses established a committee to 
investigate the disaster. The committee largely agreed with 
Hog's assessment, with the exception that they also blamed the 
"refractory and mutinous Behaviour" of Captain Obediah Wilson, 
John Smith and John Montgomery."79
The failure had major repercussions which affected the 
frontier throughout the rest of the war. In Augusta County a 
legacy of unrest and dissatisfaction remained between the men 
and the officers who had commanded the expedition. It 
particularly distressed the Cherokees. In the same manner
78 Ibid., 1QQ: 118-122.
79 Mcllwaine, Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752- 
1755, 1756-1758, pp. 368, 385; Peter Hog to George Washington, 
April 3, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 2:330; Maryland Gazette, May 6, 1756.
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that Braddock's reliance on a heavy wagon train had disgusted 
the Ohio Indians, the Cherokees now observed first-hand the 
inability of the English to inarch beyond the frontier without 
vast quantities of supplies. Nonetheless, the concept of 
carrying the attack to the Indians to prevent the assaults on 
the frontier, rather than cowering in ineffectual forts and 
blockhouses, remained valid.
In April 1756 a Maryland party under the command of 
frontiersman Thomas Cresap made another attempt to attack the 
Ohio Indians. The party set out on April 23 from Fort 
Cumberland and had even less success than the Stony Creek 
expedition. Without Indian auxiliaries, the expedition was 
unable to detect enemy parties. At the start of their 
journey, Cresap was killed in a skirmish. Lacking a strong 
leader, many members of the party mutinied and drifted back to 
Fort Cumberland. The expedition had only marched as far as 
Bear Camp twenty-one miles beyond the fort before it turned 
back.80
In Pennsylvania the negotiations with the Indians and the 
influence of the Iroquois failed to halt the raids. At the 
end of February Shingas again raided the Little Cove and Path 
Valley in Cumberland County, killing seven and capturing four. 
Shingas1 men soon pressed on farther near McDowell's Mill, a
80 Pennsylvania Gazette, May 6, 13, 27, 1756; Maryland 
Gazette, April 29, May 6, 1756; Adam Stephen to George
Washington, May 29, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 3:182-183.
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region which had already suffered extensive losses. 
Meanwhile, other small parties raided the entire frontier. 
Small parties skulking around the forts made supply difficult. 
The raiders burned deserted plantations, leaving a trail of 
destruction behind them. Although few were killed, the raids 
heightened the panic and left settlers more discontented with 
the government’s failure to protect them. On March 24 the 
Susquehanna Delawares launched a major raid into Berks County, 
reaching to within fourteen miles of Reading killing thirteen 
and capturing several more.81
For the first time these raiders encountered military 
opposition in Pennsylvania. As a consequence of the Militia 
Act, several counties had established their own militia units. 
Unlike the Virginia militia, some of the Pennsylvania militia 
units proved surprisingly effective. In Peters Township, 
Cumberland County, a militia company pursued a raiding party 
for several miles, forcing them to abandon some of their booty 
and one of their captives. However, there were not enough 
militia units, and they were insufficiently trained to offer 
much sustained protection from raids.82
81 Pennsylvania Gazette, March 11, 18, April 1, 1756;
Benjamin McGill to James Burd, March 5, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen 
Family Papers, Vol.2; Deposition of John Craig, March 30, 
1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; Jacob Arndt to 
Timothy Horsfield, March 7, 1756, H.S.P., Northampton County 
Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:183.
82 Pennsylvania Gazette, March 18, 1756; Colonial Records 
of Pennsylvania, 7:61-63.
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In Virginia the winter of 1755-1756 had seen relatively 
few raids. Dinwiddie attributed the decline in numbers to the 
success of the ranger companies. In reality, it was probably 
due more to the availability of tempting targets in 
Pennsylvania and Maryland, and the fact that winter snows made 
crossing the Appalachians difficult. During the winter the 
French concentrated on using “Upper Country Indians," Hurons, 
Ottawas and Potawatomis, to keep the frontier forces 
occupied.83
In the spring, larger-scale raids commenced again. 
Dumas, the commander of Fort Duquesne, sent out several 
parties with orders "to observe the enemy's movements back of 
Fort Cumberland," "to harass their convoys," and where 
possible to attack stores and destroy forts.84 The parties 
consisted of western Indians and Ohio Shawnees and Delawares, 
typically with a French commander. The French sensed a 
weakness in the English strategy of constructing small and 
isolated fortresses as a barrier: when they proved too strong 
for a raiding party, they could easily by-pass them; when 
their garrisons were too weak to resist, they could surround 
and destroy them. From mid-March until the end of July, the
83 Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, March 20, 1756, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:373- 
375; Montcalm to Count d'Argenson, June 12, 1756, Brodhead, 
ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:414.
84 Instructions to Ensign Douville, March 23, 1756, 
Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
New York, 10:396.
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French encouraged their Indian allies to launch repeated 
attacks against the newly. constructed Pennsylvania and 
Virginia forts. In four months they attacked nine forts and 
destroyed five. The decision to attack the forts reflected a 
major and highly successful shift in the strategy of the 
raids. Meanwhile, other raiding parties not initiated by the 
French raided more vulnerable targets along the frontier.
In the middle of February two large raiding parties 
rendezvoused near Fort Cumberland. They killed or captured 
several stragglers from the garrison. One of the parties 
pressed southward into Virginia and attacked and destroyed a 
blockhouse known as William's Fort, killing thirty-three out 
of the thirty-five men in the fort. At the beginning of April 
the raiders attacked Ashby's Fort on Patterson's Creek and 
surrounded Coxe's Fort at the mouth of the Little Cacapon 
River in Frederick County. The other raiding party pressed 
northeast into Pennsylvania. At McCord's Fort in Cumberland 
County, Pennsylvania, it destroyed the fort and killed or 
captured thirty people. All these forts were to the rear of 
Fort Cumberland and protected the vulnerable supply routes.85
At the beginning of April Washington reported to 
Dinwiddie that all communications with Fort Cumberland had 
been cut off and that "the roads between [Winchester] and Fort
85 Edward Shippen to James Burd, March 24, 1756, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.; Maryland Gazette, March 11, 
April 8, 1756; Pennsylvania Gazette, April 8, 15, 29, May 6, 
1756
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Cumberland, are much infested." Not until early May could he 
restore reliable communications. The raids frustrated 
Washington. It had become clear that the frontier forts were 
ineffective and that rangers could not intercept the raiders 
because they moved off too quickly. Washington admitted that 
"the advantageous way they have of fighting in the Woods, 
their cunning and craft are not to be equalled; neither their 
activity and indefatigable Sufferings." Unlike the English 
troops who had to take large quantities of supplies with them, 
the Indians "depend upon their dexterity in hunting, and upon 
the Cattle of the Inhabitants for provisions."*6
On April 7 a party of the Virginia Regiment with some 
Cherokee auxiliaries fell in with a raiding party. In the 
skirmish the Cherokees killed the French commander, Ensign 
Douville, and discovered his orders from Fort Duquesne 
detailing the attacks on Fort Cumberland's supply routes. 
Despite this information, Washington was unable to strengthen 
his position. He attempted to enlist local inhabitants to 
foray routes that Indian raiders were expected to use. Only 
fifteen men appeared for service. In mid-April the impotence 
of the Virginia forces became clear when several small parties 
of Indians were seen near Edward's Fort on the Cacapon River. 
A party of the Virginia Regiment setting out to intercept the 
raiders was attacked as it left the fort. In a fierce
*6 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 7, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
2:332-335; Pennsylvania Gazette, May 20, 1756.
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skirmish the Indians killed seventeen Virginians, including 
their commander Captain Mercer, while suffering no casualtiesi 
A few days later, the same party attacked Fort Hopewell on the 
South Branch.87
By the end of April, the inhabitants had abandoned all of 
Hampshire County and most of Frederick County. There were no 
settlers west of the Shenandoah except for isolated pockets 
upon the South Branch and near Edward's Fort on the Cacapon. 
Most who remained cowered in forts with little food or 
ammunition.88
As raiders descended upon Frederick County and pushed 
towards the Shenandoah Valley, Washington had only forty 
regimental troops at his disposal. The rest were posted to 
garrison the frontier forts while Washington awaited the 
arrival of new recruits. Upon receiving Washington's first 
reports of the raids, Dinwiddie hastily ordered out half the 
militia of the northern Virginia counties, but no militia 
mustered in time to aid the frontier settlers.89 The militia
87 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 16, 1756, 
William Stark to George Washington, April 18, 1756, George
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 24, 1756, Abbot and
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:1-3, 17-18, 
44-46. Maryland Gazette, May 6, 1756; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
May 6, 1756.
88 George Washington to John Robinson, April 24, 1756, 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 27, 1756, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:48-51, 58-61.
89 The militia were ordered out in Albermarle, Caroline, 
Culpeper, Fairfax, Frederick, King George, Louisa, Orange, 
Prince William, Spotsylvania and Stafford Counties. It was 
estimated that should provide between three and four thousand
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in Frederick County refused to muster at all. On the 
frontier, dissatisfaction with the failure of Washington to 
defend the inhabitants mounted. At the end of April 
Washington reported that some even talked about "capitulating 
and coming upon terms with the French and Indians; rather than 
lose their lives and Fortunes through obstinancy [sic]."90
Towards mid-May, over a month after the raiders had first 
descended on the frontier, the militia finally began to arrive 
in large numbers in Winchester. Washington posted them to 
reinforce smaller garrisons or man civilian-constructed 
blockhouses in order to encourage the populace to remain on 
their plantations and to help with the construction of 
fortifications at Winchester.91 This tactic also allowed 
Washington to send out several parties of the Regiment to act 
as rangers and scouts along the frontiers.92 Sensing the 
arrival of reinforcements, the raiders moved to other parts of 
the frontier, to Pennsylvania and western Augusta County. On 
June 25 they set fire to and captured Fort Vause in Augusta
men. Maryland Gazette, May 13, 1756.
90 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 24, 1756 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:46.
91 "Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 14, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:127-128.
92 George Washington to Henry Woodward, May 4, 1756,
George Washington to John Dalton, May 4, 1756, George
Washington to James Hamilton, May 4, 1756, George Washington 
to Nicholas Minor, May 4, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 3:90, 91, 91-92, 92.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
County. The fort was crowded with settlers seeking
protection, and three were killed and another twenty 
captured.93
As the raids moved away from Frederick County, military 
strategy began to conflict with political necessity. 
Washington wanted to recall the militia to save money and 
because it had set a poor example for the regular forces: the 
men in the militia had deserted in droves and refused to serve 
and their arrival on the frontier had encouraged many of the 
Virginia Regiment to follow their example. Washington also 
sought to concentrate the Virginia Regiment in a few strong 
locations to rationalize communication and supply routes. 
Posting the forces in small forts along the frontier had 
failed to prevent raids and merely offered new targets. Now 
Dinwiddie had other thoughts. He was concerned about 
encouraging the inhabitants to return to their plantations, 
rather than military strategy, and ordered Washington to 
continue the militia in service and to keep his men in the 
frontier forts.94
93 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83; Gov. Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, July 24, 1756, Gov.
Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, July 24, 1756, Brock, ed., The 
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:461-463, 466-469;
Maryland Gazette, July 29, 1756.
94 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 3, 1756, 
"Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 7, 11, 12, 13, 16, 
1756, William Fairfax to George Washington, May 13-14, 1756, 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 23, 1756, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:82-83 97, 
117, 119, 123, 124-126, 137-138, 171-173; Gov. Dinwiddie to 
George Washington, May 8, 1756, Brock, ed., The Official
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Hearing of renewed destruction on the frontier, Dinwiddie 
convened the House of Burgesses to review funding for the 
Virginia Regiment and various provisions for the militia.95 
Again the House was unwilling to act. The "slowness" of the 
House in dealing with the requests to augment the Virginia 
Regiment distressed many. William Fairfax informed Washington 
that when news of raids arrived in Williamsburg, the House was 
deeply alarmed, yet after studying the reports "a few Hours 
lull their Fears and all's well again."96
The House was reluctant to commit itself to funding the 
Regiment because of rumors rife in Williamsburg about the 
troops' misbehavior, particularly of the officers'. They had 
heard that the officers were guilty "of all inordinate vices; 
but more especially of drunkenness and profanity." Until they 
knew more, the House declined to increase the Regiment's 
numbers, fearing the corruption of Virginia's youth.97 The
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:407;
95 In particular Dinwiddie pressed for a law providing the 
militia with arms of the same caliber, as previously the men 
had provided their own weapons which were frequently of 
different bores which made providing them with ammunition very 
difficult indeed. Mcllwaine, Journal of the House of Burgesses 
1752-1755, 1756-1758, 6:335-337.
96 Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, April 28, 1756, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:392; 
William Fairfax to George Washington, April 26, 1756, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:56.
97 George Washington to John Robinson, April 16, c.April 
18, 1756, John Robinson to George Washington, April 17, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:6- 
8, 12, 15-17.
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House's reluctance prompted a speedy reply from the officers 
who deluged the House with letters illustrating the virtues of 
the Regiment.98
The House finally agreed to raise £25,000 through a poll 
tax to pay for defense, but only through the summer. They 
also approved measures strengthening the existing provisions 
for a draft from the militia. The act ordered the county 
lieutenants first to ask for volunteers from among all able- 
bodied single men in the county. Then they were to draft by 
lot, until one-in-twenty of these eligible men were in the 
Regiment. To ensure compliance the House authorized fines of 
up to £500 for refractory officials. They also closed a 
loophole by instructing officials to exempt as "overseers" of 
slaves only men who were registered as such on March 25. The 
House also increased and facilitated the powers of Regimental 
officers to impress needed supplies and equipment. When 
Dinwiddie finally prorogued the House on May 5, it had greatly 
strengthened the Regiment to deal with French and Indian 
incursions.99
There still remained problems enforcing the draft. When 
the Council of war met in Augusta County, as the act
98 Landon Carter to George Washington, May 1756, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:185-187.
99 "Overseers" were exempt from militia duty because of 
the fear of slave rebellion. Since many of the Virginia 
freeholders owned slaves, this was one way to avoid unpopular 
duty. Henning, Statutes, 7:9, 14-18; Mcllwaine, Journal of the 
House of Burgesses, 6:397.
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prescribed, the Council declared, "as the greatest Part of the 
able Bodied single Men of this County is now on Duty on our 
Frontiers and there must continue. . . which renders a draft 
of our militia at this time Impracticable. . . We are
therefore unanimously of Opinion to Postpone the Draughting of 
the sd Militia."100 The protest was repeated in many 
counties. Local justices refused to force men into the 
regiment, and those they drafted were generally vagrants and 
other undesirables who had no link to the county.101 By the 
beginning of June the Virginia Regiment was still not complete 
after seven months of recruiting.102
Washington believed there were only two ways to protect 
the frontier. Virginia needed many more Indian allies for 
"Indians are [the] only match for Indians; and without these, 
we shall ever fight upon unequal Terms. . . five hundred
Indians have it more in their power to annoy and disturb our 
Inhabitants than ten times as many Regulars." The second 
solution was to remove the frontier inhabitants "to live in 
Townships" in the interior and protect groups "working at each 
others Farms by turn; and to drive their Cattle into the thick 
settled parts of the Country." This action would both protect
100 Council of War of the Officers of the Militia of 
Augusta County, May 20, 1756, Draper Mss., William Preston 
Papers, 1QQ:130.
101 For more details see chapter VII.
102 Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, June 1756, Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:431-432.
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the settlers' cattle and deprive the raiders of a substantial 
source of food. The second solution was impracticable given 
the mentality of the frontier settlers, and the first had long 
been an aim of Virginia's policy but had so far yielded little 
success.103
In Pennsylvania, Governor Morris abandoned hopes for a 
negotiated settlement. Morris had sent Scarouady and Andrew 
Montour to increase the pressure on the Delawares to come to 
the peace table by encouraging the Iroquois to intervene with 
the "tributary" tribes to halt the raids. Scarouady and 
Montour were to inform the Iroquois that as "the Delawares are 
your Cousins & under your Direction" the Iroquois should 
attempt to "correct your Cousins & stop their proceedings. "IM 
Morris also sent Aroas to inform the Susquehanna 
Delawares of Scarouady's mission and to gauge their 
disposition. When Aroas returned, at the end of February, 
John Shickalamy accompanied him and reported that Scarouady 
had tried to talk some of the Delawares out of attacking, but 
"they would not so much as touch the Belts he laid before him. 
They throwed them on one side with their Pipes, and gave him 
ill Language." Shickalamy himself had wanted to come down to 
visit the English much earlier, "but the Delaware Indians
103 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 7, 1756, 
George Washington to John Robinson, April 7, 1756, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:333-334, 338.
104 Instructions of Gov. Morris to Andrew Montour and 
Scarouady, December 1755, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 
2:54.
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would not let us go. . . [they] told us in plain Terms that if 
we offered to go down the River they wou'd look upon us as 
Brethren to the English and their Enemies" and kill them.105
The Susquehanna Delawares were so set against the English 
that some had even attempted to kill Scarouady during the 
negotiations. Shickalamy reported that the Delawares of the 
East Branch gave as the reason for this defection "that from 
Time to Time the English, from their first settling 
Pennsylvania, had murdered above one hundred of their People 
without making Satisfaction for them. That the English had 
cheated them out of a great deal of Land, and cheated them in 
Commerce continually."106 Those amongst the English who 
supported the commencement of negotiations had further 
encouragement when Shickalamy informed them that despite all 
the raids there were still a few among the Delawares who 
remained loyal to the English, in particular the Delaware 
leader Paxinosa.107
Morris knew that commencing military operations against 
the Susquehanna Delawares would incense many Pennsylvanians. 
Already he faced sufficient opposition within the Assembly. 
He consequently delayed until Scarouady and Montour returned 
from their mission and predicted that the Iroquois would
105 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:49, 51; Memorandum 
of Conrad Weiser, February 22, 1756, Minutes of Council, 
February 24, 1756, H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs 2:73, 74.
106 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:53.
107 Ibid. , 7:53-54.
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"inflict proper punishments on them [the Delawares], as they 
are in Subjection to them."108
When Scarouady and Montour returned at the end of March, 
their news was bleak. As late as the fall of 1755 the 
Iroquois had branded as "a false Report" the accounts that 
the Susquehanna Delawares had joined the French and had urged 
the British "to draw your Troops from the Frontiers." Sir 
William Johnson warned them "that I plainly foresee, unless 
you, the Six Nations, who have always maintained a Superiority 
over them Indians will now exert yourselves in this Case, you 
will not only loose [sic] that Authority which they hitherto 
acknowledged, but will have them your Enemies." Finally, the 
Iroquois had agreed to discipline the Delawares and halt the 
raids. However, when Scarouady and Montour arrived amongst 
the Delawares, it was clear that Iroquois influence was non­
existent.109 Scarouady and Montour reported that the Delaware 
towns they had travelled through were " all violently against 
the English," and nearly all the Delawares "were bent upon 
striking the English." They had met the new self-proclaimed 
Delaware King, Teedyuscung, who had made clear his opposition 
to the English, and seemed ill-disposed to making any peace,
108 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 2:56; Minute^ of the 
Council, March 4, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 
2:76.
109 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:64-67, 67-69;
Affairs, 2:77; Speech of Sir William Johnson to the Iroquois, 
December 7, 1755, "Indian Treaty at Fort Johnson," February, 
1756, Minutes of the Council, March 27, 1756, H.S.P., Penn
Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:65 66-68, 77.
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and had even sent a message to the Iroquois asking for help 
against the English.110
On April 8 Morris informed the Council that "it appears 
to us that the Delawares have sold themselves to the French, 
and are determined to take this Opportunity to throw off their 
Subjection and Dependency upon the Six Nations, imagining that 
they shall be supported in it by their New Masters." Morris 
asked the Council to support a declaration of war and the 
creation of a generous scalp bounty. The Council agreed.111
News that the Council was considering a declaration of 
war alarmed "Several of the Strict and reputable Quakers" in 
the Assembly. They presented a petition expressing their 
opposition. They denounced a declaration of war as "hasty" 
and asked "that full Time may be allowed for those Indians who 
still remain well affected towards us, to use and report the 
Effect of their Endeavours to reconcile our Enemies." They 
further urged that a "full Enquiry may be made whether some 
Apprehensions these Indians have conceived of a Deviation from 
the Integrity of Conduct towards them. . . may not unhappily 
have contributed. . . to the Alteration of their Conduct
towards us." The Quakers argued that there had to be an
110 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:64-67.
111 $150 was offered for every Indian over twelve years 
old, delivered alive to a provincial fort, $130 for every 
female prisoner and children under twelve years old, $130 per 
scalp of an Indian male over 12, and $50 for a woman's scalp. 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:74-75; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 4th Ser., 2:590-593.
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explanation for the Delawares' alienation for although the 
Indians "are savage, and inexpressibly cruel to their Enemies, 
they are not void of a large share of natural Understanding, 
[and] have in many Cases, clear Sentiments of Justice and 
Equity." 112
The petition expressed the basic opposition of the 
Quakers to the war in Pennsylvania, which led to the 
establishment of the "Friendly Association" to seek a 
peaceful resolution. Unlike most of their contemporaries the 
Quakers appreciated that the Indians acted rationally and that 
their alienation could be logically explained. If the reasons 
for their discontent could be found and remedied, it should be 
possible to avoid fighting. What the Quakers failed to 
appreciate, however, was that much of the Delawares' 
dissatisfaction lay in the internal politics of the eastern 
tribes, particularly their subjection to the Iroquois. A 
solution to that problem could not be as easily negotiated as 
the Quakers imagined.113
The Quakers' pleas were drowned out by the clamor for 
action from the frontier. Complaints, pleas, and threats 
flooded into Philadelphia from the backcounty. The protestors 
were not only the poor and destitute but included "a
112 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:83, 84-86, 
Pennsylvania Gazette, April 22, 1756.
113 For a discussion of the establishment of the Friendly 
Association see Theodore Thayer, Israel Pemberton: King of the 
Quakers, (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
1943), pp.97-102.
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considerable number of the principal Inhabitants of the 
Counties of York and Cumberland," many of whom were reduced to 
living in squalor in barns and stables in Lancaster. "Men, 
Women and Children, who had lately lived in great Affluence 
and Pleanty reduced to the most extreme Poverty and 
Distress. . . in want of the Common Necessaries of Life." The 
protestors planned to meet in Lancaster on April 16 for a 
march on Philadelphia to force the Assembly to take military 
action. Immediately on hearing of their plans, Morris issued 
a proclamation to ban their meeting. He also sent out 
commissioners to meet them and attempt to appease them. With 
renewed threats of unrest in the backcountry, Morris formally 
issued the declaration of war on April 14. News of the 
declaration pacified the protestors and they disbanded.114
When the Quakers heard of the government's declaration of 
war they sent one of their most prominent members, Israel 
Pemberton, with a final plea to the Council to at least send 
a message to the Delawares. Pemberton maintained that if they 
could inform the Delawares that the Pennsylvanians were 
prepared to investigate their complaints, the Delawares would 
surely sue for peace. The Council reacted with some surprise 
and maintained, quite correctly, that private individuals 
should not intervene in Indian policy, but inconsistently 
suggested that if the Quakers wanted to open negotiations with
114 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 15, 1756; Report of Chew, 
Stedman, West and Shippen, April 21, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 2:80.
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the Indians they could do so under their own auspices rather 
than under the colony's.115
The Quakers' intervention, however, did force Morris to 
make another attempt to communicate with the Susquehanna 
Delawares. At the end of April, he sent another message that 
the Pennsylvanians had asked the Iroquois to intervene. He 
also declared that the Pennsylvanians were prepared to offer 
"just and honourable Terms" if the Delawares would negotiate. 
But first, they must release all the prisoners they had taken 
on the frontier. He went on to inform them that the Indians 
who lived among the English "have not had any Mischief done to 
them" by the English and that he would ensure their safety if 
they came to negotiate.116
Sir William Johnson further smoothed the path to 
negotiations. At the beginning of May, the Council received 
a copy of a letter from Johnson to Governor Shirley of 
Maryland in which Johnson suggested that some of the 
Susquehanna Delawares were prepared to seek peace.117 The 
failure of the threats of the Iroquois to bring the Delawares 
back into line had humiliated Johnson. He informed Morris 
haughtily that he refused to take responsibility for the 
Susquehanna Delawares because he found "great difficulties in
115 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:103-105.
116 Message of Morris to Susquehanna Indians, April 26., 
1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.:Indian Affairs, 2:81.
117 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:116-117.
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Governing and Supplying the wants of the Six Nations in 
Connection with me; 'tis therefore Impossible I should also 
take Charge of those seated at a Distance on the waters of 
Susquehanna." In this manner Johnson laid the path open for 
the Pennsylvanians to take matters into their own hands.118
The Council pressed Morris to suspend hostilities against 
the Delawares until the results of further negotiations were 
known. Reluctant to suspend the hostilities so soon after 
declaring war, Morris decided first to tour the frontier to 
gather news on the state of the province's defenses. He found 
that many Pennsylvanians desired a suspension of hostilities 
against the Indians. Receiving intelligence that the Diahoga 
Indians desired peace, or at least wished to open 
negotiations, Morris issued a proclamation on June 3 
announcing a twenty-day suspension of hostilities east of the 
Susquehanna River.119 The Council sent Newcastle and Jagrea 
to Diahoga to invite the Delawares to meet at Easton. They 
also sent James Logan to try to encourage some New Jersey 
Delawares to accompany Newcastle and Jagrea as interpreters 
and allies.120
118 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:157; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 4th Ser., 2:622-624.
119 "Governor Morris's Proclamation for a Cessation of 
Hostilities against the Indians," June 3, 1756, H.S.P., Penn 
Mss.:Indian Affairs, 2:89; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 
7:117-118; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:614, 616.
120 Report of Capt. Newcastle, Jagrea, & William Lacquis, 
May 31, 1756, "Minutes of Council," June 3, 1756, H.S.P., Penn 
Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:87, 90. Colonial Records of
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As Morris and the Council pondered negotiations, the 
raids had continued upon the Pennsylvania frontier. In late 
May and early June a raiding party of Ohio Indians terrorized 
Cumberland County, attacking in Peters Township and in the 
Tuscarora Valley. The raiders continued their policy of 
targeting provincial forts.121 On June 11 another party of 
Ohio Indians destroyed Bigham's Fort at the junction of the 
Juniata and Tuscarora Rivers. The fort was crowded with 
settlers from the surrounding district who had sought 
protection there. Three were killed , fourteen were presumed 
dead, and six were captured.122
On July 30 the Ohio Indians took their greatest prize, 
Fort Granville. Unlike the other forts the Indians took in 
the spring and early summer of 1756, which had been 
constructed mainly by the settlers themselves and had small, 
if any, garrisons, Fort Granville was a provincial fort. Most 
of the defenders were several miles away guarding reapers when 
the Indians attacked. The Indians captured twenty-two 
soldiers, three women, and six children and burned the large 
quantity of supplies which the provincial commissioners had
Pennsylvania, 7:144, 152; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser.,
2:617.
121 See p. 154.
122 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 10, 17, 24, 1756.
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amassed to distribute to other forts on the west side of the 
Susquehanna.123
While the large French-initiated raids attacked the forts 
along the frontier, smaller Indian-initiated raids harassed 
the frontier throughout late June and early July. These raids 
particularly targeted the supply routes to Fort Cumberland and 
frontier settlers gathering their harvests.124 Most of the 
raids conducted by the Ohio Indians occurred in Cumberland 
County, Pennsylvania, Frederick County, Maryland, and 
Frederick County, Virginia. On July 20, Ohio Shawnees and 
Delawares attacked soldiers guarding reapers near McDowell's 
Mill in Cumberland County while another party attacked the 
Conococheague. A third party raided down the Potomac towards 
Maidstone and into Frederick County, Virginia.125 A series of 
smaller raids, conducted by Susquehanna Indians who opposed 
any peace negotiations, occurred to the east of the 
Susquehanna in Bethel Township Lancaster County and in upper 
Berks County.126
123 Ibid., August 19, 1756.
124 Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 30, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:302-303; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83; Pennsylvania Gazette, July 29, 1756.
125 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 29, August 12, 1756; Robert 
Stewart to George Washington, July 31, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:303-305; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:120.
126 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 17, 24, 1756; Colonial
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:164.
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By the summer of 1756 the French and their Indian allies 
had subjected the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier to over 
a year of continuous raids. While Virginia and Pennsylvania 
had both slowly developed military policies to deal with the 
assault, those policies had proved notably unsuccessful. Both 
colonies had also made tentative attempts to negotiate with 
Indians living near their borders, Virginia with the Cherokees 
and Catawbas, Pennsylvania with the Susquehanna Delawares. By 
the summer of 1756 that policy had failed to bring any 
benefits but would bear fruit during the following year.
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Chapter IV
The Military Failure: The War in Virginia 1756-1757
In the fall of 1756 George Washington reported that "the 
ruinous state of the frontiers, and the vast extent of land we 
have lost since this time twelve-month[s ago], must appear 
incredible to those who are not eye-witnesses of the 
desolation. Upwards of fifty miles of a rich and (once) 
thick-settled country is now quite deserted & abandoned.111 
The French and their Indian allies had ravaged the frontier 
region and penetrated deep into the backcountry. In North 
America the British reeled from disaster and defeat. In 
August 1756 the French seized the important fort of Oswego 
driving the British from the Great Lakes making meaningful 
diplomacy between the British and the Great Lakes Indians all 
but impossible. Britain fared no better in Europe. The 
Austrians defeated Britain's allies, the Prussians, at the 
battle of Kolin in June 1757 and the French defeated the 
combined Hanoverian and British forces under the command of 
the Duke of Cumberland at Hastenbeck in July. In September 
the French forced Cumberland to sign the Convention of
1 George Washington to John Robinson, November 9 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:16- 
17.
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Klosterseven, removing his army from the field. Meanwhile 
France's other allies the Russians, occupied Berlin and the 
French much of the Netherlands.2
However, on the Virginia frontier the war was nearly an 
impasse. The Ohio Indians, lacking supplies and fearing 
British and Cherokee raids on their homes, were unwilling to 
follow up on their victories. They had begun to encounter 
supply shortages even while they devastated Virginia. In 
1755, before an official declaration of war, the Royal Navy 
had seized French merchantmen around the world and threatened 
French supply lines. By 1757, despite a string of military 
victories, the condition of Canada was desperate. In Quebec 
the French were unable to feed the seminary students and 
closed the school. On the Ohio and Susquehanna Rivers 
circumstances were even more dire.3 Besides arms and 
ammunition, the Indians lacked food and clothing. John Cox, 
who escaped from the Susquehanna Delawares in August 1756, 
reported that they were "in a starving Condition" and were 
"reduced to the necessity of living upon Dog Flesh and the few 
Roots and Berrys they could collect in the Woods."4
The Virginians were unable to capitalize on this weakness 
because they lacked the necessary diplomatic acumen and
2 W.A. Speck, Stability and Strife, p.267.
3 Guy Fregault, Canada: The War of the Conquest, pp.113, 
137; Pennsylvania Gazette, June 16, 1757.
4 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 9, 1756; Colonial
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:243, 357.
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military might to bring the Ohio Indians to the peace table. 
Washington struggled to organize the Virginia Regiment which 
never reached full strength. At the beginning of August 1756, 
when there should have been 1080 men in the regiment, a muster 
showed only 926, and that number decreased. By the following 
May only six hundred men remained on duty.5
Men abandoned their posts in "great and scandalous 
desertions," although often waiting until after they had 
received their pay and clothing. The problem worsened in the 
summer of 1757 after the House of Burgesses authorized a draft 
from the county militia. Intended to recompense for the 
shortfall in the regiment's recruits, the draft merely 
heightened the problem of desertion. Of four hundred men 
selected, 114 deserted within one week.6 The draftees spread 
the practice to the men who were already serving.
Washington warned that if something were not done quickly 
the regiment would be imperiled. He attempted to use fear to 
stem the tide of desertion. A court martial at the end of 
July 1757 sentenced fourteen deserters to death and others to
5 Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Lyttleton, May 26, 1757, Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:632-633.
6 George Washington to Adam Stephen, August 5, 1756,
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, August 14, 1756, George 
Washington to John Robinson, July 10, 1757, George Washington 
to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 11, 1757, George Washington to John 
Stanwix, July 15, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of 
George Washington, 3:337, 350 4:287-290, 295, 306; Gov.
Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, July 30, 1757, Brock, ed., The
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:676-677.
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severe sentences, such as 1,500 lashes.7 Washington himself 
ordered the construction of a forty foot high gallows at the 
entrance to the camp at Winchester "to hang two or three on 
it, as an example to others," "which has terrified the rest 
exceedingly."8 The threats did not work.
The attempt by the House of Burgesses to encourage men to 
remain in the regiment by raising their pay also did not work. 
Its failure lay mainly in the reluctance of the House to grant 
greater power to the military authorities, particularly the 
power of execution. When the Mutiny Act of 1755 expired in 
September 1756 they refused to renew it until April 1757.9 
For seven months Washington was unable to inflict serious 
punishment on mutineers and deserters. Instead he could only 
send out detachments in the hope of rounding up deserters 
before they reached towns in which they could find cover.
7 Only two men were actually hanged, the other twelve 
were pardoned. But even some of the men who had been 
sentenced to death but then pardoned, deserted as soon as they 
received their pardon! "General Court Martial," July 25-26, 
1757, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 17, 1757, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:329-334, 405-409.
8 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 10, 1757, 
George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, John
Robinson to George Washington, July 18, 1757, Abbot and
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:291-292, 306- 
307, 315-316.
9 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 8, 1756, 
January 12, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 3:396, 4:93; Henning, Statutes at Large, 6:544- 
550, 7:87-92; Mcllwaine, Journal of the House of Burgesses, 
1752/1755-1756/1758, 401-410.
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Deserters grew increasingly adept at concealing 
themselves and fleeing. Some deserters from Fort Cumberland 
even managed to make their way to Fort Duquesne, providing the 
French with invaluable intelligence. Civilians aided their 
flight, developing sophisticated ways of concealing fugitives 
in what amounted to an eighteenth-century underground 
railroad.10
Several circumstances encouraged desertion. The strict 
discipline and structure of the regiment appealed to few men. 
A soldier's life in the eighteenth century was hard and 
unrewarding. Because of disputes between Dinwiddie and the 
House of Burgesses over the emission of paper money, the 
colony often did not have the funds to pay the troops. In 
January 1757, for example, Washington was unable to pay the 
regiment for several weeks. There was no guarantee of 
financial support for men maimed in battle, or for the 
families of those killed. Not surprisingly many attracted to 
the regiment by thoughts of the glamour and pay found their 
illusions dashed and sought escape.11
10 Maryland Gazette, August 12, 1756; Vaudreuil to 
Machault, August 8, 1756, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to 
the Colonial History of New York, 10:434; William Fairfax to 
George Washington, August 13-16, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., 
The Papers of George Washington, 3:346-348.
11 Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, January 4, 1757, 
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(Vol. 1329) 12:28-30; George Washington to the earl of
Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 4:85.
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The House of Burgesses was also reluctant to provide 
funds for new equipment and supplies, dismayed at the waste 
that occurred. Waste and mismanagement drained supplies, and 
officers refused to restrain consumption. Washington 
complained to Loudoun that "the waste of Provisions is very 
inaccountable, following no method in serving a certain quota 
to each Man. Speak of an allowance (never so plentiful) and 
you offer an affront."12 The regiment was chronically short 
of basic supplies, from food to tents. Poor conditions turned 
regimental camps into breeding grounds for disease, to which 
the poor diet added scurvy. Troops starved, froze, and became 
sick. Dysentery ran rampant, almost killing Washington in the 
winter of 1757-1758.13
Morale also suffered as the regiment received no 
recognition for its services. In 1757 Washington complained 
bitterly to Loudoun about the crown's refusal to grant 
commissions to the regiment's officers. He commented that "no 
Body of regular Troops ever before served 3 Bloody Campaigns 
without attracting Royal Notice. . . we want nothing but
12 Even though sums were deducted from the men's pay to 
provide for their clothing and food the amounts raised nowhere 
near covered the actual costs. George Washington to the Earl 
of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The
Papers of George Washington, 4:87.
13 Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 15, 1756, 
January 26, 1757, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert 
Dinwiddie, 2:563-564, 584-585; George Washington to Gov.
Dinwiddie, January 12, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The
Papers of George Washington, 4:93-94.
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Commissions from His Majesty to make us as regular a Corps as
any upon the Continent."14
On the contrary, the soldiers endured bitter attacks for
their failure to protect the frontier. The regiment came
under a barrage of criticism from what Washington derided as
"Chimney Corner Politicians" in Williamsburg.15 In the late
summer of 1756 the Virginia Gazette carried an editorial
venomously attacking the regiment.
While they lie skulking in Forts, and there 
dissolving in Pleasure, till alarmed by the 
Approach of the Enemy, who could expect to find 
them no where else; when instead of searching out 
the Enemy. . . and preventing their Incursions,
they tempt them by their Security and Laziness, to 
come in Quest of them, and attack them in their 
Fortifications.— When this is the Case, how 
wretchedly helpless must a Nation be? What useless 
Lumber, what an Incumbrance, is the Soldiery. . .
But when Nothing brave is so much as attempted. . . 
when Men, whose Profession it is to endure 
Hardships, and encounter Dangers, cautiously shun 
them, and suffer their Country to be ravaged. . . 
then certainly, Censure cannot be silent, nor can 
the Public receive much Advantage from a Regiment 
of such dastardly Debauchees.16
With lack of pay, poor conditions, and low status, volunteers
and draftees alike sought freedom from the regiment.
14 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie March 10, 1757, 
"Memorial the Earl of Loudoun," March 23, 1757, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:113, 120-121.
15 George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 
1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:83.
16 There is no extant copy of the Virginia Gazette for 
this date. The editorial was reprinted in the Maryland 
Gazette, November 25, 1756.
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The potential pool of recruits shrank as rumors of the 
horrors of military life spread throughout Virginia. As men 
deserted they took with them stories of "their Sufferings and 
want of Pay (which Rags and Poverty sufficiently testified.)" 
Their tales "fixd in the Populace such horrid Impressions of 
the hardships they had Encountered, that no Arguments coud 
remove their prejudices, or Facilitate the Recruiting 
Service.1,17
The creation of the Royal Americans in the spring of 
1756, the first regiment of the regular British Army recruited 
solely in North America, made recruiting activities for the 
provincial regiments more difficult. In March 1756 the House 
of Burgesses had approved £8,000 to pay the expenses of 
recruiting for the Royal Americans and, not surprisingly, 
those with a military bent enlisted in the Royal Americans 
rather than the provincial forces.18
Recruiting for the Royal Americans generated other 
tensions as well. Denis McCarty, who had previously gained 
infamy for his recruiting activities for the Virginia 
Regiment, secured a commission in the Royal Americans. He 
proved no more suitable in his new regiment. In January 1757
17 George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 
1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:80-81.
18 Henning, Statutes at Large, 7:61-63; Journal of the 
Council of Virginia, 6:23-25; Gov. Dinwiddie to the Earl of 
Loudoun, January 14, 1757, Brock, ed., The Official Records of 
Robert Dinwiddie, 2:583-584.
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McCarty and another officer, Thomas Campbell, arrived in 
Alexandria from Philadelphia and began recruiting. They 
discovered that the townspeople did not welcome them and 
resorted to "forcing open Doors in the Night Time, taking Men 
out of their Beds and carrying them to their Guardho."19
To increase the pool of potential recruits the House of 
Burgesses authorized the impressment of vagrants. But that 
action only increased the regiment's problems. "For 
compelling these abandon'd Miscreants into the Service, who 
only waited time and opportunity to effect their escape, gave 
loose to all their vicious Principles, and invented the most 
unheard of stories to palliate Desertion and gain Compassion," 
wrote Washington.20 The House also authorized the recruiting 
of indentured servants with compensation for their masters, 
and appropriated £2000 for that purpose. The proposal failed 
because Dinwiddie insisted on no more compensation than £8 per 
servant, a figure that proved unacceptable to most masters. 
So desperate was the demand for men that in August 1756 
Dinwiddie even considered drafting convicts.21
19 William Fairfax to George Washington, January 22, 1757, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:100.
20 George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 
1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds. , The Papers of George Washington, 
4:81.
21 Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 19, 1756, 
Gov. Dinwiddie to Capt. John McNeil, December 25, 1756, Gov. 
Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 27, 1756, Brock, ed., 
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:478-480, 571-572, 
572-573; Henning, Statutes at Large, 7:61-63.
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The demands placed upon the Virginia Regiment heightened 
the strain. In the spring of 1756 the House of Burgesses 
approved the construction of frontier forts to protect the 
colony, and Dinwiddie decided that the regiment should 
garrison them. At the same time, the governor expected the 
regiment to send out rangers to detect incoming raids before 
they reached the frontier. Events of the spring of 1756 had 
shown that the two roles were incompatible, given the size of 
the Regiment: if the men were sent ranging, the garrisons were 
not large enough to resist attack; if the men remained in 
garrison, the raiders would simply bypass the forts. At the 
end of June a party of over one hundred Indians attacked 
Ephraim Vause's fort on the headwaters of the Roanoke River in 
Augusta County. The fort was vulnerable precisely because 
many of the garrison were on ranging duty.22 Adam Stephen, 
commander at Fort Cumberland, complained that the Indians 
"show themselves by way of Bravado at the Small garrisons as 
they pass & repass to destroy the Inhabitants, and as this 
insulting Behaviour escapes with impunity, it increases their 
insolence and demonstrates that Forts without a Sufficient 
number of men to defend them & Scour the Country about, are a 
useless Burthen to the province."23
22 Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, July 12, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:260; Pennsylvania Gazette, July 29, 1756.
23 Adam Stephen to George Washington, August 1, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:310.
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The regiment was also expected to work to complete the 
defenses of the forts. Dinwiddie had intended the militia for 
that purpose. However, the militia refused to lower 
themselves to manual labor, despite offers of higher pay. 
Dinwiddie's order that Washington should use the regiment to 
construct the defenses disturbed Washington and he bluntly 
asked the governor whether he was "to neglect the Inhabitants 
and build the Forts, or neglect the Forts, and mind the 
Inhabitants.1,24
Many Virginians hoped that British regulars would 
reinforce the provincial troops. When Loudoun called the 
southern governors, along with Governor Denny, to meet in 
Philadelphia to discuss plans for the forthcoming campaign 
many believed their hopes would be realized. But Loudoun's 
plans only increased the demands on the regiment, for he 
intended to all but ignore the Ohio Valley and use "the 
greatest part of the Troops this Campaign to the Northward" 
and asked that two hundred men of the Virginia Regiment be 
sent to protect South Carolina from an expected attack by the 
French.25
24 George Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, August 14, 
1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds. , The Papers of George Washington, 
3:349.
25 Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Lyttleton, January 29, 1757, 
Gov. Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, May 16, 1757, Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:588, 625- 
626; Journal of the Council of Virginia, 6:26; George 
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, March 10, 1757, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:112. Colonial
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As a result of the handicaps faced by the Virginia 
Regiment it could offer little opposition to the continuing 
raids on the frontier. During July, along the entire 
frontier, a multitude of small, Indian-initiated raiding 
parties attacked settlers harvesting their crops.26 At the 
same time two larger French-initiated and -led parties 
attacked the rear of Fort Cumberland, attempting to isolate 
the garrison. One party crossed into the Cacapon Valley and 
attacked around Maidstone killing several settlers. Another 
party pressed down the Potomac to the Conococheague, 
plundering and burning as they went and causing the settlers 
to abandon the Conococheague Valley. The raids on the
Conococheague continued for several weeks. By the end of July 
all the settlers in the Conococheague and the Maryland 
frontier had been pushed back almost to Frederick.27
The French attacks left Fort Cumberland's supply routes 
perilously exposed. French intelligence maintained that
25(.. .continued)
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:470-472; Mcllwaine, ed. , Journal of 
the House of Burgesses 1752-1755, 1756-1758, p.447.
26 "Memorandum," July 13, 1756, George Washington to
Robert Stewart, July 22, 1756, Robert Stewart to George
Washington, July 23, 1756, Abbot & Twohig, eds., The Papers of 
George Washington, 3:276, 283, 289-291; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
July 29, 1756; Maryland Gazette., August 5, 1756.
27 Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 31, 1756, 
George Washington to John McNeil, August 12, 1756, George
Washington to Thomas, Lord Fairfax, August 29, 1756, Abbot
and Twohig, eds. , The Papers of George Washington, 3:304, 343, 
380; Pennsylvania Gazette, August 5, 12, 19, September 2,
1756; Maryland Gazette, August 5, 26, 1756.
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"grass was growing in the roads communicating with [Fort] 
Cumberland [and] Expresses no longer came any farther than 
Winchester." Indeed, some reports suggested that it had been 
over three months since a wagon had passed to the fort.28 The 
raids forced Washington to employ many of his troops to keep 
the supply lines open. He pressed for the fort's abandonment 
so that he could ease the burden on the regiment. But 
Dinwiddie refused to allow the evacuation since it was a 
royal, not a provincial fort and could be abandoned only on 
strict orders from London, or from Lord Loudoun, commander-in- 
chief of the forces in North America.29
Washington continued to press the point on Dinwiddie. In 
October he even gave the garrison commander permission to 
abandon the post. Fortunately for Washington, a Council of 
War at the fort recommended instead that they should retain 
the fort to encourage the settlers on the South Branch to 
remain on their plantations. They recommended, however, 
removing the supplies to Winchester to reduce the post's 
importance.30
28 Gov. Vaudreuil to Machault, August 8, 1756, Brodhead, 
ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:437.
29 George Washington to John Robinson, August 5, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:323-326; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 19, 
1756, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:481.
30 George Washington to Adam Stephen, October 23, 1756, 
"Council of War," October 30, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., 
The Papers of George Washington, 3:440-442, 447-453.
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On November 15 the Council considered Washington's 
request. To his complete horror, the Council "were 
unanimously of Opinion by no means to abandon that Fort, as it 
would be giving up a large Extent of Country, but to reinforce 
it with a hundred Men from Winchester" and to keep it as the 
main supply depot.31 The Council's decision had the opposite 
effect from what they had intended. Since Washington had only 
eighty-one effective troops at Winchester, reinforcing Fort 
Cumberland as the Council wanted would mean abandoning 
Winchester. When word of the Council's orders reached 
Winchester, it "caused the utmost terror & consternation in 
the people." Washington sent a hurried note to the Council 
pointing out the implications of their decision, but the 
Council refused to abandon their plan and ordered Washington 
to reinforce Fort Cumberland from other frontier garrisons 
instead.32
To execute these orders Washington had to abandon most of 
the small forts on the South Branch and consolidate the 
remaining forces at Pearsall's Fort. When the troops heard 
that the Council had posted them at the vulnerable and 
isolated Fort Cumberland many deserted en masse in what
31 Journal of the Council of Virginia, 6:20-21.
32 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 2, 1756., 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:34-37; Journal of the Council of Virginia, 6:21-22; Gov. 
Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 10, 1756, Brock, ed., 
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:559-562.
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amounted to a "Mutiny."33 Washington protested, "Surely His 
Honour and the Council are not fully acquainted with the 
situation and circumstances of the unhappy Frontiers, to 
expose so valuable a tract of land as the Branch." He grew 
increasingly bitter that many Burgesses, who knew nothing 
about the military situation, repeatedly regarded his plans 
"as idle & frivolous; my propositions and measures, as partial 
& selfish; and all my sincerest endeavours for the service of 
my Country, [as] perverted to the worst purposes."34
The French, meanwhile, shifted their attention to attacks 
on southwestern Virginia in an attempt to disrupt Virginia's 
ongoing negotiations with the Cherokees. In September several 
large French-led Indian parties descended on Augusta and 
Bedford counties, killing or capturing over fifty people. The 
raiders surrounded another frontier post, Fort Dinwiddie, but 
the garrison was strong enough to hold out until a relief 
force could arrive.35 Smaller groups struck up and down the 
frontier. Throughout October parties harassed the South 
Branch of the Potomac, Stony Run in Frederick County, the
33 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 17, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:62- 
63; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, January 26, 1757, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:584.
34 George Washington to John Robinson, December 19, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:67- 
68.
35 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 7, 1756; Maryland
Gazette, October 7, 1756.
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Catawba River in Augusta County, and the Conococheague Valley 
in Maryland.36
Over the winter the raids subsided. Partly this was 
because heavy snows made crossing the Appalachians difficult. 
One French officer reported that it had been "the most severe 
winter, during which the snow has been as much as ten or 
twelve feet deep.”37 But following the thaw in the spring the 
raids still were not renewed with the same vigor. From the 
fall of 1756 until the summer of 1757 there were only two 
small raids on the Virginia frontier. At the end of February 
a small party attacked the South Branch. In May another small 
party attacked the exposed settlement at Cow Pasture in 
western Augusta County, killing three people and capturing 
several others. It was not until the end of June that another 
large assault materialized on the frontier.38
The reason for the decline in the raids lay in 
Pennsylvania, Cherokee, and Catawba sorties around Fort 
Duquesne, and a shortage of supplies on the Ohio, which 
increased the Ohio Indians' reluctance to leave their homes. 
The Cherokee raids on the Ohio Indians were the fruit of
36 Maryland Gazette, October 7, 1756; George Washington to 
Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, George Washington to Adam 
Stephen, October 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 3:431.
37 Montcalm to d'Argenson, April 24, 1757, M. Doreil to 
d'Argenson, May 5, 1757, Brodhead ed., Documents Relative to 
the Colonial History of New York, 10:547-550, 563-564.
38 Pennsylvania Gazette, March 10, June 2, 1757; Maryland 
Gazette, June 2, 1757.
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Virginia's efforts to gain Cherokee support. In the spring of 
1756 Dinwiddie sent Andrew Lewis to build a fort at Chota, one 
of the Cherokees1 main towns on the Cherokee River. He hoped 
that this would secure an alliance with the Cherokees and 
encourage them to send more warriors to aid Virginia. The 
governor did not intend to garrison the fort with a large 
number of men; rather he intended it to serve as a place of 
retreat for the warriors' families while they were away. The 
Cherokees welcomed the fort because they believed trade with 
Virginia would soon follow, lessening their dependence upon 
South Carolina.39
For the next eighteen months Virginia's relations with 
the Cherokees fluctuated rapidly. Virginia continued to send 
many diplomatic missions to the Cherokees, and several 
Cherokee deputations visited Williamsburg. But when Virginian 
traders did not flock to Fort Loudoun, as the English called 
the fort at Chota, many Cherokees grew restless at the 
existence of an English outpost in their midst. Others were 
suspicious of the settlement of settlers who had fled the 
Virginia frontier on Cherokee hunting grounds in the Lower 
Cane Valley. The activities of Carolinian traders heightened 
Cherokee misgivings. Jealous that the gifts of Indian 
diplomacy lessened the demand for their trade goods, the
39 Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, pp.77-78.
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traders spread rumors of Virginian plots and encouraged the 
Cherokees to break their relations with the colony.40
The French also made efforts to undermine the Cherokees' 
relations with Virginia. By the summer of 1756 the French had 
won the support of many of the neighboring Creeks, and through 
them sent envoys to the Cherokees. French influence was 
particularly strong in the westernmost of the Cherokee towns, 
Great Tellico. During the summer of 1756 a substantial number 
of the Cherokees threatened to join the French. Attempting to 
strengthen francophile support in the tribe, Governor 
Vaudreuil invited a party of Cherokees to Detroit to 
negotiate.41
The greatest threat to the Virginia alliance came from 
warriors returning from service on the frontier with tales of 
the colony's shameful behavior. The Cherokees were adroit at 
judging the strengths and weaknesses of their supporters and 
foes, and at manipulating the colonial governments and their 
agents. In initially entering the conflict they were not 
motivated by an altruistic desire to protect the English from 
the French, although their traditional enmity toward many of 
the Northern Indians may have been an incentive, but were
40 Ibid. , pp. 72, 87.
41 The visit actually served to weaken rather than 
strengthen the Cherokees' attachment to the French for they 
witnessed firsthand the Canadians' shortage of supplies. 
Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, pp. 71, 85-101, 107; Vaudreuil 
to Machault, April 19, 1757, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative 
to the Colonial History of New York, 10:539-540.
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lured by English promises of payment. They were well aware 
that they were indispensable to the English and expected 
compensation commensurate with their worth. Indeed Washington 
argued that "it is quite manifest to every person who had had 
an opportunity of experiencing the advantage of indian 
services, that the friendship and assistance of the Cherokees 
are well worth cultivating." He added "For my own part, I 
think they are indispensably necessary in our present 
circumstances. "42
The Cherokees expected substantial recompense for their 
services, particularly "Cloaths, Arms, and Ammunition." Funds 
soon ran short and the House of Burgesses found it more and 
more difficult to reward the Cherokees as the Indians 
expected. Even the allies of the English grew restless. The 
anglophile leader "the Swallow" protested that "it was his 
Promise of great Rewards from the Governour that engaged his 
young Men to come in, and that the Govr had now made him a 
Liar amongst his own Warriours." The Cherokees fought as 
mercenaries not as allies as the Virginians viewed them. The 
Virginians thought that they could satisfy the Cherokees with 
the normal gifts which accompanied diplomacy, but having 
decided to wage war for economic reasons, the Cherokees 
wanted, and needed, more.43
42 George Washington to John Stanwix, June 28, 1757, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:270.
43 Journal of the Council of Virginia, 6:25-2 6; Gov.
(continued...)
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Fighting on the Virginia frontier prevented the Cherokees 
from hunting for skins to trade. In addition, the uncertain 
conditions on the southern frontier kept many traders from 
venturing to Cherokee towns. As a result the prices the 
Cherokees had to pay for their goods rose. The Cherokees were 
caught in a trap: they were unable to hunt while the prices 
for the goods they needed increased. It should be no surprise 
that when the Virginians failed to reward them as they 
expected the Cherokees were outraged.44
The failure of the colony to provide the warriors, 
particularly those who had served on the Sandy Creek 
Expedition, with adequate gifts, when Dinwiddie had assured 
them that they would be rewarded handsomely for their 
services, caused deep dissatisfaction. Some even attacked and 
looted frontier settlements in Bedford and Halifax counties 
when Dinwiddie announced that the trade goods had not arrived 
from London. Not until the end of September did the Cherokees 
receive any of the goods they had been promised the previous 
spring.45
43 (... continued)
Dinwiddie to Gov. Lyttleton, January 29, 1757, Brock, ed., The 
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:588; George Washington 
to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 2, 1757, George Mercer to George
Washington, April 24, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 4:126-127, 139-141; Corkran, The
Cherokee Frontier, p.129.
44 Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, p. 133.
45 Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, July 22, 1756, Gov. 
Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, August 23, August 30, 1756, Brock,
(continued...)
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The reports of growing Cherokee dissatisfaction disturbed 
the House of Burgesses. In the fall of 1756 the House agreed 
to provide £2,000 of goods for the Cherokees, and allowed 
Dinwiddie to draw on sums previously allocated to support his 
Indian diplomacy.46 When the House of Burgesses reconvened in 
April 1757 they again attempted to strengthen the Cherokee 
alliance. Realizing the importance of trade to winning the 
goodwill and allegiance of the Indians, the House passed an 
act providing for the establishment of a Virginia Indian trade 
"in order to supply them with the goods and other necessaries 
for their support upon reasonable terms." To ensure that the 
trade did not fall into the hand of corrupt traders, the act 
established five directors to supervise it and set aside 
£5,000 to pay their expenses. The Burgesses empowered the 
directors to contract directly with factors on the frontier to 
sell goods to the Indians, and to hire interpreters at the 
colony's expense.47
The actions of the House sufficed to maintain the 
allegiance of the Cherokees temporarily. As a result of the 
funds and the arrival of the promised trade goods from London,
45 (... continued)
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:458-459, 
486-488, 492-493; George Mason to George Washington, September 
13, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George
Washington, 3:406-407.
46 Henning, ed., Statutes at Large, 7:61-63; Mcllwaine, 
ed., Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756-1758, 
401-403; Journal of the Council of Virginia, 6:28-33.
47 Henning, ed., Statutes at Large, 7:116-118.
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several hundred Cherokee, Catawba, Nottaway and Tuscarora 
Indians spent the winter and spring of 1757 on the Virginia 
frontier.48 The presence of Cherokee scouts, guides and 
warriors enabled the Virginia Regiment to launch offensives of 
its own. Several combined parties of Indians and provincial 
troops set out from Winchester to patrol the frontier and 
intercept incoming raiding parties. Some parties even 
launched raids around Fort Duquesne, harassing French supply 
routes, killing several French soldiers, and most importantly 
distracting the Ohio Indians from their raids on the Virginia 
frontier.49
The success of the Virginians in wooing so many parties 
to the frontier, however, sowed the seeds of future disaster. 
The number of Cherokee warriors surpassed the Virginians 
expectations' and there were insufficient goods on the 
frontier for them. Not only were goods in short supply, but
48 Maryland Gazette, March 15, 1757; Clement Read to
George Washington, March 15, 1757, William Fairfax to George 
Washington, March 31, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 4:117-118, 124-125; Gov. Dinwiddie to 
Henry Fox, January 4, 1757, Boehm, ed. , BPRO C05, Part 1,
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 18) 3:173-174; Montcalm 
to d'Argenson, April 24, 1757, Brodhead, ed., Documents
Relative to the Colonial History of the State of new York, 
10:548.
49 One such party, under the command of Lieutenant James 
Baker, followed the tracks of a raiding party and ambushed it 
killing two French officers and taking two prisoners including 
the commander of the party. Maryland Gazette, July 14, 1757; 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 10, 1757, George 
Washington to John Stanwix, June 15, 1757, George Washington 
to John Robinson, July 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 4:194, 200, 215-217, 287-288.
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direction of Indian affairs was in chaos. Whitehall had 
appointed Edmund Atkin as the southern superintendent for 
Indian Affairs, Sir William Johnson's equivalent in the 
southern colonies. He had arrived in Williamsburg from South 
Carolina in April. The Council immediately entrusted him with 
the supervision of Indian affairs on the frontier and provided 
him with gifts for the Cherokees. Atkin, however, delayed in 
Williamsburg on personal business and did not arrive in 
Winchester until June 2. For two crucial months Indian 
affairs in Winchester were in turmoil, lacking direction and 
crucial gifts.50
Circumstances improved only slightly when Atkin arrived. 
By the time of his arrival, many disappointed Cherokees had 
sought support from Pennsylvania and Maryland. Several groups 
marching north met George Croghan in early June. They 
protested "that they did not think themselves sufficiently 
rewarded for their Services," and complained that "after 
promising us a great deal of Goods. . . [the Virginians] have 
not given us Cloths for Ourselves, tho' we have been five 
Months in their Country."51 Croghan's talks with the 
Cherokees infuriated Atkin who was "very tenacious of his 
Power." He forbade Croghan from talking further to the
50 Journal of the Council of Virginia, 6:44-46; George 
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 29, May 30, 1757, George 
Washington to Andrew Lewis, June 3, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:170, 171-173, 179.
51 George Croghan's Journal, May-June, 1757, H.S.P., Penn 
Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:11-13.
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Cherokees, and ordered Pennsylvania not to present any gifts 
to the Cherokees.52 Atkin attempted to dissuade more 
Cherokees from going north, but merely increased their 
hostility and suspicion. Problems worsened when Atkin, who 
lacked an adequate interpreter, suspected French spies among 
the Cherokees and threw several warriors into the Winchester 
jail.53
The largest Cherokee group to arrive on the frontier in 
the spring of 1757 was led by Wawhatchee from the eastern 
Lower Cherokee settlements around Estatoe. From the outset 
there were problems. Wawhatchee's party came by a more 
easterly route than the Virginians had expected, through 
Lunenburg and Halifax counties, where they found no gifts 
awaiting them because Dinwiddie had assembled the gifts at 
Bedford Court House. Angered, Wawhatchee and his party soon 
began ransacking local farms and plantations, placing 
Dinwiddie in a quandary. Although reluctant to punish the 
Cherokees too severely for fear of discouraging them from 
intervening against the French, he needed to mollify Halifax
52 Atkin claimed that the Cherokees were under his 
authority, the Southern Department, while Pennsylvania was in 
Johnson's authority, the Northern Department. George 
Washington to John Stanwix, May 28, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:168-169; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:631.
53 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:600, 630-632;
george Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, John
Stanwix to George Washington, July 18, 1757, Edmund Atkin to 
George Washington July 20, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 4:306-307, 317, 321-322; Corkran, 
The Cherokee Frontier, p.127.
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and Lunenburg inhabitants. He ordered Clement Read, a Halifax 
justice, to round up the Cherokees "in a mild Method," 
meanwhile instructing the county lieutenants to have the 
militia ready if needed. Read hurried Wawhatchee's group on 
to Winchester where he promised presents awaited them.54
When the gifts were not ready for them in Winchester they 
again took insult and stormed off. Their discontent soon 
spread to other groups. George Mercer warned Washington that 
the Indians were "all wavering." They had told him that "the 
Govr knew not hcv; to treat Indians; that the French treated 
them always like Children, and gave them what Goods they 
wanted." Wawhatchee himself had warned that if he was no 
given sufficient reward he "would come & fight, and if he did 
not get it. . .he would turn back and take every thing from 
the Inhabitants as they went along, and maybe. . . scalp some 
of them too."55
By the beginning of August most of the warriors had quit 
Virginia's service and returned south, leaving the frontier 
dangerously exposed.56 When the House of Burgesses had met in
54 Journal of the Council of Virginia, 6:39-40, 45; Gov. 
Dinwiddie to Clement Read, April 12, 1757, April 15, 1757, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:609- 
610, 612-613; Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, pp.115-117.
55 George Mercer to George Washington, April 24, 1757, 
April 26, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 4:139-141, 142.
56 Edmund Atkin to George Washington, July 20, 1757, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:321-322; 
Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, p.127.
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May they had attempted to strengthen the colony's defenses by 
approving £80,000 to increase the strength of the Virginia 
Regiment to 1,200 men. As Washington had been unable to 
recruit over six hundred men, despite repeated efforts, 
increasing the number of men whom he could enlist was unlikely 
to improve the colony's defense. The French and their Indian 
allies tested those defenses at the end of June.57
As the French received reports of the growing 
disaffection of the Cherokees they encouraged the Ohio Indians 
to renew their attacks upon the frontier. At the beginning of 
June over two hundred Ohio Indians gathered at Fort Duquesne. 
Their intention was to attack and isolate Fort Cumberland.58 
Washington received advance intelligence of the raid from a 
scouting party. As he had stripped the garrison at the fort 
to a skeleton, Washington and his commanders agreed that the 
fort "must inevitably fall into their hands." Not only was 
the fort in danger, but as Washington had only 384 men fit for 
duty in the entire regiment and some of those were over two 
hundred miles away on the Augusta County frontier, the entire
57 The money to pay for the Regiment was to come from a 
tax of two shillings per hogshead on tobacco, two shillings 
per hundred acres on land, and a four shillings poll tax. Gov. 
Dinwiddie to George Washington, June 1, 1757, Gov. Dinwiddie 
to Gov. Sharpe, June 14, 1757, Gov. Dinwiddie to the Earl of 
Halifax, June 20, 1757, Brock, ed., The Official Records of 
Robert Dinwiddie, 2:635-636, 638-639, 648-650; Richard Bland 
to George Washington, June 7, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., 
The Papers of George Washington, 4:187-188.
58 Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, July 11, 1757, Brodhead, ed., 
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:580-581.
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frontier was imperiled.59 Washington and his officers felt 
certain that if Fort Cumberland and the magazine it held fell 
Winchester would soon follow.60
Washington called the officers to a council of war. They 
agreed that it was hopeless to defend the fort and that they 
should make a stand at Winchester. To facilitate the defense 
of the town it was imperative to recall the men stationed on 
the South Branch, Paterson's Creek, and the Cacapon.61 
Without the protection offered by the troops, the civilians in 
those regions would be exposed to French and Indian raids. 
Washington thus ordered Andrew Lewis to evacuate them "before 
it may be too late," even though the evacuation meant 
abandoning the only remaining inhabited parts of Hampshire 
County and much of Frederick County.62
Fortunately for Washington the French commander, 
Montisambert, fell ill and was forced to quit the expedition. 
Without a commander the Indians split into small groups which, 
instead of massing to attack Fort Cumberland, raided up and
59 200 men were en route to South Carolina at the time. 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 16, 1757, "Council 
of War," June 16, 1757, "Memorandum," June 16, 1757, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:217-218, 219- 
220, 220-221.
60 Gov. Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 16, 1757, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:217-218.
61 "Council of War," June 16, 1757, Abbot and Twohig,
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:219-220.
62 George Washington to Andrew Lewis, June 16, 1757, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:221-22.
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down the frontier, killing and capturing several settlers near 
Winchester, and on the South Branch, the Potomac, and the 
Conococheague. With the frontier spared a concerted assault, 
at least for the time being, Washington was able to cancel the 
evacuation of the forts and the civilians.63
The French encouraged other parties of Ohio Indians to 
attack the lines of communication between Virginia and the 
Cherokees, hoping to make it difficult for the Virginians to 
provide the Cherokees with gifts and keep Fort Loudoun 
supplied. In mid-July a raiding party attacked southern 
Augusta County, penetrating deep into Bedford, Halifax, and 
even Lunenburg counties. The attacks caused chaos and sent 
settlers over a large area hurrying east for protection. The 
terror was heightened by the actions of some of the local 
militia commanders, in particular Colonel David Stewart, who 
at the first sign of raiders panicked and began "raising false 
Alarms, terrifying the People, and refusing to act as becomes 
an Officer."64
63 Discovering that only small raiding parties were 
approaching the frontier Washington believed that the reports 
of a large attack had been false. John Dagworthy to
Washington, June 17, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 4:226.
64 George Washington to John Stanwix, July 30, 1757, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:354; 
Journal of the Council of Virginia, 6:59-60; Gov. Dinwiddie to 
Clement Read, August 3, 1757, William Withers to Andrew Lewis, 
August 15, 1757, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert 
Dinwiddie, 2:677, 686; Clement Read to William Preston, August 
9, 1757, University of Wisconsin, Draper Mss.: William Preston 
Papers, 1QQ:154-157.
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In mid-August another small raiding party attacked the 
South Branch, killing four and capturing two. The raiders 
pressed on to the Cacapon and then to Cedar Creek and Stony 
Creek, tributaries of the Shenandoah River, killing or 
capturing thirty four settlers. A month later another large 
party, numbering over one hundred, attacked along the Potomac 
River and temporarily severed communications between 
Winchester and Carlisle. Raids continued until the end of 
November, causing many settlers to abandon a large part of the 
northern Shenandoah Valley.65
The renewal of raids in the summer revealed that 
Virginia's release from the wrath of the French and their 
Indian allies had only been temporary. To offer permanent 
protection to the frontier Virginia would either have to 
conclude a more permanent and lasting agreement with the 
Cherokees and other southern Indians, or launch a major 
military offensive to take Fort Duquesne and pacify the Ohio 
Indians. The former was difficult considering Virginia's lack 
of comprehension of Indian needs and diplomacy; the latter was 
impossible without considerable support from Britain. 1758,
65 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, August 27, 1757, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 4:385; 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 17, 1757, Lewis 
Stephens to George Washington, September 20, 1757, George
Washington to John Stanwix, October 8, 1757, George Washington 
to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 24, 1757, Robert Rutherford to
George Washington, November 22, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., 
The Papers of George Washington, 4:408, 416-417, 5:9, 25, 57; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, October 6, 1757; Maryland Gazette,
October 13, 1757.
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however, would finally see the commitment of a large number of 
British regulars and substantial resources in an effort to 
take the Ohio.
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Chapter V
Fighting for Peace: The War in Pennsylvania 1756-1757
For the Susquehanna Delawares the winter of 1755-1756 had 
been one of fear for the future, rather than jubilation at 
their past success. Having attacked the Pennsylvania 
frontier, they now lived in dread of reprisals. In addition, 
provisions were running desperately low. Their fear was 
sharpened by pangs of hunger. Many of the Delawares began to 
relocate on the upper reaches of the west branch of the 
Susquehanna closer to the French, or even on the Ohio. In the 
heady days of November 1755, when the Delawares had first 
descended on the frontier, there had been rumors of the French 
building a fort at the Forks of the Susquehanna, at Shamokin, 
to protect them. Now in the reality of the late spring of 
1756, the Pennsylvanians instead had occupied Shamokin and 
were building their own formidable fortress, Fort Augusta. In 
the spring the Iroquois sent demands that the Delawares lay 
down their arms. The Susquehanna Delawares felt isolated and 
vulnerable, but as long as the French were prepared to offer 
support they were prepared to oppose the English. However, in
205
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case French support should suddenly evaporate, the Delawares 
prepared to open negotiations with the English.1
Newcastle and Jagrea arrived in Delaware country in late 
April. They found Wyoming deserted because all the Indians 
had removed north to Diahoga. They followed them. At Diahoga 
Newcastle informed the Delawares of Pennsylvania's wish for 
peace and invited them to talk.2 Before they would open 
negotiations, however, the Diahoga Indians went to Niagara to 
talk to the French and to attempt to acquire provisions. They 
found the French welcoming, but much to their horror they 
discovered that the French garrison at Niagara was almost as 
short of provisions as they were. There could be little hope 
of obtaining future supplies from the French.3
At daybreak on June 21, braving the threat from French 
raiding parties and the even greater threat from the parties 
of settlers who had set out to intercept the raiders, two 
bedraggled Indians, Nicodemus and his son Christian, 
forerunners for Teedyuscung, arrived in Bethlehem from 
Diahoga. They had come to inform the Pennsylvanians that the
1 Wallace, King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, pp.87-93; 
Letter to Thomas Penn, April 29, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.:
Indian Affairs 2:83.
2 Wallace, King of the Delawares, pp.94-95; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:190-191; "Report of Capt. 
Newcastle, Jagrea, & William Lacquis," May 31, 1756, H.S.P., 
Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:87.
3 Wallace, King of the Delawares, pp. 96-97; "Minutes of 
Council in Easton," July 25, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian 
Affairs, 2:97.
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Diahoga Indians, having heard of the desire of the 
Pennsylvanians for peace, wished to open negotiations.4 On 
July 15, Teedyuscung, having been assured by Nicodemus and 
Christian that he was safe, arrived at Fort Allen.5
Newcastle informed Morris and the Council of 
Teedyuscung's arrival. He begged them to act before it was 
too late. He told them "the times are Dangerous; the swords 
drawn and Glittering all Around you; Numbers of Enemys [are] 
in your Borders. I beseech you, therefore, not to give any 
delay to this Important Affair."6 The time had come for 
Pennsylvania to negotiate with the Delawares.
At the end of June, Teedyuscung and his followers arrived 
at Bethlehem. The local inhabitants were uncertain how to 
treat his deputation and were concerned by Morris's guarantee 
that the Indians would be unharmed. Timothy Horsefield wrote 
to the governor that the local people "are not sure whether 
they are Friends or Enemys. . . [and] hope that your Honour 
will not expose them like Sheep to the Mouths of the Wolves."7 
Morris himself was not quite sure of the Indians' intentions
4 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:164, 169.
5 William Parsons to Gov. Morris, H.S.P., Northampton 
County Records: Miscellaneous Papers; "Minutes of Council in 
Philadelphia," H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:96; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:198-201; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 4th Ser. 2:638-639.
6 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:199.
7 Ibid., 7:190-191.
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and invited them to Easton where he could post a better guard 
"in case they should not be so friendly as they Pretend."8
Easton was an unfortunate location in many ways. The 
local inhabitants were suspicious of their former enemies and 
were "very ignorant & indiscreet" in their comments around the 
Indians, many of whom understood English. The local 
magistrates, charged with keeping order in the town during the 
conference, informed Morris that they were "apprehensive that 
the whole Body of the Country People will come and with some 
of the Town, force the Indians away." The magistrates feared 
that the inhabitants' "Curiosity, especially when in Liquor, 
will lead them to go & see the Indians with whom they will 
either quarrel [or] if it is possible they will give them 
Liquor and make them drunk." The conference thus opened in an 
environment of hostility and mistrust.9
Sensing the vital importance of the negotiations the 
Council sent their most prominent members to treat with the 
Delawares: James Logan, Richard Peters, Benjamin Chew and 
Thomas Mifflin. However, it was not the eminent Councilors, or 
even Governor Morris, who were the linchpin to the
8 Ibid., 7:191, 192.
9 William Parsons to Gov. Morris, H.S.P., Northampton 
County Records: Miscellaneous Records, 1:209; "Minutes of the 
Council at Easton," July 26, 1756, H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian 
Affairs, 2:97.
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negotiations, but rather Teedyuscung, the self-proclaimed 
"King of the Delawares."10
Born in New Jersey on the Delaware River, Teedyuscung was 
well versed in the ways of the English. Contemporaries
described him as "near fifty years old, a lusty rawboned Man, 
haughty and very desirous of Respect and Command." Weiser 
described him as "well inclined, he talked in high terms of 
his own Merit, but expressed himself a Friend" to
Pennsylvania. He was quick to anger and desperately jealous 
of any threat to his authority. When he heard that the 
Pennsylvanians were meeting with a few of the Indians in 
private session, he stormed in upon them, accusing them of 
negotiating behind his back, only to be informed that they 
were merely trying to secure enough wampum for his gift.11
Teedyuscung had come to Easton to see what the
Pennsylvanians could offer the Delawares in return for peace. 
He sensed, correctly, that the French could not sustain the 
Delawares indefinitely and that the Delawares would be unable 
to resist a combined assault from the English and Iroquois. 
The time seemed ripe to push the Delawares' claims for
political independence from the Iroquois and for guarantees of 
territory. The final circumstance which pushed the Delawares
10 "Minutes of the Council at Easton,: July 25, 1755, 
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indians Affairs, 2:97.
11 Wallace, King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, pp.1-2; 
"Minutes of the Council at Easton," July 28, 1756, H.S.P., 
Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:97; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 7:216.
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to treat was the terrible depredations that they had undergone 
as a result of the disruption of their traditional trading 
networks. Whites who visited the Delawares agreed that the 
majority of the them remained set against the English. 
"Their whole conversation was continually filled with 
Expressions of Vengeance against the English and resolutions 
to kill them and lay waste there Country," declared one 
observer. Yet the threat of starvation compelled the 
Delawares to consider coming to terms with the English, for as 
some openly said, "it was better to do so than Starve."12
Negotiations finally got underway toward the end of July. 
Teedyuscung, fearful of being deceived by the Pennsylvanians, 
demanded his own interpreter instead of relying, as was the 
custom, on the provincial interpreter to serve both sides. 
His insistence upset the Pennsylvanians because it violated 
conference protocol. Reluctantly, Morris acquiesced to the 
demand.13
Teedyuscung's second requirement was recognition of 
himself as the sole negotiator for the Delawares. He 
complained that Indian affairs had been thrown into great 
confusion because the English had dealt with so many different 
Indian leaders, many of whom had no right to negotiate. "In 
every tribe of Indians there have been such Pretenders, who
12 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 9, 1756; Colonial
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:243, 357.
13 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:204.
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have hied treaties some times Publick and sometimes in the 
Bushes," he declared, "I can assure you that the present 
Clouds do in great measure owe their rise to this wild and 
irregular way of doing Business.1,14
Teedyuscung's next aim was Pennsylvania recognition of 
Delaware independence from the Iroquois, whom he claimed had 
freed the Delawares. "Formerly we were Accounted women, and 
Employed only in women's business, but now they have made men 
of us, and as such are now come to this Treaty, having this 
Authority as a man to make Peace." While this statement was 
a complete fabrication, Teedyuscung knew that the Iroquois 
were impotent to enforce their claims of suzerainty and that 
the Pennsylvanians might be reluctant to investigate his claim 
too closely.15
To encourage the Pennsylvanians to continue negotiating, 
Teedyuscung displayed the Delawares' new-found diplomatic 
weight. He informed the Pennsylvanians of his negotiations 
with the French and hinted that, if the English were not 
prepared to listen to his grievances, the French might. He 
made his position clear by presenting Governor Morris with a 
wampum belt portraying the Delawares, the English, and the
14 Not only did Teedyuscung claim recognition as speaker 
for the Susquehanna Delawares but he also claimed to speak for 
the "Ten Nations of Indians." "Minutes of the Council at 
Easton," H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:97; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:207-210; Pennsylvania Archives, 2d 
Ser., 2:640-645.
15 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:213.
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French. He explained to Morris, "We are in the middle 
between the French & the English. . . There are but two 
Chiefs. . . Their Attention is fixed to see who are disposed 
Really for Peace." He warned the side which would "not Comply 
with the terms of the Peace, the ten Nations will Joyn Against 
him and strike him.”16
Teedyuscung urged the English to do all in their power to 
speed the process. He said just two words in closing "Whish 
Shicksy." Weiser asked what he meant. He replied in a long 
simile:
Suppose you want to Remove A large Logg of Wood 
that Requires many Hands, You must take pains to 
gett as many together as will do the Business; if 
you fall short of one, tho' ever so weak, all the 
Rest are to no purpose. . . Enable us to get every 
Indian nation we can; put the means into our heads; 
be sure [to] perform every Promise you have made to 
us in Particular, do not Pinch matters neither with 
us nor other Indians. . . Whish Shiksy, do it
Effectually, and do it with all Possible 
Dispatch."n
Teedyuscung had made few demands. Morris was prepared to 
recognize both Teedyuscung's claim to speak for the Delawares 
and his claim that the Iroquois had renounced their 
overlordship. But Morris demanded time before concluding a 
more formal peace so that he could investigate Teedyuscung's 
claims. Teedyuscung, for his part, also desired an 
opportunity to broaden the peace process by including more 
Indians, particularly the Ohio Indians and the francophile
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 7:209.
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Senecas. Both sides promised to return to Easton in two 
months.18
Soon, however, storm clouds began to gather. The
Iroquois and Sir William Johnson were determined to do all in
their power to prevent the Delawares from negotiating
independently. While Teedyuscung had been treating with
Morris in Easton, the Iroquois offered the Delawares some
degree of independence if they would halt the talks. They
remained non-committal on exact terms, however, and through
Johnson told the Delawares to
remember that you are our Women, our Forefathers 
made you so, and put a Petticoat on you, and 
charged you to be true to us, and lye with no other 
Man. But of late you have suffered the String that 
tied your Petticoat to be cut loose by the French 
and you lay with them, and so became a common Bawd, 
in which you did very wrong and deserved 
Chastisement, but notwithstanding that we have 
still esteem for you, and as you have throwed off 
the Cover of your Modesty and become Stark Naked, 
which is a shame for a Woman, we now give you a 
Little Prick, and put it in your private Parts, and 
so let it grow there, that you shall be a compleat 
Man. We advise you not to act as a Man yet, but be 
first instructed by us, and do as we bid you and 
you will become a noted Man.19
While the Iroquois denied the right of the Delawares to 
negotiate, Johnson used his power to threaten the 
Pennsylvanians. He persuaded Lord Loudoun to issue a 
"peremptory Prohibition on this Governmt. from speaking to or
18 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:212; "Minutes of a 
Council at Easton," July 29, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian 
Affairs, 2:97; Pennsylvania Archives, 2d Ser., 2:640-645.
19 "Minutes of the Council at Easton," July 31, 1756, 
H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:97.
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trating w[i]th any Indians."20 Despite Iroquois claims and 
Loudoun's bluster, the Assembly decided that it was in 
Pennsylvania's interest to continue to negotiate, since the 
Delawares might take a refusal as a sign of bad faith.21
The decision was reinforced by chaos on the frontier. 
The raids on the western frontier by the Ohio Indians during 
the summer were particularly heavy and emphasized the need for 
a rapid settlement. In Cumberland County raiders attacked 
around Carlisle and McDowell's Mill. Unopposed, they pressed 
eastward into York County, spreading terror before them.22 
Another party struck in the Juniata Valley in the north and 
pressed on to Fort Granville which they captured on July 30 
taking prisoner the garrison and the settlers who had sought 
safety there. The inhabitants fled in fear abandoning most of 
the region to the north and west of Carlisle.23
In response to the raids Governor Morris continued to 
organize the Pennsylvania forces. During 1755 the 
Pennsylvania forces had consisted of several independent
20 Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, October 1756, H.S.P. 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:85.
21 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:307-308.
22 Gov. Morris letter, August 20, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz 
Collection, Case 15, Box 18; Pennsylvania Gazette, August 5, 
12, 19, 1756.
23 George Washington to Adam Stephen, August 5, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:336-338; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:241-242; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, August 5, 1756; Maryland Gazette, August 
26, 1756
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companies. In the summer of 1756 Morris rationalized them 
into a regiment of three battalions. The first battalion was 
stationed east of the Susquehanna under the command of Conrad 
Weiser. It consisted of nearly four hundred men, scattered 
along the frontier in small forts. The second battalion 
under John Armstrong was stationed in Cumberland County. The 
third battalion under William Clapham was given the task of 
finishing the construction, and garrisoning of, Fort Augusta 
at Shamokin.24
The Pennsylvania Regiment quickly reached its authorized 
strength and in the fall of 1756 went on the offensive. John 
Armstrong organized an attack on the Indian town of Kittaning, 
about twenty miles upstream from Fort Duquesne. The town was 
the home of Shingas and Captain Jacobs, believed to be the 
chief instigators of the raids on western Pennsylvania, and it 
was rumored to hold many prisoners whom Armstrong hoped to 
free.25 The expedition was as much an exercise in public 
relations as in military strategy. Morris commented it "will 
be of great use to the Publick as it will raise the spirits of 
the People and serve to remove that dread and Panick which has 
seized the generality."26
24 Pennsylvania Archives, 5th Ser., 1:41-47.
25 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:230
26 Gov. Morris, letter, September, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz 
Collection, Case 15, Box 18.
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The Kittaning expedition set off from George Croghan's 
plantation, Fort Shirley, on August 30. Although a lack of 
competent guides proved a great hindrance and the forces 
followed an atrocious route, Armstrong did manage to reach 
Kittaning and attack. The Pennsylvanians burned much of the 
town and killed many Indians, including, it was rumored, 
Captain Jacobs, but freed only seven prisoners, many fewer 
than Armstrong had hoped. On their withdrawal the expedition 
became divided and was attacked by several parties of Indians 
who managed to kill seventeen of Armstrong's men, wound 
thirteen, and capture another nineteen.27
Despite some success, the Pennsylvania Regiment was 
hamstrung by the disputes between the Assembly and the 
governor which deprived it of funding. By the end of 1756 the 
repercussions of these disputes had spread far beyond 
Pennsylvania. In the summer of 1755 William Smith had 
published A Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania in 
Philadelphia. When the work arrived in London the Penns and 
their allies seized upon Smith's arguments as evidence to 
exclude Quakers from the Assembly.28 Soon after the
27 John Armstrong to Gov. Denny, September 14, 1756,
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:100; Pennsylvania
Gazette, September 23, 1756.
28 Smith bitterly attacked the Quaker-dominated Assembly 
for leaving the province open to the wrath of the Indians 
claiming they were "Possessed of such unrestrained Powers and 
Privileges, they seem quite intoxicated; and factious, 
contentious, and disregard the Proprietors and their 
Governors. Nay they seem to claim a kind of Independency of
(continued...)
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publication of Smith's work, the Board of Trade received a 
petition from Pennsylvania, drafted in October 1755 by Chief 
Justice William Allen, another leading member of the 
proprietary faction. The petition asked the crown to 
"interpose your royal authority that this important 
province. . . might be put in a posture of defense," by
excluding Quakers from government.29 The combination of 
Smith's heated invective and a petition from many well- 
respected inhabitants of Pennsylvania convinced the Board to 
act. In March 1756 it sent a report to the Privy Council 
attacking the Pennsylvania Assembly for its pacifist stance 
and suggesting that Quakers should be permanently barred from 
holding office or sitting in the Assembly because their 
pacifism was inconsistent with the province's defense.30
The possibility that the Penns might succeed in barring 
Quakers from politics brought a swift backlash. The Anti- 
Proprietary faction, which was now led by Benjamin Franklin, 
quickly organized itself. In the summer of 1756 they 
commenced a pamphlet war on both sides of the Atlantic
28(. . .continued)
their Mother-County. " Jennings, Empire of Fortune, pp.235-237. 
William Smith, A Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania, 
(London: R. Griffiths, 1755) p. 10.
29 quoted in Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire, p.80.
30 As particular evidence the Board pointed to the many 
unconstitutional features of the militia established by the 
Assembly the previous fall. Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and 
the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776, pp.54-55; Marc Egnal, A 
Mighty Empire, p.80.
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mobilizing opposition to the proprietors.31 In the fall the 
Privy Council received a counter petition from Pennsylvania 
attacking the proprietary faction which, the petition charged, 
"under the plausible pretence of providing for the Publick 
Safety aims at nothing less than the Subversion of the present 
Constitution of Pennsylvania."32
Franklin's position was strengthened when the London 
Quakers persuaded their Pennsylvania brethren to refrain from 
standing in the elections for the Assembly in the fall of
1756. This allowed Franklin to defend the faction from 
charges of pacifism, for he was anything but a pacifist. It 
also shifted the debate on the future of Pennsylvania from the 
pacifism of the Assembly to the restrictions and 
constitutionality of the proprietors' instructions.33
31 In London they published An Answer to an invidious 
Pamphlet, intituled A Brief State of the Province of 
Pennsylvania countering Smith's arguments point for point. 
The work reminded readers of the great efforts the Assembly 
had made to assist the colony's defense, but which had been 
rejected by the governor because of the Proprietors' 
instructions. An Answer to an invidious Pamphlet, intituled A 
Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania. (London: S. 
Bladon, 1756).
32 ii-rhe Petition of the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania 
Considered," British Library, Add. Mss., 15,489:47-56; 
Benjamin H. Newcomb, Franklin and Galloway: A Political 
Partnership, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), 
pp.28-30.
33 In the elections for the Assembly on October 14, only 
eight Quakers and four non-practicing Quakers were returned 
out of thirty-six seats. Anglicans and Presbyterians held the 
majority of the seats. James Read, letter, October 7, 1756, 
H.S.P. Northampton County Records, Miscellaneous Papers, 
1:229; "Members of the House of Assembly in Philadelphia as
(continued...)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
219
Many Pennsylvanians hoped that the resignation of Morris 
and his replacement by William Denny in the summer of 1756 
would remove much of this tension. Morris himself commented 
that "the Assembly seemed at first fond of the Change, as 
indeed they would have been of any Change, as it gave them a 
Chance of getting a Man more to their mind, but when they 
find, that he is steady to his trust, as I hope they will, 
they will like him as little as they did me." Morris was 
correct.34
Many did not understand that it was not the character of 
the governor which had caused the deadlock. An able 
administrator, Morris was bound by strict instructions from 
the proprietors. The Assembly for its part, had been given 
extraordinary powers by William Penn's "Charter of Privileges" 
in 1701 and was determined to use and, where possible, expand 
them. In the half century preceding the war, conflicts had 
been few. But following the descent of the French and Indians 
upon the frontier, the two sides found themselves deadlocked 
and neither was prepared to give ground.35
33(.. .continued)
they stood October 14 1756," British Library, Add. Mss., 
3 3,029:354; Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire, pp.80-81.
34 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:222; Gov. Morris, 
Letter, August 20, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, Case 15, 
Box 18..
35 Thomas and Richard Penn, unlike their father, were 
more interested in financial considerations than an experiment 
in government and were determined to protect their property 
interests in Pennsylvania at all costs. They thus bound the
(continued...)
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Denny, arrived in Philadelphia on August 20 "and was 
received with great marks of Joy particularly by the 
Assembly."36 Unlike Morris, Denny was prepared to view his 
instructions with some flexibility. One of his first actions 
was to lay his instructions relating to financial affairs 
before the Assembly so that they could frame their bills 
accordingly. Morris had always refused to do this, claiming 
that the instructions were private. However Denny's actions 
did not prevent a stalemate with the Assembly.37
At the beginning of September the Assembly drafted 
another supply bill.38 Hoping that the new governor would be 
more tractable, the Assembly sought to issue £60,000 paper 
money and to establish a committee to control the funds. 
Denny refused to approve the bill because he could not accept 
such a large emission of paper or the Assembly's control of 
the expenditure of funds. He attempted to persuade the 
Assembly to raise only £15,000 of paper, repayable over five 
years. This sum would cover the immediate expenses of defence 
while the governor and Assembly negotiated a compromise. But
35(.. .continued)
governors with strict instructions detailing what legislation 
was acceptable. Newcombe, Franklin and Galloway, pp.17-19.
36 Gov. Morris, letter, August 20, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz 
Collection, Case 15, Box 18.
37 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:222; Gov. Morris, 
letter, August 20, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, Case 15, 
Box 18; Pennsylvania Gazette, September 23, 1756.
38 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser. 2:736, 737.
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the Assembly refused to consider his proposal. Instead they 
launched a bitter attack, identifying the proprietary 
instructions as the source of Denny's stubbornness and 
denouncing them as "arbitrary and unjust, an Infraction of our 
Charter, a total Subversion of our Constitution, and a 
manifest violation of our Rights, as freeborn Subjects of 
England. ”39
Denny and the Assembly remained deadlocked through the 
fall of 1756. As a result the Pennsylvania Regiment went 
unfunded. By January 1757 the Assembly estimated that the 
colony required £127,000 for defense in 1757, yet to date not 
a penny had been approved. In February the Assembly passed 
another supply bill. Denny once more rejected the bill, for 
again the Assembly proposed to emit £45,000 in paper money and 
to tax proprietary estates.40
39 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:249, 251-255, 256- 
257; Pennsylvania Gazette, September 23, 1756.
40 While Denny knew that the colony could not pay the 
expenses of the war without some paper money, he was convinced 
that the Privy Council would never approve so large an 
emission of paper money. The Assembly had hoped that Denny 
might relent on the taxation of proprietary estates since he 
had received a letter from the Penns announcing that they were 
willing to have their estates taxed. But the Penns would 
accept taxation only in "a Manner that appears... to be 
reasonable and agreeable to the Land Tax Acts of Parliament." 
What was not "reasonable" about the bill was that the Assembly 
established the rates, taxed unimproved lands (including many 
more proprietary lands), and appointed commissioners to 
oversee the disbursement of funds. Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 7:418; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:776- 
777, 780-784; Daniel Clark to James Burd, February 22, 1757, 
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
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When the Assembly heard that Denny would not approve the 
bill, they refused to pass any new measure and returned the 
original. Denny approached the Council, asking in view of the 
dire need whether he should accept the Assembly's bill. The 
Council unanimously agreed that he could not without breaching 
the proprietors' instructions. Denny informed the Assembly 
that he would not change his decision. Aghast, the Assembly 
informed him that they "demand[ed] it of the Governor as our 
Right, that he give his Assent to the Bill we now present 
him." Denny, disgusted at "the Incivility of the Expression," 
remained steadfast.41
As a result of the deadlock, there was no funding to 
provide the Pennsylvania Regiment with clothing, supplies, and 
at times even food. In February 1757 the forces at Fort 
Augusta ran out of meat, almost ran out of flour, and were 
within two weeks of exhausting all their other supplies. By 
the middle of March the situation was desperate. Some 
provincial troops had not been paid for ten months. Morale 
plummeted and desertion spread rapidly.42
The problem was the more urgent because the men in the 
regiment had been recruited for only one year and many terms
41 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:778; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:401-403, 416-417.
42 Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of 
Democracy, p.55; Edward Shippen to Joseph Shippen, February 6, 
February 14, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family papers, Vol 2;
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:441; William Parsons to 
Conrad Weiser, March 26, 1757 H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:47.
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were about to expire. Particularly at Fort Augusta, where the 
garrison had been exposed to the worst neglect on the 
frontier, the men refused to reenlist and threatened to leave 
the moment their terms expired, leaving the vital frontier 
fortress "without a Garrison to defend it."43
Not until the middle of June was a solution reached. 
Denny, attacked on all sides for his failure to defend the 
colony adequately, capitulated completely and allowed the 
Assembly to issue £52,000 in paper. He justified his 
capitulation to the Privy Council by arguing "that the 
Assembly wou'd not go into any other way of raising Money to 
maintain the Troops."44
The plight of the regiment became more important because 
in July 1756 the Privy Council had disallowed the militia act 
passed in the fall of 1755. As a result the colony had only 
the forces of the regiment.45 When news arrived of the 
rejection, Denny asked the Assembly to frame a new bill. He 
informed them that in the long-term a militia was "the only 
permanent Defence which the Inhabitants are capable of 
supporting." The Assembly declined unless Denny showed them 
the proprietors' instructions relating to military affairs.
43 "Col. Burd's Journal at Fort Augusta," March, 1757, 
Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Pa., Box 2, Folder 
13; Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, H.S.P., Shippen Family 
Papers, Vol. 2.
44 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:565-566.
45 Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of 
Democracy, p .55.
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He refused and the deadlock continued through the spring of
1757. In March Denny again pressed the Assembly for a militia 
bill. The Assembly finally agreed, but to Denny's horror the 
bill, except for the preamble, was exactly the same as the 
previous bill the Privy Council had rejected. In April 1757 
Denny wrote despairingly to William Pitt appealing for 
parliamentary action to establish a militia in Pennsylvania.46
The need for action was made still more pressing because 
the quest for peace with the Delawares ran into unexpected 
obstacles. Both the Pennsylvanians and the Delawares remained 
deeply suspicious of the other's actions. After the 
conference at Easton in July, Teedyuscung had dallied for over 
a month at Fort Allen, despite his promise to return in two 
months with more Indians. Some sources reported rumors that 
he had remained in Pennsylvania to talk to the Indians at 
Bethlehem and inform them of a plot to attack the colony.47
Teedyuscung was equally suspicious of the Pennsylvanians. 
At Wyoming he heard rumors that they intended to capture him 
and he delayed his return for several weeks. He sent
46 The bill retained the election of militia officers, 
which had been the principal reason for the Privy Council's 
rejection of the previous bill. John Armstrong to James Burd, 
January 28, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2;
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:784-785, 8th Ser., 6:4434, 
4426-4437, 4447; Gov. Denny to William Pitt, Boehm, ed., BPRO 
C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 18) 3:186- 
187.
47 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:729-734; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:222; Gov. Morris to the Board of 
Trade, [September] 1756, H.S.P. Gratz Collection, Case 15, Box 
18.
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messengers ahead who reported that he would be safe, but many 
of his men were still reluctant to continue. He was forced to 
leave them behind and continue to Easton with only a small 
retinue. Negotiations finally resumed on November 8.48
At their previous meeting Teedyuscung had not made clear
the reasons for the estrangement of the Delawares. In
November Denny pressed to determine the exact reasons for the
Delawares joining the French. He asked Teedyuscung outright,
"Have we the Governor or People of Pennsylvania, done you any
kind of Injury? If you think we have, you shou'd be honest and
tell us your Hearts."49 Teedyuscung was, not unnaturally,
worried about being too frank and would only say that "some
things that have passed in former times, both in this and
other Governments, were not well pleasing to the Indians."50
That explanation was insufficient and Denny pressed
Teedyuscung again. Finally Teedyuscung complained that the
root of the Delawares' alienation lay in the Proprietors'
fraudulent acquisition of their lands. He continued:
I have not far to go for an Instance; this very 
Ground that is under me. . . was my Land and
Inheritance, and is taken from me by fraud. When I 
say this Ground, I mean all the Land lying between 
Tohicon Creek and Wioming, on the River 
Susquahannah. . . When I have sold Lands fairly, I 
look upon them to be really sold. A bargain is a
48 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 21, 1756; Colonial
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:278, 284-289; Pennsylvania
Archives, 4th Ser. 2:742.
49 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser. 2:743-745.
50 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:323.
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bargain. Tho' I have sometimes nothing for the 
lands I have sold but broken Pipes or such 
Triffles, Yet when I have sold them. . . I look
upon the bargain to be good. Yet I think I should 
not be ill used on this account by those very 
people who have such an Advantage in their 
Purchases, nor be called a Fool for it. Indians 
are not such Fools as to bear this in their minds.
The Proprietaries who have purchased their Lands 
from us cheap, have sold them dear to poor People, 
and the Indians have suffered for it.51
Teedyuscung used the Walking Purchase as a vivid example,
since the land on which Easton stood was acquired in that
purchase. He did not claim that the Walking Purchase was the
only, or primary, cause of the Delaware's alienation. The
borders he mentioned included far more territory than
Pennsylvania had acquired by the Walking Purchase and he went
on to elaborate a series of other grievances, including
altering deeds after the fact, fraudulently enlarging the
boundaries, and purchasing land from Indians who had no claim
to them. Most significantly the Delawares complained that the
Iroquois, especially the Mohawks, had used their overlordship
to sell land the Delawares did not wish to sell.52
51 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:324-325.
52 Francis Jennings, in particular, stresses the primary 
importance of the Walking Purchase as the cause of the 
alienation of the Delawares. Jennings' emphasis on the 
Walking Purchase is, in many ways, merely a repetition of the 
claims made by Charles Thomson, a Philadelphia schoolmaster 
and Teedyuscung's clerk at the Easton Treaty in 1758. In his 
famous Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the 
Delaware and Shawnese Indians from he British Interest, 
published in 1759, Thomson emphasized the importance of land- 
fraud, particularly the Walking Purchase, in the alienation of 
the Delawares. While Thomson was not as "patently biased" a 
witness as A.F.C. Wallace has claimed, he was a supporter of
(continued...)
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In reply to Teedyuscung's complaints, Denny asked "what 
will satisfy you for the Injustice you suppose has been done 
you in the purchase of Lands in this Province." He offered to 
compensate the Delawares for their lands. But Teedyuscung 
replied that he needed to consult with other members of the 
tribe before he could accept terms and would return again in 
the spring. Denny also felt the need to investigate the 
actions of Teedyuscung further. So it was agreed to hold 
another conference in the spring of 1757.53
The accusation of land fraud provided much ammunition for 
the anti-proprietary faction's struggle against the Penns. 
While Teedyuscung was making his claims in Easton, in London 
the Privy Council and Board of Trade were hearing arguments 
about royalization of the colony. Those who opposed the
52(. . .continued)
the Quaker faction and the Friendly Association which induced 
him to portray the origins of the conflict in a manner not in 
conflict with that of his Quaker friends. However, Thomson's 
misrepresentation of the importance of the purchase is largely 
the result of his failure to perceive the abhorrence that the 
Susquehanna Delawares felt for their Iroquois overlords. 
Thomson was aware that the Delawares complained of land-fraud, 
but, as he was unable to comprehend the Delawares' 
interpretation that the purchase of their lands from the 
Iroquois was fraudulent, the Walking Purchase seemed the most 
glaring example. Jennings, Empire of Fortune, p.279; Wallace, 
King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, pp.250-251; Charles
Thomson, Am Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the 
Delaware and Shawnese Indians, (London: J. Wilkie, 1759) ; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:325; "Interview of Tatamy, 
Pamshire, and Teedyuscung, with Conrad Weiser," November 26, 
1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:106.
53 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:749; George Croghan 
to Gov. Denny, December 13, 1756, H.S.P., Cadwallader
Collection: Trent-Croghan Papers, 5:20.
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proprietors levelled Teedyuscung's charges directly against 
the Penns. The petition presented to the Privy Council in the 
fall by the anti-proprietary faction claimed that alienation 
of the Delawares was the result of "some Suspicions in His 
[Penn's] Manner of dealing with the Indians." In Philadelphia 
the Quakers pressed to see the Minutes of the Governor and 
Council to examine Indian claims for evidence to bolster their 
case. Richard Peters, the Provincial Secretary informed them 
brusquely that the minutes were private because they contained 
"the most important Affairs of Government" and would not allow 
them to see them.54
Charges against the Penns also came from another 
direction, from Sir William Johnson. In the fall of 1756 
Johnson, stung by the failure of the Iroquois to control the 
Delawares and his own inability to negotiate a peace, wrote to 
the Board of Trade claiming that the Delawares had been 
alienated solely because of Pennsylvania land purchases and 
the stationing of troops on the Susquehanna. The Penns were 
horrified and in turn tried to deflect blame to Virginia land 
purchases on the Ohio. 55
On his return to Philadelphia Denny asked the Council to 
examine proprietary dealings with the Indians, particularly
54 "The Petition of the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania 
Considered," British Library Add. Mss., 15,489, 47-56; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:394-395, 397-398.
55 iiproprietors of Pennsylvania's Observations on Sir 
William Johnson's Letter," December 11, 1756, H.S.P., Penn 
Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:108.
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the Walking Purchase. The Penns themselves were not totally 
opposed to unearthing the truth. Indeed, Thomas Penn later 
wrote to Peters asking him to try to recover an original copy 
of the Walking Purchase deed so that he could show that 
Teedyuscung's charges were false. The Penn's version of the 
truth, of course, might be very different from that of 
others.56
There were others who sought to deflect attention from 
the issue of land fraud. Both Conrad Weiser and Richard 
Peters stressed that the Delawares had only alleged that land 
fraud was "the cause why the Blow came the harder on us": land 
fraud had encouraged the Delawares to attack the colony with 
ferocity once the fighting had commenced, but had not caused 
the Delawares to go to war. Both Weiser and Peters acted out 
of self-interest rather than as part of a conspiracy to hide 
the details of the Walking Purchase. Weiser lacked influence 
among the Delawares. His influence lay in his position as 
Pennsylvania's interpreter with the Iroquois. If the colony 
recognized Delaware independence from the Iroquois, by 
admitting that land purchases from the Iroquois were invalid, 
Weiser lost his power and influence. As the confidant and 
close ally of the Penns, Peters' future depended on their 
influence. If the Penns' intrigues with the Iroquois to 
obtain Delaware lands were seen in too unfavorable a light in
56 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:354-355; Thomas 
Penn to Richard Peters, December 10, 1757, H.S.P., Peters
Papers, 5:6.
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London, the Penns' power, and consequently Peters' power, 
would be eclipsed. Both Weiser and Peters thus sought to 
direct the investigation of the alienation of the Delawares 
away from the issue of land fraud.57
Weiser and Peters pursued separate strategies. Weiser 
claimed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
Teedyuscung's claims as any Indians who might have been 
defrauded were "either dead or gone. . . to other places."58
He pointed out that the Delawares had previously brought 
their complaints before the Iroquois who had dismissed them. 
He also advised Denny against promising Teedyuscung that the 
government would investigate his complaints since as the 
provincial commissioners agreed, "such Promises had frequently 
been made. . . by the Governors of other Provinces and not
performed, and these people might consider them now as made 
with a Design to evade giving them redress." Avoiding any 
commitment would, of course, also mean that the government 
would be under less pressure to examine Teedyuscung's claims 
in detail.59
Peters followed different tactics. He made no attempt to 
discredit Teedyuscung's allegations but emphasized that his
57 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, pp.278-279; "Pennsylvania 
Assembly Committee: Report on the Easton Conference," January 
29, 1757, Leonard W. Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin
Franklin, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959-), 28 
Vols. 7:111-114; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:847-848.
58 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania 7:326-327.
59 Ibid. , 7:327.
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motivation for making such claims came from elsewhere. Peters
stressed that francophile Indians had initially corrupted the
Delawares, while the Quakers had fabricated the charge of 
proprietary land fraud and put it into the heads of the
Delawares during the conference at Easton in order to have 
ammunition against the proprietary government.60
Suspicions about the integrity of Teedyuscung himself 
further undermined the quest for peace. During the
negotiations at Easton in November small groups of renegade 
Delawares, opposed to Teedyuscung's peace endeavors, 
continued to raid in Lancaster and Berks counties. At the 
beginning of December other Delaware parties devastated the 
frontier of Northampton and Berks Counties. The Ohio Indians 
meanwhile subjected the western frontier to heavy raids. At 
the beginning of November they attacked Cumberland County near 
McDowell's mill, killing eleven and capturing eight.61
The raids continued during the winter, although they were 
more sporadic because of the difficulty of traveling through 
the winter snows. The winter raiders were predominantly Ohio 
Indians, most of whom were sent out from Fort Duquesne for the 
French sought to maintain pressure on the English while using 
diplomacy with the Delawares to prevent them concluding a 
peace. During January and February 1757 raiders continued to
60 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:758.
61 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 12, 28, November 11, 18, 
1756; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:302-303, 303-304, 
357.
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harass the rear of Fort Cumberland, and several small parties 
forayed around the fort itself and along the Potomac River.62
When Spring arrived the Indians renewed their attack upon 
the frontier in full force. A large party of Ohio Indians, 
reinforced by Potawatomis and Ottawas attacked near 
Chambersburg and pressed on to ravage the Concococheague. 
Several smaller parties scouted around Fort Cumberland killing 
several guardsmen.63 Simultaneously a large party of Senecas 
and Cayugas attacked Northampton County. From Northampton 
County they pressed west into Berks County and in early May 
raided Swataro Creek killing fourteen setters.64 The raids 
soon spread into the Susquehanna Valley where the Senecas and
62 Vaudreuil to Antoine Louis Rouille, Count de Jouy, July 
12, 1757, Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles. 
pp.98-104; Pennsylvania Gazette, January 6, 13, 27, March 10, 
1757.
63 Thomas Barton to Richard Peters, April 4, 1757, H.S.P., 
Peters Papers, 4:85; Pennsylvania Gazette, April 7, 14, 28, 
May 5, 1757; Maryland Gazette, April 7, 1757; "Col. Burd's 
Journal at Fort Augusta," March 1757, Pennsylvania State 
Archives, Edward Shippen-Thompson Family Papers, Box 2, Folder 
13; Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, March 4, 1757, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, July 
11, 1757, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial 
History of New York, 10:581.
64 Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, July 11, 1757, Vaudreuil to 
M. de Moras, July 13, 1757, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative 
to the Colonial History of New York, 10:581, 590; Vaudreuil to 
Antoine Louis Rouille, Count de Jouy, July 12, 1757, Stevens, 
ed., Wilderness Chronicles, 94-104; "George Croghan's Report 
on the Proceedings with the Iroquois at Lancaster," April & 
May, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:5-9; Gov.
Denny to Thomas Penn, April 8, 1757, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, 
Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 18) 3:216-217; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:492-494; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, May 12, 1757.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
233
Cayugas coalesced with a group of Ohio Indians, under French 
commander Chauvignerie, attacking from the west. The raids 
devastated a large area along the Susquehanna, and by the 
middle of May the region along the river had again been 
abandoned. In June yet another party of Ohio Indians 
assaulted Cumberland County, penetrating as far as the Great 
and Little Coves where they caused great damage.65
The raids caused many Pennsylvanians to demand that the 
government seek a military rather than diplomatic solution. 
They also provided an opportunity for those opposed to 
Teedyuscung to disparage him. At the beginning of December 
Peters openly claimed that it was Teedyuscung's followers who 
were raiding the frontier. Denny, however, was determined to 
continue negotiations. He proposed holding a general 
conference in March with the Delawares, Iroquois, and Ohio 
Indians. He sent George Croghan to Harris' Ferry to persuade 
some of the anglophile Conestoga Indians to inform the Ohio 
Indians of the conference and asked Sir William Johnson to use 
his influence to persuade as many Iroquois as possible to 
attend.66
65 Daniel Clark to James Burd, May 21, 1757, Bartram
Galbreath to James Burd, May 23, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family 
Papers, Vol. 2; Vaudreuil to M. de Moras, July 11, 1757,
Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
New York, 10:589; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:538-539; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, May 26, June 16, 23, 1757.
66 Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, December 7, 1756, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:91; William Johnson to Gov. 
Denny, February 16, 1757, Almon W. Lauber, ed., The Papers of
(continued...)
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The Iroquois arrived for the conference in great numbers 
at the end of March.67 Denny wanted the conference held in 
Philadelphia, but the Iroquois, afraid of the smallpox 
epidemic which was then ravaging Pennsylvania, refused to go 
so far into the colony. They did agree to continue on to 
Lancaster where they arrived on April 7. There they awaited 
the arrival of the other participants. It soon became 
apparent that few Ohio Indians would attend. The only 
Shawnees and Delawares present were a few refugees who had 
been living at Aughwick, George Croghan's plantation on the 
Juniata River. But the Ohio Indians were not the only ones 
not to appear. By the middle of April Teedyuscung had still 
not appeared. Rumors circulated that he would not arrive for 
several weeks. The only message had been a request that food 
and provisions be prepared for his arrival, but he had given 
no hint of when that would be.68
The end of April arrived. The Iroquois grew increasingly 
restless. They threatened to leave, complaining "we have been
66 (. . . continued)
Sir William Johnson, (Albany: The University of the State of 
New York, 1939), 12 Vols., 9:607-608; Colonial Records of
Pennsylvania, 7:384, 403, 434-435; "Instructions to george
Croghan," February 16, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian
Affairs, 3:2; Pennsylvania Archives, 2:770.
67 160 Iroquois attended. Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania,7:465.
68 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:465-466, 474-477, 
510; George Croghan to James Burd, April 3, 1756, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; William Parsons to Conrad 
Weiser, April 16, 1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:49; 
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2 :788-789.
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here a great while and the Spring is coming on Fast it is Time 
for us to think of going Home to Plant."69 The Pennsylvanians 
were horrified. The commissioners hurried up to Lancaster 
before the Iroquois delegates could leave, arriving on May 9. 
Still hoping that Teedyuscung would appear, they made hurried 
preparations for a meeting between Denny and the Iroquois.70 
The Iroquois were not prepared to wait any longer. Many of 
their warriors had contracted smallpox and were dangerously 
ill and they wished to leave Lancaster as soon as possible.71
On May 12 the conference convened in Lancaster without 
Teedyuscung. The reasons for the failure of the Delawares to 
arrive soon became apparent. One of the first actions of the 
Iroquois was to deny the right of the Delawares to negotiate 
directly with the Pennsylvanians. They informed Denny that 
the Delawares had told them that "they looked upon themselves 
as Men, and wou'd acknowledge no Superiority that any other 
Nation had over them" and had even threatened the Iroquois to 
"say no more to us on that Head, lest we cut off your private 
Parts and make Women of you." The Iroquois repudiated the
69 George Croghan's report on proceedings with the 
Iroquois at Lancaster, April & May 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 3:5-9; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 
7:484-488.
70 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:513.
71The darkest news of the conference was the death of 
Scarouady of smallpox. The English had lost a major ally, 
although by 1757 he had lost most of his influence amongst the 
Indians. John Harris to James Burd, June 6, 1757, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Colonial Records of
Pennsylvania, 7:498-499.
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claims of the Delawares, maintaining simply that "In former 
Times, our Forefathers conquer'd the Delawares, and put 
Petticoats on them" and they had no intention of changing that 
status.72
The Iroquois brushed aside the Delawares' assertion of 
land fraud and claimed, rather absurdly, that the Delaware 
raids had merely been the acts "of Drunken Men."73 Denying 
any liability for the Delawares' alienation, they claimed that 
they had removed the Delawares to "Lands to plant and Hunt on, 
at Wyoming and Juniata, on Susquehannah." It had been the 
Pennsylvanians who "Covetous of Land, made Plantations there 
& spoiled their Hunting Grounds" and drove the Delawares into 
the arms of the French.74
However, the Iroquois did not wish their claim of 
authority over the Delawares to be publicly tested. In an 
attempt to hasten the peace process without undermining their 
pretense of over lordship, they advised the Pennsylvanians that 
it would be better to "give up some Points to them than to 
contend." If the Pennsylvanians would restore some lands to
72 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:518-520, 521-528,
540.
73 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:798-799; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:521, 536.
74 George Croghan's report on proceedings with the 
Iroquois at Lancaster, April & May 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 3:5-9; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 
7:540-541.
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the Delawares perhaps the Delawares would cease their 
hostilities and the Iroquois might claim some of the credit.75
While Croghan and Denny were meeting with the Iroquois at 
Lancaster, Teedyuscung remained on the Susquehanna at Diahoga 
afraid to confront the Iroquois, especially the Mohawks, with 
his accusations. He was not completely inactive, however, for 
he sent representatives to the Senecas, the most francophile 
of the Six Nations, seeking their support. He also journeyed 
himself to Niagara and spoke to Governor Vaudreuil, promising 
to send some warriors to aid in the French attack on Fort 
William Henry.76
The Delawares had kept a line of communication open with 
the French. In the fall of 1756 the Delawares had met with 
Ligneris, the commander at Fort Duquesne, and informed him 
that they were "firmly resolved to abandon the English 
forever." So firm did their resolution appear that the French 
doubted the reports of negotiations at Easton.77 As soon as 
the French received confirmation of the negotiations, 
Vaudreuil attempted to bolster Delaware support for the French
75 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:542.
76 There is no evidence that Teedyuscung ever sent any 
aid. Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:465; Vaudreuiil to 
M. de Moras, July 13, 1757, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative 
to the Colonial History of New York, 10:589-590.
77 de Ligneris replaced Dumas as commander of Fort 
Duquesne in November 1756. Vaudreuil to Antoine Louis 
Rouille, Count de Jouy, July 12, 1757, Stevens and Kent, eds., 
Wilderness Chronicles, pp.98-104; Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, 
July 11, 1757, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the
Colonial History of New York, 10:582.
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and sent wampum belts to Diahoga reminding the Delawares of 
their former friendship and promising that if they would 
resettle in the vicinity of Presqu'Isle they would be well 
provided for. Vaudreuil's belts may have had some effect, for 
the French continued to receive reports that the Delawares 
were deeply divided over the prudence of negotiating with the 
English, and many Delawares continued to attack the 
Pennsylvania frontier despite the onset of negotiations.78
While many Delawares may have been inclined to continue 
supporting the French, the French were unable to supply them 
with the supplies they needed, particularly arms, ammunition, 
and food. Without ammunition not only were the Delawares 
unable to maintain their assaults on the frontier, but they 
could not hunt for skins and meat. At the same time, 
uncertain about the future, many were reluctant to plant a 
corn crop in the spring of 1757. By the summer of 1757 Canada 
itself was extremely short of supplies. Montcalm feared that 
"the extreme scarcity we are suffering, only too severely, in 
the interior of the Colony, will not fail to make itself 
felt. . . on the Beautiful River [the Ohio.]" For 1757 the 
French were able to secure supplies for the Ohio from Illinois
78 Vaudreuil to M. de Moras, July 13, 1757, Brodhead, ed. , 
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:582.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
239
and Louisiana, but their own situation for 1758 was uncertain, 
and provisions for their Indian allies all but non-existent.79
What Teedyuscung saw at Niagara in the spring of 1757 
convinced him that the Delawares had to continue to negotiate 
with the Pennsylvanians. When it was clear that the Iroquois 
had left the colony, Teedyuscung appeared in Easton at the end 
of June.80
Before Denny's departure to meet Teedyusucung several 
members of the Friendly Association came before the Council 
requesting permission to inspect the Council's minutes 
relating to Indian purchases to lay before the conference. 
Denny disapproved and issued a thinly veiled threat that they 
"wou'd do well to decline appearing at the ensuing Treaty in 
a Body."81 Rather bluntly they replied that Teedyuscung had 
"repeatedly inform'd us of the Necessity of our Personal 
Attendance" at Easton and had "express'd his Regards for & 
Confidence in the Quakers & declar'd he would not proceed to 
any Business unless we were Present."82 They threatened to
79 Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, July 11, 1757, Brodhead, ed., 
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:583.
80 Extract from Conrad Weiser's Journal, H.S.P., Conrad 
Weiser Papers, 2:77; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:835.
81 Another groups of Quakers had sought access to the 
Council's minutes in the fall. See p.228. Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 7:637-638; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 
2:837.
82 "Address of the Friendly Association to Gov. Denny," 
July 14, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:17-18.
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publish all the accusations about the proprietary government's 
mismanagement of Indian affairs if Denny prevented them from 
attending.83
Denny was in an awkward situation. Following the
negotiations at Easton in the fall of 1756, the Earl of 
Halifax complained to him about the influence of the Friendly 
Association amongst the Indians. Halifax had attacked their 
actions as a clear breach of prerogative and ordered Denny 
"not to suffer those People, or any other. . . Body or Society 
in Pennsylvania, to concern themselves in any Treaty with the 
Indians."84 Denny was thus forced to prevent the 
Association's attendance, though he could not prevent private 
individuals from attending.
The members of the Friendly Association were disturbed by 
these accusations. Having a genuine desire to end the war and 
not simply to stir up trouble, the Quakers protested that they 
never intended to interfere in government affairs, but merely 
to seek a peaceful settlement.85
The 1750s saw a Quaker revival which had fostered a 
renewed sense of the Quaker mission and of the importance of 
Quaker pacifism. The frontier raids generated deep divisions
83 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:837-838.
84 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:634-635; 
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:836-837.
85 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:638-646; "Address 
of the Friendly Association to Gov. Denny," July 14, 1757, 
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:17-18.
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among the Pennsylvania Quaker community: Some Quakers refused
to compromise their pacifism at all and would not tolerate any 
involvement of the colony in warfare; others were prepared to 
allow the expenditure of the colony's funds on non-military 
supplies; a final group, the "defense Quakers," were prepared 
to support defensive measures by the colony as long as they 
were not compelled to fight themselves. The Quakers' problems 
were heightened by criticisms from London where they provided 
an obvious scapegoat for the failure of the colony's war 
effort. The Pennsylvania Quakers, riven by deep divisions 
within which deepened as the war progressed and threatened by 
attacks from outside, sought to end the war as quickly as 
possible.86
As soon as the conference convened, Teedyuscung demanded 
the right to have his own clerk. Denny adamantly refused. 
What made the request offensive to Denny was his belief that 
the Quakers present at Easton, particularly Israel Pemberton, 
had given Teedyuscung the idea.87 Teedyuscung repeated his
86 Illick, Colonial Pennsylvania, pp.222-224.
87 This belief was not totally unfounded. Despite Denny's 
refusal to allow the Friendly Association to attend the 
conference many of the leading Philadelphia Quakers came 
either a provincial commissioners or as private citizens. 
Many Quakers believed that Teedyuscung would be more trusting 
of the negotiations if he could have his own independent clerk 
to records the transactions for the Indians. Colonial Records 
of Pennsylvania, 7:649-652, 654, 656-657; "Minutes of a
Council at Easton," Jul & August, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 3:19-22; Gov. Denny to George Croghan, July 
23, 1757, H.S.P., Cadwallader Collection: Trent-Croghan
Papers, 6:1.
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demand and threatened that if Denny would not acquiesce "he
was determined to give over prosecuting the good Work he was
ready and willing to accomplish with the English, and go
home." Denny bitterly rebuked him. "Brother, I am afraid by
your showing so little Confidence in me and the King's Deputy
Agent, [George Croghan] that you have hearkened to idle
Stories." But Denny knew when he had no choice and grudgingly
granted Teedyuscung his wish.88
Negotiations finally started at the end of July.
Teedyuscung repeated his claims of the previous year that:
some Lands have been bought by the Proprietary. . . 
from Indians who had not a Right to sell, and to 
whom the Lands did not belong. . . Also when some 
Lands have been sold to the Proprietary by Indians 
who had a right to sell to a certain place. . .
then the Proprietaries have, contrary to agreement 
or bargain, taken in more Lands than they ought to 
have done.89
Teedyuscung asked the Pennsylvanians to examine their 
records to see if any lands had been bought from Indians to 
whom they did not belong and, if such was the case, to 
recompense the Indians who had lost their lands. This was a 
clever ploy, as Croghan observed, for if the English agreed 
the Delawares could demonstrate that many of the lands
88 The clerk Teedyuscung chose was Charles Thompson, 
master of the Quaker School in Philadelphia, but himself a 
Presbyterian. Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:663-665; 
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:844-845; "Minutes of a 
Council at Easton," July & August 1757, Penn Mss.: Indian 
Affairs, 2:19-22; Jennings Empire of Fortune, p.343.
89 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:677.
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purchased by Pennsylvania had been sold by the Iroquois and 
not by the Delawares themselves.90
Still many Pennsylvanians remained unable to understand 
how their purchase of lands from the Iroquois could be 
fraudulent. Denny specifically instructed Croghan to ask 
Teedyuscung whether he meant "to renew the Complaints set 
forth in the former Treaty," or whether he would to drop them 
"only to charge upon the Proprietors, as an Act of Injustice, 
their having made such large Purchases of the Indians as to 
leave them no Habitation or place of Settlement."91
The Delawares stated explicitly that they felt "the 
Proprietaries had made.fair purchases of the Lands from the 
Six Nations; but these they said were not the rightful owners 
of these Lands," and they would not recognize "any Deeds made 
by the Six Nation Indians to be good." This forthright 
statement worried Croghan who informed Denny "that if the 
Delawares shou'd persist in this manner of proceeding it would 
occasion a Breach between the Six Nations & them, of which the 
Consequences at this time might be very fatal."92
The next logical step was to allow Teedyuscung to examine 
the deeds. Instead Richard Peters informed Teedyuscung that 
he had care of the deeds as a private individual and had
90 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:677; "Minutes of a 
Council at Easton," July & August, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 3:19-22.
91 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:853-854.
92 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:683.
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instructions from the Penns not to open the files while Sir 
William Johnson investigated the matter, as the government in 
London ordered.93 This refusal was a terrible blow to the 
Delawares. They could not expect their concerns to be 
listened to openly if Johnson, the patron of the Iroquois and 
confederate of their arch-enemies the Mohawks, was to hear 
them. Teedyuscung asked the conference, "Why should we be 
obliged to go to Sir William Johnson to have the Proof of 
Lands and Deeds examined by him, when there is nothing in the 
way. . . [of] our making a League of Friendship." He added 
openly "we are sensible that some of the Nations are there 
that have been instrumental in this Misunderstanding in 
selling Lands in this Province, having in former Years taken 
us by the Foretop and throw[n] us aside as Women." Finally, 
in complete disgust Teedyuscung demanded to see a copy of the 
ministry's orders that he must negotiate with Johnson only.94
James Logan spoke out in support of Teedyuscung, warning 
that it would "be of the most Dangerous Consequences to the 
Peace and safety of the Inhabitants of the Province. . . to 
refuse to gratify Teedyuscung. . . in his desire of
93 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:687; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 4th Ser., 2:855-859; "Minutes of a Council at 
easton," July & August, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian
Affairs, 3:19-22.
94 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:689-691; 
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:859-861.
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seeing. . . the several Deeds."95 He was supported by Denny 
and all the members of the Council who were present with the 
notable exception of Peters. But Peters felt secure since 
only he had access to the deeds. But much to his horror, the 
provincial commissioners announced that they had brought 
copies of the deeds which they would show to the Delawares. 
Denny, too, was aghast. He attacked the commissioners for 
interfering in the negotiations, invading the proprietors' 
prerogative. The commissioners agreed that control of Indian 
affairs and particularly the purchase of Indian lands had been 
given to the proprietors. They added that they did not claim 
the power to make war and peace, but that it was in their 
interest to attempt to prevent their fellow citizens from 
being murdered.96
On August 3 Denny again addressed the Delawares. He 
informed them that they could at last look at the deeds, and 
that Johnson would pass on their complaints for the crown to 
judge. This announcement was a masterful stroke, for it 
bypassed Johnson without affronting him, and was sufficient to 
appease the Delawares without offending the government in 
London.97
95 "Minutes of a Council at Easton," July & August, 1757, 
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 7:687-689.
96 "Minutes of a Council at Easton," H.S.P., Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 3:19-22; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 
7:687-689, 694-697.
97 Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial 
History of New York, 7:308-309.
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Teedyuscung had all but won his way. The Pennsylvanians 
agreed to have his complaints of land fraud examined, to 
construct a settlement for the Delawares at Wyoming, and to 
establish a trading house at Fort Augusta to supply them. But 
Teedyuscung and Denny both knew that any peace would have to 
be spread farther than the Susquehanna Delawares alone. 
Teedyuscung promised to send messages to the Ohio Indians. He 
also promised to send some of his men to fight for the English 
as proof of his good faith.98
The need for the peace process to be spread more widely, 
and for Delaware warriors to assist Pennsylvania, was made 
more pressing by the continuing destruction of the raids. 
Raiding parties continued to harass the frontier throughout 
the summer and fall. Many of these parties were composed of 
Delawares opposed to Teedyuscung's negotiations who joined 
with Ohio Indians the French sent to disrupt the Peace 
process. However, as the shortage of supplies on the Ohio bit 
more deeply into the French war effort, the French found it 
increasingly difficult to mass raiding parties at Fort 
Duquesne. The raids hit the area east of the Susquehanna 
particularly hard. In late June the raiders struck Lancaster
98 Despite Teedyuscung's promise Denny refused to give his 
men a scalp bounty or to provide the Delawares with any 
ammunition. He did, however, agree to his request that 
Delaware warriors should fight under their own commanders. 
George Croghan to Gov. Denny, July 30, 1757, Penn Mss.: Indian 
Affairs, 3:21; Minutes of the Treaty at Easton, Brodhead, ed., 
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 7:305; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:705-708, 713-714;
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:863-864.
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County and pressed on unopposed deep into Berks County. In 
early July another raiding party attacked Berks County, within 
a few miles of Reading. At the beginning of August another 
group assaulted Lancaster County and pushed down the eastern 
bank of the Susquehanna River. Edward Shippen warned that all 
Paxton Township would soon be abandoned while a report in the 
Pennsylvania Gazette maintained that "there has been nothing 
but Murdering and Captivating. . . by the Indians."99
As the harvest approached, planters in the open fields 
offered a tempting target to raiding parties. Some of the 
Cumberland County residents organized themselves into large 
reaping parties to protect themselves. However, the parties 
proved more of a target than a protection. On July 18 the 
raiders attacked a party of twenty reapers outside Carlisle. 
Throughout the late summer and early fall the attacks on 
Cumberland and York counties continued.100
During the fall raiding parties continued to harass the 
entire frontier. The parties were small and the damage from 
individual raids slight, but together they inspired fear 
amongst the settlers. Some of the parties spied upon the 
frontier posts in Northampton and Berks counties, arousing 
fears of a large-scale assault. Many of the settlers
99 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 7, 14, August 4, 11, 18, 
September 1, 15, 22, 29, 1757; Edward Shippen to James Burd, 
August 23, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.
100 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 4, 11, September 8, 15, 
22, 29, 1757.
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complained that they had thought that after peace had been 
made with Teedyuscung they could return home, but now they had 
been forced to flee again. A report in October stated that 
"the Frontiers are almost without Inhabitants."101
The misery caused by the raids was heightened by the 
spread of smallpox throughout the colony. As settlers fled 
from the devastated frontier, they spread the disease with 
them. In Cumberland County the situation was especially dire. 
Many of the inhabitants were "afflicted with a sever Sickness 
and die fast; so that in many places they are neither able to 
defend themselves when attacked, nor to run away." Smallpox 
also ravaged many of the Pennsylvania Regiment's garrisons, 
lowering morale and the number of men fit for duty.102
As the raids continued, it became apparent that the Ohio 
Indians had to be drawn into the peace process. At the end of 
August there were grounds to be hopeful when Teedyuscung 
returned and informed the Pennsylvanians that messengers from 
the Ohio Indians maintained that they were now prepared to 
make peace with the English. Denny used Teedyuscung's 
presence as an opportunity to execute some of the agreements 
concluded at Easton. He persuaded the Assembly to cede lands 
in the Wyoming Valley to the Delawares in perpetuity, as
101 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 6, 13, 1757;
Pennsylvania Archives, 2:870-872; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 7:757.
102 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 8, 1757; Thomas Lloyd 
to James Burd, October 8, 19, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family 
Papers, Vol. 3.
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agreed at Easton. At the beginning of November Peters penned 
a draft surrendering all lands north of the Allegheny 
Mountains. Meanwhile, Denny set about organizing the 
construction of a settlement at Wyoming.103
However, disputes which broke out again between Denny and 
the Assembly made implementing the agreements at Easton more 
difficult. Although Denny had promised to establish a trading 
house at Fort Augusta for the Delawares and in theory 
Pennsylvania had set up a trading house there, nothing was 
done to ensure that the necessary supplies and trade goods 
were laid in nor to regulate the Indian trade. In September, 
thirty Delawares came to the post expecting to sell their 
skins. But there were no goods for them and they left with 
bitter complaints.101
103 A permanent cession of lands was made easier when 
Thomas Penn empowered Richard Peters to cede lands back to the 
Indians. At the beginning of October Denny provided a
commission to Hughes, Shippen, Galbreath, and Beatty to
construct a fort and cabins for the Indians at Wyoming. He 
ordered men from Armstrong's battalion to protect the
expedition. The expedition was forced to wait for Armstrong's 
escort to arrive and when the commissioners finally arrived at 
Wyoming there was no food for them there. As a result
Teedyuscung asked them to return again in the spring. 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:725-729, 770-771; Capt. 
Lloyd to James Burd, August 8, 1757, Joseph Shippen to James 
Burd, October 23, October 25, 1757,Edward Shippen to Gov. 
Denny, October 26, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol.
3; "Draft of Surrender of Land Back to the Indians," November 
3, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:33-3 6; Thomas 
Penn to Richard Peters, November 7, 1757, H.S.P., Peters 
Papers, 4:117; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:878-879.
101 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:734; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 4th Ser., 2:872.
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Denny thus approached the Assembly to pass a bill to 
encourage the development of the Indian trade. The Assembly 
agreed, but reserved the right to appoint the commissioners 
for Indian affairs and selected several assemblymen who were 
already provincial commissioners. Denny attacked the 
Assembly's selection, claiming that they had been motivated by 
a "thirst of Power, and Fondness to Monopolise all Offices of 
Trust and Profit." The Assembly replied that it was their 
"undoubted Right" to select whoever they chose and refused to 
alter the bill. As a result, for some time the trading house 
at Fort Augusta had few supplies. As the Delawares had been 
won over to the English, at least in part, because of their 
desperate need for supplies, this failure threatened the 
outcome of Pennsylvania's Indian diplomacy.105
A new Assembly was elected in October. Denny asked them 
to pass a new trade bill, and they did. But it was exactly 
the same one Denny had previously rejected, The Assembly 
pointed out that if Denny were to reject it again, "the 
Postponing of this necessary Bill may be attended with the 
total alienation of the Indians from the British Interest." 
Denny would not relent.106
10 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:873-876; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, October 6, 1757; Colonial Records of
Pennsylvania, 7:751-752.
106 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7"759-762; 
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:800-802, 8th Ser., 5:4670.
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As the winter of 1757-1758 approached Pennsylvania seemed 
to have made some progress towards ending the war. The 
Susquehanna Delawares were slowly curtailing their attacks. 
However, their attachment to the English was not strong and 
seemed jeopardized by the deadlock between Denny and the 
Assembly. Meanwhile the French and the Ohio Indians continued 
to subject the frontier to devastating raids. The conclusion 
of a peace was a long way off. The Ohio Indians either had to 
be militarily forced to cease raiding, or brought into the 
peace process. Both would occur during 1758.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter VI 
Defeat in Victory
Blessed be God, the long look’d for Day is arrived, that has 
now fixed us. . .in the quiet and peaceable Possession of the 
finest and most fertile Country of America. . . [the conquest 
of the Ohio] lays open to all his Majesty’s Subjects a Vein of 
Treasure.1
During the winter of 1758 a council of war in New York 
instructed General John Forbes to prepare an expedition to 
assault the Ohio. The council concluded that an Ohio campaign 
would be "of the utmost consequence. . . by cutting off in a 
great measure the Communication between Canada & Louisiana, by 
which. . . the Country must fall."2 Three years after
Braddock's defeat the British were to make another attempt to 
drive the French from the forks of the Ohio.
Forbes planned to begin collecting his force at Fort 
Loudoun, at the head of the Conococheague Valley in 
Pennsylvania, on April 20, 1758. He would then assault the 
Ohio in the summer. He faced an immense task. Unlike 
Braddock, Forbes determined to secure his route by
1 Pennsylvania Gazette, December 14, 1758.
2 "Plan of Operation on the Mississippi, Ohio &ca," 
February 1, 1758, Alfred Proctor James, ed., The Writings of 
General John Forbes Relating to his Service in North America, 
(Menasha, Wise.: The Collegiate Press, 1938), p.35.
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establishing defensive posts as the army advanced and to 
create a substantial supply network to ensure that the army 
was well fed and equipped and, in case the siege of Fort 
Duquesne should prove lengthy, to keep the army provisioned 
over the winter. To this end he needed plenty of money, men, 
equipment and provisions.3
Sensing the importance of the campaign, the Pennsylvania 
Assembly, quickly agreed to raise 2,000 troops. They provided 
a £5 bounty and a £7 advance for new recruits to encourage 
enlistment and the officers soon reported that they were 
"recruiting fast."4 The Assembly was less forward in 
providing additional money for the expenses of the war, 
including the payment of the men whose recruitment they had 
authorized, for they again ran into disputes with the 
governor. Because of their previous disputes with Morris and 
Denny, the Assembly was reluctant to contemplate any action 
towards providing a supply and had been in session for three 
months before it would even consider a bill. It took another 
month to pass the bill, which taxed both proprietary lands and 
unimproved lands and created commissioners to oversee the 
disbursement of the funds, all points Denny had refused to 
accept previously. But with the prospect of a frontier 
victory that would end the war, Denny capitulated completely,
3 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:59.
4 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:52; Joseph Shippen 
to James Burd, April 30, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family papers, 
Vol. 3.
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although not without "a solemn Protestation to all the World, 
that it is Contrary to my Conscience, and in Violation of 
Truth."5
Governor Fauquier summoned the Virginia House of 
Burgesses to meet in late March. The House speedily voted 
additional money to increase the size of the provincial 
forces, almost doubling the number of troops and creating a 
second Virginia Regiment under the command of William Byrd 
III, and approved the continuation of the mutiny act for 
another year.6
During the early spring Forbes began preparing for the 
expedition. He needed not only troops but also auxiliaries. 
To conduct a campaign with an army of this size in the 
"wilderness" of western Pennsylvania the army would need to be 
largely self-sufficient and Forbes set out to recruit 
"Carpenters, Joyners, Bricklayers, Masons, Oven Makers, 
Saddlers, Millrights, Coalmakers, Coopers, Tin Men, Sawyers, 
[and] Mealmakers."7
5 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:926-929, 8th Ser. 
9:928-929; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:80.
6 George Washington to Maj. Andrew Lewis. April 21, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:134; Gov. Fauquier to the Board of Trade, June 11, 1758, 
Reese, ed., Papers of Francis Fauquier, 1:23-24; Mcllwaine, 
Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752/55-1756/58, pp.495- 
506; Henning, Statutes of Virginia, 7:463-470.
7 Henry Bouquet, Orderly Book, July 2, 1758, Kent, ed., 
The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:661.
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Forbes' greatest need was for wagoners to haul the army's 
supplies to the forward posts. Bouquet estimated that the 
expedition needed at least 180 wagons and teams, and as the 
forward posts were built farther and farther from the 
inhabited parts of the province that number rose.8 
Desperately short of wagons, in mid-May Forbes placed 
advertisements throughout Pennsylvania appealing for wagons 
and offering to pay fifteen shillings per day for wagon, team, 
and wagon master. Despite such offers few people came forward 
and the lack of wagons retarded Forbes' preparations. Forbes 
soon resorted to issuing veiled threats. At the end of May he 
informed the inhabitants of Cumberland County that the sheriff 
had provided Bouquet with a list of all the people who had 
wagons and horses but had not come forward with them. Forbes 
advised them to come forward immediately "in order to prevent 
any Damage that might happen on acco[un]t of Soldiers being 
turn'd loose amongst y[o]u"9
But Forbes' threats had little effect. A few days later, 
after spending four days procuring only four wagons, Bouquet 
reported to Forbes that "Civil Authority is. . . completely
nonexistent in this County." He added that "as the farmers
8 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:59, 60; Henry 
Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, May 22, 1758, Kent ed., The Henry 
Bouquet Papers, 1:350.
9 Pennsylvania Gazette, May 11, 1758; Forbes 
Advertisement for Wagons, Horses, Drivers, etc, James, ed, 
Writings of General John Forbes, pp.88-89; Notice to Wagoners, 
May 28, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 1:378.
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ignored the orders of the sheriff and his constables I 
appealed. . . to the magistrates for press warrants.”10 But 
the magistrates refused to issue them. Bouquet fumed. He 
threatened Lancaster County justice Edward Shippen that "I 
must have wagons without delay, wither by contract, or 
impressing." Eventually, Denny, harassed by both Forbes and 
Bouquet, agreed to instruct the magistrates to issue warrants 
for impressment.11
Several experiences contributed to the reluctance of the 
settlers to provide the army with wagons. The main reason was 
"some Unfair Usage, which they alledge, some of 'em have 
formerly rec'd from Officers in the Army." Backcountry 
settlers remembered the manner in which Dunbar had abandoned 
their wagons in his flight from the Monongahela in 1755, and 
the difficulty they had faced in getting recompense for their 
losses. Their distrust of the army was further heightened 
when provincial officials agreed to pay wagoners more than 
Forbes had promised. When the wagoners joined the army and 
discovered the real terms, some turned their wagons around and 
left spreading tales of the army's uncertain credibility.12
10 Bouquet to Forbes, May 29-30, 1758, Kent, ed., The 
Henry Bouquet Papers, 1:386.
11 Henry Bouquet to Edward Shippen, June 3, 1758, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; Gov. Denny's Press Warrant, May 
31, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 1:405.
12 Edward Shippen in particular promised the wagoners that 
they would receive forage for the entire journey, Bouquet had 
only allowed ten days forage. George Stevenson to Henry
(continued...)
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When farmers complied, their wagons were often unfit for 
the service expected of them. In mid-July Bouquet wrote to 
Forbes complaining about the teams the settlers had provided. 
Some of the settlers "who had good horses when they were 
appraised, kept them and sent nags who were unable to drag 
themselves along." However, by the beginning of June the 
threat of impressment and the exhortations of many of the 
local gentry managed to exact enough wagons for the expedition 
to commence.13
Forbes also sought to obtain Cherokee auxiliaries to act 
as scouts and guides and to harass the Indian settlements on 
the Ohio to lessen the possibility of attacks on his advancing 
column. In the early spring he sent William Byrd III to 
Cherokee country to encourage the Cherokees to send warriors 
to support the expedition. Byrd had considerable success. By 
the beginning of April five hundred Indians had arrived, or 
were soon expected, at Winchester.14
12(. . .continued)
Bouquet, May 31, 1757, Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 3, 
1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 1:399, 2:18.
13 Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 7, July 11, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:47, 180-181.
14 The largest parties were commanded by Captain Bullen 
and Wahatchee. George Washington to John Blair, April 9, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:113-114; Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 3, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:15; William Byrd III to Gov. 
Lyttelton, April 10, 1758, Marion Tinling, ed., The 
Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of Westover 
Virginia, 1684-1776, 2 Vols. (Charlottesville VA: University 
Press of Virginia, 1977), 2:647.
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As Forbes began his preparations the French anxiously 
sought a response. This response came in the form of several 
raiding parties of western Indians from Fort Duquense who 
descended on the frontier in April. On the fifth one party 
attacked into York County, killing or capturing eleven people. 
Two days later other small parties descended on the Lancaster 
and Northampton County frontiers.15 The inhabitants, 
terrified at the renewal of the raids, petitioned the Council 
begging for protection and forcing Forbes to send some of his 
troops to the Berks County frontier. The French had also 
intended the raids to sow doubts about Teedyuscung, and as 
they had hoped, many of the frontier inhabitants openly 
accused Teedyuscung and his supporters of committing the 
attacks.16
The French launched another raid on southwestern Virginia 
a few weeks later. The attack devastated a large area, 
killing or capturing over fifty people in Augusta, Bedford,
15 During the winter and spring there were few raids on 
the frontier. Denny falsely attributed this to the Indians 
changing allegiance. After the raids had recommenced several 
rafts used by the Indians to cross the Susquehanna were found 
floating on the river. Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:914- 
916; Gov. Denny to George Washington, March 25, 1758, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:106-108; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, April 13, 20, 1758.
16 To reassure the colonists Teedyuscung agreed to send a 
party of Susquehanna Delawares after the raiders. Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 8:84-85, 99, 110; Pennsylvania
Gazette, April 20, 1758.
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Halifax and Albemarle counties.17 The French intended these 
raids to hinder communications between Virginia and the 
Cherokees and they succeeded better than they could have 
hoped. Since some of the Ohio Indians claimed to be 
Cherokees, and the settlers were incapable of distinguishing 
between their allies and their enemies, the raids caused 
settlers to be suspicious of any Indian party. They viewed 
Cherokee parties journeying through Virginia to reach Forbes' 
army with intense distrust. One militia commander even 
accused the Cherokees of "vilinously Robing & stealing[,] 
Plundering houses[, ] Puling men of[f] their horses[,] striping 
[sic] & whiping[,] Beating with tomahoaks[,] & stoning many 
People." The Cherokee parties quickly became alarmed at the 
hostility displayed towards them, and by mid-May the Cherokees 
and the Virginians had clashed in several skirmishes.18
The French attacks slowed preparations for Forbes' 
expedition as wagoners and planters became wary of venturing 
too far west without a military escort. Many other 
circumstances also conspired to delay his advance. Forbes 
discovered that many of the provincial troops had no arms, and
17 George Washington to John Blair, April 24, May 4[-10], 
1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:139-141, 156-160; Maryland Gazette, May 4, 18, 1758; Journal 
of the Council 6:95.
18 William Callaway to George Washington, May 15, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:183-184; Journal of the Council of Virginia, May 20, 1758; 
Lachlin Mackintosh to William Byrd, III, May 12, 1758, 
Tinling, ed., Correspondence of the Three William Byrds, 
2:653.
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it proved difficult to acquire more.19 Forbes approached 
Governor Denny to provide some light arms from the provincial 
magazine. Denny refused, fearing it would leave the 
provincial forces still guarding the frontier east of the 
Susquehanna without weapons. Only after considerable pressure 
from the general did the governor relent.20 The Virginia 
Council refused to allow the Virginia Regiment to use the arms 
decorating the entrance hall in the Governor's Palace in 
Williamsburg. Instead the Council agreed to pay a special 
bounty to men who enlisted with their own weapons and promised 
compensation if the rigors of war damaged them. But the 
bounty attracted few additional arms and those of mostly poor 
quality.21
The provincial forces lacked not only arms but other 
essential equipment. The Pennsylvania forces had no blankets. 
The First Virginia Regiment lacked adequate uniforms since the 
colony had not provided them with new clothes or shoes for 
over two years, and many men complained of "being naked." 
Both Virginia Regiments were short of "Tents, and other sorts 
of Field Equipage." Any attempt to begin the campaign with
19 Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, May 29, 1758, Kent, ed., 
The Henry Bouquet Papers, 1:379.
20 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:79, 82, 83-84.
21 Sir John St. Clair to Bouquet, May 31, 1758, Kent, ed., 
Bouquet Papers, 1:403; Journal of the Council of Virginia, 
6:87-88.
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the soldiers so poorly provisioned would have been 
disastrous.22
Forbes also required a mass of other equipment to 
construct the road and fortify the camps. He needed "Falling 
Axes, Broad Axes, Horse Gearse [sic] Collers [sic] and Bells, 
Horse Shoes, and Nails, Drawing Knives. . . Chissels[,]
Goudges, and Augers— Brass Kittles, Crescent Saws, hand saws, 
Trowels, Addges, Hinges, hammers and Gimbletts, Locks Files[,] 
saw sets and sundry other things. "23 Consequently Forbes 
delayed while Bouquet and St. Clair scoured the backcountry 
for supplies and equipment.
When Forbes finally began to assemble the troops, he 
faced a new problem. The troops, particularly the provincial 
forces, deserted in huge numbers. Some men left because they 
had previously absconded from provincial troops to join the 
Royal Americans and were concerned that, when the regular 
forces joined with the provincial forces, their former 
officers would discover them. Desertion for this reason was 
so extensive that Bouquet offered a pardon to all men who came 
forward and confessed to their crime. Twenty did immediately.
22 Henry Bouquet to George Stevenson, June 3, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:27-29; Journal of the Council 
of Virginia, 6:105-106; George Washington to John Blair, May 
28, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George
Washington, 5:199-203; George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, 
June 17, 1758, Reese ed., The Official Papers of Francis
Fauquier, 1:30-31.
23 John Hughes to Commissioners, May 8, 1758, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.
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Forbes extended this amnesty and threatened that, if the men 
had not returned to camp by June 12, he would have them hunted 
them down and tried "without Mercy." He also threatened that 
he would heavily fine civilians who aided deserters in their 
flight.24
The expedition was also delayed when smallpox and 
dysentery swept through the army. Dysentery overwhelmed 
Forbes himself so badly in July that he was not "in a 
Condition, either to write, or think." He never fully 
recovered. Dysentery also laid low William Byrd at the end of 
August. In the middle of August Bouquet fretted to Forbes 
that "Sickness has weakened the army so much that I do not see 
how you can furnish the necessary escorts nor guard the 
communication.1,25 The carelessness of the provincial troops 
who would clean meat and clothes in the same streams from 
which the drinking water was taken was a main cause of the 
dysentery. Most important, they made no effort to locate
24 Henry Bouquet to Gen, Forbes, May 29-30, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 1:389; Forbes Advertisement 
About Deserters, June 1, 1758, James, ed., Writings of General 
John Forbes, pp.104-105; Pennsylvania Gazette, June 1, 1758.
25 Robert Rutherford to George Washington, Adam Stephen to 
George Washington, August 2, 1758, July 20, 1758, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:305, 363; 
Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, July 23, 1758, Henry Bouquet to 
Gen. Forbes, July 31, August 20, 1758, 1758, Kent, ed., The 
Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:264, 293, 398; George Washington to 
Thomas Walker, September 2, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 5:446; George Washington to Gov. 
Fauquier, September 2, 1758, Reese, ed., The Official Papers 
of Francis Fauquier, 1:68.
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their latrines at a proper distance from camp and would 
relieve themselves around the camp.26
At the beginning of June the expedition finally had 
sufficient wagons and supplies to begin its advance.27 Since 
Bouquet had already established an advanced post at Raystown, 
at the beginning of June Forbes sent out detachments to begin 
building the road from Lancaster, through Shippensburg and 
Fort Loudoun, to Raystown. At the end of June Forbes 
assembled the Pennsylvania forces in Raystown, withdrawing the 
men from the frontier posts and leaving behind skeleton 
garrisons largely of the sick and wounded. Peter Burd 
lamented that the Fort Augusta "Garrison cuts a drole Figure 
to what it formerly did." He added that the new troops "look 
more like a detachment from the dead than the Liveing."28 On 
June 24 the First Virginia Regiment began its march from 
Winchester to Fort Cumberland. The Second Virginia Regiment 
followed two days later. Washington then began construction
26 Henry Bouquet, Standing Orders During the Campaign, 
"Orderly Book," July 3, 11, August 1, 24, 1758, Kent, ed., 
Bouquet Papers, 2:658-659, 662, 664, 669, 681.
27 Adam Hoops had contracted 160 wagons in Lancaster and 
York Counties alone. Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 3, 
1758, Adam Hoops to Henry Bouquet, June 17, 1758, Kent, ed., 
The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:15-20, 105-106.
28 Henry Bouquet to Sir John St.Clair, May 31, 1758,
"Forbes Memoranda," [c. June 1, 1758], Henry Bouquet to Gen. 
Forbes, June 3, 28, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet
Papers, 1:400, 2:1, 15-19, 142; Peter Burd to James Burd, July 
20, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; Gen. Forbes 
to James Abercromby, June 27, 1758, James, ed., Writings of 
General Forbes, p.12 6.
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of a road forty miles from Fort Cumberland to Raystown. By 
early August both Virginia Regiments were in Raystown.29
Moving the troops forward was a painfully slow business. 
Bouquet warned Forbes that there would even be delays in 
marching the troops from Philadelphia to Lancaster because the 
roads were unable to handle the volume of traffic. Roads out 
of the backcountry towards Fort Loudoun were even worse. John 
Armstrong complained that his march from Shippensburg to Fort 
Loudoun had been "tedious, and Subject to One tryfleing 
Accident & another." He added that the wagons were so 
decrepit that he had "never met with any thing like it & too 
much pains cannot be taken to get them forward." The problem 
grew worse because early June saw heavy rains which made the 
roads a quagmire and swelled the rivers. Because of the high 
water, it took three days to ferry just thirty wagons across 
the Susquehanna River.30
Besides slowing the progress of the expedition, the poor 
roads also destroyed the wagons which had been so painfully 
acquired. Of the first 73 wagons to arrive at Fort Littleton, 
halfway between Fort Loudoun and Raystown, 33 could continue
29 George Washington's Orders, June 13, 1758, George
Washington to Gov. Fauquier, August 5, 1758, Reese ed., The 
Official Papers of Francis Fauquier, 1:32, 57-58; Henry
Bouquet to George Washington, June 27, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:246.
30 Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, May 22, May 25, 1758, 
Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 7, 1758, John Armstrong to 
Henry Bouquet, July 25, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet
Papers, 1:351, 361, 2:47, 272.
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no farther. Bouquet commented that "The roads are strewn with 
broken wagons." At the beginning of July Lewis Ourry, the 
commander at Fort Loudoun, wrote to Bouquet complaining that 
he had "neither Blacksmiths, Farriers, nor Waggon Makers nor 
Tools for either, and every Day Waggons breaking to pieces, f i t  
Horses wanting Shoes."31
Many of the expedition's problems, especially the lack of 
wagons and the poor state of the road, stemmed from Sir John 
St. Clair's inefficiency and incompetence. Forbes complained 
that St. Clair had not "taken the smallest pains, or. . . made 
the least inquiry" into examining the problems. He failed to 
make provision for forage for the horses along the route, and 
where forage was readily available in abandoned plantations, 
he made no effort to gather it.32 St. Clair paid little 
attention to selecting the best route for the road. Several 
times workers had already cleared a section of road over the 
rough terrain when surveyors reported a substantially better 
passage. At Loyalhanna, the most advanced of the posts along 
the route, St. Clair approved the location for a major fort 
and ordered construction to begin. When Bouquet arrived, he
31 Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 21, July 11, 1758, 
Lewis Ourry to Henry Bouquet, July 4, 1758, Kent, ed., The 
Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:121-122, 160-161, 180-181.
32 Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, July 14, 1758, Kent, ed., 
The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:207-208.
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discovered that a hill overlooked the site and rendered it 
completely useless.33
St. Clair also managed to alienate many of the other 
officers and generated much tension. Some of the officers 
complained that he gave orders "in a very Odd Manner." Others 
complained of "His imperious & insulting manner of 
communicating his intention." On one occasion when St. Clair 
heard that some of the officers were unhappy, "He bellow'd out 
Mutiny; & appearing to be in the greatest dilemma! roard out 
what shall I do; shall I fire upon them!"34 The most infamous 
occasion occurred when St. Clair lost his temper with 
Lieutenant-Colonel Adam Stephen of the Virginia Regiment. 
When St. Clair heard that Stephen, the ranking officer at 
Quemahoning camp, had issued orders after St. Clair had 
declined to, "he flew in a passion." The incident concluded 
with St. Clair throwing Stephen into jail, claiming that he 
was trying to incite "a genl mutiny amongst both Officers and 
Men of the Virginians." This action mortified Bouquet who 
warned St. Clair that he would "have a good deal to do to 
justify the necessity of Such a violent measure against an 
officer of his Ranck." Bouquet reminded St. Clair of Forbes'
33 Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, August 26, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:423.
34 Adam Stephen to Henry Bouquet, August 26, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:430-431.
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instruction "to establish and preserve good harmony with the 
Provincial Troops."35
The delays in the expedition created yet another 
predicament— the defection of the Cherokees and southern 
Indians. French encouragement of the Chickasaws to attack the 
Cherokees made the Cherokees reluctant to send warriors. 
Their reluctance increased when their "conjurors" suggested 
that the Cherokees would suffer disaster if they joined the 
British in war. As a result of the reception they received 
from the British and the threats of the French and their 
shamans, the flow of Cherokees joining the English ceased by 
the late spring.36
The cessation of new arrivals would not have been a 
problem if the expedition was already well en route and the 
Indians who had previously joined the army had been content. 
But the expedition had made little progress. Washington was 
concerned that the inactivity of the British would encourage 
the Cherokees to quit and "no words can tell how much they 
will be missed." In mid-May he warned that "unless they see
35 Adam Stephen to Henry Bouquet, August 26, 1758, Sir 
John St.Clair to Henry Bouquet, August 27, 1758, Henry Bouquet 
to Sir. John St.Clair, August 28, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry 
Bouquet Papers, 2:432, 434, 435-436.
36 Speech of Attakullaculla [The "Little Carpenter"] to 
William Byrd, May 27, 1758, George Turner to William Byrd III, 
August 4, 1758, Tinling, ed., The Correspondence of the Three 
William Byrds, 2:656, 664-665.
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the Troops assemble soon, it will be very difficult. . . to 
retain any number of the Cherokees."37
Not only were the Cherokees alienated by the endless 
delays, but they were also dismayed that they received no 
gifts for their services. In April Washington had written to 
General Stanwix asking him to ensure that army secured "a 
supply of proper Goods" for the Cherokees. He warned that 
"the Indians are mercenary, every service of theirs must be 
purchased: and they are easily offended, being thoroughly 
sensible of their own importance." Forbes applied to the 
Pennsylvania provincial commissioners for money to buy the 
Indians goods and presents, but they informed him that they 
had insufficient money and could not help him.38 Forbes 
attempted to get gifts and wampum elsewhere, but his problems 
were exacerbated because no one accompanying the army had the 
necessary authority to control and reward the Indians. Forbes 
complained to Stanwix that he had "no mortal of Consequence" 
to oversee the Indians for both Atkin and Johnson, the 
superintendents of Indian Affairs, had neither "come 
themselves, nor have they sent any one person to look after 
those Indians, altho repeated applications have been made to
37 George Washington to Gen. Stanwix, April 10, 1758, 
George Washington to Francis Halkett, May 11, 1758, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:117, 176-177.
38 George Washington to Gen. Stanwix, April 10, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:117; Gen. Forbes to William Pitt, May 19, 1758, James, ed., 
Writings of General John Forbes, p.92.
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both those gentlemen." He wrote to London complaining that "I 
do not know how to account for the behaviour of Sir W[illia]m 
Johnston and Mr Atkin upon so Criticall and urgent an occasion 
as this is." Frustrated and impatient, Bouquet deliberately 
withheld the Cherokees' gifts in an attempt to bring them back 
into order. But this action only had the opposite effect.39
By early June Washington's worst fears became reality 
when the Cherokees at Fort Loudoun informed William Trent that 
they intended to return home because they had not received any 
gifts. They warned Trent that if he did not immediately give 
them a "large Present to Carry home with them they would Rob 
all the English Houses they met with in their way home."40
While the Indians steadily defected, the commanders and 
colonists squabbled. Bouquet and Forbes refrained until they 
had detailed surveyors' reports from making a decision on 
whether the army should advance to Fort Duquesne on the road 
cut in 1755 by General Braddock, or on a new route to be cut 
directly from Fort Loudoun to Fort Duquesne. While Braddock's 
route had already been blazed, it was considerably longer than 
the Pennsylvania route, had to cross many rivers and creeks, 
and had three years growth of underbrush to be cleared. The
39 Gen. Forbes to John Stanwix, May 29, 1758, Gen. Forbes 
to James Abercromby, June 7, 1758, James, ed., Writings of 
General Forbes, pp.102-103, 109; Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, 
June 3, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:15.
40 George Washington to Gen. Stanwix, April 10, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:117; William Trent to Henry Bouquet, June 5, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:36-37.
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Pennsylvania route, however, had to be constructed over 
rougher and more uncertain terrain and had to cross the 
barrier of Laurel Ridge.41
Toward the end Of July the surveyors reported that they 
had found a route across Laurel Ridge. Bouquet and Forbes 
then concluded that the advantages of the Pennsylvania route 
outweighed its disadvantages. But the Virginians,
particularly Washington, argued vehemently that the expedition 
should follow Braddock's route. The issue became a heated 
dispute, for after the war the road would serve as the route 
for settlers and merchants traveling to the Ohio and bring 
great profits to traders and land-speculators alike.42
Forbes' decision to use the Pennsylvania route was 
immediately condemned by the Virginians. They derided the 
Pennsylvanians, claiming that "The invariable attention, 
indefatiguably pursued by the Pennsylvanians, without regard 
to the common interest, for advancing their private fortunes—  
have long been glaring proofs of a Selfish & Sordid 
principle." Forbes saw circumstances rather differently and 
commented that "I. . . cannot Conceive what the Virginia folks 
would be att, for to me it appears to be them, and them only, 
that want to drive us into the Road by Fort Cumberland."
41 George Washington to Henry Bouquet, July 7, 1758, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:267; Gen. 
Forbes to William Pitt, July 10, 1758, James, Writings of
General Forbes, p.141.
42 Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, July 11, 21, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:179, 251-252.
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Washington refused to accept the decision. In early August, 
supported wholeheartedly by the Virginia Council, he sent a 
formal representation to Forbes protesting the choice of route 
and claiming that there was no time to build a new road.43
The failure to use the Virginia route embittered 
Washington against the entire expedition. At the beginning of 
September he wrote to John Robinson, the Speaker of the House 
of Burgesses, attacking both Forbes and Bouquet. "We seem 
then— to act under an evil Geni— the conduct of our 
Leaders. . . is tempered with something— I don't care to give 
a name to— indeed I will go further and say they are d[evil]s 
or something worse. . . to whose selfish views I attribute the 
miscarriage of this Expedition."44
Forbes' problems grew worse, for as the Virginia troops 
were withdrawn from the frontier they were replaced by militia 
units. The militia proved no more reliable in 1758 than 
previously. For example, Washington ordered the Prince 
William County militia to replace two companies of the first 
Virginia Regiment stationed on the South Branch. He expected
43 Washington also maintained that the differences in 
distance were not that great. But he greatly underestimated 
the distance from Carlisle to Fort Duquesne via Braddock's 
route. John Kirkpatrick to George Washington, July 21, 1758, 
George Washington to Henry Bouquet, August 2, 1758, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:314, 355-357; 
Journal of the Council of Virginia, August 17, 1758; Gen 
Forbes to Henry Bouquet, July 23, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry 
Bouquet Papers, 2:264-265.
44 George Washington to John Robinson, September 1, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:432.
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over one hundred men, but only 73 assembled, without 
weapons.45
Upon hearing that the militia was to replace the 
provincial forces, the frontier inhabitants complained 
bitterly. One frontiersman angril y wrote to Washington that 
it gave "the Greatest uneasyness to the Inhabitants" to have 
the militia posted locally. He added that they could not 
"Expect to Receive So much Sattisfaction from the hole Company 
of Melitia as we should Do from Them Twenty Men" of the 
Virginia Regiment. Some inhabitants even prepared to abandon 
the frontier, forcing Byrd to leave several companies of the 
Second Virginia Regiment at Edward7s and Pearsall's on the 
South Branch.46 Washington also resorted to using the ranger 
companies to garrison the fort in Winchester. However, such 
an assignment dismayed the settlers that they had been 
protecting. . The commander of one ranger detachment, Robert 
Rutherford, wrote to Washington complaining that the posting 
of his company in Winchester had caused such discontent 
amongst the settlers "that it obliges me to apply to you to
45 In other counties the militia were again "mutinous" 
and refused to muster at all, unless they were allowed to 
choose their own officers. Gov. Fauquier to Sir John 
St.Clair, June 6, 1758, George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, 
June 19, 1758, Gov. Fauquier to George Washington, June 25, 
1758, Reese, ed., The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier, 
1:14-15, 35-36, 41-42.
46 Jacob Hite to George Washington, June 29, 1758, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:250; 
George Washington to William Byrd, Tinling, ed., The 
Correspondence of the Three William Byrds, 2:661.
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Countermand the orders." Rutherford claimed that the 
settlers7 were so enraged that he was "almost Liable to be 
Stoned" if he went out in public. The inhabitants were not 
alone in their disgust: the rangers themselves detested their 
new duty and refused to perform garrison duty. When forced, 
some even deserted so abhorrent did they find the task.47
As the Virginia Regiment withdrew and militia units 
replaced it, weakening the frontier defenses, Indian parties 
again struck Virginia. At the end of June a party attacked 
Hampshire County, crossed the South Branch, and pressed on 
into the Shenandoah Valley, raiding around the Masanutten 
Mountain. On June 27 they killed nine settlers, and captured 
six more. The raiders then pressed on down the valley, 
killing or capturing a total of twenty-six and causing several 
hundred to flee. The raids produced great alarm and caused 
many Virginians to grumble about Forbes' judgment in 
withdrawing the Virginia Regiment for an expedition which 
seemed doomed to failure.48
By August Forbes had massed over 2,500 men in Raystown. 
They included regiments from Britain, Virginia, and 
Pennsylvania, and four Maryland and three North Carolina
47 George Washington to Charles Smith, June 24, 1758, 
George Washington to Robert Rutherford, June 24, 1758, Charles 
Smith to George Washington, July 1, 1758, Robert Rutherford to 
George Washington, July 2, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 5:238, 239, 252-253, 255.
48 John Hite to George Washington, July 2, 1758, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:254; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, July 27, 1758.
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companies. Forbes had also overseen the supervision of a road 
to Loyalhanna, only fifty-six miles from Fort Duquesne, over 
difficult terrain. Constructing this route was a great 
logistical achievement. But the quality of the road was 
considerably lower than Forbes had hoped. When Bouquet 
finally traveled to Loyalhanna in September he described the 
road as "abominable." He added that "no trouble had been 
taken to go around the hills, to remove or break the stones, 
and the bridges are worthless." When the weather deteriorated 
in early October, streams flowed along some of the roads and 
washed out some of the bridges. Bouquet commented that "To my 
great regret it is a job which must be done over." The 
construction of the road had taken considerable time. 
Watching the days pass, Bouquet fretted to Forbes that the 
expedition looked doomed to failure. The first frost could 
come in late September and "destroy the grass on which our 
cattle feed, and if we have no pork, on what shall we live?"49
The atrocious state of the road had also caused the 
destruction of many of the wagons, and by September the 
expedition had an insufficient number to move all the army's 
supplies forward. Bouquet asked Forbes to attempt to secure 
more, but Forbes could only inform him that "the 
Magistrates. . . all agree in the great difficulty of getting
49 Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, August 15, 1758,
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; Henry Bouquet to Gen. 
Forbes, August 8, September 11, 1758, October 20, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:335, 492-494, 578-580.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
275
fresh Waggons or Horses, saying the Farmers complain their 
Horses were starved for want of forage." He added simply that 
"we must make the best of what we have." Bouquet warned 
Forbes that the army had only a month's provisions and "little 
certainty of getting enough wagons to sustain us and to push 
ahead." He asked if they should now consider abandoning their 
attempt to reach the Forks and concentrate instead on 
improving the route and strengthening their posts.50
Bouquet believed that the army should push on, for it 
would force the French to maintain their Indian allies, 
depriving them of much needed supplies, and, if the army were 
successful, it would immeasurably strengthen their hand in 
negotiating a peace with the Ohio Indians. Bouquet was also 
worried that the army was becoming "visibly bored and 
impatient." He added that "their ardor is cooling, and I am 
afraid that the discontent may very soon be followed by 
murmurs and other annoying consequences. "51
As the delay continued, the loyalty of the few remaining 
Indians also evaporated. In mid-August Forbes reported to 
Governor Fauquier that the Cherokees were behaving "like a 
parcell of Scoundrells" and most had left for home. Matters 
were made worse when the only interpreter in Raystown fell ill
50 Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, September 2, 1758, Henry 
Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, September 4, 1758, Kent, ed., The 
Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:462, 471-474.
51 Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, September 4, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:471.
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and Bouquet was unable to communicate with the remaining 
Indians. The final blow came when a raiding party killed the 
two most anglophile Catawbas "Captain Bullen" and "Captain 
French," who had used their influence to persuade many Indians 
to remain, while on their way from Winchester to Fort 
Cumberland. By October only about thirty Cherokees and thirty 
Catawbas continued with the expedition. The loss of Indian 
auxiliaries left the expedition dangerously exposed to 
surprise raids.52
The French were aware that the British were mounting a 
major assault but were unaware of the route. To heighten 
their confusion, Bouquet ordered Washington to send parties 
back and forth along Braddock's road to mislead the French 
into thinking that the army was advancing by that route. Yet 
at the beginning of August, a party of francophile Indians 
discovered the army and attacked one of the supply convoys. 
Soon after, several parties of French and Indians scouted 
along the route, forcing Bouquet to provide all the supply 
convoys with an escort and diverting men from constructing the 
road and fortifying the camps.53
52 Gen. Forbes to Gov. Fauquier, Reese, ed., The Official 
Papers of Francis Fauquier, 1:59-60; Henry Bouquet, to Gen. 
Forbes, August 26, 1758, Abraham Bossomworth to Henry Bouquet, 
September 10, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 
2:423, 486; Henry Bouquet to James Burd, October 16, 1758, 
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.
53 Henry Bouquet to George Washington, August 17, 1758, 
Kent, ed. , The Henry Bouquet Papers, 5:394-395; Abraham 
Bosommworth to George Washington, August 9, 1758, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:382-383.
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By the middle of August Bouquet reported that "The Woods 
about us are full of little Partys of Indians and I know that 
they have discovered our New Road." Several parties also 
attacked the Virginia forces around Fort Cumberland. Another 
raiding party attacked the rear of the army, close to the 
start of Forbes' road, in Cumberland County near Shippensburg, 
threatening the tenuous supply line. At the beginning of 
September Forbes warned that he believed the French might 
attempt an assault on one of the advanced posts before the 
Ohio Indians returned home for the winter; in particular the 
safety of Loyalhanna deeply concerned him.54
In view of the threat of raids upon the advancing column, 
Bouquet asked Washington if it would be possible to organize 
some expeditions to attack Indian towns on the Ohio. Bouquet 
felt that if the Ohio Indians' "houses and familis were in 
danger" it would be "a great inducemnt for them to provide for 
their immediate defence and leave to the french their own 
quarrels to fight." Washington informed him that he had been 
keeping small parties out to harass the enemy, but a larger 
raid was impracticable because the French and their Indian 
allies would detect it before it could get to the Ohio.
54 Henry Bouquet to George Washington, August 17, 
1758,George Washington to Henry Bouquet, August 18, 1758,
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:394-395, 397-399; Francis Halkett to Henry Bouquet, August 
26, 1758, Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, September 2, 1758,
Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:427-428, 461.
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Without Indian auxiliaries, francophile Indians could easily 
surround the party and defeat it.55
When the column neared Fort Duquesne Forbes, decided to 
send an advanced party under the command of James Grant to 
destroy supplies, outbuildings, and an Indian camp outside the 
French fort. If Grant could destroy the supplies at the fort, 
he might force the Ohio Indians to return to their homes. 
Grant left Loyalhanna on September 12 with 750 men, composed 
of a party of Highlanders and some Pennsylvania and Virginia 
troops. It took the force longer to march than Grant had 
expected, they did not reach the fort until the middle of the 
night. Grant immediately sent Major Andrew Lewis with the 
Virginians to attack, while he remained behind covering the 
retreat. Unbeknownst to Grant, his forces had taken the 
French by surprise; their commander commented that the English 
had taken an unexpected route and could have attacked the fort 
itself if they had not started to make much noise and set fire 
to a barn.55
55 While there were still Indians with the English, a 
typical party was commanded by an English officer but composed 
mainly of Cherokees or Catawbas, an identical arrangement to 
the French parties. Henry Bouquet to George Washington, July 
14, 1758, George Washington to Henry Bouquet, July 16, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:286-287, 291-293.
56 George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, September 25, 1758, 
Reese, ed., Papers of Francis Fauquier, 1:79; John Dagworthy 
to Henry Bouquet, September 14, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry 
Bouquet Papers, 2:499; James Burd to Col. Bouquet, September 
16, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Letter Book of Col. 
James Burd, 1756-1758, ff.182-183; Daine to Marsall de Bell
(continued...)
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Lewis returned before he had done more than burn a few of 
the Indian camp's outbuildings. He claimed that he was unable 
to attack closer to the fort because the terrain was too rough 
for a night assault. Grant was upset at Lewis for 
"Overturning a long projected Scheme." Believing that the 
French had not yet detected his men, Grant attempted to 
organize another assault, but found the troops "in the 
greatest confusion I ever saw Men in." As he was attempting 
to regroup them, just after daybreak, the French and Ohio 
Indians attacked. The unexpected counterattack threw Grant's 
force into complete confusion. The Pennsylvania troops 
guarding the flanks fled. Grant later informed Forbes, "in 
less than half an Hour all was in Confusion. . . Fear had then 
got the better of every other passion & I hope I shall never 
see again such a Pannick among Troops." The French routed 
Grant's force. British losses were heavy. The French and 
Ohio Indians killed or captured over twenty officers, 
including Grant himself, and 271 men, over a third of the 
force. Another forty returned to Loyalhanna seriously 
wounded.57
56 (. . . continued)
Isle, November 3, 1758, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to 
the Colonial History of New York, 10:884-885.
57 Only 490 men of the 750 returned unwounded. List of 
Killed & Wounded at Ft. Duquesne, September 14, 1758, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers: Military Notebook No. 7; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, September 28, 1758; John Dagworthy to Henry Bouquet, 
September 14, 1758, Maj. Grant to Gen. Forbes [c. September 
14, 1758,] Kent, ed. , The Henry Bouguet Papers, 2:499, 499- 
504.
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Grant lost almost as many men as had Braddock three years 
earlier. The flight of the survivors was as chaotic. But, 
surprisingly, the rout did not seriously weaken British 
morale. Bouquet commented that "Contrary to my expectation, 
the troops do not seem at all depressed by this setback, and 
if everything were ready, moreover, they would be more 
disposed than ever to go forward." Joseph Shippen agreed with 
Bouquet, commenting that the rout made the forces seek revenge 
upon the French.58
To follow up on their success on the Ohio, the French 
believed that it might be possible to drive Forbes' army back 
to Philadelphia in the same manner that Dunbar had fled. On 
October 12, as Forbes had feared, a French and Indian party 
attacked the forward camp at Loyalhanna. James Burd, the 
camp's commander, immediately organized a reconnaissance party 
of five hundred men, but the attack was so fierce that they 
forced Burd to retreat hastily into camp. After a fierce two- 
hour assault, the attackers withdrew. The British had lost 62 
men and five officers, French casualties were unknown, but 
they were certainly light. Most ominously the raiders retired 
with many of the expedition's horses and cattle which had been 
grazing outside the fort.59
58 Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, September 17, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:520; Joseph Shippen to James 
Burd, September 20, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers,
Vol.3.
59 James Burd to Sarah Burd, H.S.P., Shippen Family
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Some of the British officers viewed the battle at 
Loyalhanna as a victory. But at best it was a pyrrhic 
victory. Henry Bouquet commented ruefully that "A thousand 
men keep more than 1500 blockaded, carry off all their horses, 
and retire undisturbed with all their wounded and perhaps 
ours, after burying their dead. This enterprise which should 
have cost the enemy dearly shows a great deal of contempt for 
us, and the behaviour of our troops in the woods justifies 
their idea only too well."60
The expedition was at a critical juncture. Although 
within attacking distance of Fort Duquesne, the British were 
critically short of horses and wagons, and if the weather 
turned inclement they could lose many lives and most of their 
munitions and supplies. But there were many reasons to press 
forward. Governor Fauquier doubted whether the Virginia House 
of Burgesses would continue to support the campaign into 1759 
because their enthusiasm had been "a little stifled by the 
inactivity of this Campaign." He informed the Board of Trade 
that Virginians were very critical of Forbes' campaign and 
"this Inactivity as it is here call'd, and the long Delay 
before they set forward, has raised a Doubt whether the Attack
59 (... continued)
Papers, October 14, 1758, Vol. 3. James Burd to Henry
Bouquet, October 12, 1758, Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes,
October 15, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:552- 
553, 560.
60 Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, October 15, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:560.
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can be attempted this year which has so much soured some of 
the Members of the assembly that they are unwilling to grant 
any more Money towards carrying on the Expedition."61 So 
disturbed were the Burgesses that they ordered the First 
Virginia Regiment to return to Virginia to protect the 
frontiers by December 1, or else the colony would cease to pay 
for it.62 It was not only in the House of Burgesses that 
criticism of the expedition was widespread. Within the army 
itself officers began to complain sharply about the progress 
of the campaign.63
On November 6 Governor Denny received a depressing letter 
from General Forbes, still encamped at Raystown, detailing the 
misfortunes of the expedition, recommending steps that the 
colony should take to garrison the frontier over the winter, 
and suggesting that Pennsylvania should provide 1,200 men for 
garrison duty. Dismayed, Denny called the Assembly to meet on 
November 15. He informed them that "the advanced Season and 
late heavy Rains render it doubtful whether the General will
61 Gov. Fauquier to George Washington, September 16, 1758, 
Fauquier Papers, 1:72-73; Gov. Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 
September 23, 1758, Boehm, ed. , BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward 
Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol.1329) 12:66.
62 Fauquier managed to persuade the House to extend this 
date to January 1. Gov. Fauquier to George Washington, 
November 4, 1758, November 12, 1758, Reese, ed., Papers of 
Francis Fauquier, 1:99-100, 104-105.
63 Nothing revealed the low morale in the army more than 
the continual bickering amongst the officers. Henry Bouquet to 
Gen. Forbes, October 28, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet 
Papers, 2:588-589.
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be able to accomplish the Reduction of Fort Duquesne this 
Campaign.” The Assembly was apprehensive at the news and 
pondered what they should do.64
On November 11 Bouquet called his leading officers to a 
council of war at Loyalhanna.65 The council faced the 
decision of whether the army should continue towards Fort 
Duquesne or set about fortifying and securing its position for 
an assault the following spring. The council weighed the 
advantages of taking the fort, "justifying the expenses of the 
expedition and the hopes of our Colonies who, ignorant of the 
difficulties of the enterprise involves, regard the Fort as a 
very easy objective," against the risks involved, especially 
losing the ordnance in the bad weather and running out of 
provisions. The council decided that "the risks being so 
obviously greater than the advantages, there is no doubt as to 
the sole course that prudence dictates;" the expedition should 
halt. General Forbes, however, was eager to press on. Guides 
had informed him that the route from Loyalhanna to Fort 
Duquesne was easier after the first few miles, and he ordered
64 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:224-225; 
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:959.
65 The British had renamed Loyalhanna Pittsburgh, until 
the capture of Fort Duquesne. The fort was known more widely 
as Fort Ligonier.
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Bouquet to send a party of scouts towards Fort Duquesne to 
investigate the terrain.66
Meanwhile the French viewed their circumstances in a 
rather different light. Following Grant's defeat outside the 
fort, most of the Ohio Indians, feeling that the British would 
not dare attack again, "retired to hunt." With the approach 
of winter, dangerously short of supplies, and believing that 
"Fort Duquesne is safe for this autumn and winter, and that 
the enemy will also think of going into winter quarters, and 
content themselves with preserving their new establishment," 
the French sent many of their regular troops and Louisiana 
militia who had been garrisoning the fort to Illinois where 
there was an abundance of provisions. Fort Duquesne lay 
dangerously exposed.67
Forbes' advance, albeit painfully slow, also strengthened 
the hand of Pennsylvania as the colony negotiated with the 
Delawares. Following the meeting at Easton in the fall of 
1757, Teedyuscung had promised to spread the news of the 
negotiations to the Ohio Indians. Almost immediately, he sent 
a belt of wampum inviting them to peace talks. In January 
1758 Teedyuscung came before the Pennsylvania Council to ask 
them to ensure that he had sufficient supplies and gift to
66 Council of War, November 11, 1758, Gen. Forbes to Henry 
Bouquet, November 22, 1758, Kent, ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 
2:600-601, 606-607.
67 Montcalm to Marshal de Belle Isle, November 15, 1758, 
Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
New York, 10:900-901.
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bring the Ohio Indians into the peace process. He begged them 
"to enable me to make the Fire that was kindled at Easton 
blaze up high, that it may be better seen by all the Indians, 
and that they may be brought to join in this good Work, which 
will be attended with Expence." However, the Ohio Indians 
never received Teedyuscung's "Peace Belt," for the Iroquois 
halted its progress. The Iroquois feared that if Teedyuscung 
was able to place himself at the head of a confederation of 
Susquehanna and Ohio Delawares seeking peace, they would be 
unable to reassert their overlordship over the Delawares. 
They detained the belt for almost a year in Iroquoia and 
halted its progress again in Secaughkung, a Delaware town 
under strong Iroquois influence.68
Denny and the Susquehanna Delawares were also concerned 
that, as the southern Indians became involved in the conflict, 
they might endanger the peace process on the Susquehanna by 
attacking the Susquehanna Delawares. They were not alone. In 
early June the Cherokees sent a messenger to inform the 
Delawares about their support for the English and requesting 
that they keep away from the Ohio in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding. The Cherokee messenger fell dangerously ill 
in Philadelphia. Denny thus decided to dispatch Moravian
68 Minutes of the Treaty at Easton, Brodhead, ed., 
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 7:305; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:705-708, 713-714, 8:9-10, 
200; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:863-864.
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missionary, Frederick Christian Post, to carry the message to 
Teedyuscung and the Susquehanna Delawares.69
At Wyoming, Post discovered that several Ohio Delawares, 
Newcommen, Kustuloga, and Pisquitomen, had come to speak to 
their Susquehanna brethren to find out if the rumors of peace 
negotiations were true. The presence of Pisquitomen was 
especially encouraging to the Pennsylvanians because he was 
the brother of the Beaver and Shingas, the two most feared 
leaders of the Ohio Delawares.70
Post immediately informed Denny and the Council of their 
presence and their desire to know more about the negotiations 
between Pennsylvania and the Delawares. Denny and the Council 
decided to send Post to the Ohio to ascertain what the stance 
of the Ohio Indians was, and to encourage them to become 
involved in the peace process. General Forbes, who had been 
kept informed of Post's missions, also wanted Post to discover 
from the Ohio Indians the strength of French forces on the 
Ohio in order that he might plan his assault accordingly.71
69 "Report of Charles Thompson and Christian Frederick 
Post," June 1758, "Journal of Frederick Post," June 1758, 
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:49-51, 52; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 4th Ser 2:932-938; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 
8:135-137.
70 Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, August 9, 1758, Kent, 
ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:306n. 344-345; Jennings, Empire 
of Fortune, p.385.
71 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:187; Gen. Forbes to 
Henry Bouquet, July 20, 1758, Kent, ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 
2:232; Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, August 9, 1758, James, 
ed., Writings of General John Forbes, p.170-171; Jennings, 
Empire of Fortune, p.384.
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Post set out from Philadelphia on July 15. In less than 
a month he had arrived at the Ohio Delaware town of Kuskusky. 
There Post conferred with many of the leaders of the Ohio 
Indians, including Shingas and the Beaver. The Ohio Indians 
claimed that they now 11 long [ed] for that peace and Friendship 
[which] we had formerly.” Post informed them that the 
English, for their part, "assure you of our love towards you,” 
and added that "the great king of England does not incline to 
have war with the Indians: but he wants to live in peace and 
love with them, if they will lay down the hatchet, and leave 
off war against him."72
The Ohio Indians assured Post that "all the Indians" on 
the Ohio wanted peace "and have desired us. . . if we see the 
English incline a peace, to hold it fast." However, seeking 
peace with the British was difficult, for the Ohio Indians 
retained deep doubts about British sincerity. Many still 
believed that the British planned "to drive us away, and 
settle the country; or else, why do you come to fight in the 
land that God has given us?" They asked "why do not you and
72 Post was fortunate that upon his arrival he fell in 
with a group of Delawares prepared to risk their own lives to 
protect his, as they did on several occasions. The most 
notable of these rescues occurred while visiting an Indian 
town near Fort Duquesne, when the French demanded that the 
Indians turn him over so they could "blind his eyes, and lead 
him into the fort." But his companions protected him and 
smuggled him out of the town. "The Journal of Christian 
Frederick Post," Reuben Golf Thwaites, ed., Early Western 
Travels, 1748-1846, 13 Vols (Cleveland, Ohio: Arthur H. Clark, 
1904-1907), 1:185, 193, 198-199, 202-203, 205, 207. Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 8:188.
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the French fight in the old country, and on the sea? Why do 
you come to fight on our land? This makes every body believe, 
you want to take the land from us by force, and settle it."73
Despite these fears the Ohio Indians had little choice 
but to seek peace, for the war had destroyed their trade 
patterns. The Indians boasted that "they get a great deal of 
goods from the French; and that the French cloath the Indians 
every year. . . and give them as much powder and lead as they 
want."74 But as the French depleted their supplies they could 
not continue to supply the Indians. By the fall of 1758 food, 
clothing, and weapons were scarce on the Ohio. In addition, 
the Ohio Indians were well aware that a large army was 
marching towards them. Post could not persuade them to send 
aid to the British, as Forbes had hoped, nor would they send 
a large deputation to the negotiations at Easton. But they 
did agree to send Pisquitomen with Post to attend the treaty 
at Easton and asked that they should return with news of the 
negotiations.75
Denny and the Councilors arrived in Easton on the morning 
of October 7. The throng in the town was impressive. There 
were six Councilors and eight Assemblymen in attendance, along 
with several representatives of the Friendly Association.
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George Croghan, Conrad Weiser, and Henry Montour acted as 
interpreters. There were over five hundred Indians present, 
representing several Indian tribes: the Iroquois, Nanticokes, 
Delawares, and Minisinks.76
The meeting faced the problem of reconciling three 
conflicting aims: the Iroquois sought to recover their
lordship over the Delawares; the Susquehanna Delawares sought 
guarantees of their tribal territory from encroachment by 
anyone; and the Ohio Indians desired peace with a guarantee 
that the English would not settle their lands. The unfolding 
of the meeting reflected the shifting power balance in 
Pennsylvania. As Forbes pressed farther west and the French 
exhausted their supplies, Teedyuscung and the Susquehanna 
Delawares discovered that their negotiating position had grown 
weaker.
Before the proceedings officially convened, the Indians 
spent two days in private council "deliberating on Matters 
necessary to be adjusted before the meeting." According to 
Charles Thomson, "the Subject in Debate these two Days, [was] 
Whether what Teedyuscung has done shall stand, or they are to 
begin anew." However, in "warm" debates "Teedyuscung, and his
76 The Assembly appointed Norris, Fox, Hughes, Roberdau, 
Galloway, Masters, Strickland & Gibbons, to attend the Treaty 
at Easton as their representatives. Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 8:170, 175-176; Charles Thomson to Benjamin 
Franklin, December 10, 1758, Labaree, ed., The Papers of
Benjamin Franklin, 8:200.
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People, absolutely refuse[d] to retract any Thing they have 
said."77
Teedyuscung opened the conference simply and briefly on 
the afternoon of October 11. He informed the delegates 
merely: "I sit by only to hear and see what you have to say to 
one another, for I have said what I have to say to the 
Governor of Pennsylvania who sits here; he knows what has 
passed between us. I have made known to him the Reason why I 
struck him." Governor Denny then informed the council that 
Teedyuscung had informed them "that the Cause of the War was, 
their foolish Young Men had been perswaded by the Falsehearted 
French King to strike their Brethren, the English; and one 
Reason why the Blow came harder was, that the Proprietaries of 
this Province had taken [land] from them, by Fraud."78
The Iroquois, however, refused to listen to Teedyuscung 
and questioned his authority to speak for the Delawares. 
Nihas, a Mohawk, informed the council that the Iroquois 
desired "some private discourse about our Nephew, 
Teedyuscung." Nihas added, "You all know that he gives out he 
is a great Man, and Chief of Ten Nations. . . Now I, on behalf 
of the Mohawks, say we do not know he is such a great Man. If 
he is such a great man we desire to know who made him so."
77 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:178; Charles 
Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 1758, Labaree, ed., 
The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 8:201.
78 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:180, 186.
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Representatives of all the Iroquois nations then rose and 
repeated Nihas's question.79
Denny told the Iroquois that "after the Delawares had 
Struck us, you. . . advised them to sit still and do us no 
more mischief; and that soon after this we invited the 
Delawares to meet us. . .We received an Answer to our Message 
from Teedyuscung." Denny pointed out that Teedyuscung had 
claimed to represent the "Ten Nations" which included the 
Iroquois, but while he had acted as "Chief Man" for the 
Delawares, he had claimed only to be "a Messenger" for the 
Iroquois. He added that he "never made Teedyuscung this 
great Man, nor did I ever pretend to give him any Authority 
over you; and I must do him Justice to declare to you that at 
our former publick Treaties Teedyuscung never assumed any such 
Power; but on many Occasions when he spoke of you called you 
his Uncles and Superiors."80
Denny now turned the tables on the Iroquois. He pushed 
them to explain their reasons for the war, especially the 
reasons that some Iroquois warriors had participated in the 
attacks on the Pennsylvania frontier. This demand placed the 
Iroquois in an awkward predicament. When they replied, 
Thomson commented that "they gave us a Specimen of their 
Finesse in Politics." The Iroquois informed the
Pennsylvanians that they "disclaimed all Concern in it [the
79 Ibid. , 8:190-192.
80 Ibid. , 8:192, 193.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
292
war], and declared that it was not done by the Advice or 
Consent of the Public Council of the Nations, tho' they 
frankly owned some of their young Men had been concerned in 
it." They would let their warriors explain their
involvement.81 The warriors, for their part, tried to blame 
the English for the war, claiming "that you gave the first 
Offence." They claimed that the principal cause was the 
arrest of several Shawnees, which had distressed the Ohio 
Indians and had provided propaganda for French use. Then the 
Virginians had attacked some Seneca warriors traveling through 
the colony in 1755 causing many Senecas to join the French. 
Finally, they added, when the French first came to the Ohio, 
the Indians had appealed to Virginia and Pennsylvania for aid, 
"but these Governors did not attend to our Message." As a 
result, the French moved to the Ohio, "and you neither coming 
yourselves, nor assisting us with Warlike Stores. . . we were 
obliged to Trade with them for what we Wanted, as your Traders 
had left the Country. The Governor of Virginia took care to 
settle our Lands for his own Benefit; but when we wanted his 
assistance against the French, he disregarded us."82
Denny had seemingly supported Teedyuscung on the issue of 
his authority to speak for the Delawares, but when, after ten 
days of negotiations, the delegates finally began to consider
81 Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 
1758, Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 8:207.
82 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:197-198.
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the question of land, his support evaporated. Thomas King, an 
Oneida, reminded the Pennsylvanians that they had bought a 
huge tract of land at Albany extending from the Mouth of 
Penn's Creek to the Ohio. The proprietors' agents had only 
paid for a part of the area. King informed the Pennsylvanians 
that "the other Part that we have not received Payment for, 
that we re-claim." He explained that "Our Warriors or 
Hunters, when they heard that we had sold such a Large Tract 
of Land, disapproved our Conduct in Council, so now we 
acquaint you that we are determined not to confirm any more, 
than such of the Lands as the Consideration was paid for."83
The Iroquois sought to reclaim all lands which 
Pennsylvanians had not settled in 1754, but Weiser and Peters 
pressured them to reclaim only lands west of the Alleghenies, 
a much smaller area. Reluctantly, the Iroquois agreed. The 
Penns had already given Peters permission to release most of 
the lands purchased at Albany, and on October 24 Peters and 
Weiser formally released to the Iroquois lands to the west of 
the Alleghenies.84
83 Charles Thomson commented at this statement, "You see 
by Tomas King's Speech, that what was conjectured in the 
Enquiry relating to the Purchase of 1754, was not groundless, 
and that that Purchase was one main Cause of the War." 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:199; Charles Thomson to 
Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 1758, Labaree, ed., The Papers 
of Benjamin Franklin, 8:207.
84 Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 
1758, Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 8:210- 
211; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:218-219.
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Returning the land acquired at Albany was a tacit 
acceptance of Iroquois lordship over the Delawares, for the 
land included most of the Delawares' land. Teedyuscung 
realized that the Pennsylvanians and Iroquois had 
outmaneuvered him and made a new attempt to secure the 
Delawares' lands. He informed the conference: "I did let you 
know formerly what my Grievance was. I told you that from 
Tohicon, as far as the Delawares owned, the Proprietors had 
wronged me. Then you and I agreed that it should be laid 
before the King of England, and Likewise you told me you would 
let me know as soon as ever he saw it." He then pleaded, "Let 
us not alter what you and I have agreed. Let me know if King 
George had decided the Matter between you and me."85
Teedyuscung attempted to woo the Iroquois by admitting 
that "All Lands lying on the Waters that fall into the 
Susquehannah belong to our Uncles." But he then rebuked them, 
reminding them "that you have placed us at Wioming and 
Shamokin. . . Now I hear that you have sold that Land to our 
brethren the English." In final desperation he pressed the 
Iroquois to provide the Delawares with a deed for that land at 
Wyoming and a guarantee that the Delawares would be able to 
remain there.86
85 Significantly Teedyuscung's claim still included much 
more land than the Proprietors had acquired in the Walking 
Purchase alone. Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:201.
86 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:201, 203.
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Teedyuscung may have hoped from support from Denny on the 
issue, but Denny washed his hands of it. He merely informed 
the Iroquois that "there is an old agreement between the 
Proprietaries and you, that you will not sell any of the Lands 
lying within this Province to any but them, and they never 
take Possession of Lands till they have bought them of the 
Indians. You know, also, that the United Nations have sold 
Lands to the Proprietaries which your Nephews, the Delawares 
now claim as their Right." Denny then went to the heart of 
the problem: "The Proprietaries are desirous to do Strict
Justice to all Indians, but it cannot be supposed they can 
know in which of you the Right was vested." He then dismissed 
the matter, simply saying that "it is a matter that must be 
settled among yourselves."87
On October 21 the Iroquois and Delawares again met face 
to face. Several Quakers attended "at this particular Request 
of the Delawares." Teedyuscung addressed the Iroquois for the 
last time. He informed them that "We have gone so far at this 
Treaty, as to talk of Lands; I, therefore, thought proper to 
meet you here, to let you know that I have consulted with all 
my Brethren, your Cousins, here present, about the Deed you, 
our Uncles, Signed, to the Proprietaries of Pennsylvania, 
shewn to us Yesterday, for the Lands beyond the Kittocktinny 
Hills. We have seen the Deed, and know it well. . . We give 
it up, and now confirm it. . . This is not the Land I have
87 Ibid. , 8:204, 205.
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disputed with my Brethren, the English. That Land lies between 
Tohiccon Creek and the Kittochtinny Hills."88
Teedyuscung had realized that the Pennsylvanians were 
determined to hand over control of the land at Wyoming to the 
Iroquois, not to the Delawares. He would have to press the 
Iroquois, not the Pennsylvanians, to guarantee that land. 
There was still the issue of lands on the Delaware, most of 
which the proprietors had acquired in the Walking Purchase. 
The Pennsylvanians controlled those and had not receded them 
to the Iroquois. The fraud at issue with the Walking Purchase 
was not that they had acquired lands from the Iroquois, which 
seemed a difficult issue to argue in light of the agreement 
between Pennsylvania and the Iroquois, but that the 
Pennsylvanians had counterfeited the deed. Teedyuscung, 
perhaps encouraged by the Quakers, hoped that he might at 
least get compensation for those lands. Israel Pemberton 
commented to Franklin that "Teedyuscung confirmed the Purchase 
of 1749; his Motives for this Confirmation, were to engage the 
Six Nations to confirm the Wyoming Lands to him and his 
People; but such Measures were pursued by our proprietary 
Managers, to prevent it, and to set the Indians at variance 
with each other, that all our Arguments, Persuasions and
88 Ibid. , 8:211-212.
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Presents were scarce sufficient to keep them from an open 
Rupture.1,89
It was not until the end of the conference that the 
Iroquois finally addressed Teedyuscung's claim for a deed to 
the lands at Wyoming. Pemberton commented to Franklin "The 
Business was shamefully delayed from Day to Day. . . it [is] 
well known to us who attended, that the Time was spent in 
attempting Teedyuscung's Downfal, and silencing or contracting 
the Complaints he had made."90 Finally, Thomas King, an 
Oneida, addressed the Delawares. Teedyuscung himself, perhaps 
knowing what King intended to say, was not present. King 
simply informed the Delawares that "Teedyuscung desired us to 
make you the Owners of the Lands at Wioming, Shamokin, and 
other places on the Susquehannah River; in answer to which, 
we, who are present, say that we have no power to convey Lands 
to any one." King would promise only that they would take 
Teedyuscung's "Request to the great Council Fire for their 
Sentiments. . . in the mean time you may make use of those 
Lands in Conjunction with our People, and all the rest of our 
Relations. "9I
89 Israel Pemberton to Benjamin Franklin, December 11, 
1758, Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 8:211- 
212.
90 Israel Pemberton to Benjamin Franklin, December 11, 
1758, Labaree, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 8:212.
91 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 8:221.
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Teedyuscung had lost his struggle. The Pennsylvanians, 
as victory on the Ohio loomed, were loath to abandon their 
traditional understanding with the Iroquois. Indeed, they 
mostly remained unaware that giving the land back to the 
Iroquois meant the Delawares' subjection to the Iroquois and 
the forfeiture of Delaware lands. While the agreement to cede 
to the Iroquois the lands west of the Alleghenies laid the 
foundation for the Proclamation Line of 1763, it was not a 
victory for Indians generally, but a victory for one 
particularly self-interested group, the Iroquois, and a 
terrible defeat for the Delawares. After three years of war 
the Delawares had gained nothing.
As the delegates prepared to leave Easton, Forbes was 
preparing for his final assault on Fort Duquesne. On November 
20 Bouquet set out with a large party from Loyalhanna towards 
the French fort. When de Ligneris, the French commander, 
discovered that the British intended to attack the fort he 
realized that his weakened garrison would be unable to resist 
and prepared to evacuate and destroy the fort to prevent it 
from falling into English hands. On the evening of November 
24 scouts from Bouquet's column reported that "they had 
discovered a very thick smoak from the Fort extending in the 
bottom along the Ohio." The following morning advance units
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of Forbes' expedition came in sight of the fort. They found 
it burned to the ground.92
Washington predicted to Governor Fauquier that "the
unexpected success of our Arms, will be attended with happy
effects. The Delawares are suing for Peace; and I doubt not 
that other Tribes on the Ohio will follow their example."93 
The Pennsylvania Gazette informed its readers "Blessed be God, 
the long look'd for Day is arrived, that has now fixed
us. . . in the quiet and peaceable Possession of the finest
and most fertile Country of America." It continued that the 
conquest of the Ohio "lays open to all his Majesty's Subjects 
a Vein of Treasure."94
While the Pennsylvania Gazette celebrated the victory of 
British arms, its report revealed underlying contradictions in 
British and Pennsylvania policy. The Gazette had promised 
readers that Pennsylvania was now in "Possession" of the Ohio 
for "all his Majesty's Subjects." But at the same time the 
Pennsylvanians had promised the Iroquois and the Ohio 
Delawares that they had no intention of expanding British 
settlement into Indian lands.
92 Henry Bouquet to John Stanwix, November 25, 1758, Henry 
Bouquet to William Allen, November 25, 1758, Kent, ed., Henry 
Bouquet Papers, 2:609, 610; M. Daine to Marshall de Belle 
Isle, November 3, 1758, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to 
the Colonial History of New York, 10:884-885.
93 George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, November 28, 1758, 
Reese, ed., Papers of Francis Fauquier, 1:115-116.
94 Pennsylvania Gazette, December 14, 1758.
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Chapter VII
"And Some Drink Bumbo": The Failure of the War Effort
But Soldiers differ; some will shed their Blood,
And some drink Bumbo— for their Country's Good.
Some in the Field will nobly risque their Lives;
Some Hero Like, will swear, or play at Fives.
Some shew themselves the genuine Sons of Mars;
Some brave in Venus' or in Bacchus' Wars
Can shew their letcherous and drunken Scars.
—  The "Virginia Centinel," 17561
In every battle between regular troops fought on the 
frontier between the French and their Indian allies on one 
side, and the British and their colonists on the other, the 
French routed the British: at Washington's surrender at Fort 
Necessity in 1754, at Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela in 
1755, and again at Grant's defeat outside Fort Duquesne in 
October 1758. Frontier raids paralysed Virginia and 
Pennsylvania. Both colonies focused their military and 
economic strength on the defense of the frontier and did not 
contribute to the war farther north. Each colony surpassed 
the population and economic production of New France. But 
even though the French committed only a small portion of their 
available resources to the Ohio theater, never posting more 
than a few hundred men on the Ohio, Virginia and Pennsylvania
1 Maryland Gazette, November 25, 1756
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found it all but impossible to halt the raids. The war on the 
Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier, despite its outcome, was 
an outstanding success for the French and a disaster for the 
British.
The military failure created an upsurge of opposition in 
Virginia and Pennsylvania to the conduct of the war. In the 
summer of 1755, despite Braddock's defeat, Virginians had 
taken pride in the newly created Virginia Regiment, referring 
to them as "our Brave Blues."2 However, during the fall and 
winter of 1755, as the raiders devastated the colony's 
frontiers, Virginians expressed doubts about the regiment's 
capabilities. Many claimed that "the greatest Immoralities," 
the spread of "Gaming, drinking, swearing, and irregularities 
of every other kind," had enfeebled the troops. Outraged at 
the criticism of his regiment, Washington informed Dinwiddie 
that if the attacks continued he would consider resigning his 
commission. Only after assurances from Landon Carter that the 
critics had not directed their slights at him, and that his 
resignation would only serve their wishes, did Washington 
agree to retain command.3
2 John Martin to George Washington, August 30, 1755, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:11- 
12.
3 Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, April 8, 1756, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:381; 
John Robinson to George Washington, April 17, 1756, George 
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 17, 1756, George
Washington to John Robinson, [c. April 18, 1756], Landon
Carter to George Washington, April 21, 1756, George Washington
(continued...)
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The attacks did continue. In the fall of 1756 the 
Virginia Gazette published a still more stinging rebuke of the 
regiment. The "Virginia Centinel" reproved all aspects of the 
regiment's conduct. The Centinel continued to attack the 
regiment's morality, but also attacked its military prowess. 
The commentary claimed that the regiment had done little more 
than hide "skulking in Forts, and there dissolving in 
Pleasure, till alarmed by the Approach of the Enemy." It 
continued, "instead of searching out the Enemy, waylaying and 
surprising them, obstructing their Marches, and preventing 
their Incursions," the troops merely "tempt them by their 
Security and Laziness, to come in Quest of them, and attack 
them in their Fortifications." It concluded by asking readers 
"what useless Lumber, what an Incumbrance, is the Soldiery?"4
This attack on their honor horrified the regiment's 
officers who threatened to resign en masse, "no longer to 
serve a Country that is guilty of the basest Ingratitude to a 
Sett of Men who have made it their Study to defend & protect 
it at all Times." They insisted that "Nothing less will be 
suffic[ien]t than the Thanks of the Assembly in the publick 
prints for what We have already done." The House had 
adjourned before it could consider their complaint. However,
3(.. .continued)
to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 22, 1756, Landon Carter to George 
Washington, April 22, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 3:12, 13-14, 15-16, 30-31, 33-34, 36-37.
4 Virginia Gazette, September 3, 1756.
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the Speaker, John Robinson, wrote a soothing letter denouncing 
the Centinel as "a vile and Ignorant Scribler," and reminding 
the officers "of what fatal Consequence to your Country your 
resigning the Command at this time may be."5
Pennsylvanians expressed a similar dissatisfaction with 
the performance of the Pennsylvania Regiment, although the 
attacks were less severe because the colony had no claim to a 
military heritage. In the summer of 1756 rumors circulated in 
Philadelphia of rampant immorality in the regiment. The 
regiment's detractors maintained that the three hundred men 
garrisoning Fort Augusta had over one hundred women in camp to 
serve their every need.6 Rumors of immorality grew into 
criticism of the regiment's military performance in the fall 
of 1757, when the Assembly censured the regiment for its 
failure to protect the frontier. The Assembly claimed that 
"our Frontier Inhabitants have received so little Protection 
from the Provincial Forces, under their present Management, 
that. . . they are obliged to keep Watch, for the Defence of 
their Lives and Properties, at their own Expence." John 
Armstrong, one of the regiment's commanders, denounced the 
rebuke, claiming that it was "so unjust and Severe, as not to
5 John Kirkpatrick to George Washington, September 22, 
1756, William Ramsay to George Washington, September 22, 1756, 
William Peachey et al. to Washington, November 12 1756, John 
Robinson to Washington, November 16, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:409-411, 412-413, 
4:18-20, 28-29.
6 Peter Burd to Governor Morris, August 8, 1756, H.S.P., 
Gratz Collection, Case 15, Box 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
304
be pass'd with Silence, for which reason I have on behalf of 
my Officers 6 Soldiers under my Command Sent to the Press a 
Modest Vindication from the unnatural Charge of the As y."7
The colonies' military failure stemmed from several 
sources. The task faced by the colonial military commanders, 
George Washington, and initially Conrad Weiser, William 
Clapham, and John Armstrong in Pennsylvania, was all but 
impossible. The inhabitants expected the provincial forces, 
of only a few hundred men, to protect settlers on an exposed 
frontier several hundred miles long. In the fall and winter 
of 1755 raiding parties struck at will. After the 
construction of a chain of frontier posts, the task became 
more demanding. But the raiders could bypass the forts with 
little difficulty to reach isolated plantations or straggling 
travelers. To combat the problem, Washington suggested 
evacuating the settlers into fortified townships where the 
regiment could guard them, only allowing them to work on their 
plantations in large groups protected by military detachments. 
Edward Shippen proposed a similar solution in Pennsylvania. 
But such proposals were totally unacceptable to the 
backcountry inhabitants.8
7 John Armstrong to James Burd, September 13, 1757, 
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; Pennsylvania Archives, 
8th Ser., 6:4612.
8 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, [April 7, 1756], 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
2:333-334; Edward Shippen to William Allen, July 4, 1755, 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:459.
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The task of the Pennsylvania Regiment was additionally 
hampered because the Assembly vested substantial control of 
the force in the hands of the provincial commissioners who 
provided the regiment with its money and supplies. The 
commissioners used this power in an attempt to influence 
various military decisions. But, the titular head of the 
regiment was the governor. Split into three separate
battalions, with command divided between the governor and the 
commissioners, the Pennsylvania Regiment lacked central 
command.
Not only was the task of protecting the frontier all but 
impossible, but both Virginia's and Pennsylvania's forces were 
ill-equipped to fight in the backcountry and on the frontier. 
Despite the myth of the colonial backwoodsman as a skilled 
rifleman, tracker, and hunter, the colonial forces were poorly 
prepared to fight in the backwoods. Dinwiddie informed 
Whitehall in the fall of 1755 that "neither the Regulars or 
Provincials are accustom'd to fight'g in the Method that the 
Ind's do." Both Dinwiddie and Washington felt that "Indians 
are only a match for Indians: and without these we shall ever 
fight upon unequal terms."9 Only after the Virginians had 
gained the support of a substantial number of Cherokees and 
other southern Indian allies who could threaten the Ohio
9 Gov. Dinwiddie to Thomas Robinson, November 15, 1755, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:267; 
George Washington to John Robinson, April 7, 1756, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:338.
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Indians' towns, and the French had exhausted their supplies, 
did the task of raiding the frontier become demanding for the 
French and their Indian allies.
Virginians had expected the colony's militia to form the 
backbone of its defense. The militia was ill-equipped for 
such a task. Eighteenth-century militia musters had become 
social events rather than opportunities for inculcating 
military discipline. Dinwiddie had hoped that as soon as the 
alarm was raised he could muster the militia to repulse the 
attackers. But the militia was so slow to assemble that the 
attackers had moved elsewhere by the time it was ready. The 
militia was untrained, unarmed, and poorly led. Lacking 
insight into the principles of war and military discipline, 
militia commanders were unwilling to take any initiative 
without direct advice. Fewer than half the militia who 
mustered carried arms. Those who carried arms had weapons of 
different bores, making the provision of ammunition all but 
impossible. Instead of ranging stealthily through the woods 
in an attempt to intercept the enemy, they would dash 
"hooping11 and "hallooing" warning any nearby raiders of their 
presence.10
10 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, 
George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757., 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:1, 
87; Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, February 23, 1756, 
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(Vol. 1328) 11:1048.
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More alarming than the militia/s unreadiness was its 
refusal to serve. On occasion when raiders devastated the 
backcountry, the militia refused to muster. During the first 
major raid on the Virginia frontier in October 1755, one 
commander refused to summon his troops, maintaining "that his 
Wife, Family and Corn were at Stake, so were those of his 
Soldiers, therefore it was not possible for him to come." In 
the spring of 1756 Washington posted the militia from Louisa 
and Stafford counties at two forts on the South Branch. When 
the militia heard that a raiding party was nearby, "all the 
Militia. . . save 6 of the first & 8 of the latter
deserted."n
When the militia did muster, it neither hurried to its 
station nor remained in service for any length of time. In 
the summer of 1755 it took one detachment twenty-two days to 
march six miles. As the militia expected to be on duty for 
only one month at a time when the men arrived at their post, 
they felt that they had served long enough and would disband. 
In May 17 56 Dinwiddie called up the northern Virginia militia 
to defend Frederick and Hampshire counties against an intense 
Indian attack. Many of the men deserted en route. The few 
who arrived at their post refused to serve any longer, 
claiming that they had done their duty merely by marching to
11 "Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 17, 1756,
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:145; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:239.
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the frontier. On several occasions entire militia companies 
decided that they had served a sufficient time and abandoned 
their posts, leaving important positions unmanned.12
The militia also habitually refused to leave their home 
county. The Frederick County militia refused to march into 
Hampshire County, even though raiders were passing through 
Hampshire to get to Frederick. The House of Burgesses 
increased this difficulty by specifying that the militia could 
not march more than five miles beyond the furthest settled 
part of the colony, a restriction that prevented the militia 
from garrisoning the advanced frontier posts.13
The militia officers were the source of many other 
problems. The militia elected their officers, and as a result 
the officers were reluctant to execute an order which might 
prove unpopular. As the election of an officer was more a 
reflection of social status than military prowess, militia 
officers were especially sensitive about their rank, and
12 Mcllwaine, ed., Journal of the House of Burgesses, 
1752-1755, 1756-1758, pp.161, 449; Gov. Dinwiddie to 
Lieutenant William Wright, July 8, 1755, Brock ed. , The
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:92; "Memorandum 
respecting the Militia," May 7, 12, 13, 17, 1756, George
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, George
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, Abbot and
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:97, 119, 122, 
145-146, 432-433, 4:1.
13 The House of Burgesses also specified that the militia 
of Norfolk and Williamsburg did not have to serve outside 
their corporations' limits. Adam Stephen to George Washington, 
October 4, 1755, Washington to Thomas, Lord Fairfax, August 
29, 1756, Abbot & Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 2:72-73, 3:380-381; Henning, Statutes, 6:541, 548.
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Washington complained several times that "every petty Person 
must assume Command, direct and advise."14 Even the ranks 
were conscious of their status. When Washington attempted to 
use the militia to construct defenses at frontier posts, the 
men refused to do such service unless they received additional 
pay. On occasion, even when offered additional pay, they 
still refused to lower themselves to such menial service.15
Many of the militia officers saw their commission more as 
an opportunity for profit than as a service for their country. 
They presented the House of Burgesses with inflated accounts 
of their costs and requested pay for more men than had served, 
pocketing the difference. They also aided their friends and 
neighbors when impressing provisions by leaving the valuation 
to their "ignorant and indifferent neighbours. . . [who] exact 
high prices."16
Most troublesome was the tendency for the militia's 
recalcitrance to spread to units of the Virginia Regiment with
14 Gov. Dinwiddie to Maj. Andrew Lewis, December 23, 175t, 
Brock, ed. , The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:569; 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, George 
Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:2, 87.
15 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 26, 1757, George
Washington to John Stanwix, June 28, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:430, 4:264-266,
4:269-271.
16 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:2; 
Gov. Dinwiddie to Captain Hogg, November 1, 1756, Brock, ed., 
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:537.
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whom they were posted. Sensing this, in the spring of 1756, 
Dinwiddie purposefully countermanded an order to assemble the 
militia alongside provincial troops in Winchester, fearing 
they would "be a bad Example" to the regiment.17
As a result of the militia's failure, Virginia created a 
permanent professional military establishment, the Virginia 
Regiment. Pennsylvania also resorted to the formation of a 
permanent military establishment, the Pennsylvania Regiment, 
because the colony had no militia to defend it and the 
Assembly and Governor were unable to agree on the terms for 
the creation of a provincial militia.
The creation of these professional military units created 
new obstacles, particularly the difficulty of persuading men 
to enlist. In Virginia in the fall of 1755 it took the 
officers three months to recruit only five hundred men, half 
the required number. Officers needed to obtain a specific 
number of recruits before the governor confirmed their 
commissions.18 This had unforseen consequences. Some 
officers created phantom companies. Dinwiddie complained 
about companies supposedly at full-strength but actually
17 Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, May 27, 1756, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:422- 
423; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 23, 1756, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:171.
18 Captain's were required to recruit thirty men, 
Lieutenants eighteen, and ensigns twelve. "General 
Instructions for Recruiting," September 1-3, 1755, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:13; Gov. 
Dinwiddie to Gen. Shirley, January 24, 1756, Brock, ed., The 
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:328-331.
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short-handed. In November 1756 Washington informed Dinwiddie 
of his suspicions that many officers had produced "a list. .
. of sundry persons who are willing to serve under them, one 
part of those, it is said, are fictitious names another, the 
names of persons who never saw the list and the remainder are 
persons drawn into it by fallacious promises." Several 
officers informed potential recruits that they would serve 
only until the end of the war, which might come within a few 
months. When the war showed no sign of ending the men grew 
restless. Washington connived in such practices and dismissed 
them as "nothing more than one of those little subterfuges 
which, from the disagreeable nature of the Recruiting service, 
has, at some junctures been considered necessary." Other 
officers coerced men to enlist. The most infamous case was 
that of Denis McCarty who was discovered "forcibly taking, 
confining and torturing those, who would not voluntarily 
enlist. "19
These practices increased the poor reputation of the 
regiment and made men less likely to enlist voluntarily. To 
alleviate this problem, both colonies eventually permitted the 
recruitment of indentured servants, who soon comprised a
19 Gov. Dinwiddie to the Captains of the Virginia Forces, 
August 25, 1755, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert 
Dinwiddie, 2:177; George Washington to Denis McCarty, 
[November 22, 1755], George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, 
November 9, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Sharpe, July 20, 
1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
2:176, 4:4, 319.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
312
substantial proportion of the recruits.20 In December 1756 
Dinwiddie reported that over 200 indentured servants had 
enlisted in the Virginia Regiment. The number in the 
Pennsylvania Regiment was much higher. However, recruiting 
indentured servants alone could not meet the need for 
recruits. So great was the demand that Virginia even allowed 
free blacks to enlist and serve alongside whites. By the end 
of the war Virginia authorities even resorted to purchasing 
convicts from Britain to complete their quotas. The demand 
for recruits forced the House of Burgesses to move toward 
drafting men. In 1756 the House passed a law impressing 
vagrants. But the measure made recruiting more difficult, as 
Washington explained, "for compelling these abandon'd 
Miscreants into the Service, who only waited time and 
opportunity to effect their escape, gave loose to all their
20 In 1755 both colonies had forbidden the recruiting of 
indentured servants. But as the number of recruits lagged 
behind requirements the restrictions were abandoned. At 
first, in early 1756, indentured servants were recruited only 
to complete the regular regiments, by command of General 
Shirley. This practice caused many complaints, particularly 
in Pennsylvania. However, once the Pennsylvania authorities 
observed how many servants came forward, and their masters 
were appeased by the payments they received, recruiting of 
servants was extended to both the Virginia and Pennsylvania 
forces. George Washington to Robert Stewart, November 18, 
1755, George Washington to George Fraser, November 18, 1755, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
2:169, 170; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:37-39, 45;
Pennsylvania Archives, 4th Ser., 2:582-584.
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vicious Principles, and invented the most unheard of storys to 
palliate Desertion.1,21
Eventually Virginia resorted to drafting single white men 
from the militia. This task was left to the county 
lieutenants and justices of the peace and was very unpopular. 
In Augusta County drafting men prompted a riot in 1756. The 
justices thereafter found many excuses to avoid the task 
whenever they could. Dinwiddie attributed the justices' 
reluctance to the fact that "most of the People are 
Freeholders, in course [they] have votes for choosing Assembly 
Men, in w'ch they strenuously insist on their Privileges." 
However, even when the justices enforced the draft, most men 
could avoid service by hiring a replacement or paying a £10 
fine.22
21 Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, February 23, 
1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to John McNeil, December 25, 1756, Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:339, 571; 
Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, August 2, 1759, Boehm 
ed., British Public Record Office, Class 5 Files, Part 1, 
Westward Expansion, (Vol. 1329) 12:94-95; Peter Hog to George 
Washington, November 29, 1755, George Washington to Peter Hog, 
December 27, 1755, George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, 
January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds,. The Papers of George 
Washington, 2:188, 236, 4:79-81.
22 "Account of William Preston with the Assembly," July- 
November, 1755, Preston Family Papers, Virginia Historical 
Society, Richmond, 164; Edmund Pendleton letter, May 12, 1756, 
"Council of War of Officers of Militia of Augusta County," May 
20, 1756, Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, University of 
Wisconsin, 1QQ:126-128, 13 0; H.R. Mcllwaine, ed., Journal of 
the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756-1758, 381; Gov.
Dinwiddie to Lord Loudoun, October 28, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to 
Col. Fontaine, August 24, 1757, Gov. Dinwiddie to Col. Bland, 
August 24, 1757, Brock ed., The Official Records of Robert 
Dinwiddie, 2:532, 687, 688; Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of
(continued...)
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Civil officers resorted to nefarious means to get men
into the regiment. Butts Roberts of Lancaster County, for
example, had traveled to Maryland upon business. When he
returned, he discovered that the justices had drafted him in
his absence. In other cases justices coerced militia
deserters to enlist in return for a pardon for their
desertion.23 Finally, the justices resorted to drafting those
who had little voice in the community and whose presence would
not be missed, the "dregs" of society, particularly the
landless and recent immigrants. Indeed, the House of
Burgesses ordered the justices to draft all men
found loitering and neglecting to labor for 
reasonable wages; all who run from their 
habitations, leaving wives or children without 
suitable means for their subsistence, and all other 
idle, vagrant, or dissolute persons, wandering 
abroad without betaking themselves to some lawful 
employment.24
Half the men who served in the Virginia Regiment were born in 
Britain or Europe, and almost half described their pre­
enlistment occupation as some manual craft or simply as a 
"Labourer," an unusual circumstance for an almost exclusively 
agricultural society. Many of these men from the lowest
22 (.. . continued)
Trade, February 23, 1756, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1,
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1328) 11:1050; Henning, 
Statutes, 6:527, 7:15.
23 "Orders for the Militia" May 15, 1756, "Memorandum 
respecting the Militia," May 18, 1756, Robert Carter Nicholas 
to George Washington, August 18, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., 
The Papers of George Washington, 3:136, 151, 356-357.
24 Henning, Statutes, 7:70.
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levels of society even volunteered for service, attracted by 
the exemption from prosecution for civil suits granted to all 
members of the Virginia Regiment.25
Recruiting was easier in Pennsylvania because the colony 
had a larger pool of willing recruits. Enlistment appealed, 
in particular, to indentured servants and to the many recently 
released servants who had not yet acquired property. To 
encourage servants to enlist, the colony agreed to recompense 
masters for their loss from the servants' pay.26 In 
Pennsylvania, as the war continued and tales spread of the 
colony's failure to pay its troops and to provide adequate 
clothing, shelter, and provisions, recruiting became more 
difficult. In 1757 Daniel Clark spent several weeks in 
Cumberland County enlisting only eight men, one of whom 
deserted immediately.27
Not all who enlisted served for long. Desertion was 
endemic in both colonies' forces. Not all deserters were men 
seeking freedom from the rigors of military life and returning 
to their homes: many men enlisted several times, each time
25 William Waller Henning, ed., Statutes at Large, 13 
Vols. (Richmond, Va.: Published by the state, 1820-1823), 
7:31. See Appendix I
26 In 1757 Captain Thomas Lloyd reported recruiting 
several indentured servants, recompensing their masters up to 
£14 each. Capt. Lloyd to James Burd, July 26, 1757, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Joseph Shippen, Account Book, 
1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Account Book of Joseph 
Shippen's Company, 1756.
27 Daniel Clark to James Burd, June 11, 1757, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
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receiving an enlisting bounty. In 1757 Joseph Shippen 
complained that he had unwittingly enlisted a man who had used 
aliases to enlist in several regiments. The recruit had 
deserted from Captain Shaw's Company of the New Jersey 
provincials. He then joined Herbert's Regiment of the Royal 
Americans, then deserted to enlist with another officer in the 
same regiment from whom he deserted again. Shippen made his 
discovery too late, for the recruit had already received his 
bounty and deserted again!28
Other men developed the practice of enlisting in both the 
Virginia and Pennsylvania Regiments, and then in the Royal 
Americans. The intense rivalry between the colonial forces 
aided this practice. On occasion, when an officer discovered 
that a recruit had previously deserted from another regiment 
he might still enlist him. So common was the practice of 
multiple-enlisting that when General Forbes amassed the 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and British forces for his attack on 
Fort Duquesne in the summer of 1758 there was widespread 
desertion as men feared that their former companions would 
recognize them. As a result, Forbes offered an amnesty 
promising that he would not punish men who came forward and 
agreed to continue in service.29
28 Joseph Shippen letter, June 6, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen 
Family Papers: Military Letter Book of Joseph Shippen 1756- 
1758, ff.59-61.
29 George Washington to Abraham Bosomworth, December 8, 
1756, Robert Stewart to George Washington, September 27, 1757,
(continued...)
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On occasion there were mass desertions, particularly in 
Virginia. When Dinwiddie assembled the Virginia troops at 
Fredericksburg for Braddock's campaign in the spring of 1755, 
the men deserted in droves. The men whom Dunbar left at Fort 
Cumberland following Braddock's defeat deserted at the rate of 
ten or twelve per day until there was virtually no garrison 
remaining.30 In December 1756 Denis McCarty encouraged 
eighteen men to desert from Fort Loudoun at Winchester, hoping 
that he could encourage them to enlist under him in the Royal 
Americans.31 The largest mass desertion occurred in the 
summer of 1757 following the attempt to draught men from the
29(.. .continued)
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:45, 
423-424; Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, May 29-30, 1758, Donald 
H. Kent, S.K. Stevens, & Autumn L. Leonard, eds., The Papers 
of Henry Bouquet, 5 Vols. (Harrisburg, PA., The Pennsylvania 
Historical and Museum Commission, 1951-1972), 1:389;
Pennsylvania Gazette, June 1, 1758.
30 Gov. Dinwiddie to Captains Mercer, Waggener and 
Stewart, January 15, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Capt. Stewart, 
January 15, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, 
August 20, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, August 20, 1755, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1:462, 
464, 2:163, 164; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:602.
31 McCarty also ensured that the soldiers were aware that 
as the colony had no mutiny act at the time they could not be 
punished severely."Orders" December 3, 4, 1756, George
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 4, 1756, George
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 10, 1756, George
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 17, 1756, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:40, 40-41, 
48-49, 62-66; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 
10, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Dennis McCarty, December 10, 1756, 
brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:559- 
562, 562.
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militia into the provincial forces. Within two months almost 
half the recruits— two hundred men— had deserted.32
Many of the men headed for Maryland, North Carolina, or 
Pennsylvania where their recapture was unlikely. Some 
attempted to reach Fort Duquesne and join the French, while 
others sought refuge among neighboring Indian tribes. 
Washington raised road-blocks and sent out parties to
intercept them before they reached safety. But, having just
escaped from the regiment, the deserters would not allow
themselves to be taken without a struggle. In December 1755
a party of deserters assaulted an officer of Peter Hog's 
company. The officer bettered his opponents and "was Amply 
revenged by Cutting off the Arm of one." In July 1757, when 
the guard halted a party of deserters at a road-block near 
Maidstone, the deserters attacked. One man was killed and 
several others injured.33
The Pennsylvania Regiment was also weakened by constant 
desertion. However, in Pennsylvania the proportion of 
deserters was smaller than in Virginia. The major reason for
32 George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:306.
33 Vaudreuil to Antoine Louis Rouille, Count de Jouy, 
August 8, 1756, Stevens, ed., Wilderness Chronicles, pp.93-98; 
Gov. Dinwiddie to Adam Stephen, October 3, 1755, Gov Dinwiddie 
to Sir Charles Hardy, July 1, 1756, Brock ed., The Official 
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:233, 453; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
September 2, 1756; Peter Hog to George Washington, December 
11, 1755, George Washington to David Bell, January 10, 1756, 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 11, 1757, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:219, 271, 
4:295-296.
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the lower rate of desertion was that the Pennsylvania Regiment 
was an entirely volunteer regiment. In addition, because 
recruiting was easier in Pennsylvania than Virginia, deserters 
could be replaced more easily and thus the loss of deserters 
was less of a military handicap.34
Men were encouraged to desert by their family, militia 
officers, and other troops. In the summer of 1757 the threat 
of desertion forced Washington to reassign the troops 
stationed at Maidstone on the Potomac River. The men had been 
enlisted mainly in Maryland and, "under the immediate 
influence and perswasion of their friends," deserted in large 
numbers. James Fitzpatrick, a former soldier in the regiment, 
warned some of the 1757 drafts that "if they knew as much as 
he did they wou'd sooner cut their own Throats than come to 
Winchester," and promised them that he would help them 
escape. Colonel Paramour of the Accomac County militia 
informed the men he drafted, doubtless to encourage them to 
report to the regiment and ease his task, that "when they were 
draughted they might desert with Impunity after they were 
delivered to the military Officers."35 Not surprisingly,
34 Joseph Shippen to James Burd, September 12, 1757, 
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; John Stanwix to george 
Washington, September 19, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 4:415-416; Maryland Gazette, 
November 17, 1757.
35 "General Court Martial," July 25-26, 1757, George 
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:194, 333.
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urged on by their peers, family, and superiors, the men showed 
no reluctance to desert.
Desertion was only one facet of the disobedience which 
permeated the provincial forces. Mutiny and embezzlement of 
supplies were also common. Mutiny was most common in isolated 
frontier posts. Fort Augusta, secluded at the forks of the 
Susquehanna and often lacking supplies, was the scene of 
recurrent mutinies. In the spring of 1757 the men mutinied 
when the commander attempted to retain them in the service 
after their terms of enlistment had expired until a new 
garrison arrived. In January 1760 there was "a General 
Mutiny" when they heard a rumor "that they were to receive no 
pay" and "almost to a Man" they refused to do duty. The 
garrison commander, Joseph Shippen, confined one of the 
ringleaders but "the Men ran out of their Barracks & rescued 
him." Shippen had to march with his "Sword drawn" to restore 
order.36
Matters were little better at other posts. In August 
1756 one of Captain Jacob Arndt's subordinates, Lieutenant 
Miller, posted at Tucker's Mill, refused to obey Arndt's 
orders. Arndt sent out a detachment with directions to seize 
the post and send Miller back to Fort Norris for court 
martial. But Miller told them "that he would not go
36 Col. Burd's Journal At Fort Augusta, March 1757, 
Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen Thompson Family 
Papers, Box 2 Folder 13; Joseph Shippen to James Burd, January
21, 17 60, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 5.
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absolutely, and the first man that would touch him, he would 
cut an arm from his body. . . and he would see how they would 
bring him away." Arndt sent out a larger detachment to arrest 
Miller, but when they arrived at the post he had already 
fled.37
Just a few days later another mutiny broke out at Fort 
Norris. One of the troopers refused to do sentry duty. Arndt 
arrested him "but the guard rebelled against me, and told me 
they would all stand together." Arndt begged his commander, 
Conrad Weiser, to send him help, for the men "do what they 
think suits them best, and I must live like a prisoner here 
amongst them at this Fort." He warned that if he did not 
receive assistance quickly he was "afraid there might happen 
a great destruction, for I have no commissioned Officer with 
me here, and I am in a very great trouble."38
Several mutinies also broke out in Virginia. In the
winter of 1756-1757 there was a general mutiny on the South 
Branch when Dinwiddie ordered Washington to transfer his men 
from the forts there to the isolated and exposed Fort 
Cumberland. Upon hearing the news many of the men refused to 
leave and threatened to desert. When Washington pressed on
37 The detachment returned to Fort Norris to get 
reinforcements and when they returned to Tucker's Mill Miller 
had fled before he could be arrested. Jacob Arndt to William 
Parsons, August 17, 1756, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: 
Miscellaneous Papers, 1:183.
38 Jacob Arndt to Conrad Weiser, August 26, 1756, H.S.P., 
Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:183
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with his decision, large numbers of men abandoned their posts 
and fled for Pennsylvania. During the Sandy Creek Expedition 
the men refused to obey Major Andrew Lewis' orders and 
deserted the expedition, forcing Lewis to abandon the project. 
In 1758 when Washington ordered some of the rangers to 
garrison frontier forts while the regiment was in 
Pennsylvania, the men refused to do the duty and threatened to 
desert if they were compelled to. When Washington refused to 
countermand his order, almost half the men in the ranger 
company feigned sickness to avoid duty, deserted, or simply 
refused to obey orders.39
Mutiny was not the only way in which troops were able to 
avoid work. The men compelled to labor on the construction of 
Fort Loudoun at Winchester in the summer of 1756 used 
"counterfeit sickness" to avoid duty. This practice forced 
Washington to issue orders that all men who claimed to be ill 
must report to the camp's surgeon for examination. If he 
decided that the soldier was feigning illness, the culprit was 
to receive fifty lashes as punishment.40
39 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 17, 1756, 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, January 12, 1757, Charles 
Smith to Washington, July 1, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 4:462-63, 93-94, 5:253; Gov.
Dinwiddie to George Washington, January 26, 1757, Brock, ed., 
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:584-585.
4° "orders" August 30, 31, September 1, 1756, "Orders" 
October 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 3:382-383, 439.
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Soldiers hampered the war effort in several other ways. 
The constant pilfering of supplies was endemic amongst the 
colonial forces. Following Braddock's defeat in 1755 many 
troops purloined supplies in the flight and sold them to 
unscrupulous frontiersmen. Following the fall of Fort 
Duquesne there was an orgy of looting of military supplies in 
all the Pennsylvania forts. One commander complained to 
Bouquet that it was impossible to protect the stores from "the 
plundering Hands of unjust & ungratefull Men, who receive the 
King's Pay to guard & protect the very Effects, they Steal & 
embezzle: Nothing is spared, Horses, Saddles, Waggons,
Provisions, Hay, Planks, all these & many other Articles, are 
every Day, Night, & Hour, Stolen." At Fort Ligonier the men 
even looted the officers' baggage.41
The men also stole the army's horses and cattle.
Following Forbes' campaign the theft of horses for resale to 
civilians was so widespread that it prompted General Stanwix
to warn that "if. . . any such Horse is discovered in the
Possession of any Person, under any Pretence whatever, the 
Offender may depend upon being Prosecuted, as the law directs 
against Horse-Stealers.1,42
41 Virginia Gazette, September 5, 1755; John Armstrong to 
Henry Bouquet, December 13, 1758, December 27, 1758, Lewis 
Ourry to Henry Bouquet, December 20, 1758, Kent, ed., Papers 
of Henry Bouquet, 2:631, 638, 646; Proclamation of John
Stanwix, June 22, 1759, Edward Biddle to James Burd, August 5, 
1759, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 4.
42 Proclamation of John Stanwix, June 22, 1759, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 4.
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The horses and cattle at abandoned plantations also 
offered a tempting opportunity. Frontiersmen repeatedly 
complained that the men scouting from Fort Augusta drove away 
the cattle and horses from abandoned plantations. In the fall 
of 1756 some of the garrison "dishonourably drove from their 
Walks. . . a Number of Horses & Mares said to belong to the 
poor Scatter'd Inhabitants." These they then "sold at 
Vandue." Fort Cumberland was another prime location for 
looting the horses and cattle of Hampshire and Cumberland 
counties.43
Not only did the men drive away cattle from abandoned 
plantations, the troops often made use of the chaos of war to 
pillage and plunder occupied farms and homesteads. In October 
1755 Washington received several complaints about his troops 
"pilaging and plundering of Houses" on "all the Roads they 
have marched." The complaints compelled him to give strict 
orders to ensure that "the men are not allowed to pillage the 
Country." However, in the spring of 1756 another planter 
complained that the troops billeted at his plantation had 
"killed his Fowls, pulled down one of his Houses for firewood; 
turned the Horses into his meadow and corn; [and] destroyed 
them and his Fences." Matters were no better in Pennsylvania.
43 "Orderly Book of Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company," 
October 5, 1759, Cumberland County Historical Society,
Carlisle, Pa., 9:22; John Armstrong to James Burd, September 
13, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Henry Bouquet 
to John Forbes, January 23, 1759, Richard Pearris to Henry
Bouquet, February 5, 1759, Kent, ed., Papers of Henry Bouquet, 
3:74-75, 101.
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During the winter of 1757 troops in Northampton County, short 
of provisions, took to attacking the local inhabitants to 
force them to provide supplies.44
Much of the misbehavior stemmed from the repeated 
drunkenness of the troops. Across Pennsylvania and Virginia 
soldiers missed duty or performed duty while drunk.45 At Fort 
Allen in the summer of 1756 the whole garrison celebrated the 
arrival of Teedyuscung by heavy drinking. The men, who had 
been isolated in the garrison for several months, soon "got 
ajoking" with the women Teedyuscung had brought with him. 
They then took the "Rum & Water, and washed their parts with 
it, for fear of getting some distemper of the Squaws" and soon 
"got in earnest." The commander, who himself was drunk, 
attempted to stop the proceedings. He threatened to shoot the 
men, but they "began to lay on him with sticks." Another 
group, worried by the chaos, decided to set out for help, but 
they were too drunk to get far and soon returned. The 
behavior of the garrison paralyzed the fort during a period of 
many raids and jeopardized important Indian diplomacy.46
44 "Orders," October 23, 1755, George Washington to Adam 
Stephen, October 29, 1755, George Washington to Robert
Spotswood, October 31, 1755, George Washington to Henry
Woodward, May 5, 1756, "Orders," July 21, 1756, Abbot and
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:135, 147, 
150, 3:96, 269; William Parsons to Conrad Weiser, [January], 
1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:67.
45 "Orderly Book of Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company," 
July 3, 1759, Cumberland County Historical Society, 9:22.
45 George Reynolds to Conrad Weiser, August, 1756, H.S.P., 
Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:187.
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The behavior of the Virginia and Pennsylvania troops 
contrasts with that of provincial forces in other theaters. 
In New England the Massachusetts troops, while inadequate 
soldiers, were at least generally cooperative and often 
displayed bravery. Although New England troops deserted in 
small numbers, protested any failure to receive their wages 
and the lack of food, and at times indulged in drinking and 
gaming, they did not display the widespread discontent and 
misbehavior prevalent amongst the Virginia and Pennsylvania 
troops.47
The troops of the Virginia and Pennsylvania regiments had 
many valid reasons for their behavior. They often went unpaid 
for long periods. The Virginia troops sent to South Carolina 
received no pay for over three months. The problem was worse 
in Pennsylvania where the disputes between the governor and 
Assembly prevented the colony from putting its regiment's 
finances on a sound footing. In the spring of 1757 the 
Pennsylvania forces received no pay for five months, and some 
of the officers had gone unpaid for ten months.48
47 Anderson, A People’s Army, Chaps. 3 and 5.
48 George Mercer to George Washington, November 2, 1757, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:40- 
42; Jacob Arndt to Timothy Horsefield, February 26, 1756,
H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers,
1:181; Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, March 4, 1757,
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; William Parsons to 
Conrad Weiser, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:47; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:448.
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Recruiters also encouraged men to enlist under "false 
pretenses." In Pennsylvania in 1757 Captain Hambright 
discovered that he could only recruit German settlers by 
guaranteeing, although he had no authority, that they would 
not do garrison duty at Fort Augusta and that they would not 
"do any kind of work but to range & scour the Woods 
continually." Unconcerned at his deceit, since once recruited 
the men ceased to be his responsibility, Hambright was able 
to recruit many Germans. Not surprisingly, shortly after 
Hambright handed over command of the men, Edward Shippen 
reported that the men were "such a parcel of mutinous Dutch 
Rascalls, that several of them refuse to go without their own 
Captain." He added "I have threatened them several times to 
confine them in Goal [sic] & have them every Soul of them 
punished for Mutiny: But all will not do, they seem determined 
to act as they please. I have therefore concluded it most 
prudent to have nothing more to say to them & not to use any 
forceable or Military Expedients with them as it might hurt 
the Recruiting Service."49 Across Virginia and Pennsylvania 
recruiters made promises they knew would not be honored. Not 
surprisingly the men quickly became disillusioned and were 
disinclined to obey the orders of their new officers.
The troops also served under appalling conditions. In 
1757 Washington maintained that much of the opposition to the
49 Joseph Shippen to James Burd, May 31, 1757, Joseph
Shippen to James Burd, June 7, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family 
Papers, Vol. 2.
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war had stemmed from the Fort Necessity expedition when the 
men had not received the proper equipment, tents, or clothes. 
He added that this lack of support caused "great murmering and 
discontent" amongst the men which spread as they returned 
"recounting their Sufferings and want of Pay (which Rags and 
Poverty sufficiently testified); fixd in the Populace such 
horrid Impressions of the hardships they had Encountered, that 
no Arguments could remove their prejudices, or Facilitate the 
Recruiting Service."50
The troops' discontent over clothing was another major 
cause of disaffection. In August 1756 Washington reported to 
the House of Burgesses that "Our Soldiers complain that their 
pay is insufficient even to furnish Shoes, shirts, stockings, 
&c." Virginia expected the forces to pay for their own shoes 
and uniforms. Yet the nature of the service meant that these 
items did not last long. Washington confided to General 
Loudoun that "I have known a Soldier go upon Command with a 
new pair of Shoes, which perhaps have cost him from 7/6 to 10/ 
and return back without any; so much do they wear in wadeing 
Creeks, Fording Rivers: climbing Mountains." The colony
sometimes provided uniforms, deducting the cost from the 
troops' pay, but the clothing was often substandard. 
Washington described the uniform that the commissaries 
provided in 1755 as "a suit of thin sleazy Cloth without
50 George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 
1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:80-81.
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lining." Worse still, on occasions the troops paid for 
clothes they never received.51
Virginians viewed life in the regiment as so appalling 
that many would risk all to avoid service. In 1758 John 
Catlet, convicted of stealing a horse, was offered the 
opportunity to serve in the Virginia Regiment "to free himself 
from a nauseous Goal and the Sentence of Death which hung over 
him." No sooner was he freed and handed over to the regiment 
than he deserted. When recaptured he claimed that "the Mercy 
extended to him appeared more terrible to him than Death 
itself[,] and he chose rather to Run the Risque of Suffering 
an ignominious Death by living with his Wife and Children than 
to embrace that Mercy which was to deprive him of every 
Blessing which made life dear to him."52
The conditions under which the Pennsylvania troops served 
were as bad as or worse than those of Virginia. Pennsylvania 
troops also lacked clothing and equipment. But the 
Pennsylvania forces regularly went without adequate food. In 
April 1759 Samuel Weiser wrote to his father describing the 
conditions at Fort Ligonier. "There are not 25 men in this 
Garrison that have not the Scurvy, they die fast, some have
51 Peter Hog to George Washington, June 26, 1756, George 
Washington to John Robinson, August 5, 1756, George Washington 
to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:227-228, 327-329, 
4:86-87.
52 Petition of John Catlet, [ca. 1759,] Reese, ed., Papers 
of Francis Fauquier, 1:140-141.
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shrivelled limbs [and] can neither move back nor forwards." 
He continued that "we had in four months past not a bit of 
meat but rotten, and hard salted pork, and the flour is all in 
balls and the bread. . . quite bitter." He feared that if the 
men stayed in the fort much longer "they will all die without 
Exception god knows that no body cares for us, we are abused 
in all respects." Following Forbes' campaign Thomas Lloyd 
described the Pennsylvania troops as "hardly worth writing 
about[,] the grave yard has the most of them[,] exhausted as 
they were with the Fatigues of a most unmerciful Campaign twas 
impossible they shou'd stand the united Effects of Sickness 
and hard Duty." He added "The scurvy has been fatal to 
them."53
The troops at Fort Augusta suffered particularly badly. 
The garrison endured scurvy during the winter and during the 
summer was struck by malaria. Joseph Shippen reported in the 
summer of 1757 that of the garrison of 380 men sixty were "ill 
with bad Fevers, which have reduced many of them to mere 
Skeletons." A few months later dysentery, or "the bloody 
flux," decimated the garrison still further. No sooner had
53 Thomas Lloyd to James Burd, July 26, 1757, Thomas Lloyd 
to James Burd, April 14, 1759, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, 
Vols. 3 & 4; William Parsons to Conrad Weiser, March 26, 1757, 
Samuel Weiser to Conrad Weiser, April 1, 1759, H.S.P., Conrad 
Weiser Papers, 2:47, 151.
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the men begun to recover from dysentery than smallpox broke 
out.54
Illness was not restricted to Fort Augusta. In the fall 
of 1757 John Armstrong reported that his troops in Carlisle 
were ill and that he had "lost some good Men, [and] Many are 
sickly." During Forbes' Campaign dysentery was rife in the 
posts on the route to Fort Duquesne. Smallpox also attacked 
the army. There were other diseases that concerned the 
commanders. Forbes ordered that "Any woman suspected to be 
infected with the Venial Destemper to be sent to the Hospital 
to be examind & those who are found disorderd are either to be 
kept in the Hospital till Cur'd or Turnd out of Camp."55
To reduce the threat of disease the officers made great 
efforts to encourage cleanliness in the camps, but to little 
effect. The men were reluctant to shave and keep clean and 
had to be ordered to wash themselves and their clothes. When 
they did wash, it was in the same springs and streams from
54 Shippen reported to his father that he had taken "a few 
doses of the Bark" to recover, suggesting that he was taking 
quinine and the disease was malaria. Edward Shippen to Joseph 
Shippen, February 19, 1757, Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, 
August 10, 1757, James Young to James Burd, October 3, 1757, 
Thomas Lloyd to James Burd, October 8, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen 
Family Papers, Vols. 2-3; Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, 
August 23, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Military 
Letter Book of Joseph Shippen 1756-1758, ff.76-78.
55 John Armstrong to James Burd, September 13, 1757,
Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, August 15, 1758, H.S.P.,
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; Francis Halkett to George 
Washington, August 2, 1758, Henry Bouquet to George
Washington, August 10, 1758, "Orderly Book," October 4, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:362, 384-386, 6:60.
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which the drinking water was taken. Such behavior forced 
Forbes to issue standing orders that "Cleanliness in Camp is 
particularly to be taken Care of, by sweeping the Streets and 
Communications twice a day." Sweeping the streets was
especially important as the street cleaners had to ensure 
"that the Camp is kept clean & free off all Dead Carcasses & 
Deseased Horses." But the refuse exuded by the army was still 
so great that the army attracted packs of wild dogs, forcing 
Bouquet to issue orders that each camp's provost should track 
and kill all the stray dogs that he could find.56
The greatest source of disease, however, was the 
excrement of the troops themselves. Provincial troops, unused 
to military necessity, were reluctant to use the "necessary 
houses." Bouquet issued standing orders that "No Man [should] 
presume to ease himself any where near the Camp, but in the 
House of Office." James Burd reissued the order the
following year to the Pennsylvania Regiment, adding that "The 
Sentries [are] to call upon the Guard[,] who is to Confine 
those the[y] See Disobeying this Orders."57
56 Orderly Book of Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company, 
September 30, 1759, Cumberland County Historical Society, 
9:22; Henry Bouquet Orderly Book, July 3, 1758, Kent, ed., The 
Papers of Henry Bouquet, 2:662; Orders, Carlisle, July 5, 
1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Orderly Book of Joseph 
Shippen's Company, 1758; George Washington's Orderly Book, 
September 22, 1758, November 24, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., 
The Papers of George Washington, 6:32, 156-157.
57 Henry Bouquet Orderly Book, July 11, August 1, 1758, 
Kent, ed., The Papers of Henry Bouquet, 2:664, 669; Orders, 
Carlisle, July 5, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Orderly
(continued...)
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Even when the men used the necessary houses, there were 
problems because they were built too close to the camp and 
were allowed to overflow. In 1759 Burd issued explicit 
orders that the necessary houses must be built at least one 
hundred yards from the camp, and threatened to court-martial 
any officer who should disobey the orders.58
Racked by disease and hunger, often without pay and 
adequate clothing, the lot of the provincial soldiers was 
miserable. However, their misbehavior cannot be attributed to 
their sufferings alone. The provincial forces of
Massachusetts suffered similar hardships during the war yet 
their behavior was remarkably different.59
Washington attributed the disorderliness of the 
Virginians to the lack of punishment for insubordination. He 
complained that the lenity of the laws punishing deserters 
resulted in the "growing Insolence of the Soldiers, the 
Indolence and Inactivity of the Officers, who are all sensible 
how confin'd their punishments are, in regard to what they 
ought to be." He was particularly dismayed by the refusal of
57 (... continued)
Book of Joseph Shippen's Company, 1758; Orders, July 2, 1759, 
Orderly Book of Capt. Thomas Hamilton's Co. 9-22, Cumberland 
County Historical Society, Carlisle.
58 Orders, Carlisle, July 5, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family 
Papers: Orderly Book of Joseph Shippen's Company, 1758; 
Orders, July 2, 1759, Orderly Book of Capt. Thomas Hamilton's 
Company, Cumberland County Historical Society, 9:22.
59 Fred Anderson portrays the Massachusetts provincial 
forces as generally submissive and orderly. Anderson, A 
People's Army, pp.65-110.
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the House of Burgesses to grant him power to execute deserters 
and mutineers and expressed surprise "that we alone shou'd be 
so tenacious of Liberty as not to invest a power, where 
Interest, and Politicks so unanswerably demand it."60
Washington's claim that it was the lack of penalties 
which encouraged insubordination is difficult to substantiate, 
especially since he had power during much of the war to 
execute troops when necessary. The Massachusetts assembly 
refused to give officers that power. Generally, the
punishments inflicted on Massachusetts forces were very
lenient. The most common punishment was a public whipping 
which never exceeded thirty lashes. Other offenders were 
forced to straddle "the wooden horse," two planks of wood 
nailed together in an inverted " v ." 61 Compared with these 
punishments, those imposed on Virginian and Pennsylvanian
troops were severe.
The penalty for desertion was execution by firing squad. 
However, in July 1757 in an attempt to halt the mass
desertions from the provincial forces, Washington chose to 
hang some of the deserters on a forty-foot-high gallows in the 
camp at Winchester because "it conveyed much more terror to 
others; and it was for example sake, we did it." Even the
60 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, 
George Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, July 10, 1757, July 
11, 1757, George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, 
Abbot and Tvrohig, The Papers of George Washington, 2:102-103, 
4:291-292, 295-297, 306-307.
61 Anderson, A People's Army pp. 127-128.
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Pennsylvanian authorities resorted to hanging deserters as a 
deterrent.62
Troops were also executed for other offenses. In 1756 
Washington had Sergeant Nathan Lewis executed in front of the 
Virginia Regiment for cowardice when he retreated his men 
during a skirmish with Indian raiders. Washington 
purposefully delayed his execution until the new recruits had 
arrived in the camp so that he could make Lewis "a publick 
Example to deterr others from such like Offenses."63
Only a few of the many deserters were finally executed, 
but those who had their sentences commuted were still severely 
punished. Adam Stephen apprehended two men attempting to 
desert in July 1756. He "wheal'd them 'till they pissd 
themselves and the Spectators Shed tears for them— which will 
I hope answer the End of punishment." Many of the deserters 
in the summer of 1757 were likewise punished with sentences 
typically of several hundred lashes and even over a thousand. 
During the months when the House of Burgesses refused to grant
62 George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757,
General Court Martial, July 25-26, 1757, George Washington to 
Governor Dinwiddie, August 3, 1757, "Orderly Book," September 
24, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George
Washington, 4:306-307, 329-334, 360, 6:36; Orderly Book of 
Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company, July 19, 1759, Cumberland 
County Historical Society, 9:22.
63 Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, May 8, 1756,
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:407; 
"Court Martial," May 3, 1756, George Washington to Gov.
Dinwiddie, May 3, 1756, "After Orders," May 18, 1756, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:77-79, 
84, 154.
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Washington the power of execution, he still harshly punished 
the troops. A court martial in the summer of 1756 gave 
deserters punishments ranging from 250 to 1,000 lashes. 
Washington ordered that they should in one beating "receive as 
much of their punishment as the Surgeon (who must attend upon 
this occasion) shall judge they are able to bear."64
For lesser crimes punishments were also severe. During 
Forbes' campaign a court martial sentenced several 
Pennsylvania troops, who had refused to continue building 
Forbes' road until they received their pay and more food, to 
between 600 and 1,000 lashes. For leaving the camp without 
permission and for selling regimental supplies soldiers 
received between 500 and 1,000 lashes. For insolence to a 
senior officer men received 100 lashes.65
It was not the lack of punishments that caused provincial 
troops to behave so defiantly. Anderson argues that the 
leadership capabilities of the Massachusetts officers 
determined the manner in which they associated with their men. 
In particular, the sharing of the hardships and deprivations
64 Orders, [July 6, 7, 8, 1756), Adam Stephen to George 
Washington, July 25, 1756, "Court Martial," June 19, 1757, 
"General Court Martial," July 25-26, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:238-241, 294, 4:230- 
231, 329-334.
65 Proceedings of Court Martial at Raystown, August 30, 
1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; "Orders," August 
1, 1756, "Court Martial," June 19, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:305, 4:230-231.
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experienced by the men gave a sense of common cause.66 In 
Virginia and Pennsylvania this was not the case. The Virginia 
and Pennsylvania officers were reluctant to lower their style 
of living. Washington complained that despite the shortages 
of supplies it was impossible to get officers to restrict 
their consumption. The most notorious case was that of 
William Clapham, the commander at Fort Augusta. Edward 
Shippen described dinner with him: "we generally had choice 
Beef, both Roast & Boiled. . . We had Good Table Beer et une 
boteille ou deux d'excellent Vin." After dinner "the 
Collo[nel] ordered three Musicians (his own Soldiers) to stand 
under a Tree at a Proper Distance & Play us a few Tunes on the 
Claronette, Violin and Fife." This excess occurred at the 
same time that many of the men in the fort were going hungry 
because of a shortage of supplies67
Officers were reluctant to restrict their consumption 
because they were exceptionally conscious of their social 
status. Virginia gentlemen besieged Washington with requests 
for commissions in the regiment. Many gentlemen even 
complained that they did not have the rank they believed they 
deserved, causing Dinwiddie to remind them that were they in 
the British army they "might have served twenty Years 
before. . . [they] had a Co[mpan]y, and then, with a large
66 Anderson, A People's Army, pp. 161-164.
67 Edward Shippen to William Peters, July 22, 1756, 
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
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Purchase." As a result of this pressure for commissions, the 
Virginia Regiment was top-heavy in officers. The regiment was 
initially divided into seventeen companies, each with a 
captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign, as in the regular 
service. If the regiment had achieved full-strength, each 
company would have contained only about sixty men, whereas a 
British company typically numbered around one hundred. 
Because of slow recruitment, the companies had even fewer men 
compared with the number of officers. As the expenses of the 
war mounted, some Virginians began to raise "Great 
Clamours. . . ag'st the many officers in Commiss/n to command 
so few Men."68
In May 1757 the House of Burgesses intervened. "Having 
consider'd the great Expence the Virg'a Regim't has cost the 
Country from the No. of Companys it has consisted of, and 
those Companys not half compleat in proportion to the vast 
Charges of Officers," the House reduced the number of 
companies to seven. This reduction forced several officers to 
resign their commissions to avoid the insult of demotion and 
deeply embittered many of them. William Peachey, who resigned
68 Anthony Strother to George Washington, July 9, 1755, 
Landon Carter to George Washington, September 25, 1755, Landon 
Carter to George Washington, February 26, 1756, "Orders," July 
12, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George
Washington, 1:333, 2:61, 3:251-253, 319; Gov. Dinwiddie to 
Adam Stephen. January 1, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Captain
Mercer, January 15, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, 
December 14, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington,
January 26, 1757, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert 
Dinwiddie, 1:446, 462-463, 2:291-292.
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his commission, commented that to serve in the regiment "a Man 
must either push himself into the jaws of Death, & that too 
without the least hopes of Redemption, or be subject to the 
Calumnious Tongues of a Sett of base Traducers. "69
Because of their sensibility of rank, officers were very 
reluctant to submit to any order which could be construed as 
inappropriate, and disputes over command were frequent. 
Washington complained in 1757 that if an officer was not 
consulted "he takes huff[,] thinks his wisdom and merit 
affronted, and so Marches off in high Indignation, and great 
contempt of every Social Law." James Burd likewise complained 
about the "paultry Behaviour of some of the Officers" of the 
Pennsylvania Regiment. He added that "I can't help taking 
notice that their Self Sufficient Opinion of themselves only 
tends to expose their Folly, and it is with Regret that I see 
them too wise to be taught."70
In August 1758 at Fort Augusta Captain Humphries refused 
to take orders from Captain Thomas Lloyd, claiming he would 
only take orders directly from Colonel Conrad Weiser.
69 Gov. Dinwiddle's Instructions to George Washington, May 
16, 1757, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert 
Dinwiddie, 2:622; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 24, 
1757, William Peachey to George Washington, November 14, 1757, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:162, 5:54.
70 George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 
1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:87; James Burd to John Armstrong, September 6, 1758, H.S.P., 
Shippen Papers, Letter Book of Col. James Burd, 1756-1758, 
ff.176-178.
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Humphries had no argument with Lloyd's orders, but felt 
insulted to accept orders from another captain. Humphries 
informed Lloyd, in front of the entire garrison, that he would 
rather be arrested than submit to Lloyd's orders. For his 
part, Lloyd felt that Humphries had publicly humiliated him 
and promptly resigned his commission.71
The most infamous dispute was over Colonel William
Clapham and paralyzed Fort Augusta. Clapham was a skilled
military tactician. Edward Shippen described him as "a
sensible Man, with the most knowledge f i t  Experience in the
Indian Manner of Fighting of any Man in America." After he
left Pennsylvania his military acumen was sufficiently
respected that Lord Loudoun offered him the command of Fort
William Henry.72 Despite his military skills, many of the
officers felt that Clapham came from too low a social rank to
hold command. A year after he had praised Clapham's military
skill Edward Shippen commented
It was always my opinion that if a Man had the 
natural of an Indian or a negroe Prince & their 
Education, nay were he ever so famous a General 
among them; nay until he changed his manners & 
Savage nature and became like one of us, & had the 
advantage of keeping Gentlemen's Company, I say 
unless those changes had been wrought in him he was
71 Thomas Lloyd to Col. Burd, August 31, 1758, 
Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen Thompson Family 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.
72 Edward Shippen Jr. to Edward Shippen Sr., April 8, 
1756, Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, January 19, 1757,
Edward Shippen to Joseph Shippen, April 5, 1757, H.S.P.,
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
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as fit to command a Battalion belonging to the King
of England as Shingas or Jacobs were.
Shippen continued complaining that Clapham was "like all 
your low life upstarts." He added "its well for him that he 
never understood Latin, Greek and French." Such knowledge 
would only have made matters worse as he had never been "at 
the University of good manners, and afterwards initiated into 
the Company of Gentlemen of great politeness." Shippen's 
comments were typical of many made by Clapham's fellow 
officers and subordinates. The pressure upon Clapham was so 
great that it forced him to resign his commission in March 
1757 ,74
A similar dispute occurred in Virginia in 1758 when the 
officers at Winchester refused to rank with Lieutenant 
Steenbergen, feeling that he had lowered his social status by 
engaging in various business activities "below the Dignity of 
an Officer," and "sufficient to give the whole Corps, the most 
indifferent opinion of his morals." His heinous activities 
included acting as deputy-commissary and keeping a "Sutteling 
Shop." When challenged by his fellow officers, Steenbergen 
"made answer that he made more money by doing so than by his
73 Edward Shippen to James Burd, March 26, 1757, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
74 Edward Shippen to Joseph, April 5, 1757, Joseph Shippen 
to Edward Shippen, April 23, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family 
Papers, Vol. 2.
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Commission, & that he would take the first opportunity of 
throwing it up.1,75
Steenbergen's behavior was not unusual. While some 
officers saw their commissions as a means of gaining social 
status, others saw them as an opportunity for personal profit. 
Lieutenant Mercer in Captain Stewart's Company made money by 
selling horses to his men at a substantial profit. Many of 
the officers embezzled the funds the colony provided them for 
recruiting. Even Andrew Lewis and Conrad Weiser profited from 
the service. Lewis arranged for the wagons carrying 
Virginia's gifts for the Cherokees to stop at his plantation 
to carry his own provisions and trade goods, while Weiser was 
accused of misappropriating provincial supplies and selling 
them to his men. Even George Washington benefitted from the 
two percent commission he collected on regimental funds that 
passed through his hands.76
The cohesion and esteem of the officer corps was further 
undermined by disputes among officers and between different 
colonial forces. The Virginia militia and regular forces
75 Court of Inquiry, May 4-8, 1758, George Washington to 
John Blair, May 28, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 5:162-163, 199-203.
76 Gov. Dinwiddie to Hugh Rose, June 16, 1755, Gov.
Dinwiddie to Robert Stewart, July 4, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to 
Andrew Lewis, June, 1756, Brock, ed., The Official Records of 
Robert Dinwiddie, 2:66, 81, 262; "Memorandum from Committee to 
Supervise Military Expenditures," November 8-11, 1755,
"Orders," January 9, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 2:163-164, 262, 4:251fn. Richard Peters 
to Conrad Weiser, November 9, 1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser 
Papers, 2:101.
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detested each other. The militia felt that the regiment was 
a collection of debauched scoundrels. In May 1756, when the 
militia from the Piedmont were mustered in Winchester, they 
"made use of every mean's to treat not only the Private 
Soldiers but the Officer's of the Virga Regt ill." Washington 
ordered one of the militia arrested and held in the guardhouse 
overnight for his behavior. But the militia officers gathered 
their men, attacked the guardhouse, and released the 
prisoner.77
The men in the Virginia Rangers also detested the 
Virginia Regiment, while the regimental troops looked down on 
the rangers. On several occasions Washington found it 
necessary to guarantee that he would not incorporate the 
ranger companies into the regiment. In 1758 Robert Stewart, 
a captain in the regiment, received information that 
Washington might reassign him as captain of a ranger company. 
He beseeched Washington that "the very name of Ranger is 
horrible, its Duty if well executed insupportable by at least 
9/10ths of the Human Species, it's nature inconsistent with 
order & Discipline."78
77 George Washington to John Robinson, April 16, c.April 
18, 1756, John Robinson to George Washington, April 17, 1756, 
"Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 8, 1756, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:6-8, 12, 15- 
17, 99.
78 Andrew Lewis to William Preston, November 19, 1757, 
Draper Mss.: William Preston Papers, 1QQ:164; George
Washington to Robert Stewart, December 17, 1756, Robert
Stewart to George Washington, November 24, 1757, December 12,
(continued...)
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Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania there were similar tensions. 
In November 1757 in Reading there was a skirmish between some 
of the local volunteers and the regular troops of the 
Pennsylvania Regiment in which several men were wounded. 
There were also ethnic tensions between the different units, 
the Germans and Irish, in particular, detesting one another.79
Different companies within the same regiment also 
bickered with one another. In January 1757 there was a bitter 
dispute at Fort Allen between Captain Orndt's company and 
Captain Reynolds7 company. Weiser had transferred Orndt7s 
company from Fort Norris. Upon their arrival at Fort Allen 
they were horrified to find that Reynolds7 men had not kept 
the post orderly. They complained that it was "something 
nasty, at least not so clean as they used to keep." For their 
part, Reynolds7 men "were very angry at being. . . [addressed] 
as a Company [of] Dirty Idle [fellows]." The ill-feeling 
between the two companies was so great that it forced Weiser 
to transfer Reynolds7 men out of the fort and replace them 
with another company.80
78(. . .continued)
1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 4:61, 5:58, 6:169.
79 Many Pennsylvania units consisted of men primarily of 
one ethnic background. Conrad Weiser to Governor Denny, 
November 10, 1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:103; Conrad 
Weiser to James Burd, June 7, 1757, Joseph Shippen to James 
Burd, June 7, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
80 William Parsons to Conrad Weiser, January 28, 1757, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:30.
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The different colonial forces also bickered with each 
other. At Fort Frederick, Maryland, the officers of the 
Virginia and Maryland forces disputed the command of the post. 
At Fort Cumberland, from the fall of 1755 to the spring of 
1756, the disputes were even more intense. The fort was 
located on the Potomac River in Maryland, and several of the 
Maryland officers had received commissions in independent 
companies from the Crown. The Maryland officers therefore 
claimed that they had precedence over the Virginia Officers 
and asserted that they had the right to consume Virginia's 
stores and supplies as they saw fit. However, over three 
quarters of the forces in the fort were from Virginia, which 
had constructed and supplied the fort as well. The Virginia 
officers refused to cooperate and countermanded the orders of 
the Maryland officers. At the height of the enemy assault, 
internal bickering paralysed this key frontier post.81
There were also bitter disputes between the officers of 
the British regular forces and the provincial officers. Henry 
Bouquet described the provincial officers as "without 
knowledge & Experiences. . . They are all a cruel Incumbrance 
upon us." Provincial officers constantly sniped at Bouquet
81 Adam Stephen to George 'Washington, May 19, 1756, George 
Washington to Joshua Beall, November 1, 1757, Abbot and
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:165-166, 
5:37-38.
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and complained of the haughty and imperious behavior of the 
British officers.82
The behavior of the Virginia and Pennsylvania officers 
contrasted sharply with that of the Massachusetts officers. 
This may explain in part the great differences in the behavior 
of the forces. The most important influence on the behavior 
of the forces was not the difference in their treatment or 
their commanders, but rather the different composition of the 
forces.
Anderson maintains that the Massachusetts forces were a 
mirror of provincial society, composed largely of the sons of 
farmers awaiting their "portions" when their father's e ate 
was divided at his death or when old age forced him to rely on 
his children for support. Until they received their portion, 
and after that if they were younger sons and received only a 
small portion, Massachusetts men had insufficient funds to 
establish an independent household. These men joined the 
Massachusetts forces to accumulate a lump sum with which to 
begin their independent lives. The men who joined the 
Massachusetts forces were typically young. Although they 
represented what was in some ways a "surplus population," they 
were not permanently poor, or permanently in surplus supply, 
and were not part of an "agricultural proletariat."83
82 Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, August 30, 1758, Henry 
Bouquet to John Forbes, October 28, 1758, Kent, ed., The 
Papers of Henry Bouquet, 2:450, 588-589.
83 Anderson, A People's Army, pp.33-35, 38.
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Virginia and Pennsylvania forces, by comparison, 
represented, rather more the permanently poor and surplus 
population of their societies. Virginia recruited convicts, 
deserters, and vagrants. Pennsylvania recruited indentured 
servants. Part of the reason for the difference in the 
composition of the forces lies in the different opportunities 
that the army offered. In Massachusetts, joining the 
provincial forces was, in Anderson's words, "a reasonably 
lucrative proposition, providing cash income to hasten. . . 
[the] attainment of independence.1,84 The war in Massachusetts 
depressed the economy, as the embargo on trade reduced the 
demand for seamen and laborers. As the fighting occurred far 
from the colony's soil, the army's demands for labor and 
supplies had a limited effect on the colony's economy. With 
few prospects at home, Massachusetts men viewed a term in the 
provincial forces as attractive. They could expect to serve 
for one campaign, (about eight months,) receive a generous 
bounty upon enlistment which would provide for them during the 
campaign, and then at the end of the campaign receive their 
pay, which averaged El 12s per month, giving them a sum of 
around £8 with which to return home.85
In Pennsylvania and Virginia joining the provincial 
forces was far less attractive. While the pay of the troops
84 Ibid., p. 39. See Appendix I.
85 Unlike the Virginia and Pennsylvania troops the 
Massachusetts forces generally received their pay in a timely 
fashion. Anderson, A People's Army, p.67.
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was comparable to Massachusetts— Pennsylvania privates 
received £2 per month86 and Virginia privates about £1—  
Virginia and Pennsylvania troops received smaller bounties, 
had to pay for their uniforms, received their pay monthly (at 
least in theory,) and tended to fritter their pay away on 
liquor and gambling. As a result they could not expect to 
leave the army with a large lump sum. Still more important, 
in Virginia and Pennsylvania men enlisted for at least one 
year, and from 1756 onward in both colonies men enlisted for 
at least three years.87
In Virginia and Pennsylvania the war also opened new 
opportunities. The army demanded labor and supplies which 
could be met by an enterprising civilian. The raids drove 
settlers from large tracts of desirable cleared land, which 
could be available for a brave man who was prepared to risk 
the raids. The availability of land in these two colonies 
also meant that there was not the large number of young men 
awaiting their fathers' demise. Young adult males enjoyed
86 Initially Pennsylvania privates received only 3s per 
month. Orders & Instructions to James Burd, January 17, 1756, 
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 7:448.
87 Gov. Dinwiddie to Gen Shirley, April 28, 1756, Gov. 
Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 19, 1756, Brock, ed., 
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:395, 481; Joseph 
Shippen to James Burd, May 19, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family 
Papers, Vol. 2.
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more opportunity on the frontier., and the provincial service 
was only one, rather unattractive option.88
There were other important differences in the composition 
of the forces. Virginia and Pennsylvania troops tended to be 
older than their Massachusetts counterparts; the Virginia and 
Pennsylvania forces lacked the higher proportion of young men 
aged sixteen to twenty who joined the Massachusetts forces. 
Virginia and Pennsylvania troops also lacked ties to the 
colony. Whereas half the Virginia forces, and three-quarters 
of the Pennsylvania forces, had been born in Europe, eight out 
of ten troops in the Massachusetts forces had been born in 
Massachusetts. These ties of origin were further strengthened 
because most of the Massachusetts troops in each regiment came 
from a relatively small area, just one or two counties. 
Massachusetts troops knew one another before recruitment, and 
such ties played an important role in the recruiting process 
in Massachusetts. Virginia and Pennsylvania forces were 
recruited from all over the colony and from neighboring 
colonies, and the troops were more likely to be strangers to 
one another.89
88 See Chapter VIII for more detail on the opportunities 
offered by the Seven Years' War.
89 Anderson, A People's Army, p.239. See Appendix I. For 
a fuller discussion of the composition of the Virginia forces 
see John Ferling, "Soldiers for Virginia: Who Served in the 
French and Indian War?" Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography, 94 (1986) 307-328; James Titus, The Old Dominion at 
War: Society, Politics and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia, 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), pp.
(continued...)
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The Massachusetts forces represented the communities they 
came from, and the ties of kinship and authority in those 
communities were transferred to the army. This characteristic 
was not the case in the Virginia and Pennsylvania forces. 
Their composition was not likely to enhance respect for the 
social order and the social hierarchy. The elements of 
Virginia and Pennsylvania society which were transferred to 
the army were themselves the source of much of the discontent. 
Virginia and Pennsylvania troops brought with them a sense of 
independence and disregard for hierarchy which characterized 
backcountry society. This attitude was hardly a basis upon 
which to build military discipline.
As a military struggle, the Seven Years' War on the 
Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier was a disaster for the 
British colonial and imperial authorities. Regular and 
provincial troops and the colonial militia proved themselves 
singularly inept at waging war in the forests and mountains of 
North America. However, the failure of the war effort cannot 
be blamed entirely on the shortcomings of the military forces: 
the colonists themselves contributed to the failure by their 
refusal to cooperate with the war effort.
89(.. .continued)
78-88. Ferling argues strongly that the Virginia Regiment was 
"far more representative of the colony's society than 
historians hitherto have realized." Titus, on the other hand, 
maintains that the troops in the regiment "fell outside the 
mainstream of Virginia Society."
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"Discontent, Dissatisfaction, and Clamours of All Ranks": 
The War and Frontier Society
If the Fate of our Country be approaching, and this favourable 
Spot of the Globe, this Land of Plenty and Liberty, shall 
become a conquered enslaved Province of France, and the Range 
of the Indian Savages, it will be principally owing to the 
Security or Cowardice of its present Inhabitants.
—  "The Virginia Centinel" 17561
The Seven Years' War was a catastrophe for many of the 
settlers of the Virginia and Pennsylvania backcountry. In the 
spring of 1756 Governor Morris wrote despairingly to Sir 
William Johnson, "You cannot conceive what Havock has been 
made by the Enemy. . . nor what Numbers of Murders they have 
committed; what a vast Tract of Territory they have laid 
waste, and what a Multitude of Inhabitants. . . they have
carried into Captivity."2
Over two thousand British subjects, civilian and 
military, died on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier 
between 1754 and 1758. The raiders killed almost 1,500 
settlers. Frederick, Hampshire, and Cumberland counties were 
particularly hard hit, but the raiders penetrated everywhere 
deep into the backcountry of both Virginia and Pennsylvania.
1 Maryland Gazette, August 12, 1756.
2 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:97.
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In Virginia, raiders attacked Bedford, Halifax, and Albemarle 
counties, while in Pennsylvania they attacked almost as far 
into the settled parts of the colony as Reading, only forty 
miles from Philadelphia. Besides civilian casualties, the 
French and their Indian allies killed about six hundred 
soldiers, both provincials and regulars.3
The raids also devastated a huge swath of countryside. 
George Washington reported in the fall of 1756 that "the 
ruinous state of the frontiers, and the vast extent of land we 
have lost. . . must appear incredible to those who are not 
eye-witnesses of the desolation. Upwards of fifty miles of a 
rich and (once) thick settled country is now quite deserted & 
abandoned." Adam Stephen reported that around Fort Cumberland 
"The Smouk of the Burning Plantations darken the day, and hide 
the neighbouring mountains from our Sight."4
3 See Appendix II for details. Accounts record slightly 
over 1,200 deaths resulting from raiding parties. In clashes 
involving regular forces thirty persons were killed and 
seventy wounded at Fort Necessity; about 300 men were killed 
in Braddock's defeat and 300 wounded; twenty officers and 271 
men were killed or captured at Grant's defeat outside Fort 
Duquesne; 67 men were killed in the French raid on Loyalhanna 
in 1758; "Account by George Washington and James Mackay of the 
Capitulation of Fort Necessity," July 19, 1754, George
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 18, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 1:160, 340; List of 
Killed and Wounded at Fort Duquesne, September 14, 1758,
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Military Notebook No. 7.;
James Burd to Sarah Burd, October 14, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen 
Family Papers, Vol. 3.
4 Adam Stephen to George Washington, October 4, 1755, 
George Washington to John Robinson, November 9, 1756, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:72, 4:16- 
17.
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The raiders plundered most of the plantations they 
attacked, seizing food, guns, ammunition, and valuables before 
setting fire to the buildings. They often returned to the 
Ohio or Susquehanna with the settlers' cattle and horses, 
having killed those they could not capture. In a typical raid 
on Cumberland County and along the Potomac River in April 
1756, the French reported that "all the oxen and cows having 
been collected together were killed; a hundred and twenty 
horses. . . served to carry the large quantity of plunder the 
Indians got, and in returning they set fire to all the 
settlements they had left." Virginians reported that the Ohio 
Indians drove away over five hundred cattle after a raid on 
the Greenbrier River in Virginia in the fall of 1755.5
The greatest fear of most of the backcountry inhabitants 
was capture by the Indians. They had good reason, for enemy 
Indians captured nearly one thousand prisoners on the 
frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania.6 The captives lived 
throughout the Ohio and Susquehanna valleys, Iroquoia, and 
much of the Great Lakes region. In 1756 Governor Morris 
maintained that there were British prisoners in all the Indian 
towns from the Delaware to the Ohio. All British prisoners
5 "Abstract of Despatches from Canada," June 4, 1756,
"Abstract of Despatches from America, August 30, 1756,"
Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
New York, 10:408, 486-487; Pennsylvania Gazette, July 31,
1755, March 11, 1756; Gov. Morris letter, September 1756,
H.S.P., Gratz Collection, 15:18; Virginia Gazette, September 
19, 1755.
6 See Appendix C.
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who returned to their homes reported that they had encountered 
many other prisoners during their captivity. John Baker, who 
escaped from Kitanning, estimated that the Indians held over 
one hundred prisoners in that town. In the wake of the 
"Articles of Agreement" concluded between the British and the 
Ohio tribes at Fort Pitt in 1764, the Shawnees and Ohio 
Delawares alone handed over 260 captives to Henry Bouquet in 
six months. Other Indian groups returned large numbers of 
captives at Easton from 1757 onward, and at various times at 
Albany, Fort Niagara, and Detroit, while throughout the war 
the French routinely returned small numbers of captives whom 
they had purchased from the Indians.7
The colonists had lurid notions of what would happen to 
them if captured, particularly what would happen to any woman 
whom the Indians captured. James Burd related that "they put 
their Prisoners to Death in a most unhuman Manner." Adam 
Stephen maintained that the Indians "Spare the Lives of Young 
Women, and Carry them away to gratify the Brutal passions of 
Lawless Savages."8
7 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:97-98; "Examination 
of John Baker," March 31, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian 
Affairs, 2:78; William S. Ewing, "Indian Captives Released by 
Colonel Bouquet," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 
(1956) 39:187-201.
8 James Burd letter, December 20, 1756, P.S.A., Edward 
Shippen Thompson Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 3; Adam Stephen 
to George Washington, October 4, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., 
The Papers of George Washington, 2:72.
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While the frontier settlers had reason to fear captivity 
based on the number of captives, their notion of what they 
would experience after capture was grossly distorted. The 
Indians sought prisoners primarily for adoption into their 
tribes and treated their prisoners well. As a result of this 
motivation, most of the captives were women and children, 
particularly children, whom the Indians felt could be most 
easily integrated into their tribes.9
When seeking prisoners and booty the raiders sought 
lightly guarded plantations where there were many women and 
children. Any "battle" was typically short. The raiders 
attempted to surprise the guards before descending on the 
plantation itself. There they quickly seized prisoners and 
plunder, and retreated swiftly before a rescue party could 
intercept them. Sometimes the raiders were in such haste to 
evade pursuers that they retreated without stopping for food 
or water until nightfall.10
9 The treatment of captives is not surprising. Despite 
the popular view of the horrors of captivity and brutality of 
Indian ritualistic torture, historians have long realized the 
fallacy of this view. For a more detailed discussion of the 
treatment of Indian captives see James Axtell, The European 
and the Indian, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1981), 
pp.168-200, and The Invasion Within, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), pp.302-327. Between 1754 and 1758 
there are reports of the raiders taking 755 captives. Of 
those the sex and age is known for 457. Of these 250 were 
children, 118 men, and 89 women. However, from contemporary 
accounts the percentage of women was probably much higher. See 
Appendix II.
10 James E. Seaver, A Narrative of the Life of Mrs Mary 
Jemison, (Canandaigua, N.Y.: J.D. Bemis and Co., 1824), pp.25- 
26.
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The primary goal of the raiders was to escape 
interception. If threatened by a party attempting to rescue 
the captives, the raiders did anything necessary to escape. 
If a captive had suffered wounds and could not travel, the 
Indians might kill him or her. Abraham Miller, captured in 
May 1757 on the Northampton County frontier, described how his 
captors killed his mother and a girl with him because of their 
wounds. Under other circumstances it was highly unusual for 
the Indians to kill women and children. Thus, it is ironic 
that women and children were in the greatest danger of losing 
their lives when parties set out to rescue them."
If any men were disruptive and refused to comply with 
their captors' wishes, the Indians might also kill them as 
they fled. During flight any killing was generally quick and 
without torture. William Flemming described how, after his 
capture Captain Jacobs, the leader of the raiding party, 
informed him that he "looked young and lusty, [and] they would 
not hurt me, provided I was willing to go with them." When 
ordered to do various tasks, Fleming did them with "my usual 
submission." Flemming was treated well, but not long after 
they had captured him the Indians captured another young man
11 Conrad Weiser described how a detachment he had sent 
out to intercept a raiding party discovered the bodies of some 
women and children just as they thought they were close to 
reaching the party. Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 
18, 1755, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:60; "Depositions of 
those who had been taken prisoners by the Indians," June 20, 
1757, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous
Papers, 1:253; Pennsylvania Gazette, June 30, 1757, December 
22, 1757.
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from a neighboring plantation. He was rather less compliant 
and shortly the Indians killed him "with several tomahawk 
blows."12
When the captors finally halted, they bound their 
prisoners and often forced them to strip, making any attempt 
to escape more difficult. After John Craig's capture, the 
Indians "immediately stripped him[,] tied a Rope around his 
Neck and drove him before them." When the raiding party 
finally stopped, for the night they frequently tied the 
prisoners to trees to prevent escape. Craig reported that 
when they stopped at night the prisoners "were stripp'd stark 
naked and their Limbs stretched out to the utmost Extent and 
tied to a Post and Trees." En route to the Ohio, Christian 
Post came across "poles, painted red. . . stuck in the ground 
by Indians, to which they tye the prisoners when they stop at 
night in their return from their incursions."13
After a few days several raiding parties assembled at a 
prearranged location. There they divided the prisoners and 
booty between the different groups. At this point the raiders 
might kill and ceremonially torture some of the captives, 
particularly soldiers in the provincial forces or the British
12 Maryland Gazette, April 1, 1756.
13 Craig was captured in 1756 near McDowell's Mill, 
"Deposition of John Craig," March 30, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 2:78; "Deposition of George Hutchinson," 
November 15, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward 
Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 17) 2:728-730; "Post's Journal," 
Thwaites ed., Early Western Travels, 1:190.
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army. Peter Lewney described how his captors tortured one of 
the Virginia rangers they had captured. "They roasted [him] 
alive and tormented [him] for a whole Night before he expired, 
cutting pieces of Flesh off of his Body, and eating it."14
When the party neared the home town of the raiders the 
captives were, as was traditional in many Indian societies, be 
whipped and had to "run the gauntlet" before their adoption 
into the tribe. At this point, other male captives, again 
normally captured soldiers, might be ceremonially tortured and 
killed. John Cox reported that during his captivity at 
Kitanning Shingas and Captain Jacobs had returned with several 
prisoners. They "made an example" of one of the prisoners. 
Calling "all the Prisoners to be Witnesses to this Scene," 
they beat him "for half an hour with Clubs and Tomahawks, and 
afterwards fastening him to a Post, cropt his Ears close to 
his Head; after which an Indian chopt off his Fingers, and 
another, with a red hot iron, burnt him all over his Belly." 
Eventually they "Shot him full of Arrows, and at last killed 
and scalped him."15
14 Lewney continued that he had been very well treated by 
his captors. "Deposition of John Craig," March 30, 1756, 
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; George Mercer to John 
Fenton Mercer, April 15, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 2:354-355; Maryland Gazette, 
September 2, 1756; Pennsylvania Gazette, September 2, 1756. 
Pennsylvania Gazette, July 28, 1757.
15 Maryland Gazette, March 18, October 7, 1756; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, September 9, 1756, October 14, 21, 1756; 
"Deposition of John Craig,: March 30, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 2:78; John Ingles, The Story of Mary Draper
(continued...)
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The Indians generally kept the children they had captured 
and adopted them into their families, but on occasion, sold 
adults, especially any elderly they had taken, to the French. 
The Ohio Indians captured Charles Stewart and his family in 
the Great Cove in Cumberland County in 1755. They took 
Stewart and his family to Kittaning, where they divided the 
prisoners among the various raiding groups. There they 
separated Stewart and his wife from their children. They took 
the two adults to Detroit and sold them to a French 
missionary, who arranged for their transport to France, from 
whence they finally sailed back to Pennsylvania.16
Nearly all the prisoners agreed that they had been well 
treated during their captivity, and most reported that the 
Indians had treated them "very kindly." When Christian Post 
met with the Delaware leaders on the Ohio in 1758, Shingas 
assured him that he "was always very kind to any prisoners 
that were brought in." Others informed Post "when we take any 
prisoners from you, we treat them as our own children. We are
15 (. .. continued)
Ingles and Her Son Thomas Ingles, (Radford, Va: Commonwealth 
Press Incorporated, 1969,) p.10; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 7:241-245. For a more detailed discussion of the 
Shawnees' treatment of captives see James H. Howard, Shawnee! 
The Ceremonialism of a Native Indian Tribe and Its Cultural 
Background, (Athens Oh. : Ohio University Press, 1981), pp.119- 
125.
16 "Examination of John Baker," March 31, 1756, H.S.P., 
Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
December 22, 1757.
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poor, and yet we clothe them as well as we can, though you see 
our children are as naked as at the first."17
The Indians generally adopted the prisoners into their 
families and treated them as full members of the tribe. One 
of the Indian leaders at Detroit adopted Peter Lewney. He 
"was often with them at their Councils with the French, being 
dressed and painted as the Indians were, and not known by the 
French but as an Indian, living in every Respect as they did." 
Many of the captives who escaped were able to do so because 
their captors had treated them as full family members and had 
even provided them with weapons to hunt and allowed them to 
venture out alone.18
Because of the good treatment they received and the great 
length of their captivity, many of the captives came to view 
the Indians as their family and were reluctant to return to 
the British after the war. David Boyd reported that when he 
returned to Virginia and his family he was very unhappy for 
"he had grown fond of the wild and free life of the forest and
17 Examination of Daniel McMullen, September 22, 1756,
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:101; Pennsylvania
Gazette, September 2, 1756, July 28, 1757; Journal of the
Council of Virginia, 6:24; "Narrative of the Captivity of Mrs. 
Jane Frazier," The Garland Library of Narratives of North 
American Captives, (New York, Garland Publishing, 1977), 
109:6; "Post's Journal," Thwaites ed., Early Western Travels, 
1:212, 214.
18 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 28, 1757; "Captivity of
Peter Looney," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 1928- 
1929, 15:95-96; "Examination of John Baker," March 31, 1756, 
H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; Maryland Gazette, 
March 18, 1756; "Examination of John Hochtattler, [May 5?, 
1758,] Kent, ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 1:391-393..
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was greatly dissatisfied by his new surroundings." He 
considered escaping and returning to the Indians and "had to 
be closely guarded for weeks before he relinquished his plan." 
Thomas Ingles, who returned to Virginia after thirteen years 
amongst the Shawnees, "became very restless & uneasy," and 
likewise had to be closely watched. A young girl whom the 
Susquehanna Delawares returned to the British in 1758 "was 
obstinate, [and] would neither tell her name nor Speak a Word, 
and made great resistance to her being delivered up."19
Many others did remain with their captors. Mary Jemison, 
captured in Cumberland County in 1758, remained with the 
Senecas until her death in 1833 even though some of her family 
survived the raid and lived in Virginia. Several captives 
rose to prominence among their adopted tribes. George Brown, 
rose to "become one of the chief Men among the Shawnese" and 
Joshua Renick became a Miami leader.20
Several "captives" actively aided the Indians in their 
struggle against the English, acting as guides for raiding
19 Mrs. Elvert M. Davis, ed., "History of the Capture and 
Captivity of David Boyd from Cumberland County Pennsylvania, 
1756," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 1931, 14:39; 
John Ingles, The Story of Mary Draper Ingles and Her Son 
Thomas Ingles, (Radford, Va: Commonwealth Press Incorporated, 
1969,) p.27; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:147.
20 Harry S. Douglas, "The Immortal Mary Jemison," 
Historical Wyoming, January 1958 9:33-46; Seaver, ed., Life 
of Mary Jemison, p.25; Journal of the Council of Virginia, 
6:25; Chester Raymond Young, "The Effects of the French and 
Indian War on Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of 
Virginia, 1754-1763," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Vanderbilt 
University, 1969, p.13 3.
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parties. William Johnson, captured in Frederick County, 
Maryland in 1754, reported that "several of our late 
Inhabitants who have been taken and carried back associated 
with the Indians, and as often as they make Incursions, come 
down and serve them as Guides."21 On several occasions, 
settlers even reported hearing Indians who were raiding 
speaking in English or German.22
Despite the actual treatment received by captives, the 
fear of capture terrified many backcountry settlers and was 
responsible for much of the panic that settlers felt when they 
heard rumors of nearby raids. A report in December 1755 
maintained that "such shocking Descriptions are given by those 
who have escaped of the horrid Cruelties and indecencies 
committed by those merciless Savages on the Bodies of the 
unhappy wretches who fell into their hands" that reports 
"struck so great a Pannick and Damp upon the Spirits of the 
people, that hitherto they have not been able to make any 
considerable resistance or stand against the Indians."23
Fear of the Indians caused many tens of thousands of 
settlers to flee their homes and seek safety in the east. 
Following Braddock's defeat, frontiersmen complained to the 
Council of Pennsylvania that "their Wives and Children are
21 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:341.
22 Pennsylvania Gazette, January 15, 1756; James Young to 
James Burd, October 3, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, 
Vol. 3.
23 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:767-768.
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terrified to death with every. . . most trifling story, and 
are with difficulty persuaded to stay and do the Duty of their 
Families." Many families quit their homes and headed to the 
east, North Carolina, or New Jersey.24
When raiders struck, hysteria erupted. After the fall of 
Fort Vause in Augusta County in 1756, William Preston lamented 
that "to describe the Confusion and Disorder [of] the Poor 
People. . . is Impossible. . . Mothers with [a] train of
helpless Children at their heels straggling through woods & 
mountains to escape the fury of those merciless savages." 
Throngs of covered wagons, loaded with the belongings of 
families heading for safety, packed the roads. James Maury 
reported in southwestern Virginia that "From the waters of 
Potomac, James River, and Roanoake. . . from the side of the 
Blue Ridge, hundreds of families have, within these few months 
past, removed, deserted their habitations, and conveyed 
themselves and their most valuable movables into other 
governments." He added that "by Bedford Court House, in one 
week. . . near three hundred persons. . . passed on their way 
to Carolina. And I  have it from good authors, that. . . five 
thousand more had crossed [the] James River. . . at Goochland 
Court House." Those fleeing were "not the idler and the
24 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:590; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, August 28, 1755.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
364
vagrant. . . but the honest and industrious, men of worth and 
property.,|25
Not everyone was free to evacuate. The departure of a 
prominent settler's family might prompt a widespread panic. 
James Burd confided to Edward Shippen in August 1755 that he 
was thinking of evacuating his wife and children, but he had 
"been plagued with the Solicitations of the People in this 
County not to Carry my Family to Lancaster." After the raids 
had begun, Conrad Weiser complained to Governor Morris that "I 
must stand my ground or my neighbours will all go away and 
leave their habitations to be destroyed by the Enemy." In May 
1756 James Wood, the founder of Winchester, decided to move 
from his plantation near the town. His decision created a 
panic and "caused many to think their Case desperate."26
Life for the refugees was indeed desperate. Having 
abandoned their plantations and possessions, they lacked any 
means of earning a living. Most lost their crops and 
livestock. They had nowhere to live and lodged in what 
amounted to refugee camps in backcountry towns near military
25 ["Memorandum" July, 1756] Draper Mss.: Preston Papers, 
1QQ:132; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 
1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
2:105; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Denny, June, 1757, H.S.P., 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:73; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 
2:767-768; Ann Maury, Memoirs of a Huguenot Family, (New York:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1852), p.432.
26 James Burd to Edward Shippen, August 24, 1755, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, 
November 18, 1755, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:60; William 
Fairfax to George Washington, May 20, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:167.
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garrisons such as Lancaster, York, and Winchester. There they 
lived in barns and stables, "Men, Women and Children who had 
lately lived in great Affluence and Plenty reduced to the most 
extreme Poverty and Distress. . . and in want of the Common 
Necessaries of Life." The refugees were short of food and 
clothing. Several times their need compelled Washington to 
provide them with supplies, lamenting that he was forced "to 
hear the cries of the hungry, who have fled for refuge to 
these places, with nothing more than they carried on their 
backs.1,27
Settlers abandoned a vast area of the frontier. 
Hampshire County was completely abandoned. The county court 
did not meet from mid-1755 to the end of 1757, and the House 
of Burgesses even considered merging the county again with 
Frederick County from which it had been formed in 1752. An 
area running along the frontier from the Delaware River to the 
James River between fifty and one hundred miles wide was 
deserted. The population of Augusta County fell by nearly 
half from 1754 to 1758 and did not recover to prewar levels 
until 1764. The population of Frederick County fell by almost 
a third, although it had recovered to pre-war levels by 1760.
27 Pennsylvania Gazette, January 1, 1756; "Report of Chew, 
Stedman, West and Shippen," April 21, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: 
Indian Affairs, 2:80; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, 
April 27, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 3:60; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, May 3, 
1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, June 24, 1757,
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:401- 
402, 654.
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Bedford and Halifax counties both lost population in years of 
heaviest raiding, and other backcountry counties in the 
interior found their population growth stalled as existing 
settlers moved out at the same rate that new settlers 
arrived.28
To encourage settlers to remain, the colonies posted 
military units on the frontier, often with regard only to 
protecting valuable settlements such as the South Branch of 
the Potomac. Some settlers did remain on their plantations 
despite the danger. For them life was no less desperate. 
They attempted to protect their farms by fortifying them, 
turning them into strongholds, such as Henry Enoch's 
plantation and Job Pearsall's in Hampshire County. By the end 
of 1756 there were at least 68 non-military fortified posts on 
the Virginia frontier. Pennsylvania had almost fifty such 
posts. Some of these were even constructed under the 
auspicies of the county authorities. In Cumberland County a 
mass meeting of the inhabitants decided to build five forts
28 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 24, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:45; 
Henning, Statutes, 7:67; Mcllwaine, Journal of the House of 
Burgesses, 1758-1761, p.110; Chester Raymond Young has used 
county records to estimate the changes in population of the 
frontier and backcountry counties of Virginia. Chester 
Raymond Young, "The Effects of the French and Indian War on 
Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of Virginia, 1754- 
1763," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 
1969, p.207; See Appendix B.
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across the county to which they could evacuate their wives and 
children.29
Isolated in their forts, the frontier inhabitants lacked
arms and provisions. The forts were open to attack and their
occupants had to keep constant guard. Afraid, hungry, and
strained by keeping a continual watch, those confined in these
small outposts grew increasingly temperamental.30 In 1757
Robert Armstrong complained that a local settler wanted
shelter in his fort. Armstrong protested that "it is much
Contrary to My Interest as I have found by Experience when he
lived here last Summer— for at that time my wife and Children
could not pas [sic] or Repas With out Receiving Some immodert
[sic] and insulting affronts." He added
besides I look upon it to be hard Usage to bring 
familyes with their stocks upon My plantation, Not 
but that I should Willingly put up with 
Disconveniencyes of this kind were they poore 
honest people such as were Not fully able to Work
29 On o c c p  ,ion the provincial forces even aided in the 
construction and defence of these outposts. George Washington 
to William Cocks and John Ashby, October 27, 1755, George
Washington to Adam Stephen, January 9, 1756, George Washington 
to Thomas Waggener, January 9, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., 
The Papers of George Washington, 2:141, 263-264, 265-266;
Andrew Lewis to William Preston, February 26, 1757, Draper 
Mss.: William Preston Papers, 1QQ:150-151; Young, "The Effects 
of the French and Indian War on Civilian Life," p.205; William 
A. Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758, 
(Harrisburg Pa.: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum
Commission, 1960), pp.548-564; "Meeting of the General Council 
of Cumberland Council," October 30, 1755, H.S.P., Lamberton 
Scotch-Irish Collection, 1:23.
30 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 27, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:60; 
"Deposition of Robert Brown," August, 1756, H.S.P., Conrad 
Weiser Papers, 1:79.
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for their living but as he has always been known to 
be an Idle [man]. . . that never Would Work as an 
honest Man ought I think he has less [right] to be 
supported by a fort.31
The progress of the war greatly dismayed those settlers 
who remained. They bitterly reproved the provincial 
authorities for their failure to protect them. After the 
first raids upon Pennsylvania, Conrad Weiser was lucky to 
escape death from a mob of angry settlers who swarmed around 
his home, demanded guns and ammunition, and denounced him as 
a traitor because of his association with the Indians. In 
Virginia Dunbar's flight produced the greatest outpouring of 
wrath. The bitter sentiments of the backcountry settlers 
horrified Governor Dinwiddie, who informed General Shirley 
that he could not "in strong enough Colours represent to You 
the Dissatisfact'n, Discontent and Clamours of All ranks of 
People here."32
Some backcountry inhabitants may even have considered 
capitulating to the French. Washington reported to Dinwiddie 
that "numbers. . . hold Councils and Cabals to very
dishonourable purposes. . . Despairing of assistance and
protection. . . they talk of capitulating and coming upon
terms with the French and Indians; rather than lose their
31 Robert Armstrong to James Burd, April 18, 1757, 
Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Edward Shippen 
Thompson Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.
32 Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 19, 1755,
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:34; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gen. 
Shirley, October 18, 1755, Brock, ed., The Official Records of 
Robert Dinwiddie, 2:245.
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lives and Fortunes through obstinancy." Other backcountry 
inhabitants provided the French with important intelligence. 
Whatever action the provincial authorities undertook
displeased the backcountry settlers. Morris commented sourly 
to the Board of Trade that "the people are not satisfied,
nor. . . would they be unless every man [' ] s house was
protected by a Fort and a company of soldiers and themselves
paid for staying at Home and doing nothing."33
Especially in Pennsylvania, relations between the 
military and civilians became very tense. When Henry Bouquet 
arrived in Philadelphia in December 1756 he reported that 
"while entering the city on horseback at the head of the 
battalion, a farmer rogue mounted on a nag lashed at me with 
his whip, which missed me fortunately for him. He was at once 
beaten up and taken to prison where he still is." The 
incident by itself was not particularly remarkable, but it was 
"the third incident of this kind to occur." Bouquet for his 
part denounced the civilian population as "riffraff" and added 
"I hope we shall succeed in inspiring them with fear of the 
red coats. Everything most abominable that nature has 
produced, and everything most detestable that corruption can
33 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 24, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:46; 
Gov. Dinwiddie to Clement Reed, January 13, 1757, Brock, ed., 
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:582; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:399; Gov. Morris to the Board of 
Trade, January 5, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, 15:18.
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add to it, such are the honest inhabitants of this 
province.,|34
Most Pennsylvanians were not so forward in their 
opposition to the army, nor was opposition restricted to 
Pennsylvania alone. Virginians and Pennsylvanians were 
reluctant to provide the army with needed supplies and 
equipment. Both Braddock and Forbes found that the reluctance 
of the settlers to aid the army made organizing a major 
expedition from the backcountry all but impossible.35 
Washington discovered that the Virginia backcountry settlers 
were reluctant even to aid in the construction of fortresses 
to defend them. One of his commanders, Robert Stewart, who 
encountered little enthusiasm from the inhabitants of 
Maidstone for construction of a fort there, complained that 
"unerring Experience has convinc'd us that we can neither Buy 
Hire or Borrow any [tools] from the Country people."36
34 Bouquet to Lt. Col. John Young, December 15, 1756, 
Kent, ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 1:37.
35 Gen. Braddock to the Duke of Newcastle, June 5, 1755, 
"Papers Relating to the Supplying of His Majesties Forces in 
North America," [1756] BL, Additional Mss., 32,855:336-337, 
35,909:246-254; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:368-369, 
7:602-603; Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 23, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:289-290; Henry Bouquet to Sir John St. Clair, May 31, 1758, 
Edward Shippen to Henry Bouquet, June 4, 1758, Bouquet to 
Magistrates of Berks County, June 5, 1758, Kent, ed., Henry 
Bouquet Papers, 1:400-401, 2:30-31, 31-32.
36 George Washington to Thomas Waggener, January 9, 1756, 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 25, 1756, Robert 
Stewart to George Washington, July 3, 1756, Robert Stewart to 
Washington, July 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 2:265-266, 3:223, 235, 289-290.
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Yet more troublesome than the reluctance of the settlers 
to aid the war effort was their resistance to the war. 
Settlers actively hindered all aspects of the war and refused 
to cooperate with military authorities. Washington complained 
frequently of "the villainy and ill-judged compassion of the 
country-people; who deem it a merit to assist Deserters." 
Settlers hid deserters from the army and developed what 
amounted to an eighteenth century "underground railroad" to 
speed them to the safety of neighboring colonies.37
Backcountry settlers were sometimes willing to supply the 
army. However, rarely did they provide supplies of the type 
or at a cost that the military desired. Selling liquor at a 
fort was a particularly profitable activity, and company 
commanders on occasion sought the privilege of a sutling 
license for their friends and relatives. In November 1757 
William Allen asked James Burd to allow Joseph Yeats to sell 
beer at Fort Augusta. Yeats was an old friend "who has gone 
through various flaws in life, and has been reduced by 
misfortunes. "3*
Sutlers flocked to military encampments, with the result 
that liquor was often more available than any other commodity,
37 William Fairfax to George Washington, August 13-16, 
1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 10, 1757, 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 11, 1757, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:346-348, 
4:193-194, 295-296; Pennsylvania Gazette, September 11, 1755.
38 William Allen to James Burd, November 1, 1757, 
Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen Thompson Papers, 
Box 1, Folder 3.
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including food. In the spring of 1757, although the soldiers 
at Fort Augusta were starving and cut off from the rest of 
Pennsylvania by raiding parties, sutlers still managed to 
smuggle large supplies of liquor to them. When the soldiers 
had no money to pay for their liquor, the sutlers sold it on 
credit. When the men finally received their pay, the sutlers 
seized the money to collect their debts, leaving the men 
penniless.39
Military authorities made repeated attempts to restrict 
the availability of liquor, but to no avail. With little 
effort, sutlers were able to hide their activities. In July 
1758 a sutler set up business only half a mile from Fort 
Loudoun and operated successfully for several months before 
the garrison commander discovered him.40
Discovery did not necessarily halt a sutler's activities. 
In June 1756 Robert Stewart, one of Washington's commanders, 
attempted to shut a tippling house in Maidstone where his men 
got drunk and received encouragement to desert. Stewart 
ordered the tippling house to close, but the owner refused. 
Stewart posted a guard, but the owner bribed the guards "by 
his giving them liquor for liberty to supply others." Stewart 
then tried to get the local magistrate to close the tavern.
39 James Burd letter, April 23, 1757, Gov. Denny to James 
Burd, October 19, 1757, Shippen Family Papers, H.S.P., Vols. 
2 & 3.
40 Lewis Ourry to Henry Bouquet, July 4, 1758, Kent, ed., 
Papers of Henry Bouquet, 2:162.
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The magistrate was reluctant and took his time. When he 
finally issued a warrant, the owner ignored it. Stewart then 
sought to have the magistrate arrest the owner, but the 
magistrate replied that he would need two other justices and 
since they were not in town, he could do nothing.41 Stewart 
in desperation ordered his officers to patrol through the 
house every evening to insure that, if nothing else, the men 
returned to camp. The owner was so incensed at this action 
that he began a brawl with one of the officers and threatened 
to have Stewart demoted and reassigned from the post. For 
several months the tavernkeeper successfully flouted all 
military authority.42
It was not only civilians who sold liquor to the troops. 
In Winchester in 1758 an officer of the Virginia Regiment 
established his own profitable tavern. Nowhere was the 
situation worse than in Winchester Virginia, the headquarters 
of the Virginia Regiment. Washington ran a constant campaign 
to limit the number of innkeepers and tippling houses in the
41 Robert Stewart to George Washington, June 20, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:207-209.
42 Robert Stewart to Washington, June 23, 1756, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:214-215.
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town, but to no avail.43 In October 1757 Washington
complained to Governor Dinwiddie that he
cou'd give your Honor such instances of the vil­
lainous Behaviour of those Tippling-house-keeper's, 
as wou'd astonish any person. . . it is impossible 
to maintain that discipline and do that Service 
with a garrison thus corrupted by a sett of people, 
whose conduct looks like the effect of a combi­
nation to obstruct the Service. . . these are the 
people of a country whose bowels are at this 
juncture torn by the most horrid devastations of 
the most cruel and barbarous enemy.44
Selling liquor was not the only avenue for profit the war 
offered. Army supplies provided another. In 1756 a 
Winchester merchant persuaded several of the Virginia 
Regiment's guards to .provide him with flour in return for 
liquor. He then sold the flour back to the army. Civilians 
also developed an extensive "black market" in military 
equipment. Unscrupulous merchants persuaded many troops to 
part with their clothing, equipment, and even arms in return 
for liquor. They may have been only imitating the example of 
the Virginia Regiment's quarter-master general, John Hamilton, 
who made a substantial profit by selling regimental supplies. 
When Washington halted the scheme, Hamilton fled, although the 
Frederick County justices refused to press charges against the
43 Robert Stewart to Washington, June 23, 1756, "Orders" 
August 5-9, 1756, "Court of Inquiry," May 4-8, 1758, William 
Woodford to George Washington, May 17, 1758, Thomas Waggener 
to George Washington, May 20, 1758, George Washington to John 
Blair, May 28, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of 
George Washington, 3:214-215, 338-340, 5:162-163, 187, 188., 
199-203.
44 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 9, 1757, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:12.
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merchants and were even reluctant to supply a warrant to 
search Hamilton's home.45
Civilians took advantage of opportunities provided by the 
chaos of war in other ways as well. Sometimes their actions 
took the form of pillaging and plundering. In October 1755, 
after a large raid on Penn's Creek, Pennsylvania, many of the 
inhabitants began "plundering the Houses, & mak[ing] the best 
of other people's Misfortune." On occasion frontiersmen even 
disguised themselves as Indians so they could ransack 
plantations with impunity. Indian disguise could provide 
other opportunities for frontiersmen. During 1758 several 
frontiersmen dressed as Indians successfully received presents 
from the English designed for the Indians.46
Even within the law there were many areas where 
civilians could profit from the war. The demands of the 
military for supplies and equipment allowed farmers and
45 Gov. Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, May 5, 1756, Brock, 
ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:403-404; 
William Hughes to Robert Stewart, February 12, 1756, "Evening 
Orders," May 26, 1756, "Orders," August 11, August 12, 1756, 
Robert Stewart to George Washington, September 27, 1757,
Gabriel Jones to George Washington, October 6, 1757, George 
Washington to General Stanwix, October 8, 1757, George
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 9, 1757, Abbot and
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:177-178, 211, 
343, 4:423-424, 5:7-8, 8-9, 10-13.
46 Conrad Weiser, to Gov. Morris, October 26, 1755, Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (17)
2:831; Mcllwaine, Journal of the House of Burgesses of 
Virginia, 1752-1755, 1756-1758, 6:350; William Fairfax to
George Washington, October 20, 1755, Charles Smith to George 
Washington, August 15, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The
Papers of George Washington, 2:132, 5:392.
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planters to charge a premium for their goods. The receipt 
books of John Harris, a frontier merchant settled on the 
Susquehanna River, reveal the greatly increased demand for 
goods and provisions as a result of military activities. 
Planters made full use of this opportunity to charge inflated 
prices for their produce and on occasion even conspired to fix 
minimum prices below which they agreed not to sell.47
These premiums alone did not satisfy the backcountry 
farmers and planters. In many cases they defrauded the army 
by sending sub-standard animals. After commissioners 
inspected the animals to value them, the farmers substituted 
other animals. Bouquet described the horses supplied to 
Forbes' Expedition as "nags who were unable to drag themselves 
along," while the cattle were "small, lean, and poor as they 
could be."48
Food the settlers provided was often inedible. In 1755 
Thomas Cressap, one of the most respected Maryland 
frontiersmen, supplied Braddock's expedition with beef so 
rotten the troops had to bury it. In 1757 nearly all the beef 
collected at Fort Cumberland was inedible and of 140 barrels 
of pork collected for Forbes' expedition, only 60 were fit for
47 "Receipt Book" of John Harris II, 1749-1769, Harris- 
Fischer Family Papers, Pennsylvania State Archives, 
Harrisburg, Box 1; Thomas Walker to George Washington, 
December 4, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 2:199. See Appendix B.
48 Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, July 11, 1758, Henry 
Bouquet to John Forbes, August 26, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry 
Bouquet Papers, 2:180, 424.
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consumption. Even when the produce met standards, civilians 
found other ways to defraud the army, such as using fraudulent 
weights and measures. In the summer of 1758 one of the 
commissaries was discovered using weights which were light by 
12%%.49
The potential for profit lured large numbers of camp- 
followers who served as washerwomen, cooks or whores. To 
control their numbers, Forbes issued standing orders that "All 
Sutlers must have Licenses and must attach themselves to some 
particular Corps, or to the Head Quarters, as the Commanding 
Officers of [the] Corps will be made answerable for the 
Behaviour of those Sutlers, that they allow to follow their 
Regiment." He also attempted to control the sutlers by 
establishing regulated markets in the camps, setting prices, 
and forbidding the sale of goods on credit. His attempts 
failed, and swarms of peddlers and vendors continued to pursue 
the army in their quest for profit.50
Local civil authorities played a major role in the 
consolidation of frontier resistance to military authority.
49 John Billings to Henry Bouquet, June 9, 1758, Adam
Stephen to Henry Bouquet, August 18, 1758, Kent, ed., The
Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:57, 386-387; George Washington to Gov. 
Dinwiddie, June 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers 
of George Washington, 4:194; Robert Orme, "Journal of General 
Braddock's Expedition," BL, King's Mss., 212:44.
50 Orderly Book of Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company, 
October 18, 1759, Cumberland County Historical Society, 9:22; 
George Washington's Orderly Book, September 22, 1758, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 6:32; 
Orders, Carlisle, June 5, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: 
Orderly Book of Joseph Shippen's Company, 1758.
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The primary reason for the failure to suppress the illegal 
liquor trade was that the civil courts refused to prosecute 
offenders while the military authorities had no right to take 
direct action against civilians. County justices refused to 
issue warrants to search for embezzled supplies. Some 
magistrates warned merchants that they were going to search, 
allowing them ample opportunity to hide any illegal supplies. 
County justices refused to draft men, to punish deserters, to 
impress needed equipment and supplies, and to enforce military 
authority over civilians. Some even offered to defend 
deserters in court.51
In October 1755 Governor Dinwiddie complained to the 
Virginia House of Burgesses "of the great Obstruct's given to 
the Service by many of the Magistrates and other civil 
Officers, some of whom have even given Protect'n to those who 
have shamefully deserted with their Arms. . . and others with 
an unparrallel'd and most criminal Undutifulness to their 
Country have discouraged and prevented the Enlist'g [of] Men, 
tho' to protect themselves." But the House of Burgesses was 
reluctant to increase military authority. Dinwiddie thus
51 William Hughes to Robert Stewart, February 12, 1756, 
Robert Stewart to George Washington, June 23, 1756, Thomas 
Walker to George Washington, June 30, 1756, "Orders" August 5- 
9, 1756, Gabriel Jones to George Washington, October 6, 1757, 
George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 9, 1757, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:211, 214- 
215, 231, 338-340, 5:7-8, 10-13; Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, 
May 25, 1758, Kent, ed., The Henry Bouquet Papers, 1:363
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resorted to issuing new commissions of the peace, but even 
this action failed to provide more reliable justices.52
On the occasions when magistrates and local officials did 
cooperate, it was rarely as desired. They often authorized 
higher compensation for the hire of wagons and other equipment 
than the army had authorized. When military authorities 
refused to pay, the wagoners complained bitterly, blaming the 
military officials rather than their local justices. 
Particularly during Forbes' expedition the justices either 
refused to cooperate in the hiring of wagons and the purchase 
of equipment, or agreed to pay exorbitant rates. The 
reluctance of the justices to cooperate with military 
authorities stemmed mainly from their own self-interest, 
causing Henry Bouquet to comment bitterly that every 
Pennsylvania justice "wishes to be popular, and build his 
career at the expense of the government."53
When there was a direct conflict between civil and 
military authority, justices gave precedence to the civil. In 
1758 county justices in York, Pennsylvania, arrested some 
troops in Forbes' army for brawling with civilians. They 
refused to release them to military authorities, despite 
assurances that the army would punish them and pleas that they
52 Address of Gov. Dinwiddie to the Assembly, October 27, 
1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 19, 1756, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:254, 
483.
53 Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, June 3, 1758, Kent, ed., 
The Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
380
were needed for the expedition against Fort Duquesne, and held 
them for a civil trial.54
In Virginia and Pennsylvania, military officials 
repeatedly clashed with civil authorities whose refusal to 
cooperate infuriated many officials. Washington complained 
that "In all things I meet with the greatest opposition[; ] no 
orders are obey'd but what a Party of Soldier's or my own 
drawn Sword Enforces; without this a single horse for the most 
urgent occasion cannot be had."55
The failure of the Virginia and Pennsylvania settlers to 
participate in their own defense seems perverse. Yet there 
were compelling considerations that prevented them from doing 
so. Military authorities failed to comprehend the roots of the 
conflict between military and civilian officials. American 
colonists demanded the right to be treated as full British 
citizens, yet there were no British precedents to guide the 
conduct of war amongst a civilian population. Britain had not 
seen a major foreign invasion since 1066, and only during the 
civil war in the mid-seventeenth century had civilians been in 
close contact with campaigning armies. In Britain the 
government had not been forced to resolve problems of 
impressing supplies and equipment. Troops could be lodged in
54 George Stevenson to Henry Bouquet, May 30, 1758, Kent, 
ed., The Papers of Henry Bouquet, 1:398.
55 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, 
Abbot & Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:101- 
102.
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barracks without inconvenience, supplies could be obtained 
from contractors without dispute.56 The recalcitrance of the 
frontiersmen infuriated Braddock, Washington, and Forbes. But 
to frontiersmen the demands of the army seemed unreasonable.
The reluctance of the settlers to aid the army can, in 
part, be explained by the difficulties they encountered. The 
army generally paid on credit rather than by cash, and as a 
result many colonists had difficulty obtaining repayment for 
wartime expenses. Following Braddock's defeat, Dunbar refused 
to pay many of the settlers who had supplied the army with 
cattle. Many of the receipts had been lost with the defeat of 
the army and Dunbar was, rightly, afraid that many settlers 
would use the opportunity to make fraudulent claims. The 
Virginia and Pennsylvania assemblies would only settle debts 
if claimants brought their accounts to Williamsburg and 
Philadelphia. As most of the claimants lived in the
56 Many of the problems faced by the royalist and 
parliamentary forces during the Civil War are reminiscent of 
those encountered in North America. In mid-seventeenth- 
century England, some civilians were so opposed to military 
authority that they organized themselves into bands of 
"clubmen" to resist forcibly. For a discussion of anti­
military sentiment in England in the mid-seventeenth century 
see J.S. Morrill. The Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives 
and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630-1650, (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1976) . For a discussion of the problems 
faced by the British and colonial authorities in North America 
during the Seven Years' War, see Alan Rogers, Empire and 
Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1753-1763, 
(Berkely, Ca.: University of California Press, 1974); Douglas 
Edward Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and 
Colonial Americans, 1677-1763, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1986.)
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backcountry, traveling to the colonial capitals was a great 
undertaking.57
The Virginia House of Burgesses established a committee 
of the House to investigate all claims against the colony. So 
rigid were their demands for precise accounts that they often 
refused to pay the officers' expenses. The commissary, 
Charles Dick, resigned in disgust at the House's failure to 
reimburse him. If the officers and commissary could not get 
their accounts approved, a backcountry farmer stood little 
chance.58 In the fall of 1757, when Washington announced that 
he was going to Williamsburg to meet with the committee, many 
of the backcountry settlers brought their accounts to him, 
begging him to settle them for them and reminding him of "the 
vast hardships many of the poor people groan under here, 
having been so long kept out of the money which the country 
owes them."59
57 Gov. Dinwiddie to Charles Dick, August 11, 1755, Gov. 
Dinwiddie to Charles Dick, September 2, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie 
to Gov. Shirley, January 24, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. 
Shirley, March 13, 1756, Brock, ed., The Official Records of 
Robert Dinwiddie, 2:150, 18 3, 3 30, 3 69.
58 George Washington to Charles Dick, September 6, 1755, 
Charles Dick to George Washington, September 6, 1755, George 
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 5, 1755, Thomas Walker 
to George Washington, April 14, 1756, John Robinson to George 
Washington, August 19, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 2:21-22, 25-26, 2:200-202, 353, 
3:365-367; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, September 17, 
1755, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:201.
59 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:45-46.
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Pennsylvania handed control of war finances to the 
provincial commissioners. They were as fastidious as the 
Virginians. Conrad Weiser complained in 1758 that he had 
found it impossible to get his accounts settled. He added "I 
have found by Experience, that new debts are Suffered to grow 
Old ones, and old ones are never paid, which is but poor 
encouragement for faithfull Servants of the Government.”60
The difficulties settlers encountered in recovering their 
debts cannot fully justify their behavior: this problem might 
explain the settlers' reluctance to participate in the war, 
but cannot account for their active hindrance of the war 
effort. Settlers embezzled supplies, hid deserters and 
ignored military authority on one hand, and rushed to provide 
the army with supplies when the opportunity seemed profitable 
on the other.
The reason for this seemingly self-destructive behavior 
lay in the nature of backcountry and frontier society. 
Frontier society lacked a sense of community which would have 
induced setters to protect one another and to view the war in 
a wider context. An intense sense of individualism dominated 
frontier society. This individualism was further heightened 
by the substantial rate of mobility which characterized 
frontier settlements. George Franz estimates that during this 
period in Paxton, Derry, and Donegal townships, on the
60 Conrad Weiser to Richard Peters, December 16, 1758, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:141.
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frontier of Lancaster County, mobility rates averaged around 
50% per annum, an incredibly high figure creating what he 
terms "a community of strangers."61
The development of community was further weakened by the 
deep ethnic and religious divisions in the backcountry, and 
more especially between the backcountry and the older eastern 
settlements. The frontier region was peopled by polyglot 
settlers, many of whom were recent immigrants who tended to 
associate within their ethnic groups. The largest single 
group throughout the backcountry was the Scotch-Irish, but 
there were substantial minorities of Catholic Irish, Germans, 
Scottish, Welsh and English, with smaller numbers of French 
Huguenots and Swiss.62 While ethnic divisions weakened the 
development of community on the frontier, it is not possible 
to assign responsibility for the resistance to authority and 
unrest on the frontier to any one particular ethnic group.63
61 George Franz, "Paxton: A Study of Community Structure 
and Mobility in the Colonial Pennsylvania Backcountry," 
Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1974, 
pp.209, 236-242.
62 Illick, Colonial Pennsylvania, pp. 172-173; Mitchell, 
Commercialism and Frontier, pp. 104-106/Gregory H. Nobles, 
"Breaking into the Backcountry: New Approaches to the Early 
American Frontier, 1750-1800," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d 
Ser., (1989) 46:650-653.
63 David Hackett Fischer in particular attributes much of 
the violence and unrest endemic in the eighteenth century 
southern backcountry to the predominance of Scotch-Irish 
settlers. David Hackett Fischer, Albion's Seed: Four British 
Folkways in America,(New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 
1989), pp.605-782, passim.
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Frontier society was dominated by a sense of 
individualism which cut through many traditional social 
barriers. Frontier and backcountry settlers viewed the war 
only as a threat to their immediate family and an opportunity 
for individual profit or loss. Frontier settlers were unable 
to see the benefit of supporting a large military garrison to 
protect them, although they might band together with their 
immediate neighbors to construct small fortified outposts. 
Indeed, the sense of individualism and self-preservation may 
have cut through the bonds of marriage. When a raiding party 
captured William Fleming near the Conococheague in November 
1755, in an effort to save his own scalp, Flemming guided the 
party back to his home to capture his wife.64
But perhaps the greatest element undermining the frontier 
community was the motivation of the settlers for migrating to 
the region. Settlers came to the frontier in search of 
personal independence and economic opportunity. The frontier 
they moved to was not a region of self-sufficient farmers, but 
rather of agressive commercialism and questing for economic 
opportunity.65
64 Maryland Gazette, April 1, 1756.
65 Jack Greene, "Independence, Improvement, and Authority: 
Toward a Framework for Understanding the Histories of the 
Southern Backcountry during the Era of the American 
Revolution," in Hoffman, et al., eds., An Uncivil War, pp.12- 
13; Robert D. Mitchell, Commercialism and Frontier: 
Perspectives on the Early Shenandoah Valley. (Charlottesville, 
Va: University of Virginia Press, 1977), pp.1-8. Mitchell 
maintaines "Commercial tendencies were present from the
(continued...)
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Frontier settlers resisted any development which might 
hinder their own advancement. The war simultaneously 
threatened to destroy their aspirations and opened new avenues 
for profit. Abandoned plantations awaited new owners. In 
1755 Dinwiddie commented after a fierce raid on Augusta County 
that "I cannot help the Families des'rting their Habitat's. If 
they will run away from themselves and desert their 
Int[erest]ts[,] those that y't rema. to defend the Co'ty may 
hereafter be tho't worthy of enjoying their Plantat's." 
Settlers might claim lands cleared but then abandoned by 
squatters, or purchase lands from an owner who had fled east 
willing to take whatever capital he could.66 If a settler 
could not find abandoned land, he could recover property 
abandoned in the haste of flight or claim stray horses and 
cattle. Large numbers of butchers came down from Philadelphia 
to scour the Virginia backcountry for abandoned cattle, which 
they then drove back to Pennsylvania for sale.67
The war opened other lucrative opportunities. A settler, 
acting within the law, could profit by supplying the army with 
cattle, grain, or other necessaries. Because of its desperate
65 (... continued)
beginnings of permanent settlement, and were the most dynamic 
element in the emerging pioneer economy."
66 Gov. Dinwiddie to Colonel John Buchanan, August 11, 
1755, Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
2:154-155.
67 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 8, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:397; Maryland Gazette, July 28, 1757.
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need, the army would pay high prices for needed supplies, 
allowing sutlers to charge a 25% markup on goods at Raystown 
and a 75% markup on goods at Pittsburgh.68
Even if a settler had no provisions to sell, the army 
needed laborers. While Bouquet was unable to hire wagoners to 
haul supplies to Raystown even though he offered 15s per day, 
the wagoners were only too willing to haul goods all the way 
to the Ohio, for profits were greater. The army also required 
blacksmiths and farriers, "Carpenters, Joyners, Bricklayers, 
Masons, Oven Makers, Sadlers, Millrights, Coalmakers, Coopers, 
Tin Men, Sawyers, [and] Mealmakers," who were all well 
rewarded. Even unskilled laborers received 2/6d per day. 
There were even opportunities for women to work as nurses, 
cooks, and washerwomen, as well as the disrespectable, but 
more lucrative, demand for prostitutes.69
The Seven Years' War opened great opportunities for those 
who were prepared to brave the risks of remaining on the 
frontier. The decision to remain while others fled was a 
desperate gamble in the quest for economic advantage, and for 
this reason settlers paid little attention to the greater
68 "Rates and Prices at Raystown," August 10, 1758, Kent, 
ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:352-353.
69 Edward Shippen to Henry Bouquet, June 9, 1758, Bouquet 
Orderly Book, July 2, 1758, Lewis Ourry to Henry Bouquet, July 
4, 1758, Kent, ed. , Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:63, 160, 661;
James Burd to Edward Shippen, April 27, 1755, James Burd to 
Sarah Burd, May 15, 1755, H.S.P. Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 
1; Peter Burd to Gov. Morris, August 8, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz 
Collection, 15:18.
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needs of the army and their province. The activities of
embezzlers and profiteers merely reflect this individualism: 
they were unable to see how their benefitting from the 
distress of others could be iniquitous. In 1756 Governor
Dinwiddie complained that the backcountry inhabitants "appear 
to me to endeav'r to make Money unjustly from the Distress of 
the Co'try." His opinions were echoed two years later by 
Henry Bouquet who commented that "no one in this country can 
be relied on. At all times, private interests outweigh the 
general welfare."70
These characteristics of individualism and the quest for 
improvement made it difficult, if not impossible, for 
provincial and imperial authorities to govern and control the 
frontier settlers, a fact that was central to Whitehall's 
desire for an Indian "reservation" west of the Appalachians. 
Frontier settlers could not be brought to accept any outside 
interference or advice which might hinder their progress. 
During the war the cool reception frontier settlers gave to 
their Cherokee allies had partly served to alienate the 
Indians, and from 1759 to 1761 the Cherokees waged another 
bitter war against the Virginia backcountry. Following the 
fall of Fort Duquesne, frontier settlers ignored the advice of 
the bureaucrats in Whitehall who threatened to block their
70 Gov. Dinwiddie to Clement Read, September 8, 1756,
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:504; 
Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 11, 1758, Kent, ed., Henry 
Bouquet Papers, 2:73.
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access to the west. The settlers paid for their impudence 
when the Ohio Indians again descended upon the frontier in 
Pontiac's uprising in 1763.
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Chapter IX 
Denoument
The fall of Fort Duquesne did not mark the end of the 
Seven Years' War on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier. 
Rather, it spelled only the end of a phase of the struggle; 
its fall ended the descent on the frontier of raiding parties 
composed of Ohio Indians and Susquehanna Delawares. The end 
of the frontier raids was not the result of successful British 
policy but of the failure of the French war effort. Open 
Indian support for the French declined precipitously on the 
Ohio once they were unable to provide supplies and trade 
goods. Any Ohio Indians who still openly supported the 
French, rather than raiding the frontier settlements, now 
sought to isolate and destroy Fort Pitt. For the French 
themselves the prime strategy in the Ohio theater also 
shifted, from paralysing Virginia and Pennsylvania, to 
attempting to stave off the British onslaught on the Ohio 
Valley and on New France itself.
In the spring of 1759 the French had many reasons to be 
optimistic. While British and colonial administrations 
attempted to forge a policy to win the support of wavering 
Indians, the backcountry settlers hindered their efforts 
towards peace. In the same manner in which, during the raids,
390
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they had been unable to comprehend why they should aid central 
authority, in the years following the war they were unable to 
understand why they should restrain their land hunger and 
animosity towards the Indians for the benefit of central 
government.
The miltary outlook was also desperate for the British. 
Forbes had left only a small garrison at Pittsburgh and 
withdrew most of his troops east for the winter. Hugh Mercer, 
the commander at the fort, sent Forbes and Bouquet repeated 
reports of its precarious condition; a concerted assault could 
bring its fall. In preparation for a spring assault, small 
parties of francophile Ohio Indians attacked convoys en route 
to the fort.1 At the end of May a party attacked a convoy of 
fifteen wagons traveling from Bedford to Ligonier escorted by 
one hundred men. The Indians killed forty troops, destroyed 
five wagons, and damaged several others. These raids 
threatened the extended British supply lines. Upon his 
arrival at Pittsburgh, Adam Hoops was horrified to find the 
garrison "in such Extremity," while Bouquet deplored "the
1 Hugh Mercer to Gen. Forbes, January 8, 1759, Hugh
Mercer to Henry Bouquet, February 17, 1759, Hugh Mercer,
Indian Intelligence, April-May, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Henry 
Bouquet, May 23, 1759, Thomas Lloyd to Gen. Stanwix, May 25, 
1759, Kent, ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 3:26, 130-131, 278-280, 
304-306, 3:315-317.
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Extraordinary activity of the Enemy and the Continual Success 
they have had in their Attempts."2
More worrying than the shortages experienced by the 
garrison itself was the danger that the post would run out of 
Indian goods to bolster the wavering support of the local 
tribes. The Ohio Indians, starved of European goods for 
several years, rushed to Fort Pitt to acquire necessities. 
The ability of the British to supply them with goods could 
ensure that many would pursue a strict neutrality in the 
conflict. Any sign that the British might not be able to 
supply them could shift their support to the French.3
The shortage of trade goods prompted a desperate exchange 
between Mercer and his commanders. In early January he wrote 
to General Forbes begging him to send "a large quantity of 
Indian Goods." He added that "the Constant Sollicitations of 
all our friends obliges me again to repeat it, as a measure 
equally necessary to gain the Indian Interest, as a Body of 
Troops is to Secure the Country." But the long supply lines, 
bad winter weather, and continuing raids on convoys made the 
provision of large quantities of Indian goods impossible.4
2 Thomas Lloyd to Gen. Stanwix, May 23, 1759, Adam 
Stephen to Gen. Stanwix, May 25, 1759, Adam Hoops to Henry 
Bouquet, May 30, 1759, Henry Bouquet to Hugh Mercer, June 1, 
1759, Kent, ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 3:309-311, 318-319, 
334, 357.
3 Hugh Mercer to Henry Bouquet, March 18, 1759, Kent,
ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 3:210.
4 Hugh Mercer to Gen. Forbes, January 8, 1759, Kent, 
ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 3:26.
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While Mercer was trying to secure trade goods, Lignery 
was ready to attack. He had massed 700 French troops and 9 00 
Indians at Venango to strike at Fort Pitt. Outnumbered and 
with their supply lines stretched to a maximum, the British 
seemd to have little chance of holding on to Fort Pitt.5
Events farther north saved the British. While Lignery 
was marching his troops towards Fort Pitt General Prideaux 
captured Fort Niagara for the British. The loss of this key 
fort horrified the French. They had not suspected an attack 
in that quarter and the fort's loss cut communication between 
Canada and the Ohio and Mississippi. In dismay Montcalm 
ordered Lignery to cancel his attack on Fort Pitt and to speed 
his troops towards the St. Lawrence where he desperately 
needed them.6
The loss of Niagara deprived the French of the Ohio. 
However, it did not secure it for the British, since the Ohio 
Indians were no more prone to support the British in 1759 than 
they had been in 1755, and they remained deeply concerned 
about British intentions to occupy their homeland. Seeking 
reassurance about British plans in the wake of the French
5 Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, January 15, 1759, Hugh 
Mercer to Henry Bouquet, January 19, 1756, Kent, ed., Henry 
Bouquet Papers, 52-54, 58-60; Fregault, Canada: The War of the 
Conquest, p.257.
6 John Tulleken to Bouquet, July 21, 1759, George Croghan 
to Henry Bouquet, July 11, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Henry Bouquet, 
July 11, 1759 George Croghan to Gen. Stanwix, July 15, 1759, 
Kent, ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 3:398, 399, 416-417 433;
Fregault, Canada: The War of the Conquest, p.258.
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withdrawal, many Indian parties came to Pittsburgh to open 
negotiations. Some openly expressed their hopes that both 
sides would now withdraw from the Ohio Valley. The Mingoes, 
for example, openly claimed that they hoped that both the 
British and the French would "Fight as formerly, over the 
great Water, without Disturbing their Country that they Might 
live in Peace with both, and that the English should return 
home. "7
Both the British and the French sensed the Indians 
uneasiness. From Canada the French continued to send the Ohio 
Indians messages "to engage them to persevere in their good 
dispositions." French communications had the desired effect. 
As Mercer perceived, while "the Indians are generally disposed 
to make peace," they were "kept back by the Insinuations of 
the French, that we come to rob them of their Lands and cut 
their Throats."8
The British attempted to reaasure the Ohio Indians that 
they "had no Intention to Make Settlements in their Hunting
7 Hugh Mercer, Indian Intelligence, March 17, 1759, Hugh 
Mercer to Henry Bouquet, July 22, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Gen. 
Stanwix, July 22, 1759, Henry Bouquet to Hugh Mercer, July 23, 
1759, Hugh Mercer to Gen. Stanwix, July 28, 1759, George
Croghan: Indian Intelligence, [July 31, 1759], Indian
Intelligence, August 4, 1759, George Croghan to Gen. Stanwix, 
August 6, 1759, Kent, ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 3:205, 437, 
440, 445-446., 461-462, 470. 493-494, 502; Vaudreuil to
Berryer, June 24, 1760, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to 
the Colonial History of New York, 10:1092.
8 Vaudreuil to Berryer, June 24, 1760, Brodhead, ed., 
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 
10:1092; Extract from Hugh Mercer's Journal, April 5, 1759, 
Kent, ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 3:234.
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Country beyond the Allegheny Hills: Unless they should be 
desired, for the conveniency of the Indians, to erect Store- 
Houses in order to establish and carry on a Trade." They 
assured the Indians that "your Bretheren the English will 
never violate their engagement." Throughout 1759 the British 
repeated such guarantees.9
Such reassurances did not calm the Indians' fears. In 
particular the caveat "unless they should be desired, for the 
conveniency of the Indians" disturbed them. It sounded too 
much like the reassurances the British had made ten years 
earlier over the construction of a fort at the forks. Indeed, 
in familiar fashion, British promises slowly changed: settlers 
pressed for the opening of bottom lands on the Ohio for 
settlement; military officers pressed for the construction of 
new posts and garrisons. In August 1760 General Monckton told 
Ohio Indians that the British "mean not to take away any of 
your Lands; But. . . the necessity of his Majesty's Service 
obliges me to. . . build Forts in some parts of your Country, 
to protect our Trade w[i]th you, and prevent the Enemy from 
taking your Lands and hurting both you and us." Monckton 
merely guaranteed that "no part whatever of your Lands joining 
the said Forts shall be taken from you, nor any of our people 
be permitted to hunt or settle upon them: but they shall
9 "A Narrative of what hath passed between the King's 
Generals, Governors etc. and the Indians in relation to 
Lands," [June 1761], Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward 
Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1330) 12:174-176; Colonial Records 
of Pennsylvania, 8:268-269.
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remain in your absolute property." But almost immediately 
Monckton added that the British intended to take "a space of 
Ground adjoining every Fort to raise Corn."10
As ominously for the Indians the British made their 
offers wholly conditional on the Indians remaining "Good and 
Faithful Allies." With many Indians on the Ohio still 
supporting the French, even anglophile Indians realized that 
the British would not find it difficult to discover an excuse 
to renege on their agreements and to seize the entire Ohio 
Valley.11
The Ohio Indians also watched with anxiety the renewed 
westward push of British settlements. In Cumberland County 
settlers soon began to occupy lands which the Treaty of Easton 
had reserved for the Indians. Disputes quickly broke out 
between Indians and frontiersmen. They reached a head in the 
winter of 1760-1761 when Pennsylvania settlers killed several 
Indians who were hunting on the Cumberland County frontier. 
By the fall of 1761 crowds of British hunters and settlers had 
moved into the Monongahela Valley and onto the New and 
Greenbrier Rivers in southwestern Virginia.12
10 "A Narrative of what hath passed between the King's 
Generals, Governors etc. and the Indians in relation to 
Lands," [June 1761], Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward 
Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1330) 12:177-178.
11 McConnell, "The Search for Security," p. 305.
12 Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, February 21, 1760,
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:169; Gov. Fauquier to the 
Board of Trade, July 8, 1763, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, 
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1330) 12:184-185;
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The Ohio and Susquehanna Indians watched these 
developments with dismay and could not fail to wonder whether 
the British would honor their promises. They had further 
reason to worry for even the colonial governments complained 
about the promises made to the Indians. Governor Fauquier 
wrote bitterly to the Board of Trade that "the two great 
points in View, in driving the French from this Country, was 
I conceive, to stop the Communication between Canada and New 
Orleans on this Side the Lakes, and to get possession of the 
fertile Lands on the Ohio." He asked the board why then he 
should not allow settlers to cross the Appalachians.13
Fauquier's arguments were made more pressing because his 
predecessor, Governor Dinwiddie, had encouraged men to enlist 
in the Virginia Regiment in the early stages of the war by 
promising them lands around the forks of the Ohio. Now that 
the British had captured the Ohio, these veterans were 
clamoring for their land.14
From 1760 to 1763 the British slowly extended their
military control of the Ohio Valley, but that control remained 
weak. The British occupied posts and key fortresses, but
failed to win the support of the Ohio Indians. General
McConnel, "The Search for Security," p.351.
13 Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, March 13, 1760, Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 
1329) 12:107.
14 Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, May 7, 1760, Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 
1329) 12:145-46.
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Amherst and Sir William Johnson, who took over control of 
Indian affairs on the Ohio, spoke in terms of ''managing 
Indians” and of "keeping them in Subjection." Amherst, in 
particular, had little respect for the Indians and paid no 
heed to their objections to the establishment of new forts and 
posts.amongst them, despite the previous promises at Easton 
and Pittsburgh.15
Amherst felt that he could best manage the Ohio Indians 
by restricting their access to European trade goods, in the 
belief that it would make them more pliable. He ordered the 
traders to cease supplying the indians with weapons and 
ammunition, and soon extended that ban to include even knives 
and razors. Simultaneously, he moved to restrict the flow of 
gifts and presents to the Indians, part of traditional 
diplomacy.16
The Ohio Indians depended on trade to supply their needs. 
The collapse of the French supply network had precipitated 
their abandoning their former ally. They had been drawn even 
deeper into dependence on European goods after the 
establishment of the first British posts: British garrisons, 
short of supplies, had purchased meat and corn from the 
Indians in return for ammunition or even hard currency which 
the Indians could use elsewhere to purchase their own
15 McConnell, "Search for Security," pp.189-194.
16 Amherst sought to both place pressure on the Indians 
and to cut costs. McConnel, "The Search for Security," 
pp.200-201.
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supplies. Lacking the means to obtain weapons and knives, 
with the British refusing to provide gifts, the Ohio Indians, 
"whose squaws hitherto had pretty easily obtained whatever 
they wanted, whilst waging war," found it difficult even to 
hunt. Still more ominous for some of the western Indians was 
their interpretation that changes in British trade and gift 
policy were an attempt to weaken them before the British 
attacked in revenge for their previous alliance with the 
French.17
The Ohio Indians' hostility to the British grew steadily. 
Many still hoped that the French would ultimately return to 
aid them and bided their time. But by the end of 1761 the 
Indians perceived that the British intended to exclude the 
French permanently from the region and their fears mounted. 
Their fears seemed justified by the ever-increasing number of 
British forts. The construction of a fort at Sandusky was 
particularly worrisome because it threatened to cut the 
traditional route between the Iroquois and the settlements at 
Detroit and on the upper Great Lakes. In 1761 several Ohio 
Indians journeyed to Pittsburgh to beg the British to halt the 
construction of further forts and to complain that "we. . . 
are penned up like Hogs; there are Forts all around us, and 
therefore we are apprehensive that Death is coming upon us."
17 McConnel, "The Quest for Security," pp. 324, 385;
Vaudreuil to Berryer, June 24, 1760, Brodhead, ed., Documents 
Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 10:1092.
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British settlements around Fort Niagara alienated even the 
Iroquois.18
Farther east, on the Susquehanna River, tensions also 
smoldered. In January 1759 the Pennsylvania Council's 
committee appointed to inquire into the Delawares' complaints 
presented its findings and dismissed the claims of the 
Delawares with almost unseemly haste. The committee claimed 
that the province had not defrauded the Indians, but had 
treated them instead "with great Justice, Candour, and 
Fairness." Point by point, the committee's report proceeded 
to answer the Delawares' complaints and to prove the propriety 
of the colony's actions. Finally, the committee concluded 
that the Delaware Indians had previously been conquered by the 
Iroquois "and continued ever since, their Tributaries and 
dependents, and were looked upon to have no Right to sell any 
lands within this Province."19
18 McConnell, "The Quest for Security," p.350; Gipson, The 
British Empire before the American Revolution, 9:89; Jennings, 
Empire of Fortune, p.440.
19 The committee also dismissed the Indians' complaint 
that they had not received enough payment for their land 
maintaining that the lands were not worth much because they 
were wilderness and had only gained value after they were 
settled. The committee's findings also summarily dismissed 
Teedyuscung's charges of the falsification of deeds. The 
committee specifically pointed out "that the Indians being 
utterly unacquainted with reading and Writing, keep no Records 
of their Sales of Land, or other Transactions." The report 
concluded "Upon the Whole it is very evident to us, and so we 
presume it must appear to all unprejudiced Persons, that there 
is not the least Shadow of Foundation for any part of the 
Complaint made by Teedyuscung, on behalf of the Indians 
against the Proprietaries, we must, therefore, attribute his 
exhibiting that false and groundless Charge against them to
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In the wake of the collapse of the Delawares' bid for 
freedom and sovereignty, many Susquehanna Delawares wondered 
what their future would hold. Developments on the Ohio 
heightened this concern as they foresaw the prospect of an 
anti-British alliance between the Ohio Indians and the 
Iroquois. Besides their uncertain political status, the 
Susquehanna Delawares faced the same acute shortages of 
supplies and provisions following Amherst's decree that beset 
their Ohio brethren. The crisis grew deeper in the fall of 
1762 when representatives from the Susquehannah Company 
arrived near the Delaware settlements and began clearing land 
for planting in the following spring. Soon there were over 
150 company settlers along the East Branch of the 
Susquehanna.20
Teedyuscung rushed to Phildelphia to voice his complaints 
to the Pennsylvanians and to appeal for help. But his 
complaints fell on deaf ears. The Pennsylvania authorities 
were prepared to use political pressure to remove the 
Connecticut settlers, but not military action. Faced with 
renewed submission to the Iroquois, an acute shortage of 
supplies, and the theft of their lands by the Susquehannah
some undue Influence, or to the Difficulty he was under to 
invent any other plausible Excuse for the cruel Murders and 
horrid Devastations committed by them on our back Inhabitants, 
and for their base ungreatful [sic] Breach of Faith." Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 8:246-259.
20 Boyd, The Susquehannah Company Papers, 2:166-169, ISO- 
183; Wallace, King of the Delawares, pp.221, 232-233, 254-256.
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Company, many Susquehanna Delawares evacuated the region, 
moving north closer to the Iroquois, or to the Ohio Valley.21
Unrest on the Ohio and Susquehanna was foreshadowed by 
unrest amongst the Cherokees. As with the Ohio Indians, 
British actions propelled the Cherokees towards war. During 
the later years of the war the Cherokees had shown increasing 
dissatisfaction at their treatment by the Virginians. During 
1758 the death of several Cherokee warriors at the hands of 
Virginians prompted calls from many Cherokees for attacks upon 
British colonists to revenge the deaths of their fellows. In 
May 1759 some of the Lower Townsmen took action and attacked 
settlements in North Carolina on the Yadkin and Catawba 
rivers. This prompted a speedy response from the British who 
imposed a trade embargo on the tribe.22
Governor Fauquier sent William Byrd to negotiate with the 
Cherokees in an attempt to forestall war. Byrd sought 
guarantees that the Cherokees would hand over all warriors who 
had committed atrocities in Virginia. He promised to supply 
the Cherokees with trade goods, but warned that "if they 
fail'd in their Engagements we would fall on them w[i]th all 
our Force."23
21 Boyd, The Susquehannah Company Papers, 2:180-183; 
Wallace, King of the Delawares, p.257.
22 Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, pp. 163, 165, 172
23 Gov. Fauquier to the Board of Trade, August 30, 1759, 
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(Vol. 1329) 12:96-97.
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While Byrd believed that the Cherokees were prepared to 
negotiate, he failed to realize that the tribe was deeply 
divided between a peace party, centered in the Overhill 
settlements and led by the Little Carpenter, and a war faction 
centered in the Lower Towns.24 The Little Carpenter was 
unable to pacify the pro-war faction and throughout the fall 
of 1759 small Cherokee parties raided the North Carolina 
frontier. In September several of the war faction even 
attempted to assassinate superintendant Edmund Atkin as he 
negotiated with the tribe. In desperation Governor Lyttelton 
of South Carolina marched into Cherokee country and seized 
twenty-eight Cherokee warriors as hostages until the tribe 
handed over all those suspected of attacking colonists and 
ceased the war. For the Cherokee peace party this was an 
impossible demand. The warriors had acted within Cherokee 
tradition, by revenging the deaths of those who had died in 
Virginia, and were supported by the pro-war faction. 
Lyttelton's action thus served only to strengthen the hand of 
those who favored open conflict with the English.25
At the beginning of 1760 the Cherokee war spread. Many 
parties descended upon the backcountry from Georgia to 
Virginia. Augusta, Bedford, and Halifax counties in Virginia
24 Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, pp. 163
25 Fauquier to Board of Trade, December 17, 1759, Boehm 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol.
1329) 12:99-103; Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, pp.173, 176, 
185-188.
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were particularly hard hit. The British replied with force. 
In June Colonel Archibald Montgomery advanced from Fort Prince 
George in South Carolina into Lower Cherokee country burning 
all the Indian towns in the region. However, instead of 
Montgomery's action subduing the Cherokees, they viewed his 
heavy casualties and his eventual retreat from the region as 
evidence of a Cherokee victory. They achieved a greater 
victory farther north, where, on August 7, despairing of 
relief from William Byrd who was advancing from Virginia with 
nine hundred men, the garrison of Fort Loudoun surrendered.26
Throughout the winter of 1760-1761 the Cherokee peace 
party managed to restrain the bellicose warriors. But attacks 
recommenced in the spring. In May 1761 another force under 
the command of Major Grant advanced into the Middle Cherokee 
towns and destroyed them. With over half their towns 
destroyed, the Cherokees sought peace. The Carolinians felt 
sufficiently revenged and they too were prepared to talk peace
26 The Cherokees promised the garrison safe passage upon 
their surrender. But soon after the men had evacuated the 
fort they were attacked by the Cherokees. Many men were 
killed, the remainder taken captive. Corkran points out that 
the number killed was almost the same as the number of 
Cherokee hostages the South Carolinians had taken at Fort 
Prince George and who had been put to death at the start of 
the hostilities. Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, September 
17, 1760, Articles of Capitulation of Fort Loudoun, Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05, Part l, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol.
1330) 12:140-141, 143-144; Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, pp. 
193-196, 208-215, 219, 223.
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and through the fall they negotiated a final settlement with 
the Little Carpenter.27
While the Cherokees were negotiating a peace, opposition 
began to surface in the west. In the summer of 1761 the 
Senecas circulated a war-belt amongst the Ohio Indians to 
encourage them to participate in a concerted attack on all the 
new British posts in the region. Throughout the winter and 
spring of 1761-1762 rumors circulated throughout the Ohio of 
planned uprisings. Yet nothing surfaced. The Ohio Indians 
used the delay to continue to seek support from French 
outposts in the west. Several Shawnee leaders traveled to 
Illinois "to demand. . . their most urgent necessaries." But 
the French could not adequately supply them, although "in view 
of the circumstances and their dispositions to continue the 
war against the English," they provided them with token 
gifts.28
In the summer of 1763 Indian outrage broke into violence.
In early May the Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Huron Indians, led 
by their local leader, Pontiac, after whom later historians 
have named the uprising, attacked the British garrison at 
Detroit. Only a warning by one of Pontiac's men to the
27 Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, pp. 225, 228, 240, 250- 
254, 261-265.
28 M. de St. Ange to M. d'Abbadie, November 9, 1764, 
Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
New York, 10:1158; McConnel, "The Quest for Security," pp.362- 
369, 373; Gipson, The British Empire before the American 
Revolution 9:92.
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garrison commander prevented the fort's capture. Pontiac 
besieged the fort from May to September, but the British were 
able to keep it supplied by shipments from Niagara by lake and 
river.29
As news spread of the siege of Detroit, other Ohio and 
western Indians seized the opportunity to vent their own 
grievances against the occupying British forces. Between May 
16 and June 2 the Indians overwhelmed and destroyed the 
remaining British posts in the west from Michilimackinac to 
Sandusky. In June the uprising spread east. The Ohio 
Indians, aided by the Senecas, seized the forts from the 
Alleghenny to Lake Erie. Only Fort Pitt remained and by mid- 
June it too was under siege. From Fort Pitt the violence 
spread east to the Cumberland County frontier. During late 
June and July bands of Indians descended on the reestablished 
frontier settlements, particularly on the Juniata River, 
wreaking havoc.30
From the Juniata the unrest quickly spread east of the 
Susquehanna River. The Susquehanna Delawares were all too 
willing to rise up against the British, for on April 19, 1763 
the final blow befell them. On that morning representatives
29 Gipson, The British Empire before the American 
Revolution, 9:96-99, 103; Howard Peckham, Pontiac and the 
Indian Uprising, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1947), pp.130-140.
30 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 9:32; Peckham, 
Pontiac and the Indian Uprising, pp.156-170, 214-217; Gipson, 
The British Empire before the American Revolution, 9:99-102.
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of the Susquehannah Company burned and destroyed the Delaware 
settlement at Wyoming. All that remained of the town was the 
charred remains of the Indian cabins. Inside one of the ruins 
lay the burned body of Teedyuscung. The uprising on the Ohio 
provided the Susquehanna Delawares with a final chance for 
revenge. In October they descended on the Susquehannah 
Company settlers and destroyed all their settlements before 
retreating to the Ohio. Other Delaware raiding parties 
descended upon Northampton and Berks counties.31
In the wake of the uprising the British restored their 
control only gradually. At the beginning of August 1763 Henry 
Bouquet managed to get reinforcements to Fort Pitt, after 
forcing his way past the Indian besiegers at Bushy Run. With 
Fort Pitt reinforced and resupplied, Fort Detroit resisting 
all the assaults of Pontiac's men, and several of their 
leaders killed in battle, many Ohio Indians rapidly lost hope 
in their chances of driving the British from the Ohio. It 
was not until 1764, however, that the British had the Ohio 
Valley back under control and not until the construction of a 
series of posts in the Iroquois territory in 1765 and 1766 did 
the British secure their control over the entire region.32
31 Boyd The Susquehannah Company Papers, 2:276-278; 
Wallace, King of the Delawares, pp.258, 261.
32 Gipson, The British Empire before the American 
Revolution, 9:111-113; Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian 
Uprising, pp.265-287.
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Some Ohio Indians continued to resist the British advance 
fancifully believing that the French in the Illinois country 
would come to their aid, unable to envision that the French 
would surrender all North America to the British. As late as 
March 1765 a group of Shawnees traveled to Fort Chartres to 
seek succor from the French commander who was awaiting the 
arrival of British forces to take over command of the fort. 
Pathetically the Shawnees informed him that there were forty- 
seven "villages who are willing to die in alliance with the 
French, defending their lands to the last drop of their 
blood." They pleaded with the commander, telling him that "the 
English are coming and saying the land is theirs and that it 
is the French who have sold it to them." They begged 
"aid. . . to continue the war, and to know what you want us to 
do," informing the French that they had "adopted you as our 
Father and will never hearken save to your word."33
All the commander could do was to attempt to assuage the 
Shawnees' fears. He told them that now "the English and 
French were friends and that the Red men. . . should look on 
each other as brothers." He asked them "Why, children, do you 
continue the war. . . Peace will bring you back plenty to your
33 M. de St. Ange to M. d'Abbadie, November 9, 1764,
Conference between M. d'Abbadie and the Shawnees, March, 1765, 
Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
New York, 10:1157-1158, 1159-1160; Peckham, Pontiac and the 
Indian Uprising, pp.263-269.
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villages, and the English themselves will hasten with goods to 
supply your wants."34
However, as the Ohio and Susquehanna Indians knew only 
too well, the British did not hearken to the Indians fears and 
wishes. Frontier settlers continued to refuse to obey 
colonial and imperial decrees. In 1758 the British had made 
promises to the Iroquois not to settle west of the 
Appalachians. In 1763, while the Ohio Indians were preparing 
to rise against the British, the Board of Trade prepared 
general instructions to the colonial governments to forbid 
settlement west of the Appalachians. Despite these agreements 
and instructions, colonial authorities were unable or 
unwilling to restrain frontier settlers from moving west. To 
these settlers the only solution to the conflict was the 
removal of the Indians.35
In 1765 Fauquier worriedly informed the Board of Trade 
that he believed that "the people on our Frontier are rather 
desirous that we should be at War than in peace with the 
Indians."36 Indeed, the backcountry settlers soon responded
34 Conference between M. d'Abbadie & Shawnees, March, 
1765, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial 
History of New York, 10:1160-1161.
35 Gipson, The British Empire Before the American 
Revolution, 9:51. Jack Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: 
The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775, 
(Lincoln Ne.: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), pp.52-78.
36 Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, May 26, 1765, Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol.
1331) 12:278-279.
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with violence. On both the Virginia and Pennsylvania 
frontiers, settlers attacked and massacred Indians. In 
December 1763 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania a band of 
settlers from Paxton Township attacked some of the local 
Conestoga Indians. Not satisfied with killing six warriors a 
few days later they returned and attacked the survivors of the 
raid who had taken shelter in the county jail. The band, 
popularly called the Paxton Boys, even marched on Philadelphia 
to demand the end of colonial support for Indian refugees and 
improved representation for the backcountry in the Assembly.37
Eighteen months later, in May 1765, a party of Augusta 
County ruffians attacked and burned a barn in which ten 
Cherokees warriors had taken shelter. Most of the Indians 
were burned alive; those who fled they pursued through the 
woods. The local magistrates arrested the ringleaders, but a 
mob, who styled themselves the "Augusta Boys," stormed the 
country jail and freed them. Fauquier advised local justice 
Andrew Lewis to use "a little patience" to allow the unrest to 
calm down.38 However, the unrest remained. Only a few weeks 
later the Augusta Boys threatened to kill the Little Carpenter 
as he returned to Cherokee country from negotiations with
37 Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, pp.28-29; James Kiby 
Martin, "The Return of the Paxton Boys and the Historical 
State of the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1764-1774," Pennsylvania 
History, 38 (1971) 117-133.
38 Andrew Lewis to Gov. Fauquier, May 9, 1765, Gov. 
Fauquier to Andrew Lewis, June 14, 1765, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, 
Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 1331) 12:285-287, 
312.
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Fauquier. On the Pennsylvania frontier tensions remained high 
until the Revolution. Such was the power of these "boys" that 
neither the Augustas nor the Paxtons were ever prosecuted.39
In the years following, the frontier remained a center of 
unrest and instability. The frontier environment of 
opportunity and mobility made it impossible for frontier 
settlers to comprehend a reality beyond their personal needs 
and quest for improvement. During the Revolution the Virginia 
backcountry was the center of much loyalist agitation as 
backcountry settlers failed to comprehend why they should 
transfer their loyalties to Richmond. In the early republic 
southwestern Pennsylvania was the scene of the Whisky 
Rebellion as settlers failed to see why they should sacrifice 
their profits to support a government in Washington.40 Only 
the eventual removal of both the Indians and the frontier 
environment created a degree of stability in the region.
39 Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, August 1, 1765, Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 
1331) 12:302-304; James Kirby Martin, "The Return of the 
Paxton Boys and the Historical State of the Pennsylvania 
Frontier, 1764-1774," Pennsylvania History, 38 (1971) 117-133.
40 Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion; James Kirkby Martin, 
"The Paxton Boys and the Historical State of the Pennsylvania 
Frontier," Pennsylvania History, 38 (1971) 117-133; Albert
Tilson, "Political Culture and Social Conflict in the Upper 
Valley of Virginia, 1740-1789,” Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Texas, 1986; Albert Tilson, "The 
Militia and Popular Culture in the Upper Valley of Virginia, 
1740-1775," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 94 
(1986) 285-306.
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Appendix A
The Composition of the Colonial Forces
The table below lists the average ages of privates in the 
provincial forces. Figures for Virginia are taken from the 
size rolls for 1755-1758 in the George Washington Papers. 
Figures for Pennsylvania are compiled from the lists of 
Pennsylvania troops from 1755-1758 in Pennsylvania Archives. 
Figures for Massachusetts have been compiled from Fred 
Anderson, A Peoples• Army.1
The mean age of privates in the Massachusetts forces was 
25.8 years.
Table I Average Age of Privates in Provincial Forces
COLONY N Mean Median Mode
Massachusetts 1734 25.8 22 18
Pennsylvania 788 25.2 23 22
Virginia 1540 26.5 25 24
However, as Anderson points out "the presence of a small 
group of older men" raised this figure. The mean age of 
Virginia and Pennsylvania troops was not notably different. 
However the modal and median ages of the forces were rather 
different. The median age of the Massachusetts forces was 22, 
whereas the Pennsylvania forces were somewhat older, 23 and 25 
respectively. This difference is revealed even more clearly by 
the modal ages of the forces: 18 for Massachusetts, 22 for 
Pennsylvania and 24 for Virginia. Whereas 24.7% of the 
Massachusetts troops were aged 19 or less, in Virginia and 
Pennsylvania only 10% and 13.8%, respectively, were that 
young. Almost two-thirds of the Virginia and Pennsylvania 
forces were in their twenties.
This contrast of an army with a large number of 
teenagers, compared to an army with much larger numbers of men
1 Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, 
Presidential papers Microfilm, (Washington DC: Library of
Congress, 1961), Series 4, Reels 29-31; Pennsylvania Archives, 
2d Ser., 2:419-528; Anderson, A People's Army, pp.225-237.
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in their twenties may, in part, account for some of the 
reluctance of the troops to obey their superiors. 
Unfortunately samples are not large enough for the Virginia 
and Pennsylvania forces to get a meaningful picture of the 
profile of the officer corps.
Table II: Age Cohorts for All ranks of Provincial Troops
Massachusetts Virginia Pennsylvania
Age Group N % N % N %
14-19 591 24.7 154 10.0 113 13.8
20-24 758 31.7 645 41.9 337 41.2
25-29 395 16.5 344 22.4 182 22.3
30-34 208 8.7 182 11.8 100 12.2
35-39 158 6.6 61 4.0 55 6.7
41-44 117 4.9 82 5.3 24 2.9
45-49 87 3.6 52 3.4 6 0.7
50-54 48 2.0 12 0.8 0 0.0
55 + 29 1.2 6 0.4 0 0.0
Even more striking is the variance of birthplace among 
the different recruits. Over 90% of Massachusetts troops were 
born in Massachusetts itself or in other New England colonies. 
By comparison only about half the Virginia troops and less
Table III: Birthplace of Privates in the Provincial Forces
Birthplace Massachusetts Virginia Pennsylvania
N % N % N %
Same Colony 2,013 82 .4 635 41.2 128 15.8
Neighboring Colony 183 7.8 82 5.3 66 8.2
Other N. American 22 0.9 56 3.6 12 1.5
Other G.B. Colony 12 0.5 1 0.1 4 0.5
Great Britain 193 7.9 724 47.0 430 53.2
Continental Europe 19 0.8 42 2.7 167 20.6
than a quarter of the Pennsylvania troops were born in 
Virginia and Pennsylvania respectively, and over half were 
born in Great Britain. A substantial number of the 
Pennsylvania forces were born in continental Europe, 
predominantly Germany. Thus whereas the Massachusetts forces 
were predominantly native, the Virginia and Pennsylvania 
forces were predominantly composed of immigrants. This is a
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significant difference, for men born abroad would have less 
emotional attachment to the colony for which they were 
fighting and would be less tolerant of the failure of the 
province to provide them with pay and necessary supplies.
The divergence of birthplace also reflects the divergence 
in social status of the troops from the different colonies. 
This is also revealed in the pre-war occupations of the 
troops. 86.6% of the Virginia forces were "farmers" or 
"artisans" while 92.1% of the Pennsylvania forces were 
laborers or artisans. The Massachusetts forces troops came 
from a wider-range of occupations. The categories for 
occupational breakdown are taken from Anderson to ensure
Table IV Pre-enlistment Occupations of Privates in the 
Provincial Forces
Massachusetts Virginia Pennsylvania
Occupation N % N % N %
Farmer 335 20.7 625 45.9 11 1.7
Laborer 621 38.4 62 4.6 304 46.8
Artisan 579 35.7 554 40.7 294 45.3
Seafarer 62 3.8 72 5.3 33 5.1
Non-manual 21 1.3 48 3.5 7 1.1
comparability of the results. The description "artisan" 
includes a particularly wide range of occupations from 
blacksmith to tailor, and including some more unusual 
occupations such as an armorer and "perukemaker." The largest 
categories were tailor, shoemaker, carpenter and weaver. The 
category "Non-manual" includes school-teachers and soldiers.
The age, birthplace, and occupations of the troops, as 
revealed from the muster and size rolls of the provincial 
forces suggest that there were differences in the nature of 
the colonial forces. This information, while far from 
conclusive in itself, provides important corroborating 
evidence for statements by contemporaries about the low status 
of the provincial forces.
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Appendix B
The Impact of the Raids
Figure 4 illustrates the economic impact the raids had 
upon the merchant John Harris, who lived upon the Susquehanna
Figure 4s: The Economic Impact of the Raids. Number of
Entries per season, in John Harris' Receipt Book, 1752-1760. 
Receipt Book of John Harris II, 1749-1769, Pennsylvania State 




1752 1 7 5 4 1756 1 7 5 8 1760
1 7 5 3 175 5 17 5 7 1 7 5 9
Year
River at Harris' Ferry. The economic dislocation is very 
clear as the number of entries dropped to zero during early 
1756. Equally clear are the economic opportunities opened by 
Braddock's expedition and Forbes' expedition, as the number of 
entries peaked in mid 1755 and 1758.
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of the raids upon the 
civilian population of Frederick and Augusta Counties taken
415
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from those compiled by Chester Raymond Young.1 Comparable 
figures are not available for Hampshire County as the county 
court ceased operation. However, this suggests, and sources 
confirm, that the county was all but abandoned.2 Sources are 
also unreliable for the Pennsylvania frontier counties and it 
is impossible to compile any meaningful figures for population 
changes in those counties.
Figure 5 reveals the continuing impact of the raids until 
1758. Frederick County probably suffered less population loss
Figure 5:: The Impact of the raids on the population of
Frederick and Augusta Counties, Virginia. The estimated annual 
population of the counties. (From: Young, "The Impact of the 




1 Chester Raymond Young, "The Impact of the French and 
Indian War on the Civilian Population of Virginia," 
Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1969 
p.207.
2 Mcllwaine, Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1758- 
1761, p.110.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
than Augusta because the majority of the Virginia Regiment was 
stationed in Frederick County, offering some degree of 
protection to the inhabitants. In addition, the presence of 
the regiment itself spurred some growth. The town of 
Winchester, in particular, benefitted from the large number of 
troops stationed there.
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Appendix C
The Casualties of the Raids
Chester Raymond Young's work gives insight into the 
population changes on the Virginia frontier during the Seven 
Years' War. What Young's work cannot show is the number of 
settlers who were killed, the number captured, and the number 
who fled. The only means of discovering the numbers who were 
killed and captured is by examining casualty figures for the 
individual raids.1
Table V lists every French and Indian raid, reported in 
examined sources, upon the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier 
from 1754 until the end of 1758. The primary sources are the 
Pennsylvania Gazette, Maryland Gazette, the lists of casualty 
figures in the Conrad Weiser Papers, and the "Register" of 
casualties in the Preston Papers. Where different sources 
cite conflicting casualty figures, the lower rate has been 
accepted, unless there is reason to suspect a higher number 
may be more accurate, such as when a source provides a list of 
the names of the casualties. Every attempt has been made to 
ensure that the same raid has not been included twice. In 
most cases it is possible to cross-check the date of a raid 
with the location, and if there is still doubt, with the names 
of the casualties. Where figures are estimates, for instance 
where several sources merely record that "fifty or sixty were 
killed or captured," the number in the table is italicized, 
(an explanation of the estimate can be found in the 
footnotes.) When the number is completely unknown, question 
marks are shown and the entry has been counted as zero for the 
purposes of calculating the total.
As a result, the figures below for individual raids 
probably underestimate casualties. Some attacks appear to 
have been much larger than the reports suggest. For example, 
there was a raid on the northern Virginia frontier in early 
April 1756. The only casualty reports are for an attack on 
Cox's Fort, where five were killed and two captured. 
Nevertheless, Washington reported that the French and their 
Indian allies had "committed several murders not far from 
Winchester" and expressed a belief that the Indians intended 
to rendezvous with their prisoners at the back of Warm-Spring
1 Chester Raymond Young, "The Effects of the French and 
Indian War on Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of 
Virginia, 1754-1763." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Vanderbilt University, 1969.
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Mountain, on the boundary of Frederick and Hampshire counties. 
These statements suggest a much larger raid than the specific 
figures indicate.2 On other occasions reports similarly refer 
to great devastation whereas specific casualty numbers 
reported are small. In July 1758 there was a raid on 
Frederick County. The only specific toll lists nine deaths 
and six people captured around the Massanutten Mountain, 
whereas the Pennsylvania Gazette and Maryland Gazette had 
reported twenty-six people killed or captured between 
Winchester and Augusta Court House and other reports refer to 
the people abandoning a large swathe of territory between 
those places.3
As well as the fact that extant records underestimate the 
number of casualties in specific raids, there is good reason 
to believe that many raids were omitted from reports. In 
particular the Pennsylvania Gazette and Maryland Gazette gave 
great detail of the early raids, and early raids were likely 
to appear in corroborating sources. However, the reporting of 
raids declined as the war progressed, probably because a small 
raid was not as sensational in 1757 as it had been in 1755. 
The opposite tendency can be seen in the reports of casualties 
provided to Conrad Weiser: the reports become more accurate as 
the war progresses. One of Weiser's informants, Jacob Morgan, 
admitted that his recent figures were relatively accurate but 
for earlier figures he was "not certain, but got the best 
information [he] could."4
In addition to the varying reliability of the sources 
over time, geographic coverage is also variable. Coverage of 
the raids in eastern Pennsylvania, Northampton, Berks, and 
Lancaster Counties is very thorough. Coverage for Augusta 
County, primarily because of the "Register" in the Preston 
Papers is also adequate although not as thorough as for 
eastern Pennsylvania. However, coverage for Frederick and 
Hampshire Counties in Virginia, and Cumberland and York 
Counties in Pennsylvania, is less adequate. As these 
counties were the most exposed to assaults from the Ohio 
Indians, it seem reasonable to conclude that figures for these 
counties are underestimates.
2 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 7, 1756, 
George Mercer to John Fenton Mercer, April 15, 1756, George 
Washington to John Robinson, April 16, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 2:333, 354, 3:6.
3 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 27, 1758; Maryland Gazette, 
July 27, 1758; John Hite to George Washington, July 2, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:254.
4 List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.
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Finally it is likely that in the disorder of the 
frontier, many small raids went unnoticed. The disappearance 
of a peddlar attacked and captured or his body dumped in the 
woods, would have gone unremarked. Many might have presumed 
a planter who disappeared had simply fled rather than been 
captured by the Indians.
For these reasons it seems likely that the real figures 
are higher than the final figures for this table. The French 
and their Indian allies probable killed around 1,500 settlers 
and took 1,000 prisoners.
Table V: Casualties of the Raids in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 
1754-1758.





July Holston’s River, 
Augusta County
9 ? ?/?/?s
August Pennsylvania Frontier 9 ? 9/9/?«
October Monongahela River, 
Augusta County
7 0 o/o/o7
October Holston’s River 3 1 ? / ? /?  8
December Frederick County, 
Virginia
? ? ? /? /? 9
5 Gov. Dinwiddie to Richard Pearis, August 2, [1754], 
R.A. Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758, 2 
Vols., (Richmond, VA: Virginia Historical Soxiety Collections, 
Vols. 3 & 4) 1901-1902, 1:266-268.
6 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:133-136.
7 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
8 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
9 Capt. Rutherford to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 27, 1754, 
Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(Vol. 15) 2:141-142.
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1755
May Virginia Frontier 17 11 ?/?/?i°
Mid-May Juniata &
Kishacoquillis Valleys
0 0 0/0/0 Settlers driven off."
June 18 Holston's River 4 2 2/0/0l:
June 22 Around Will’s Creek 3 8 1/1/613
June 24 Patterson’s Creek 14 19 ?/?/7 Two large Parties of 
130 French & 
Indians14
June 28 North Branch 21IS 7 ?/?/?16
Early July Road builders in 
Cumberland County
1 1 0/0/117
Early July Around Shippensburg 9 14 ?/7/? 9 men killed, 15 or 20 
men, women, & 
children missing18
10 Kent, ed., Wilderness Chronicles. pp.88-90.
11 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:402.
12,lRegister," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.
13 Gov. Sharpe to Sir Thomas Robinson, June 28, 1755,
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(16) 1:361-362; Maryland Gazette, July 3, 1755; Colonial
Records of Pennsylvania, 6:456, 457.
14 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:456, 457, 465;
Pennsylvania Gazette, July 3, 1755; Maryland Gazette, July 3, 
1755; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, July 5, 1755, Brock, ed., 
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:85-86.
15 Dinwiddie reported to Sir Thomas Robinson on July 4 
that about thirty-five people had been murdered on the
Virginia frontier. Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson,
Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, 
(Vol. 16) 2:344-345.
16 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 3, 1755
17 The captive was described as a "boy" aged 16. Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 6:466-467
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Early July Holston’s River 3 6 ?/?/?19 
(1/1/0)
Several Prisoners30
Early July Near Fort Cumberland 6 0 0/0/0 Killed as they fled to 
the fort for safety21
Early July Raystown,
Pennsylvania
9 0 0/0/0 Adam Hoops’ men 
guarding provisions 
were attacked.22
July 3 New River 7 10 2/1/723
July 12 Reed Creek, (branch of 
New River)
3 0 0/0/024
Mid July Juniata River 4 7 ?/?/? 2 families murdered25
July 31 Augusta County, Head 
of Roanoake River
3 7 1/3/326 Col. Patton’s 
detachment attacked
18(.. .continued)
18 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:455-456, 459-461; 
Edward Shippen to William Allen, July 4, 1755, H.S.P., Shippen 
Family Papers, Vol. 1.
19,,killed three men” [emphasis mine], Gov. Dinwiddie to 
Gov. Dobbs, July 8, 1755, Brock, ed., The Official Records of 
Robert Dinwiddie, 2:90; Captain Stallnicker and his wife were 
captured, Virginia Gazette, July 11, 1755.
20 Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, July 8, 1755, Gov.
Dinwiddie to Capt. Lewis, July 8, 1755, Brock, ed., The
Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:90-91, 91; Virginia 
Gazette, July 11, 1755; Maryland Gazette, July 24, 1755.
21 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 10, 1755.
22 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 17, 1755, Maryland Gazette, 
July 24, 1755.
23|,Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.
24 Allan Macrae to George Washington, May 13, 1755, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, l:270n; 
"Register,” Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.
25 John Harris to Richard Peters, July 26, 1755, H.S.P., 
Peters Papers, 4:34; Pennsylvania Gazette, July 31, 1757.
25 Colonel Patton and eight men, women and children were 
killed or captured. Virginia Gazette, August 8, 1755;
Pennsylvania Gazette, August 21, 1755; "Register," Draper
Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.
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Early August Halifax County, Near 
Smith’s Mountain
7I7 7 ?/7/7








Greenbrier River 1230 831 0/2/6 50 Shawnees drove off 
500 cattle & besieged 
59 people in a fort for 
4 days.31




Augusta County 1 0 0/0/0 Skirmish with Indians, 
several Indians killed 
or wounded.34
October 1 Patterson’s Creek 4235 28 ?/?/? 150 Indians raiding34
27 Reports stated seven or eight people had been killed in 
Halifax County. Virginia Gazette, August 8, 1755; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, August 21, 1755.
28 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83.
29 Maryland Gazette, September 11, 25, 1755; "Register," 
Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.
30 Dinwiddie reported to Andrew Lewis that 13 people had 
been killed on the Greenbrier. Gov. Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, 
September 15, 1755, Brock, ed. , The Official Records of Robert 
Dinwiddie, 2:198 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston 
Papers, 1QQ:83.
31 Reports stated about 15 killed or captured. Virginia 
Gazette, September 29, 1755; Pennsylvania Gazette, October 9, 
1757; Maryland Gazette, October 2, 1755; "Register," Draper 
Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.
32 Gov. Dinwiddie to John McNeil, September 27, 1755, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:218; 
Maryland Gazette, October 2, 1755.
33 Maryland Gazette, October 2, 1755.
34 Virginia Gazette, October 3, 1755.
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Early October Near Fort Cumberland 2 12 2/3/737
October Berks County 8 1 0/0/138
October 16 Penns Creek, Pa. 13 12 ?/?/?»
October 24- 
25
"From McKee’s to 
Hunter’s Mill" (along 
Susquehanna River.)
8«° 10 ?/7/7 "killed a great many 
people. "4I
35 (... continued)
35 William Trent reported to James Burd that 42 people had 
been buried at Patterson's Creek. Washington reported to 
Dinwiddie that about 70 had been killed or captured in this 
raid "no so great... as was at first reported." Gov. Dinwiddie 
to Gov. Morris, October 31, 1755, Brock, ed., The Official 
Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:259; George Washington to Gov. 
Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The
Papers of George Washington, 2:104.
36 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:643; Adam Stephen 
to George Washington, October 4, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., 
The Papers of George Washington, 2:72-73; Virginia Gazette, 
October 10, 1755; Pennsylvania Gazette, October 16, 30, 1755; 
Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs., October 10, 1755, Brock, ed., 
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:235.
37 The men killed were troops going to Fort Cumberland. 
Maryland Gazette, October 9, 1755 lists 2 killed, 3 captured, 
10 killed or captured. More details are in the Pennsylvania 
Gazette, October 16, 1755.
38 List of People Killed or Captured in South-West Side of 
Schulkill River, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
39 A petition of the survivors from Penn's Creek reported 
that most of the bodies found "were men and elderly women, & 
one Child of two weeks old, the rest being young Women & 
Children we suppose to be carried away Prisoners." "Petition 
of the Inhabitants of Penn's Creek," October 20, 1755, H.S.P., 
Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs 2:32; Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 6:645, 647
40 "Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the 
Frontier of Lancaster County" lists 8 men as killed in Paxton 
Township alone on this date. Some of the attacks were also on 
the western side of the Susquehanna. 8 is thus a minimum 
estimate of the. numbers killed. H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:89.
41 James Reed to Conrad Weiser, October 26, 1755, Gov. 
Morris to Sir Thomas Robinson, October 28, 1755, Boehm, ed.,
(continued...)
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October 25 Mouth of Mahoney 
River





Swatarro Creek 2 5 0/ 1/4“
November Berks County 17 0 0/0/045 Most of these attacks 
were on the Kittaning 
Hill.
November Northampton County 8 0 0/0/046









BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 16) 
2:647-648, (Vol. 17) 2:815-816; Colonial Records of
Pennsylvania, 6:650-651, 656.
42 4 killed by Indians, 4 drowned.
43 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:654-655; William 
Buchanan and John Armstrong to James Burd, October 27, 1755, 
William Buchanan to George Croghan, November 2, 1755, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
44 Pennsylvania Gazette, November 6, 1755.
45 List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of 
Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
45 Lombard Boss, Goldon, Hans von Flary, a negro man, 
James Caull. Richard Thomas, & Williams killed. The entry then 
maintains a total of eight were killed, List of People Killed 
or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser 
Papers, 2:115.
47 Some women and children taken captive.
48 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:673-674, 676; 
William West to Thomas Penn, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, 
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 17) 2:769; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, November 13, 1755.




Juniata, Tuscarora, & 
Sherman’s Valley
4 5 7/7/7 Killed some and took 
5 prisoners 30
November 15 Tulpehocken 15“ 3 0/1/252
November 24 Gnadenhutten l l 53 ? ?/?/?
December Northampton County 7 11 7/?/?
3/1/054
December Northampton County 13 3 0/0/3“




49 The sheriff of Cumberland County reported that 47 had 
been killed or captured in Coves and Canalways. Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 6:706-707.
50 "40 killed" on the Pennsylvania frontier; Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 6:673-674, 704-705; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, November 13, 1755.
51 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:703, 704-705;
Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 18, 1755, H.S.P.,
Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:60.
52 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
53 David Zeisburger reported that the Indians had "Killed 
the most part of the people," Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 6:736, 737; Timothy Horsefield to William
Parsons, November 25, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1,
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 17) 2:736-737; List of 
People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
54 Nicholas Weiser & Peter Hass & 3 more killed & Henry 
Hass & Lanord Weiser & one man were captured; Benjamin Deetz 
& one other man were killed, his wife & 7 more were captured. 
List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
55 Those killed were Gist von Camp and his wife and child; 
John Worly Sr. and his wife; John Worly Jr. and his wife and
family of seven children; 3 children were captured. List of 
People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.




Northampton County 6257 6* 0/1/5









January Northampton County 2 1 0/1/061
January Northampton County 5 1 ?/?/? At "Fox’s"62
56(... continued)
56 List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River 
Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Manuscripts, 2:119.
57 From the accounts in the Pennsylvania Gazette and in 
the Historical Society of Pennsylvania those killed were: Hans 
Bush & Family; Lambert Bush; Benjamin Tidd & family; Matthew 
Roe; Daniel Williams & family; [Williams Wife was reported in 
the "List" as being captured with her six five children]; 
Piercenwall Golden; Frederick Hoeth & Family; Cornelius 
Vanaker; Guilbert Van Camp & family; Hans Bush, Bush's wife &
son; John Drake; William Kennedy; Nathan Parks; -----
Goulding; William Roe; Abram Miller; Hans Van Flesa; Adam 
Snell & his family. Pennsylvania Gazette, December 11, 18, 
1755; "List of Inhabitants Killed in Northampton County," 
December 19, 1755, H.S.P., Penn Mss. : Indian Affairs, 2:52;
List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115. The Pennsylvania Gazette, 
of December 25 reported over 100 killed in Northampton County.
58 It was thought that one woman and three children had 
been captured but a rescue party later found their bodies. 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 758-759; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, December 4, 1755, January 8, 1756.
59 List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township 
Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.
60 Pennsylvania Gazette, January 1, 1756. The Gazette 
lists those killed as Brewer Decker and Family, John Worley 
and Family, and Peter Van Godrey and his three sons.
61 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
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January Plainfield Township, 
Northampton County
3 0 O/O/O63
January 1 Nazareth 1 0 O/O/O64
Early January Gnadenhutten 11 0 0/0/0 Those attacked were a 
force of 52 men 
"mostly labourers" 
sent to guard the 
village65
January 8 Albany Township, 
Berks County
3 0 O/O/O66
January 15 Northampton County 8 2 0/0/267
January 17 Smithfield Township, 
Northampton County
3 0 0/0/068
January 18 Northampton County, 
near Wind Gap
15 9 ?/?/?«>
January 27 Juniata River 12 670 0/ 1/5
62(.. .continued)
62 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
63 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
54 Pennsylvania Gazette, January 22, 1756.
65 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 6:772; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, January 8, 15, 1756; List of People Killed or
Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser 
Papers, 2:115.
66 List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River 
Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Manuscripts, 2:119.
67 Pennsylvania Gazette, January 29, 1756; List of People 
Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad 
Weiser Papers, 2:115.
68 Pennsylvania Gazette, January 29, 1756.
69 Pennsylvania Gazette, February 5, 1756.
70 The Pennsylvania Gazette, for February 5, 1756, 
provides the names of four of those killed, and the names of 
six who were captured, although it added that a total of
(continued...)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
429
January 28 Canalways, 
Cumberland County
3 2 0/0/271
February Berks County 5 2 0/0/277










February Reed Creek 2 0 O/O/O76
February 7 Berks County 11 0 O/O/O77
February 11 Near McDowell’s Mill 0 3 3/0/078
70 (... continued)
fifteen were killed or captured. The gazette a week later 
added the names of eight more. Only those whose names were 
given have been counted. Robert Morris to James Burd, February 
7, 1756, H.S.P.: Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
71 Pennsylvania Gazette, February 12, 1756.
72 List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River 
Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.
73 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
74 It was reported that the French and their Indian allies 
"had picked up several of the Men belonging to the Fort." 
Pennsylvania Gazette, February 26, 1756.
75 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
76 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83.
77 List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River 
Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.
78 Two of the three men were Widow Coxe's sons, described 
as "young men." Hugh Mercer to James Burd, February 17, 1756, 
H.S.P, Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
February 19, 1756.
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February 14 Allemingle, Berks 
County
11 0 O/O/O79
February 19 Lynn Township, 
Northampton County
3 1 l/O/O80
February 29 Little Cove 4 4 ?/?/?8!
February 29 Near McDowell’s Mill 3 0 o/o/oK
Early March Berks County 2 1 0/0/183
March Berks County 8 0 O/O/O84
March Augusta County 3 1 l/O/O85
March New River 4 0 O/O/O84
March 1 Northampton County, 
between Forts Norris 
and Hamilton
3 0 O/O/O87
March 6 Cumberland County 14 0 O/O/O88
79 List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.
80 Pennsylvania Gazette, February 19, 1756.
81 Pennsylvania Gazette, March 18, 1756.
82 Benjamin McGill to James Burd, March 5, 1756, James 
Patterson to James Burd, March 7, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family 
papers, Vol. 2; Pennsylvania Gazette, March 18, 1756.
83 Pennsylvania Gazette, March 11, 1756; List of People 
Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
84 List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River 
Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.
85 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83.
86 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83.
87 Pennsylvania Gazette, March 11, 1756.
88 James Patterson to James Burd, March 7, 1756, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family papers, Vol. 2.
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March 6 Berks County 4 0 o/o/ow
Early March Williams Fort VA, 30 
miles from Ft. 
Cumberland
7 7 O/l/O90
March 18 Near McDowell’s Mill 1 1 l/O/O91
March 22 Berks County 2 0 O/O/O92 At Baumgartner’s 
Plantation
March 24 Berks County 6 0 O/O/O93 At Cluck’s and
Linderman’s
Plantations
March 24 Hereford Township, 
Berks County
2 1 0/0/194
March 24 Near Allemingle, Berks 
County.
5 0 O/O/O95
April Berks County 2 0 O/O/O96
April 1 Cox’s Fort, VA 5 2 2/0/097
89 List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.
90 William's Fort was near the Potomac River thirty miles 
downstream from Fort Cumberland. Edward Shippen reported that 
thirty-three had been killed. However the Maryland Gazette of 
April 8 reported that there were 18 inside the fort when it 
was attacked and burned. Some of those inside were killed, 
some captured, and two men and three women escaped. Edward 
Shippen to James Burd, March 24, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family 
Papers, Vol. 2.
91 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 1, 1756.
92 List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.
93 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 1, 1756; List of People
Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser
Papers, 2:117.
94 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 1, 1756.
95 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 1, 1756.
96 List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of 
Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
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Early April McCord’s Fort, PA 15 72* ?/?/?
Early April Near Fort Cumberland 1 0 0/0/0"
Early April Patterson’s Fort on 
Juniata River
0 1 l/O/O100
Early April Near Sideling Hill, PA 20 0 0/0/0 Indians attacked a 
party sent to intercept 
them.101
April 4 Northants County 3 2 0/0/2102
April 15 Patterson’s Creek 1 0 0/0/0 Party under command 
of John Fenton Mercer 
attacked.103
April 18 Patterson’s Creek 17 0 0/0/0 John Fenton Mercer’s 




97 The men captured were described as the "sons" of 
Michael Teabol. Maryland Gazette, April 8, 1756; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, April 15, 1756.
98 The Maryland Gazette for April 8, 1756 reported that 
thirty people at McCord's Fort had been killed or taken 
captive; the Pennsylvania Gazette for the same date reported 
only twenty-seven. A letter from Hance Hamilton maintained 
that the Indians took many captives from the fort. Colonial 
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:77.
99 Maryland Gazette, April 8, 1756.
100 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 8, 1756.
101 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 15, 22, 1756; Colonial
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:77.
102 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
103 John Fenton Mercer to George Washington, April 17, 
1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:11.
104 William Stark to George Washington, April 18, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:17- 
18.
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April 21 Hanover Township, 
Lancaster County
1 1 O/O/l105
April 22 Near Winchester 10106 0 0/0/0
April 22 Near Cunningham’s 
Fort
1 7 0/1/6107
April 24 Edward’s Fort, 
Frederick County, VA
4\oe 0 0/0/0
Mid-May Patterson’s Creek 0 1109 ?/?/?
May 20 Near McDowell’s Mill 1 1 0/1/0*'°
May 25 Bear Camp, (beyond 
Ft. Cumberland)
3 0 0/0/0 This was a Maryland 
Party under Cressap 
sent out to raid the 
Ohio.111
May 26 Peters Township, 
Cumberland County
1 1 O/l/O"2
105 Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the 
Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:89.
106 Three families were killed. George Washington to Gov. 
Dinwiddie, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 3:45.
107 Pennsylvania Gazette, May 13, 1756.
108 One family killed. Washington to Henry Harrison, April 
26, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 3:53.
109 "Memorandum respecting the militia," May 17, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:145.
1,0 John Armstrong to James Burd, May 23, 1756,
Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen Thompson Family 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.
111 Maryland Gazette, June 10, 1756.
112 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 10, 1756.
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May 28 Cox’s Fort, VA 2 1 l/O/O"3
June Roanoake River 0 1 l/O/O"4
June 8 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
1 4 0/3/ 1"5
June 8 Berks County 1 1 O/O/l"6
June 10 Bigham’s Fort, 
Cumberland County
17 6 1/3/2"7
June 19 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
4 0 O/O/O"8
June 25 Vause’s Fort, Augusta 
County
9 19 8/6/5119
June 28 Near Fort Cumberland 1 1 O/O/l120
113 Maryland Gazette, July 1, 1756; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
July 1, 1756.
114 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:8 3.
515 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 17, 1756; List of People
Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County,
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.
116 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 17, June 24, 1756; List of 
People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
117 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 17, 24, 1756.
118 List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township 
Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.
119 Peter Looney who escaped from captivity in the summer 
of 1757 reported that the French had captured 8 men, 6, women, 
and 5 children. Pennsylvania Gazette, July 29, 1756, July 28, 
1757; Memorandum, July 1756, William Preston Letter, August 
24, 1756, Draper Mss: William Preston Papers, 1QQ:131, 134- 
135; Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:260n; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
120 A "boy" was taken prisoner. Maryland Gazette, July 8,
1756.
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June 30 Frederick County, MD 4 1 ?/?/?i:i
Late June Augusta County 10 0 o/o/o'-
Early July Bethel Township, 
Cumberland County
2 0 0/0/0123
July 7 Near Fort Cumberland 4 0 O/O/O124
July 19 Near Fort Cumberland 1 0 0/0/0,2S
July 20 Near McDowell’s Mill 1 2 2/0/0'26
July 20 Conococheague 2 0 O/O/O127
July 21 Near McClure’s Gap, 
Cumberland County
1 2 0/0/2128
July 24 Juniata River 1 7129 ?/?/?
121 Maryland Gazette, July 8, 1756
122 Gov. Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, July 24, 1756, 
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:467.
123 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 8, 1756; List of People 
Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
124 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 15, 1756.
125 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 29, 1756.
126 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 29, 1756; Maryland Gazette, 
August 5, 1756.
127 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 29, August, 12, 1756; 
Maryland Gazette, August 5, 1756.
128 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 29, 1756; Maryland Gazette, 
August 5, 1756.
129 Report stated that two families were captured. 
Pennsylvania Gazette, August 5, 1756.
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July 30 Fort Granville 8 23 15/3/5 130
July 31 Near Maidstone, VA 1 2 2/0/0131
Early August Conococheague 4 4'32 ?/?/?
August 5-8 McDowell’s Mill 4 5 0/0/5 '33
August 9 South Branch 1 2 2/0/0'34
August 11 Cacapon 2 0 0/0/0,3S
August 20 Conococheague 15 0 O/O/O136
August 21 Fort Pleasant, VA 2 0 O/O/O137
August 21 Conococheague 4 1 l/O/O138
130 The Indians took possession of the older men and women 
and children, the French of the younger men and women. The 
Maryland Gazette for August 26, 1756 reported that several of 
the soldiers in the fort had been killed but gave no exact 
figures. Pennsylvania Gazette, August 19, 1756.
131 Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 31, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:304.
132 A report in the Maryland Gazette on August 26 stated 
that the Conococheague had been attacked by the Indians 
returning from Fort Granville. Washington wrote to Lord 
Fairfax that as a result of the raid "the whole Settlement of 
Conogochieg in maryland is fled."
133 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 19, 1756.
134 Thomas Waggener to George Washington, August 10, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:340.
135 Virginia Gazette, August 27, 1756.
136 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 2, 1756.
137 Thomas Waggener to George Washington, August 21, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:373-374.
138 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 2, 1756.
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August 21 "Salisbury Plain" 9 4 4/0/0139
August 21 South Mountain, 
Cumberland County
4 0 0/0/0'"
August 25 Lancaster County 2 4 0/ 1/3141
September Berks County 0 1 O/O/l142
September 1 South Mountain, 
Cumberland County
3 0 O/O/O143 Murders and raids 




Jackson’s River 13 29144 2/4/23145
September 20 Conococheague 1 3 0/1/2'4*
139 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 2, 1756.
140 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 2, 1756.
141 Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the 
Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:89.
142 List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the 
River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:119.
143 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 9, 1756.
144 Reports in Pennsylvania Gazette for October 7, 1756, 
maintained that over fifty people had been killed or captured. 
At the end of September Washington maintained that the South 
Branch had been "constantly pestered" by Indian raids while 
Dinwiddie reported to the Earl of Halifax that "Flying 
Parties... continue harassing our Frontiers." George 
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 28, 1756, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 3:422; 
Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, September 24, 1756, Boehm, 
ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol 
1329) 12:21.
145 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83.
146 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 7, 1756.
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October Tulpehocken 2 1 l/O/O147
Early October Preston’s Fort, on 
Catawba River
? 7 7 Attacked by the 
Indians.14®
Early October Augusta County 2 0 O/O/O149
October 7-8 Lancaster County 3 1 O/O/l150
October 12 Vause’s Fort 1 1 l/O/O151
October 12 Hanover Township, 
Lancaster County
1 3 0/0/3152
October 15 Berks County 0 1 l/O/O153
October 18 Berks County 3 3 0/1/2154
October 18 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
6 0 O/O/O155
147 List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side 
of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
148 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:431.
149 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
3:432.
150 Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the 
Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser papers, 
2:89.
151 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83.
152 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:303; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, October 21, 175 6.
153 List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.
154 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:302; List of 
People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
155 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:303.







October 24 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
3 1 O/l/O157
Mid-October Frederick County, 
Virginia and Maryland
7 9 ?/?/? "The Enemy ravaging 
the country about 
Conogochieg, stony- 
run, and South- 
Branch."158
November Berks County 1 1 0/0/1159
November 2- 
3




November 3 Near McDowell’s Mill 11 8 2/0/6161
November 3 Lebanon Township, 
Berks County
5 4 0/1/3'62
November 3 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
1 0 0/0/0'“
156 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 23, 1756.
157 List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township 
Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.
158 Stony Run was southwest of Winchester. George 
Washington to Adam Stephen, October 23, 1756, Abbot and
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:440. 
Dinwiddie reported in November "The Enemy, in fly'g parties 
have infested our frontiers this fall and committed some few 
Murders." Gov. Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, November 9, 1756,
Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:540.
159 List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the 
River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:119.
160 List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.
161 Pennsylvania Gazette, November 11, 1756.
162 Pennsylvania Gazette, November 11, 1756; List of 
People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad 
Weiser Papers, 2:117.
163 List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township 
Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.
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November 6 Near Aliamingle, Berks 
County
0 6 1/1/4164







December 10 Berks County 1 1 0/1/0167




January IS Berks County 1 0 0/0/0169
Late February South Branch 0 6 0/0/6170
March Craigs Creek, Augusta 
County
0 2 1/0/1171
March 30 Near Chambersburg, 
on Conococheague
1 11 0/1/101 172
164 The "List" includes an additional captive. 
Pennsylvania Gazette, November 18, 1756; List of People Killed 
and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.
165 Pennsylvania Gazette, December 9, 1756.
166 Maryland Gazette, December 23, 1756.
167 Pennsylvania Gazette, December 23, 1756; List of 
People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, 
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
168 Maryland Gazette, December 23, 1756.
169 List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the 
River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:119.
170 Pennsylvania Gazette, March 10, 1757; "Register," 
Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.
171 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:8 3.
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April Tulpehocken, Berks 
County
0 1 0/1/0174
April Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
1 0 0/0/0175
April 2 Conococheague 2 0 0/0/0'76
Early April Northampton County, 
near Blue Mountain
1 2 0/1/1177
Early April Berks County 1 1 0/0/1178
April 10 Near mouth of 
Conococheague
13 0 o/o/o179
Early April Fort Cumberland 2 0 0/0/0 Two Catawba Indians 
were scalped outside 
the fort.180
172 (... continued)
172 The Pennsylvania Gazette, April 14, 1757 reported that 
only on woman was killed, not three people as had previously 
been maintained; Pennsylvania Gazette, April 7, 1757, Maryland 
Gazette, April 7, 1757; Thomas Barton to Richard Peters, April 
4, 1757, H.S.P., Peters Papers, 4:85,
173 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
174 List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side
of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
175 List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side
of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
176 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 14, 1757.
177 Gov. Denny to Thomas Penn, April 8, 1757, Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 18) 
3:215-216.
178 Gov. Denny to Thomas Penn, April 8, 1757, Boehm, ed., 
BPRO C05, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, (Vol. 18) 
3:216; List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River 
Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.
179 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 28, 1757; John Armstrong 
to James Burd, April 30, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, 
Vol. 2.
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April 16 Fort Frederick, 
Maryland
1 0 0/0/0181
April 16 Fort Cumberland 2 1 l/O/O182
April 20-23 Northampton County 3 1 O/O/l183
April 23 Conococheague 2 0 O/O/O184
Late April Fort Lebanon, Berks 
County
1 0 O/O/O183
April 28 Berks County 1 0 O/O/O186
Late April 40 miles from Fort 
Cumberland
4 0 0/0/0 Surprise attack on 
Virginia troops187
May Northampton County 0 1 0/1/0'88
May 2 Northampton County 17 2 2/0/0189
180 (.. . continued)
180 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 16, 1757, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:135; Pennsylvania Gazette, May 5, 1757.
181 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 28, 1757.
182 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:135; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, May 5, 1757.
183 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 28, 1757; Colonial Records 
of Pennsylvania, 7:493-494.
184 John Armstrong to James Burd, April 30, 1757, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
185 Charles Macelraine, a wagoner, was killed. 
Pennsylvania Gazette, May 5, 1757.
186 John Adam Miller was killed. List of People Killed or 
Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.
187 Pennsylvania Gazette, May 19, 1757; Maryland Gazette, 
May 19, 1757.
188 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
189 The Pennsylvania Gazette reported that 14 people were 
killed at the home of a Mr. Buffet where they had taken
(continued...)
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Early May McCormack’s Fort, 
Cumberland County
1 1 0/0/1190
May 6 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
5 0 O/O/O191
May 14 Calf Pasture, Augusta 
County
3 7 ?/?/?l«
May 14 Jacksons River 2 0 O/O/O193
May 16 Cowpasture, Augusta 
County
1 6 0/1/5194
May 16 South Branch 7 0 O/O/O193
May 17 Swatarro Creek 4 0 O/O/O196
189(.. .continued) 
shelter. The deposition of George Ebert, who was taken 
prisoner during the raid, describes an attack at Conrad 
Bittenbender's. Pennsylvania Gazette, May 12, 1757;
"Deposition of those who had been taken prisoners by the 
Indians, June 20, 1757," H.S.P., Northampton County Records: 
Miscellaneous Papers, 1:253; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 
7:620-621.
190 The captive was described as a "servant girl." 
Pennsylvania Gazette, May 26, 1757.
191 List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township 


















"Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
196 George Croghan on Proceedings withi the Iroquois at
Lancaster, April and May 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian
Affairs, 3:5-9; Pennsylvania Gazette, May 26, 1757.
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Mid May Lancaster County 20 10 ?/?/?197
Late May Lynn Township, 
Northampton County
1 1 0/0/1198
June Bern Township, Berks 
County
2 3 0/0/3199
June 1 Northampton County 3 0 O/O/O500
June 1 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
7 0 0/0/0501
Early June Berks County 4 4 7/2/2505
Early June Big Cove 3 5a» 31010
197 An account in the Pennsylvania Gazette on May 26, 
maintained at least twenty people had been killed and more 
taken prisoner, while Bartram Galbreath maintained that "the 
whole Frontier about Seven or Eight Miles into the Inhabitants 
are Laid Waist." Bartram Galbreath to James Burd, May 23, 
1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; The numbers 
contained in "List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel 
Township Lancaster County," "List of People Killed or Captured 
on South-West side of Schuylkill," are slightly lower. H.S.P., 
Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107, 109.
198 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 2, 1757.
199 List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side 
of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.
200 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
201 List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township 
Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.
202 Conrad Weiser reported that all those killed and 
captured were women and children. Conrad Weiser to Gov. Denny, 
June, 1757, H.S.P.: Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:73.
203 The report stated seven men were killed or captured. 
George Croghan's Journal, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 
3:11-13.
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Early June Fort Augusta 4 0 O/O/O304
June 9 Cumberland County, 
near Great Cove
4 4 4/0/0305 A party of troops 
commanded by Lieut. 
Holliday were 
attacked.
June 6 Near Shippensburg, 
Cumberland County
2 3 3/0/0306
June 9 Near Fort Frederick, 
Maryland
2 0 0/0/0 Two wagoners were 
killed.307
June 11 Cumberland County 0 1 0/1/0308
June 23 Allemingle, Berks 
County
1 0 O/O/O309
June 23 Cunningham’s Fort, 
near Winchester
0 3 0/O/3310
June 24 Near Henry Paulins 1 2 0/0/23"
June 24 Fort Littleton 1 0 O/O/O313
204 Daniel Clark to James Burd, June 5, 1757, H.S.P.:
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.
205 Clark maintained that fifteen men and the commander 
were killed. A later report maintained that only 4 were killed 
and four captured. Daniel Clark to James Burd, June 11, 1757, 
H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Pennsylvania Gazette, 
June 23, 1757.
206 Daniel Clark to James Burd, June 11, 1757, H.S.P.,
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Pennsylvania Gazette, June 16,
1757.
207 Maryland Gazette, June 16, 23, 1757.
208 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 23, 1757.
209 List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County,
H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.
210 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 27, 1757; 
Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:632.
211 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:632.
212 colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:632.
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Late June Conococheague 3 0 O/O/O113
June 23-25 Northampton County 2 0 O/O/O214
June 29 Bern Township, Berks 
County
2 3 0/0/3215
Late June Antrim Township, 
Cumberland County
1 2 0/0/2216
Late June Sherman’s Valley 1 0 O/O/O217
July Berks County 10 0 O/O/O218
July Northampton County 1 0 O/O/O219 At William Maks
July Jackson’s River 2 0 O/O/O220
July 1 Tulpehocken 7 0 O/O/O221
213 Washington reported that the whole frontier was 
infested with parties of French and their Indian allies. They 
had killed "several" people on the Conococheague. David 
Jameson also reported that the Indians had killed several 
people in Cumberland County including John Muffit. George 
Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 27, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 4:264; David Jameson 
to James Burd, July 1, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, 
Vol. 2.
214 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:621; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, June 20, 1757.
215 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 7, 1757.
216 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 14, 1757.
217 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 14, 1757.
218 List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the 
River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:119.
219 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
220 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83.
221 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 7, 1757.
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July 2 York County 0 4 0/1/3—
July 8 Berks County 2 5 0/0/5223
July 8 Lancaster County 4 3 0/0/3224
July 9 Lynn Township, 
Northampton County
8 0 O/O/O225
Mid July Antietam Creek 1 0 O/O/O224
July 18 Cumberland County 9 4 0/3/1227
July 20 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
1 4 1/3/0228




July 27 Frederick County, 
Maryland
1 1 l/O/O230
222 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 14, 1757; Maryland Gazette, 
July 7, 1757.
223 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 14, 1757.
224 Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the 
Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:89.
225 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 14, 1757.
226 Maryland Gazette, August 4, 1757.
227 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 4, 1757.
228 List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township 
Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.
229 Washington reported raids on the southern part of 
Augusta, while Dinwiddie maintained there had been several 
murders committed there. George Washington to John Stanwix, 
July 30, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington, 4:354; Journal of the Council of Virginia, 6:59- 
60; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 9, 1757; 
"Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.
230 The prisoner was the son of the man killed. Maryland 
Gazette, August 4, 1757.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
448
July 28 Marsh Creek, York 
County.
0 1 O/O/l23'
Early August South Branch 0 5 5/0/0333
August Northampton County 1 0 O/O/O533
August 2 Hanover Township, 
Lancaster County
1 2 0/1/ l534
August 4 Between Tolhas and 
Monaidy?
1 4 0/4/0535
August 5 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
1 0 O/O/O336
August 6 Hanover Township, 
Lancaster County
1 2 ?/?/?»7
August 13 Bethel Township, 
Lancaster County
2 0 O/O/O338
August 10 Hanover Township, 
Lancaster County
2 1 0/1/0339
231 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 11, 1757.
232 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, August 3, 1757, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
4:360.
233 List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River 
Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.
234 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 11, 1757.
235 Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:706.
236 List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township 
Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.
237 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 11, 1757; this is
probably also the incident listed for August 17 in Memorandum 
of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster 
County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.
238 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 11, 1757.
239 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 18, 1757.
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August 11 Hanover Township, 
Lancaster County
0 2 O /l/l240
August 17 Paxton Township, 
Lancaster County
1 0 O/O/O241
August 18 Hanover Township, 
Lancaster County
1 6 0/2/4242




South Branch 4 2 1/1/0244
August 30 Cumberland County 1 0 O/O/O245
September Fort Dinwiddie 1 0 O/O/O246
September Cowpasture 1 4 2/0/2247
240 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 18, 1757; Memorandum of
Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster
County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.
241 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 1, 1757.
242 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 1, 1757; this attack 
was referred to as occurring on August 24-25 in Memorandum of 
Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster
County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.
243 The Gazette reported Semeleke's wife and a neighbor's 
child missing, the "List" reported three of Peter Smither's 
Children missing. This is almost certainly the same attack. 
Pennsylvania Gazette, September 1, 1757; List of People Killed 
or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:117.
244 George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, August 27, 
September 17, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of 
George Washington, 4:385, 408.
245 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 8, 1757.
246 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
247 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ-.83.
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September 1 Cumberland County 1 1 7/0/0248
Early
September





3 3 0/2/1“ °
September 16 Plainfield Township, 
Northampton County
0 4 0/1/3“ '
September
18-19
Cumberland County 2 7 0/2/5252
September 19 Lancaster County 8 1 0/1/0253
September 24 McClure’s Gap, 
Cumberland County
1 0 O/O/O254
September 27 Hyndshaw’s Fort 0 1 0/0/1255
September 28 Bern Township, Berks 
County
3 4 0/0/4256
248 Two men were reported as either killed or captured. 
Pennsylvania Gazette, September 8, 1757.
249 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 15, 1757.
250 James Watson, James Mullen and Richard Johnston
killed. Mcllroy's son and two daughters, referred to as a boy 
and women in the Pennsylvania Gazette were captured. 
Pennsylvania Gazette, September 15, 22, 1757; Memorandum of 
Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster
County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.
251 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 22, 1757; Colonial
Records of Pennsylvania, 7:735.
252 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 29, 1757.
253 Pennsylvania Gazette, September 29, 1757; "Memorandum
of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster 
County" H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.
254 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 6, 1757.
255 Pennsylvania Gazette, November 10, 1757.
256 James Young to James Burd, October 3, 1757, H.S.P.,
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; List of People Killed or
(continued...)
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September 29 Bern Township, Berks 
County
0 4 1/0/3257
September 30 Lancaster County 0 5 0/0/5258









October Catawba River 1 1 1/0/0261
October 1 Swataro Creek 0 5 0/0/5*°
October 1 Hanover County 1 0 O/O/O*3
October 17 Paxton Township, 
Lancaster County
2 0 0/0/0 Harvesters were 
attacked264
256 (... continued)
Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad 
Weiser Papers, 2:109 .
257 James Young to James Burd, October 3, 1757, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.
258 Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the
Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers,
2:89
259 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 6, 1757.
260 Thirty-four inhabitants were reported as either killed 
or captured. Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George
Washington, 4:417n; Maryland Gazette, October 13, 1757.
261 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83.
262 James Young to James Burd, October 3, 1757, H.S.P., 
Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.
263 Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the
Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 
2:89.
264 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 27, 1757; Memorandum of 
Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster 
County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.
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2 0 0/0/0“ *
1758
January Fort Dinwiddie 0 1 0/0/1267
January Roanoke River 2 0 O/O/O268
March 19 Brock’s Gap 1 0 O/O/O269
March 19 South Branch 3 3 3/0/0270
March 20 Cowpasture 1 2 O /l/l271
March 20 Roanoke River 2 2 O /l/l272
March 20 Catawba River 0 1 0/0/1273
March-April Bedford & Halifax 
Counties, Virginia
SO 40 ?/?/? "many Robberies and 
Murders." Some of 
raids were Cherokees 
returning home274
265 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
266 List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township 
Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.
267 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:8 3.
268 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
269 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
270 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
271 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
272 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
273 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
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April 5 York County 4 8 9 /9 /9 275
April 7 Shearman’s 1 0 O/O/O276
Early April Swatarro Creek 4 1 0/1/0277
Early April Tulpehocken 2 0 O/O/O278
Early April Northkill 4 0 O/O/O279
April 24 Cowpasture 0 2 2/0/0280
April 27 Upper Tract, South 
Branch
23 0 O/O/O281
April 28 Fort Seybert 17 24 ? z ? /? 282
274 (.. .continued)
274 Maryland Gazette on May 18, 1758 and Pennsylvania
Gazette, May 11, 1758, reported that seventy people had been 
killed and captured in Halifax and Bedford Counties. John 
Blair reported to the Council on May 19 that 47 people had 
been killed or captured in Halifax County alone. He wrote to 
Washington that "a large party of Indians... spread themselves 
in smaller Companys many Miles wide and Robb's every
Plantation they came at." Journal of the Council of Virginia, 
6:91-93; John Blair to george Washington, May 24, 1757, Abbot 
and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:194-195.
275 One man was killed, eleven others, mainly women and 
children were "missing." Pennsylvania Gazette, April 13, 1758.
276 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 13, 1757.
277 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 13, 1758.
278 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 13, 1758.
279 Pennsylvania Gazette, April 13, 1758.
280 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers,
1QQ:83.
281 Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George
Washington, 4:160n; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston 
Papers, 1QQ:83.
282 Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George
Washington, 4:160n; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston 
Papers, 1QQ:83.
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May Jackson’s River 0 1 l/O/O583
May 22 Hanover Township, 
Lancaster County
1 0 O/O/O584
May 22 Hunters Fort 1 0 0/0/0585
June 1 Conococheague 1 2 O /l/l286
June 14 Northampton County 3 0 O/O/O287
June 18 Berks County 2 3 0/0/3288
June 20-21 Swatarro, Lancaster 
County
2 0 O/O/O289
June 27 Masanutten, Frederick 
County, Virginia
9 6 ?/?/?»>
July 10 Near Fort Cumberland 2 1 l/O/O291
Early August Sideling Hill 1 3 3/0/0 A wagon train was 
attacked295
283 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 
1QQ:83.
284 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 1, 1758.
285 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 22, 1758.
286 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 22, 1758.
287 Pennsylvania Gazette,June 28, 1758.
288 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 28, 1758.
289 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 28, 1758.
290 The Pennsylvania Gazette reported on July 27, 1758 
that 26 people had been killed or captured between Winchester 
and Augusta Court House. Other accounts gave a lower death 
toll. John Hite to George Washington, July 2, 1758, Abbot and 
Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 5:254.
291 George Washington to Henry Bouquet, July 13, 1758, 
Abbot and Twohig, eds., The Papers of George Washington, 
5:282-283; Abraham Bosomworth to Henry Bouquet, July 14, 1758, 
Kent ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:204.
292 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 31, 1758.
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Early August Culbertson’s Fort 1 1 O/l/O393
Early August Near Shippensburg 1 0 O/O/O394
August 7 Cumberland County 2 2 2/0/0 A wagon train was 
attacked between 
Juniata and Fort 
LyttletonMS
September 10 Hanover Township, 
Lancaster County
2 2 2/0/0396
October 1 Swataro Creek 0 3 3/0/0297
October 1 Loyalhanna 2 0 0/0/0 Grass guard at the fort 
attacked.398
TOTAL 1217 755 118/89/
250
293 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 31, 1758.
294 Pennsylvania Gazette, August 31, 1758.
295 Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, August 8, 1758, Kent, 
ed., Henry Bouquet Papers, 2:337; Abraham Bosomworth to 
George Washington, August 9, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., The 
Papers of George Washington, 5:382.
296 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 5, 1758.
297 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 19, 1758.
298 Pennsylvania Gazette, October 19, 1758.
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